Determinants of violent and property crimes in England and Wales: a panel data analysis

We examine various determinants of property and violent crimes by using police force area level (PFA) data on England and Wales over the period of 1992–2008. Our list of potential determinants includes two law enforcement variables namely crime-specific detection rate and prison population, and various socio-economic variables such as unemployment rate, real earnings, proportion of young people and the Gini Coefficient. By adopting a fixed effect dynamic GMM estimation methodology we attempt to address the potential bias that arises from the presence of time-invariant unobserved characteristics of a PFA and the endogeneity of several regressors. There is a significant positive effect of own-lagged crime rate. The own-lagged effect is stronger for property crime, on an average, than violent crime. We find that, on an average, higher detection rate and prison population leads to lower property and violent crimes. This is robust to various specifications. However, socio-economic variables with the exception of real earnings play a limited role in explaining different crime types.     

Is property crime caused by drug use or by drug enforcement policy?

The relationships among drug offenses, prorperty crime, and the allocation of police resources are investigated in a structural model using data from Florida countries. Law enforcement resources are scarce, and as efforts to combat drug crime increase the amount of these resources allocated to property crime is reduced. This reallocation of police resources results in reduced deterrence for property crime and, as a result, an increase in these crimes. The evidence presented suggests that rising property crimes in Florida are at least partially the result of drug enforcement policy.     

Violent crime and punishment: an application of the LISREL model

Public anxiety over violent crime has forged a broad consensus to purchase more crime control. Recently, the President brought into law a federal anti-crime bill that will put an additional 100 000 police on the nation's streets. This paper presents empirical evidence on the deterrence effect of police presence. The principal finding is that police presence deters commission of violent crimes by increasing the risk of being punished for committing those crimes. This risk is modelled as a latent variable, because the probability and severity of punishment for committing a violent crime are generally communicated in an onconsistant fashion. The violent crime commission rate is also treated as a latent variable, because it is almost certainly afflicted with measurement error.     

Does private security affect crime?: a test using state regulations as instruments

Private security is employed to deter criminals from attacking specific targets, presumably not to produce general deterrence. Indeed, private security generates negative spillovers as criminals substitute non-protected targets for protected targets. Specific deterrence efforts may generate positive spillovers too, however, by raising the expected cost of committing crimes, thereby reducing crime in an area. The hypothesis that private security deters crime at the state level is tested. The demand for private security in an area is expected to be simultaneously dependent on the level of crime; so, an instrumental variables approach is employed in a panel-data fixed-effect model using state-level data from 1998 to 2010. Instruments for the amount of private security are state-wide licensing regulations for firms specializing in providing security, since these regulations should influence entry. Some state-level measures of violent and property crime are shown to be negatively and significantly related to increases in private security, suggesting that private security generates a general deterrence effect.     

Private protection and public policing

This paper looks at situations in which public and private protection are complementary, that is, when private protection must be coordinated with public protection to be effective. For example, home alarms deter theft by being connected to a local police station: if the police do not respond to a home alarm, the home alarm on its own is virtually useless in halting a crime in action. We make a distinction between gross and net complementarity and substitution, where the latter takes into account the effect on the crime rate. We show that when public and private protection are complements, the optimal provision of public protection trades off the manipulation effect of encouraging private protection with the compensatory effect of providing protection to households that do not privately invest. We discuss the implications of our results for policy and empirical research in this area.     

Compulsory schooling laws and school crime

Extensive literature demonstrates that compulsory schooling laws improve educational attainment, well-being, civic involvement, and labour market outcomes. However, at-risk youth incapacitated to schools may impact the learning environment and school safety. The purpose of this article is to study whether raising the minimum dropout age (MDA) requirement above 16 increases crime committed within US public high schools. A difference-in-difference estimation exploits changes in state-level MDA laws over time and indicates that schools in states that raise their MDA requirement to 18 incur more overall crime relative to schools in states that do not, while no effect on overall crime is identified when the MDA requirement is raised to 17. Furthermore, these effects persist for 4 years after passage and more intensely in metropolitan areas. Coupling this research with existing literature suggests that when the MDA requirement is raised to 18, only a small portion of the observed reduction in juvenile crime is displaced to schools. Analysis by category of crime reveals schools incur more physical attacks, no change in illegal drug and property crimes, and fewer violent crimes in states that raise their MDA requirement to 18, while illegal drug crimes increase in states that raise their MDA requirement to 17.     

Crime,apprehension and clearance rates: Panel data evidence from Canadian provinces

The Becker model of crime establishes the importance of the probability of apprehension as a key factor in a rational individual's decision to commit a crime. In this respect, most empirical studies based on US data have relied on variation in the number of police officers to estimate the impact of the probability of apprehension or capture. We measure the probability of apprehension by clearance rates and study their effects on crime rates, employing a panel of Canadian provinces from 1986 to 2005. OLS, GMM, GLS and IV estimates yield statistically significant elasticities of clearance rates, ranging from ?0.2 to ?0.4 for violent crimes and from ?0.5 to ?0.6 for property crimes. These findings reflect the importance of police force crime‐solving productivity.     

The effect of reporting errors on the cross-country relationship between inequality and crime

This paper analyzes reporting errors in crime data to see how they impact econometric estimates, particularly of the key relationship between inequality and crime. Criminal victimization surveys of 140,000 respondents in 37 industrial, transition and developing countries are used. Comparing the crimes experienced by these respondents with those reported to the police, non-random and mean-reverting errors are apparent. Time-varying factors affect the propensity of victims to report crimes to the police, undermining the use of country-specific fixed effects as a means of dealing with measurement error in official crime data. These errors substantially attenuate both cross-sectional and panel estimates of the partial correlation between inequality and crime.     

EDUCATION,WORK, AND CRIME: A HUMAN CAPITAL APPROACH*

This article develops a model of crime in which human capital increases the opportunity cost of crime from foregone work and expected costs associated with incarceration. Older, more intelligent, and more educated adults should commit fewer street (unskilled) crimes. White collar crimes decline less (or increase) with age and education. Predictions for age–crime and education–crime relationships receive broad empirical support in self‐report data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and arrest data from the Uniform Crime Reports. The effects of education, training, and wage subsidies, as well as enforcement policies on criminal behavior are discussed.     

The effect of reporting errors on the cross-country relationship between inequality and crime

This paper analyzes reporting errors in crime data to see how they impact econometric estimates, particularly of the key relationship between inequality and crime. Criminal victimization surveys of 140,000 respondents in 37 industrial, transition and developing countries are used. Comparing the crimes experienced by these respondents with those reported to the police, non-random and mean-reverting errors are apparent. Time-varying factors affect the propensity of victims to report crimes to the police, undermining the use of country-specific fixed effects as a means of dealing with measurement error in official crime data. These errors substantially attenuate both cross-sectional and panel estimates of the partial correlation between inequality and crime.     

Global terrorism: deterrence versus pre-emption

Abstract .  This paper analyses two anti-terrorism policies when a targeted nation's people and property are in jeopardy at home and abroad. A country's deterrence decision involves both external benefits and costs as the terrorist threat is deflected, while its preemption decision typically gives external benefits when the threat is reduced for all potential targets. With damages limited to home interests, a country will overdeter, while, for globalized terror, a country will underdeter. Pre-emption is usually undersupplied. Leader-follower behaviour is apt to lessen inefficiency for deterrence, but worsen inefficiency for pre-emption, compared with simultaneous-choice equilibrium allocations. Targeted nations can never achieve the proper counterterrorism policy through leadership.     

Guns and crime revisited

I focus on the effect of changes in public security (policing) on private security measures that potential victims can take. In particular, I look at the tradeoff between different types of private security measures – such as using or carrying guns, carrying less cash or keeping less valuables at home, and using burglar alarms or Lojack – and study how this tradeoff is affected by changes in public security. If private householders’ direct security expenses are strongly substitutable with public policing (e.g., for guns which may be more useful in badly policed areas), an increase in policing results in a drop in these expenses; it also results in carrying or keeping less cash (an indirect security measure which reduces the prize a criminal can seize). If, however, householders’ direct security expenses are “complementary” to policing in the sense that they are more effective when police response is rapid (e.g., for burglar alarms), more policing increases these expenses unless the efficacy of joint (public and private) security expenses on combating crime encounters very sharply diminishing returns; moreover, a rise in policing also induces carrying or keeping more cash. An increase in penalties increases the tendency to keep cash on hand, and also reduces crime, provided that as private precautions increase, with policing constant, it takes a larger increment in security spending to compensate for a specific drop in penalties. The results are consistent with some empirical trends in crime rates, policing, penalties and private precautions.     

Does state-level per capita income affect juvenile delinquency? An empirical analysis for Indian states

While average juvenile crime rates across India has dropped in recent decades, juvenile property crime rates (total juvenile crimes divided by state population) has actually gone up from 15% in 2000-01 to about 20% in 2013-14. There is huge variation across states when it comes to juvenile crime rates. The literature on juvenile crime in the Indian context is scant. This paper aims to fill the gap in the literature by undertaking a comprehensive analysis of juvenile delinquency related to property crimes across Indian states. Results show that state income per capita has a non-linear impact on incidences of juvenile crime across Indian states - rising when the income starts growing for relatively poorer states but increasing at a diminishing rate when state income per capita rises further. When a poor state gets relatively richer, both opportunities to commit crime and returns from property crime increases. However, as the state grows even richer, growth of employment and state facilities including rehabilitation and redistribution, improve. Further, we find that states with the lowest income per capita and highest level of adult crime face the steepest increase in juvenile crime rates for a rise in state income per capita.     

The effect of migration on terror: Made at home or imported from abroad?

We analyze how a country's immigrant population—defined as the stock of people born abroad—affects the probability of a terrorist attack in the host country. Using data for 20 OECD host countries and 183 countries of origin over the 1980–2010 period our OLS and 2SLS regressions show that the probability that immigrants from a specific country of origin conduct a terrorist attack in their host country increases with a larger number of foreigners from such countries living there. However, this scale effect does not differ from the effect domestic populations have on domestic terror. We find scarce evidence that terror is systematically imported from countries with large Muslim populations or countries where terror networks prevail. Policies that exclude foreigners already living in a country increase rather than reduce the risk that foreign populations turn violent, and so do terrorist attacks against foreigners in their host country. Highly skilled migrants are associated with a significantly lower risk of terror compared with low skilled ones, while there is no significant difference between foreign-born men and women.     

Police Violence and the Underreporting of Crime

This paper examines the relationship between police violence and the reporting of crime. Utilizing original data from a large‐scale household survey conducted in Costa Rica from October 2013 to April 2014 (n = 4,200), we find that the observation of police violence significantly reduces citizens’ willingness to report crime. The implications of this finding are explored using a game‐theoretic model of crime, crime reporting, and police misconduct. The model reveals that although the prospect of police violence against criminals may generate a degree of deterrence for criminal behavior, permissiveness toward police violence also raises expectations about the likelihood of police abuse against law‐abiding citizens. Consistent with our empirics, this reduces citizens’ propensity to report crime, thereby fostering a climate of impunity for criminal activity.     

Public opinion and terrorist acts

The paper examines support for terrorism in public opinion and the relationship with terrorist attacks. We link the 2007 PEW survey data on justification for suicide terror and opinions in 16 countries of the Middle East, Africa and Asia on nine regional powers, to the NCTC data on international terrorist acts between 2004 and 2008. We find that justification in public opinion for suicide terrorism increases terror attacks on people in countries that are unfavorably regarded. There is a robust positive relationship between the share of the population in a country that at the same time justifies suicide bombings and has an unfavorable opinion of another country, and terrorism originating from the former country.     

Agglomeration,city size and crime

This paper analyzes the relationship between crime and agglomeration where the land, labor, product, and crime markets are endogenously determined. Our main theoretical findings are the following: (i) better accessibility to jobs decreases crime in the short run but may increase crime in the long run; (ii) the per-capita crime rate increases with city size; (iii) when allowing for endogenous policing, lower commuting costs make the impact of police on crime more efficient.     

Mixed markets and crime

This paper specifies and solves a two-stage, game theoretic model of a mixed market for crime control. In the first stage of the model, private targets and the government choose levels of policing. In the second stage, criminals choose targets and the severity of the crimes that they commit.The paper's key results are as follows. First, private policing can both divert crime to targets that lack private protection and also increase the severity of the crime that these less-protected targets suffer. Second, an increase in private policing reduces the aggregate expenditure on traditional policing. This is an instance of a political incentive externality, where private policing affects the objective function of the government. Specifically, it reduces the level of traditional policing that is consistent with the Samuelson condition for efficient provision of a public good. Third, the substitution of private for public policing carries with it a change in the technology of policing. In effect, private policing leads to a shift from enforcement and punishment towards monitoring and target hardening. This, in turn, may lead to an increase in the severity of crime. Fourth, the mixed policing equilibrium is inefficient, and, in some situations, mixing may reduce the utility of all targets.     

COPS and crime

The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 established the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program that provided grants to states and localities to pay up to 75% of the cost for new police hires for 3 years. To date, the COPS program has awarded almost $5 billion in hiring grants paying for 64,000 new police officers. We use annual data from 1990 through 2001 from 2074 cities with populations in excess of 10,000 to show that for each officer paid for by grant funds, the size of the force expands by 0.70 officers. The size of COPS grants are correlated with population and crime rates, but not the pre-COPS time trends in crime rates or the size of the police force. This allows us to use the size of COPS grants as an instrument for the size of the police force in regressions where crime is the outcome of interest. These models indicate that police added to the force by COPS generated statistically significant reductions in auto thefts, burglaries, robberies, and aggravated assaults.     

Crime and punishment again: The economic approach with a psychological twist

Akerlof and Dickens (1982) suggested that in a model of criminal behavior which considered the effects of cognitive dissonance, increasing the severity of punishment could increase the crime rate. This paper demonstrates that that conjecture was correct. With cognitive dissonance, people may have to rationalize not committing crimes under normal circumstances if punishment is not severe. The rationalization may lead them to underestimate the expected utility of committing crimes when opportunities present themselves. If punishment is severe, then rationalization may not be necessary and people may be more likely to commit crimes when opportunities arise.