Optimal tax treatment of private contributions for public goods with and without warm glow preferences

Tax-favored contributions for financing some public goods may be a useful part of optimal nonlinear income tax and expenditure policy. There are two sides to the potential gain from subsidized donations. First, for a given level of public good provision, higher private donations from high earners than low earners eases the incentive compatibility constraint for donors and so can raise social welfare. This follows since considering a lower-paid job includes a perception of a drop in public good provision. Second, private donation reduces consumption, easing the resource constraint. This paper explores optimal policy, using first a model with standard preferences and then a model with a warm glow of giving. In addition to showing the conditions for the level of public goods, the paper considers the pattern of optimal subsidization across earnings levels. Analysis of optimal taxation with warm glow preferences is sensitive to the choice of preferences that are relevant for a social welfare evaluation. After considering optimal rules with formulations of social welfare which do and do not include warm glow utility, the paper considers the choice of normative criterion. Like the earlier literature, this paper assumes that organizing private donations is costless while tax collection has a deadweight burden. Since private charitable fundraising is very far from costless, the paper is an exploration of economic mechanisms, not a direct guide to policy.     

A competitive equilibrium for a warm-glow economy

The warm-glow model (Andreoni in J Political Econ 97:1447–1458, 1989; Econ J 100:464–477, 1990) of public goods provision has received widespread interest, yet surprisingly most attention has focused on the voluntary contribution equilibrium of the model, and only very little attention has been devoted to the competitive equilibrium. In this paper, we introduce the concept of competitive equilibrium for a warm-glow economy (henceforth, warm-glow equilibrium) and establish both existence and welfare properties. The warm-glow equilibrium concept may prove to be very useful to the normative and positive theory of public goods provision. First, it is a price-based mechanism achieving efficient outcomes. Second, not only could the warm-glow equilibria outcomes serve as a point of reference to measure free-riding and welfare loss but also, as suggested by Bernheim and Rangel (Behavioral Economics and Its Applications, 2007), in large economies they may be approximated by Walrasian equilibria outcomes.     

Retailing public goods: The economics of corporate social responsibility

This paper explores the feasibility and desirability of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). We identify CSR with creation of public goods or curtailment of public bads. Using a model with profit-maximizing firms, the paper shows that there is a direct parallel between CSR and traditional models of private provision of public goods. Indeed, firms that use CSR will produce public goods at exactly the same level as predicted by the standard voluntary contribution equilibrium for public goods. We compare CSR with government provision and charitable provision, discussing when CSR by private for-profit firms could have a comparative advantage in dealing with public goods provision.     

Demand for collective goods in private nonprofit markets: Can fundraising expenditures help overcome free-rider behavior?

Economic theory ascribes the primary role in the provision of public goods to government. This emphasis on government overlooks the role of the not-for-profit sector in providing collective-type goods. In this paper we seek to determine the factors influencing charitable contributions to private nonprofit organizations by estimating a demand function for the output of these collective-good providers. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that voluntary giving is responsive to conventional market variables such as advertising expenditures, price, and quality. Overall, the results are strongly supportive.     

Environmental regulation and trade openness in the presence of private mitigation

Acknowledging the differential ability of individuals to privately mitigate the consequences of domestic pollution for their health is essential for an understanding of their demands for regulation of the environment and of trade in dirty goods, and for analysis of the implications of these demands for equilibrium policy choices. In a small open economy with exogenous policy, we first explain how private mitigation at a cost results in an unequal distribution of the health consequences of pollution in a manner consistent with epidemiologic studies, and consequently how the benefits and costs of trade in dirty goods interact with choices concerning private mitigation to further polarize the interests of citizens concerning environmental stringency. The economy is then embedded in a broader political economy setting, and simulated to investigate the role of private mitigation in shaping political equilibria. We show that when citizens can choose between mitigating the health consequences of domestic pollution privately and reducing pollution through public policy, the same polarization of interests underlies equilibrium policy choices in both democratic and autocratic regimes.     

Public goods and the value of product quality regulations: the case of food safety

The paper examines preferences for product quality regulations. Our premise is that preferences for product quality regulations derive from preferences for both private and public goods. The model is used to explain public attitudes toward a referendum measure to eliminate pesticide residues on food. Results from a survey of consumers are consistent with the conceptual model and show that preferences for public goods influence support for the product quality regulation. The results help explain why consumption behavior is a poor predictor of political behavior, and have implications for methods that use voting and market behavior to value public goods.     

Pork versus public goods: an experimental study of public good provision within a legislative bargaining framework

We experimentally investigate a legislative bargaining model with both public and particularistic goods. Consistent with the qualitative implications of the model: there is near exclusive public good provision in the pure public good region, in the pure private good region minimum winning coalitions sharing private goods predominate, and in the “mixed” region proposers generally take some particularistic goods for themselves, allocating the remainder to public goods. As in past experiments, proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted, resulting in public good provision decreasing in the mixed region as its relative value increases, which is inconsistent with the theory.     

Private provision of discrete public goods

We investigate private provision of discrete public goods under refund and cost-sharing. If it is commonly believed that individuals may be warm-glow altruists and the group-size is a Poisson random variable, then the equilibrium distribution of collected contributions is uniquely determined. If composition uncertainty is very small and the expected group-size sufficiently large, the distribution of contributions can be described by concentrating in a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium. As the expected group-size increases, the probability a randomly selected player contributes and the associated expected number of contributions converge to the corresponding ones in the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium of the game with no uncertainty.     

A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions

We extend the model of voluntary contributions to multiple public goods by allowing for bundling of the public goods. Specifically, we study the case where agents contribute into a common pool which is then allocated toward the financing of two pure public goods. We explore the welfare implications of allowing for such bundling vis‐à‐vis a separate contributions scheme. We show that for high income inequality or for identical preferences among agents bundling leads to higher joint welfare. Interestingly, a welfare improvement can in some cases occur despite a decrease in total contributions. On the contrary, when agents are heterogenous, for low income inequality bundling can lead to lower total contributions and may decrease welfare compared to a separate contribution scheme. Our findings have implications for the design of charitable institutions and international aid agencies.     

基于个人利益视角的美国消防服务供给模式分析

公共产品理论认为公共产品与服务应该由政府垄断提供。但是公共选择学派在理论上的创新以及欧美国家私有化改革实践都证明了公共产品私人供给的可能性。19世纪中期美国消防服务供给模式向市政化演进，是私人利益所致，市政化对包括消防员、保险公司和政治家在内的利益集团都有益处。对中国公共产品供给政策的借鉴和启示：引导社会组织参与公共物品的提供；明确划分各级政府事权范围，并以法律形式确定下来；完善政治决策程序，提高政府服务效率。     

Price–quality competition in a mixed duopoly

We examine competition between a private and a public provider in markets for merit goods, such as education, healthcare, housing, recreation, or culture. The private firm provides a high‐price/high‐quality variety of the good and serves richer individuals, whereas the public firm provides a low‐price/low‐quality variety and serves poorer individuals. We first characterize the private competitor’s best response to changes in the public firm’s price and quality. This enables us to examine the distributional effects of policies that affect the price or quality of the public firm’s product. We then numerically characterize the public firm’s optimal provision policy, taking the private response into consideration. Our results have implications for the financing of publicly provided goods, and for whether additional resources, if available, should be spent on reducing the price or enhancing the quality of these goods.     

Bergstrom,Blume, and Varian: Voluntary contributions and neutrality

Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian provided a neutrality result for the private provision of public goods that has inspired a considerable literature. The result has significant implications for income redistribution and broader policy interventions. This paper reviews the basic result and its applications, and discusses extensions to general private provision economies.     

Public Preferences and Private Choices: Effect of Altruism and Free Riding on Demand for Environmentally Certified Pork

Sales of private goods with affiliated public good attributes have markedly risen in recent years. This fact is difficult to explain within the paradigm of purely self-interested behavior. This paper investigates factors influencing consumer demand for pork products with certifications related to the environment, animal welfare, and antibiotics. Using psychometric scaling techniques, we measure individuals’ degree of altruism and propensity toward free riding. Results of a random parameter logit model applied to choice data obtained from a nationwide survey in the United States indicates that more altruistic individuals are willing to pay more for pork products with public good attributes than less altruistic individuals and free riders. These results indicate that private purchases of goods with public-good attributes are not simply a result of individuals’ perceptions of the ability to mitigate private risks such as food safety, but that individuals are making private choices to affect public outcomes. Results have implications for policy makers weighing the relative costs and benefits of food labeling policies versus bans related to certain livestock production practices.     

ALTRUISM,EGOISM, AND THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THE PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS*

The economic approach to understanding human behavior has encountered serious difficulties when attempting to explain the private provision of public goods, such as voting and charitable contributions to large organizations. To gain insights into these important issues, this study takes an interdisciplinary approach. The individual is modeled formally in terms of dual egoistic/altruistic utilities, and the recursive relation between altruism and the existence and production of social capital is developed. The model is analyzed as a non-cooperative game between the egoistic and altruistic selves. The socialized rational actor that results from the combination of social capital, dual utilities, and non-cooperative behavior resolves a number of public goods paradoxes. Comparative statics and the dynamics of social capital formation are explored.     

Socially responsible products: what motivates consumers to pay a premium?

The motivation to pay a premium for socially responsible products is partly an expression of consumer concern for the well-being of those involved in the production process. Buying a product with a socially responsible label, and donating to a charity are similarly motivated actions. While there is an extensive literature on the economics of charitable giving that examines motivations to donate as well as on the impacts of labelling on consumer demand, there is little overlap between the two literatures. We bridge these two literatures by investigating whether consumers have heterogeneous motivations for paying a premium. Through a laboratory experiment that auctions coffee with hypothetical socially responsible labels that put different weights on in-kind versus cash transfers, we find that those consumers who prefer an in-kind transfer (paternalistic altruists) are willing to pay a 52.5% price premium over standard coffee. Those who prefer that most of the premium is paid as cash (strong altruists) are willing to pay a 42.5% premium. Finally, those who are indifferent to how the premium is spent by the recipient (warm-glow givers) are willing to pay only a 19.2% premium. We discuss the implications of our results and future research directions.     

A case for taxing charitable donations

We develop a model that allows for public goods and status signaling through charitable contributions. We use this setup to re-examine the conventional practice of rendering a favorable tax treatment to charitable contributions.     

Giving gifts to groups: How altruism depends on the number of recipients

When a single gift goes to a group of recipients, how does giving depend on the size of the group? This question is important for understanding charitable giving and fund-raising, public goods provision, family altruism, and more. If we think of the gift as giving up a dollar to create a social surplus, then we want to know how the number of recipients of that surplus affects its value to the giver. In other words, how congestible is altruism? This paper builds a theoretical framework for this question and begins to answer it with a controlled experiment. The finding is that for most subjects altruism is congestible. For the average subject, a gift that results in one person receiving x is equivalent to one in which n people receive x / n^0.68 each.     

A fundraising mechanism inspired by historical tontines: Theory and experimental evidence

The tontine, which is an interesting mixture of group annuity, group life insurance, and lottery, has a peculiar place in economic history. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it played a major role in raising funds to finance public goods in Europe, but today it is rarely encountered outside of a dusty footnote in actuarial course notes or as a means to thicken the plot of a murder mystery. This study provides a formal model of individual contribution decisions under a modern variant of the historical tontine mechanism that is easily implemented by private charities. Our model incorporates desirable properties of the historical tontine to develop a mechanism to fund the private provision of a public good. The tontine-like mechanism we derive is predicted to outperform not only the voluntary contribution mechanism but also another widely used mechanism: charitable lotteries. Our experimental test of the instrument provides some evidence of the beneficial effects associated with implementing tontine-like schemes. We find that the mechanism has particular power in cases where agents are risk-averse or in situations where substantial asymmetries characterize individual preferences for the public good.     

慈善捐赠税收激励原理及效应探析

慈善捐赠被视为调节贫富差距的平衡器,税收政策是国家直接掌握的刚性调节手段,世界各国都制定相应的税收政策激励慈善捐赠。运用税收政策促进慈善捐赠主要基于弥补公共品政府缺位、有限政府理论和帕累托改进理论。税收政策通过改变慈善捐赠的相对价格产生的收入效应和替代效应,促进捐赠数额的增加。     

Crowd-out and diversity

Research has shown that altruism is lower in diverse communities. Can this phenomenon be counteracted by government intervention? To answer this question, this paper introduces diversity to the canonical model of “warm glow” giving. Diversity may have two effects on incentives: it may attenuate individuals' altruistic preferences for public goods, and it may “cool off” the warm glow that individuals get from voluntarism. Either of these effects leads to diverse communities having lower levels of public goods, consistent with prior research. However, these effects have opposite implications for the efficacy of government intervention. I then empirically investigate whether government intervention is more effective in diverse communities. For identification, I exploit the Supreme Court-mandated 1991 expansion of the SSI program. Using a new dataset of United Methodist churches from 1984 to 2000, the results show that the expansion of SSI crowded-out charitable spending by churches. The crowd-out estimate for the average church is reasonably large, but this masks significant differences in crowd-out between communities. Crowd-out occurred almost entirely in relatively homogeneous communities; there is only modest evidence of crowd-out in racially diverse communities. Thus diverse communities, while having the lowest levels of altruism, are in this instance the most amenable to government intervention.