COPS and crime

The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 established the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program that provided grants to states and localities to pay up to 75% of the cost for new police hires for 3 years. To date, the COPS program has awarded almost $5 billion in hiring grants paying for 64,000 new police officers. We use annual data from 1990 through 2001 from 2074 cities with populations in excess of 10,000 to show that for each officer paid for by grant funds, the size of the force expands by 0.70 officers. The size of COPS grants are correlated with population and crime rates, but not the pre-COPS time trends in crime rates or the size of the police force. This allows us to use the size of COPS grants as an instrument for the size of the police force in regressions where crime is the outcome of interest. These models indicate that police added to the force by COPS generated statistically significant reductions in auto thefts, burglaries, robberies, and aggravated assaults.     

Modelling crime and punishment

This paper provides an extended supply of labour model which allows for different intensities of legal and illegal (criminal) activities and in which criminal activities may be considered both as work and leisure. Heterogeneity of individuals is also taken into account. The model is estimated from Finnish aggregate time-series data, pooled Finnish municipalities data and pooled international cross-country data. With the Finnish aggregate data, a volume index of crime is constructed and then used in testing the model. All empirical results give strong support to the hypothesis that apprehension and punishment are important deterrents of crime. By contrast, the role of sosioeconomic and demographic variables turns out to be of little importance.     

Guns and crime revisited

I focus on the effect of changes in public security (policing) on private security measures that potential victims can take. In particular, I look at the tradeoff between different types of private security measures – such as using or carrying guns, carrying less cash or keeping less valuables at home, and using burglar alarms or Lojack – and study how this tradeoff is affected by changes in public security. If private householders’ direct security expenses are strongly substitutable with public policing (e.g., for guns which may be more useful in badly policed areas), an increase in policing results in a drop in these expenses; it also results in carrying or keeping less cash (an indirect security measure which reduces the prize a criminal can seize). If, however, householders’ direct security expenses are “complementary” to policing in the sense that they are more effective when police response is rapid (e.g., for burglar alarms), more policing increases these expenses unless the efficacy of joint (public and private) security expenses on combating crime encounters very sharply diminishing returns; moreover, a rise in policing also induces carrying or keeping more cash. An increase in penalties increases the tendency to keep cash on hand, and also reduces crime, provided that as private precautions increase, with policing constant, it takes a larger increment in security spending to compensate for a specific drop in penalties. The results are consistent with some empirical trends in crime rates, policing, penalties and private precautions.     

Mixed markets and crime

This paper specifies and solves a two-stage, game theoretic model of a mixed market for crime control. In the first stage of the model, private targets and the government choose levels of policing. In the second stage, criminals choose targets and the severity of the crimes that they commit.The paper's key results are as follows. First, private policing can both divert crime to targets that lack private protection and also increase the severity of the crime that these less-protected targets suffer. Second, an increase in private policing reduces the aggregate expenditure on traditional policing. This is an instance of a political incentive externality, where private policing affects the objective function of the government. Specifically, it reduces the level of traditional policing that is consistent with the Samuelson condition for efficient provision of a public good. Third, the substitution of private for public policing carries with it a change in the technology of policing. In effect, private policing leads to a shift from enforcement and punishment towards monitoring and target hardening. This, in turn, may lead to an increase in the severity of crime. Fourth, the mixed policing equilibrium is inefficient, and, in some situations, mixing may reduce the utility of all targets.     

Corporate crime and the 'Management' of major hazards

This article is concerned with criminal activity in the context of the regulation of occupational safety and health; within this general concern is a more specific focus upon corporate crime, in the context of the management of major hazards. The article begins by, developing the argument that safety violations are indeed crimes, and ought to be treated as such. This leads on to a more general definitional discussion of the nature of corporate crime. The article then addresses the 'production' of

corporate crime in the context of the management of major hazards, This consideration begins by noting the principles of 'effective'—and hy implication lawful—safety management, before going on to discuss briefly the findings of case studies on the management of safety in contexts characterized by the operation of hazardous technologies. It is concluded that the management and organization ofsafep in these contexts might be labelled 'criminogenic'; a conclusion challenging arguments for increased self-regulation in the organization of safety in such contexts. More generally, it reinforces the claim that we need to consider hazardous technologies and their organizational and managerial contexts in terns of the possible production of safety crimes.     

Income inequality and crime in the United States

This paper investigates the relationship between income inequality and crime. Results show that there is a strong and robust effect of relative income inequality on burglary. Effect on robbery is also strong and robust in most cases.     

Housing prices and crime perception

In this article, we combine data from the housing market with data from a victimization survey to estimate the effect of crime perception on housing prices in the City of Barcelona from 2004 to 2006. Using dwelling data and a hedonic price model (using both OLS and quantile regressions), in the first stage, we estimate the shadow price of the location of dwellings. In the second stage, we analyse the impact of crime perception, after controlling for other district characteristics such as local public spending and immigration, on this locational valuation. After accounting for the possible endogeneity of crime and housing prices, our findings suggest that crime exerts relevant costs beyond its direct costs. Indeed, a one standard deviation increase in perceived security is associated with a 0.57 % increase in the valuation of districts. Moreover, in districts perceived as being less safe than the average for the City of Barcelona, houses are highly discounted. Less safe districts have on average a valuation that is 1.27 % lower.     

Measuring the impact of crime on house prices

This paper uses data on over 2800 house sales in Jacksonville, FL to estimate the impact of crime on house prices. A GIS programme is used to develop neighbourhood characteristics that are unique to each observation. Crime data, available for 89 police beats are assigned to each observation. Weighting the seriousness of offences by the cost of crime to victims is used as an alternative to the customary measures of the number of index crimes. The cost of crime has virtually no impact on house prices overall, but homes are highly discounted in high crime areas.     

Modeling crime in Japan

This study aims at identifying the factors of aggregate and disaggregate crime categories in Japan over the period 1964–2009. All crime categories are related to police outlays, police numbers, unemployment, divorce and urbanization rates. Bounds testing approach to cointegration is implemented to test the existence of a long-run relationship amongst the variables. Cointegration analysis yields that the main deterrent effect on crime is the police presence and this factor is further confirmed by the real police outlays. As for the essential cause of crime, urbanization stands as the leading factor which is followed by divorce and unemployment rates. Policy implications are discussed.     

Violent crime and punishment: an application of the LISREL model

Public anxiety over violent crime has forged a broad consensus to purchase more crime control. Recently, the President brought into law a federal anti-crime bill that will put an additional 100 000 police on the nation's streets. This paper presents empirical evidence on the deterrence effect of police presence. The principal finding is that police presence deters commission of violent crimes by increasing the risk of being punished for committing those crimes. This risk is modelled as a latent variable, because the probability and severity of punishment for committing a violent crime are generally communicated in an onconsistant fashion. The violent crime commission rate is also treated as a latent variable, because it is almost certainly afflicted with measurement error.     

“9．11”恐怖袭击的经济后果

很早就流行这样一种说法,世界上的政治首都有许多,但经济首都却只有一个,它就是纽约。公允地讲,这一描述虽然夸张但也道出了部分事实。全球约１／３的外汇交易在这里完成,全球股票进出的一半以上在这里进行,总量高达数万亿美元的美国政府债券买卖的大部分在这里易手。而纽约市的标志性建筑,当首推那两座耸立在曼哈顿岛上的世界贸易中心塔楼。今天,它们已经随着恐怖主义分子的自杀性攻击灰飞烟灭。其更深层次的、更具本质性的含义在于,对关乎人类生命财产的和平与战争之性质,随着那声巨响和几场大火而彻底改变。这次史无前例的袭击…     

Central city crime and suburban economic growth

This paper explores the relationship between inner-city crime patterns and suburban income growth, analysing data on 318 US counties for selected metropolitan statistical areas of 32 states within the United States from 1982 to 1997. The findings suggest that violent crime does seem to have a negative impact on close-in suburbs, with a less negative impact farther away from the central city (becoming positive at some point). While results are not as robust as we had hoped they are consistent with flight to further-out suburbs rather than migration to different metropolitan areas in response to urban crime.     

Transaction costs and the use of cash and credit

Summary An overlapping generations model with spatial separation and transaction costs is developed that displays steady state equilibria in which both cash (fiat currency) and trade credit are used in exchange. Equilibria in which trade credit is used are not Pareto optimal. The question of the optimal quantity of money is addressed. Deflation is found to be optimal, contrary to the result for standard overlapping generations environments.This paper is based upon my dissertation, written for the University of Minnesota. I am grateful to Kathryn Combs, Michael Dotsey, Bruce Horning, Anne Villamil and seminar participants at numerous institutions for helpful comments. Most of all, I want to thank my advisor, Neil Wallace, for the attention he gave to my work. The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.     

试论恶意透支信用卡犯罪及其立法完善

恶意透支犯罪是当前经济领域中利用信用卡作为犯罪工具的一种犯罪,是信用卡诈骗罪最常见的一种表现形式,其特征相对其他信用卡犯罪有特殊之处,因此有必要对恶意透支进行分析,予以准确界定,以便协调立法冲突.本文围绕恶意透支信用卡犯罪中的一些疑难问题做了探讨,并为完善立法提出了建议,以求共识.