共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Toke Reinholt Fosgaard Lars Gårn Hansen Erik Wengström 《The Scandinavian journal of economics》2017,119(2):435-456
Earlier studies have found that framing has a substantial impact on the degree of cooperation observed in public good experiments. We show that the way the public good game is framed affects misperceptions about the incentives of the game. Moreover, we show that such framing‐induced differences in misperceptions are linked to the framing effect on subjects' cooperation behavior. When we do not control for the different levels of misperceptions between frames, we observe a significant framing effect on subjects' cooperation preferences. However, this framing effect becomes insignificant once we remove subjects who misperceive. 相似文献
2.
Ernst Mohr 《Review of International Economics》1995,3(1):1-19
We investigate the joint occurrence of international intertemporal trade and international environmental-permit trade, both of which are subject to country sovereignty. Assuming that side payments cannot be made to keep a debtor country from terminating international environmental cooperation, we analyze the impact of these two trade opportunities on a debtor country's incentive to continue environmental cooperation. We also show how, by way of a suitable strategic linkage between debt and permit trade, the public good of ensuring continued environmental cooperation can be provided by the supply side of private international loans. 相似文献
3.
There is a large repeated games literature illustrating how future interactions provide incentives for cooperation. Much of the earlier literature assumes public monitoring. Departures from public monitoring to private monitoring that incorporate differences in players' observations may dramatically complicate coordination and the provision of incentives, with the consequence that equilibria with private monitoring often seem unrealistically complex or fragile. We set out a model in which players accomplish cooperation in an intuitively plausible fashion. Players process information via a mental system – a set of psychological states and a transition function between states depending on observations. Players restrict attention to a relatively small set of simple strategies, and consequently, might learn which perform well. 相似文献
4.
We study the length of agreements in a market in which infinitely-lived firms contract with agents that live for two periods. Firms differ in the expected values of their projects, as do workers in their abilities to manage projects. Worker effort is not contractible and worker ability is revealed during the relationship. The market dictates the trade-off between sorting and incentives. Short- and long-term contracts often coexist: The best firms always use short-term contracts to hire high-ability senior workers, firms with less profitable projects use short-term contracts to save on the cost of hiring junior workers, whereas intermediate firms use long-term agreements to provide better incentives to their workers. We relate our results to the optimal assignment literature that follows Becker (1973). 相似文献
5.
A highly integrated area like the EMU features a large amount of interactions between the participating countries. In this context the interactions of monetary and fiscal policies are a crucial issue. This paper focuses on how coalitions among policymakers are formed and discusses their effects on the stabilization of output and price. We emphasize the role played by the institutional design of cooperation forums (as, e.g., the ECOFIN). If the coalition formation game is played without communication among the policymakers, full cooperation is an unlikely outcome. On the other hand, if policymakers can communicate, full cooperation becomes a possible equilibrium, while the complete non-cooperative solution is, in general, not a stable equilibrium. This supports the view that institutions for discussions can play a crucial role in achieving international cooperation even when these institutions are not endowed with enforcement powers.revised version received August 1, 2003 相似文献
6.
《Journal of public economics》2006,90(4-5):679-701
Although tax earmarking constitutes a voluntary constraint for government's policymaking, it is widely used in the real world. This paper investigates the electoral dimension of earmarking in a model of political competition with ideological parties. Its main contribution is to derive new insights on the relationship between earmarking and parties' probability of winning the elections. We find that the electoral pressure may favor the existence of tax-earmarking equilibria, but that it sometimes creates a tendency against earmarked taxation even when, as shown by Brett and Keen (2000) [Brett, C., Keen, M., 2000. Political uncertainty and the earmarking of environmental taxes. Journal of Public Econonomics 75, 315–340], incumbent governments have strong incentives to use earmarking rules to constrain future policymakers. 相似文献
7.
Monetary Policy Cooperation May Not Be Counterproductive 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Henrik Jensen 《The Scandinavian journal of economics》1997,99(1):73-80
This paper qualifies Rogoff's famous (1985) result that international monetary policy cooperation is counterproductive. In a model similar to his, it is shown that if wage-setters are non-atomistic and inflation averse — as policymakers are — cooperation leads to higher employment and possibly lower inflation. 相似文献
8.
1925年 《斯匹茨卑尔根群岛条约》的签订,标志着中国开始参与北极国际合作。当前,北极问题正逐步成为一个全球性问题,我国作为近北极国家,北极地区的气候、环境的变化将对我国的生态、经济等各方面产生重大影响,我国参与北极国际合作刻不容缓。本研究主要从参与北极科研、经济、治理合作三个方面对已有文献进行整理分析,以对我国参与北极国际合作进行整体概述。可以发现,当前对北极国际合作研究的相关文献有逐年增长趋势,但对北极国际经济合作进行综合分析的文献并不多,随着冰上丝绸之路建设提出及《中国的北极政策》颁布,对中国参与北极国际经济合作的研究将会是以后的一个重要方向。 相似文献
9.
Wolfgang Buchholz Alexander Haupt Wolfgang Peters 《Review of International Economics》2013,21(4):705-718
In this paper, we analyze how the prospect of international negotiations over trans‐boundary pollution shapes intracountry transfer schemes when the governments of the countries' polluting regions are in charge of environmental policy and negotiations. Federal governments can implement compensation payments between domestic regions and matching grants prior to the international negotiations between the polluting regions. The subgame‐perfect transfer schemes fail to fully internalize the environmental externality, leading to an inefficient international environmental agreement. As the international spillover increases, the intracountry compensation rates increase while the matching rates decline, distorting the incentives for the regional governments in opposing directions. We also show that decentralization of environmental decision making arises endogenously. 相似文献
10.
We study a fundamental conflict in economic decision-making, the trade-off between equality, equity and incentives, in a new experimental game that nests a voluntary contributions mechanism in a broader spectrum of incentive schemes. In a 2×2 design, we let subjects either vote on or exogenously encounter incentive settings while assigned unequal endowments are either task-determined or random. We find that earned endowments lead to less support for redistribution and less cooperation. Subjects' voting is influenced by egalitarian and equity concerns, in addition to self-interest. Cooperation rates respond rather continuously to incentives. 相似文献
11.
We argue that international fisheries are a prime example to study the incentive structure of forming impure public good and common pool agreements. We consider a fully integrated multiple zone model, in which zones are linked through density-dependent migration. The incentive to accede to Regional Fishery Management Organizations (RFMOs) is related to multiple characteristics. Firstly, the relative patch sizes of the high seas, which is the internationally (publicly) accessible domain, compared to exclusive economic zones, which are state-owned (privately owned). This can be related to the degree of socially constructed excludability. Secondly, the intensity of fish migration between various zones, which can be related to the degree of technical excludability. Thirdly, the growth rate of the resource, which can be interpreted as the degree of rivalry, with a low (high) degree of rivalry approximating public good (common pool) features. We show that, generally, excludability reduces free-riding incentives but also the need for cooperation, a variant of the “paradox of cooperation”. Moreover, we show that the benefit-cost duality between public goods and common pool resources generally holds except for some extreme parameter values for which a low degree of rivalry fosters the success of cooperation. Finally, through a variation of the diffusion matrix, we can also analyze a closed as well as a sink-source system. 相似文献
12.
As Weber ( 1904 ) recognized, Calvinistic beliefs about predestination may constitute a powerful incentive for good works; an individual wishes to receive assurances about her future prospects of salvation, and good works may provide a positive signal about such prospects. These beliefs can in turn create a social pressure to behave well, as good works can also signal to others that individuals belong to the “elect” and are therefore likely to behave well in social interactions. Moreover, the Consistory, an institution created by Calvin to monitor and publicize individuals' behavior, can allow for such social signalling. We analyze these self and social signalling incentives, and show how religions affect levels of cooperation and coordination. 相似文献
13.
Changying Li 《Scottish journal of political economy》2006,53(3):377-397
Incorporating parallel imports (PI), we develop a two‐country two‐firm model which relates to the incentives for cost‐reducing innovation. We show that PI may facilitate or inhibit the manufacturers' incentives to innovate. In particular, PI could encourage both firms' innovations. The difference between the manufacturer's profits under successful innovation and failed innovation is either a U‐shaped curve or an inverted U‐shaped curve in terms of the cost of engaging in PI. As these differences reflect the manufacturers' incentive to innovate, the variations in R&D investment depend on transportation cost, and firms' marginal costs before and after successful innovations. 相似文献
14.
World oil: the growing case for international policy 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
Can the economic theory of depletion be reconciled with low petroleum prices? This article uses a revision of the theory, which reflects demand functions that rise in response to increasing world population and income. The magnitude of producers' and consumers' surplus is estimated under both competitive and monopolistic assumptions; the result indicates a present value comparable to or in excess of today's gross world economic product. Game theory suggests a framework that explains the interaction between oil pricing and military policy, and the economic incentives that result in a general pattern of recent market equilibrium crude oil prices often fluctuating with a $15–20 per barrel range. The analysis concludes that the economic incentives for political instability in the Persian Gulf will increase, and more formal methods of setting the international framework for Persian Gulf oil may be expected. 相似文献
15.
Games of Climate Change with International Trade 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:1
Claudia Kemfert Wietze Lise Richard S.J. Tol 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2004,28(2):209-232
We analyse games of greenhouse gas emission reduction in which the emissions and the emission reduction costs of one country depend on other countries' emission abatement. In an analytically tractable model, we show that international trade effects on costs and emissions can either increase or decrease incentives to reduce emissions and to cooperate on emission abatement; in some specifications, optimal emission reduction is unaffected by trade. We therefore specify the model further, calibrating it to larger models that estimate the costs of emission reduction, trade effects, and impacts of climate change. If trade effects are driven by total emission reduction costs of other countries cooperation is slightly more difficult than in the case without trade effects. If trade effects are determined by relative emission reduction efforts in other countries, cooperation becomes easier. Carbon leakage does not affect our qualitative insights, although it does change the numbers. 相似文献
16.
《Journal of public economics》2006,90(1-2):189-213
This paper studies the effects of incentive mechanisms and of the competitive environment on the interaction between schools and students, in a set-up where the students' educational attainment depends on their peer group, on their effort, and on the quality of the school's teaching. We show that increasing the power of the incentive scheme and the effectiveness of competition may have the counterintuitive effect of lowering the students' effort. In a simple dynamic set-up, where the reputation of the schools affects recruitment, we show that more powerful incentives and increased competition lead to segregation of pupils by ability, and may also determine lower attainment in some schools. 相似文献
17.
The aim of this article is to examine what the geopolitics of the Arctic look like as seen from the largest Arctic state. How are narratives about the development of the region received, reworked and produced in a Russian context? We find that Russian policy actors distance themselves from discourses of Arctic conflict and geopolitical competition, and examine how this approach may serve some of Russia's key interests in the region. We further argue that the key tension in the Arctic region is not along the conflict/cooperation axis, but rather lies in the tricky process of delineating between international cooperation and national sovereignty in tackling Arctic problems. In attempting to illustrate the various voices, ideas and interests that shape Russia's policy understanding of the Arctic and its challenges and opportunities, we draw upon a media analysis and a set of qualitative interviews with representatives of the five Arctic states. 相似文献
18.
NATHALIE COLOMBIER DAVID MASCLET DANIEL MIRZA CLAUDE MONTMARQUETTE 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2011,13(5):755-790
The World Trade Center attack has shed light on the urgent need to implement preventing measures against terrorism and to enhance cooperation in the global security system for all countries. However, international coordination cannot be taken for granted. It is often ineffective and likely to fail for several reasons. Perhaps the more prominent reason to explain failure in coordination is that collective actions against terrorism may suffer from the well‐known free riding problem. In this paper we experimentally investigate cooperation dilemma in counterterrorism policies by measuring to what extent international deterrence policy may suffer from free riding. In our game, contributions to the group account do not aim to increase the production of the public good but instead seek to decrease the probability that a stochastic event destroys the good. A country could choose to free ride by investing nothing in the international deterrence policy and instead invest all its resources in its own national protection or even choose to ignore totally terrorism by investing on alternative projects. We also look at the effects of institutions that allow sanctioning and rewarding of other countries to facilitate coordination on deterrence policy. We find that, in absence of institutional incentives and after controlling for risk aversion, most of countries defect by investing very weakly in collective actions against terrorism while largely investing to protect themselves. In contrast, the introduction of punishment/reward incentive systems improves significantly the contribution level to the collective security account. 相似文献
19.
Some countries are importers while others are exporters of global backbone connectivity. At the same time, input components
such as local access are non-traded. This paper analyzes a non-cooperative regulatory game between importing and exporting
countries, assuming that the prices of both traded and non-traded inputs can be regulated. We show that exporting countries
choose a more restrictive regulation of non-traded goods than importing countries do. We further show that a requirement of
international non-discrimination may hurt importing countries, and give firms producing traded inputs incentives to invest
in quality degradation. 相似文献
20.
Uncertainty and learning play an important role in the management of many environmental and resource problems and in particular in climate change. In stylized game-theoretic models of international environmental treaty formation, which capture the strategic interactions between nations, learning usually has a negative impact on the success of cooperation. We use a richer climate model that captures the large heterogeneity between different world regions and considers uncertainty about the benefits and costs from climate mitigation. By explicitly exploiting differences between regions and allowing transfers to mitigate free-rider incentives, we derive much more positive conclusions about the role of learning. 相似文献