Fiscal Policy with Heterogeneous Agents and Incomplete Markets

I undertake a quantitative investigation into the short run effects of changes in the timing of proportional income taxes for model economies in which heterogeneous households face a borrowing constraint. Temporary tax changes are found to have large real effects. In the benchmark model, a temporary tax cut increases aggregate consumption on impact by around 29 cents for every dollar of tax revenue lost. Comparing the benchmark incomplete-markets model to a complete-markets economy, income tax cuts provide a larger boost to consumption and a smaller investment stimulus when asset markets are incomplete.     

FIRM BEHAVIOUR AND FINANCIAL PRESSURE: EVIDENCE FROM SPANISH PANEL DATA

This paper examines responses by firms in Spain to the experience of financial pressure. Using panel data methods applied to a large company panel, a number of aspects of corporate behaviour and the response of each to financial pressure are examined. We consider fixed investment, inventories, employment – distinguishing both permanent and temporary contract employees – and dividend policies. Our results include finding significant effects of financial pressure from borrowing costs on each outcome, particularly investment and employment. The effects on temporary employment are also found to be larger and work through more quickly than on permanent employment.     

Dividend taxes,corporate investment,and ‘Q’

Taxes on corporate distributions have traditionally been regarded as a ‘double tax’ on corporate income. This view implies that while the total effective tax rate on corporate source income affects real economic decisions, the distribution of this tax burden between the shareholders and the corporation is irrelevant. Recent research has suggested an alternative to this traditional view. One explanation of why firms in the United States pay dividends in spite of the heavy tax liabilities associated with this form of distribution is that the stock market capitalizes the tax payments associated with corporate distributions. This capitalization leaves investors indifferent at the margin between a corporation's decision to pay out dividends or to retain earnings. This alternative view holds that while changes in the dividend tax rate will affect shareholder wealth, they will have no impact on corporate investment decisions.This paper develops econometric tests which distinguish between these two views of dividend taxation. By extending Tobin's ‘q’ theory of investment to incorporate taxes at both the corporate and personal levels, the implications of each view for corporate investment decisions can be derived. The competing views may be tested by comparing the performance of investment equations estimated under each theory's predictions. British time series data are particularly appropriate for testing hypotheses about dividend taxes because of the substantial postwar variation in effective tax rates on corporate distributions. The econometric results suggest that dividend taxes have important effects on investment decisions.     

Taxes and firm investment

We investigate the firm-level investment response to unanticipated narrative shocks to average personal and corporate tax rates using a universal micro dataset of publicly-traded U.S. firms for the post-1976 period. Using local projections, we show that: (i) corporate tax shocks have significant effects on investment while personal tax shocks do not; (ii) corporate income tax responses are negative overall, and this result is driven by smaller firms who face larger borrowing constraints, especially when the accompanying monetary policy is contractionary or output gap is slack; (iii) there is some evidence of positive personal income tax responses during monetary contractions by dividend-paying firms, which is consistent with the recent literature.     

Attracting private investment: Tax reduction,investment subsidy,or both?

This paper uses a real-option model to examine the net benefit to a government from using tax cut and/or investment subsidy as incentives to induce immediate investment. Although earlier papers generally concluded that investment subsidy dominates tax cut, it is observed that many governments use a combination of subsidy and tax cut. We show that, when the government uses a different discount rate from private firms, and when it has to borrow money to provide an investment subsidy, it is possible to get an internal optimum; that is, it might be optimal for the government to provide an investment subsidy as well as charge a positive tax rate on the profits from the project. Thus, we provide an explanation for the puzzling fact that many governments provide an investment subsidy to a firm while simultaneously taxing its profits.     

Does dividend tax impede competition for corporate charters?

We develop a model of jurisdictional competition for corporate charters among the states in which a firm’s agency cost depends on the federal dividend income tax rate and the takeover regulations of its domicile state. When firms are mobile across states, the federal dividend income tax rate affects both the intensity of competition among the states and the equilibrium level of state takeover regulations. Our model shows that increasing dividend tax rate weakens the competition for corporate charters under a condition: dividend-paying and the market for corporate control are complementary corporate governance mechanisms. This condition holds empirically, suggesting that dividend tax not only discourages firms from paying dividends but also weakens their corporate governance by disincentivizing states to improve their corporate laws.     

Accelerated depreciation and the efficacy of temporary fiscal policy: Implications for an inflationary economy

The effect on investment of temporary tax rate changes depends on the age profile of depreciation deductions. If the depreciation allowance schedule is accelerated, then temporary cuts in the corporate tax rate could reduce investment. Inflation causes the age profile of real depreciation deductions to become accelerated and thus could make temporary tax cuts have a contractionary effect on investment. Two currently proposed reforms are shown to exacerbate this effect. Under each of these proposals, temporary tax cuts are likely to have opposite effects on investment in short-lived and long-lived capital, thereby complicating the conduct of countercyclical fiscal policy.     

Investment incentives and corporate tax asymmetries

Recent facts on the importance of corporate losses motivate more careful study of the impact of tax incentives for investment on firms that lose money. I model firm investment decisions in a setting featuring financing constraints and carrybacks and carryforwards of operating losses. I estimate investment responses to tax incentives allowing effects to vary with cash flows and taxable status. Results suggest that asymmetries in the corporate tax code could have made recent bonus depreciation tax incentives at most 4% less effective than they would have been if all firms were fully taxable. Cash flows have more important effects on the impact of tax incentives. Recent declines in cash flows would predict a 24% decrease in the effectiveness of bonus depreciation. Results thus suggest that tax incentives have the smallest impact on investment exactly when they are most likely to be put in place — during downturns in economic activity when cash flows are low.     

On the marginal source of investment funds

Under the ‘new view’ of dividend taxation developed by Auerbach (Quarterly Journal of Economics 1979;93:433-446), Bradford (Journal of Public Economics 1981;15:1-22) and King (Public Policy and the Corporation, Chapman & Hall, London, 1977), the marginal source of finance for new investment projects is retained earnings. In this case, the tax advantage of retaining earnings precisely offsets the double taxation of subsequent dividends: taxes on dividends have no impact on the investment incentives of firms using retentions as a marginal source of funds and paying dividends with residual cash flows. We show that the same invariance with respect to dividend taxes may hold under weaker conditions with respect to the source of funds, if the use of funds follows the same pattern. We find evidence that there is significant heterogeneity in our sample of US firms, with some firms exhibiting dividend behavior consistent with this expanded version of the new view, and others exhibiting behavior consistent with the traditional view that retained earnings are not an important marginal source of funds.     

Income shifting, investment, and tax competition: theory and evidence from provincial taxation in Canada

We study corporate income taxation when firms operating in multiple jurisdictions can shift income using tax planning strategies. Because income of corporate groups is not consolidated for tax purposes in Canada, firms may use financial techniques, such as lending among affiliates, to reduce subnational corporate taxes. A simple theoretical model shows how income shifting affects real investment, government revenues, and tax base elasticities, depending on whether firms must allocate income to provinces or not. We then analyze data from administrative tax records to compare the behavior of corporate subsidiaries that may engage in income shifting to comparable firms that must use the statutory allocation formula to determine their taxable income in each province. The evidence suggests that income shifting has pronounced effects on provincial tax bases. According to our preferred estimate, the elasticity of taxable income with respect to tax rates for “income shifting” firms is 4.9, compared with 2.3 for other, comparable firms.     

Optimal combination of innovation and environmental policies under technology licensing

Under what conditions will a carbon tax encourage environmental innovation? Can a regulator design an optimal environmental policy to reduce emissions and to promote clean technologies? This paper studies optimal environmental policy in the situation where a monopoly innovator develops and licenses clean production technologies to downstream polluting firms. We find that (i) a higher emission tax will encourage innovation when the burden of the tax payment in the polluters' costs and/or the price-elasticity of the demand for polluting goods are small, (ii) the innovation-inducing effects of emission tax are inversely related to the emission-reduction (Pigouvian) effects of the tax, and (iii) the social optimum can be achieved by the mix of tax and subsidy. We also show that if the policy instrument is limited to the tax, the second-best tax rate would lie between the marginal damage and the first-best rate. By performing numerical simulations, we also demonstrate that the optimal mix of the emission tax and R&D subsidy can have “double dividend” benefits.     

Tax Uniformity: A Commitment Device for Restraining Opportunistic Behavior

We show that uniform and differentiated tax systems diverge in their propensity to generate distortionary opportunistic behavior. First, when firms choose investment before the government can commit to its taxes, the tax scheme creates strategic incentives for firms to distort their investment. Second, a system of differentiated taxes has a greater propensity to foster strategic distortions in investment than a uniform tax regime. While the paper makes these points in a set‐up in which polluting firms face an emission tax and invest in abatement, the main message is shown to hold for a wide class of tax policy games.     

Dividend Taxes and Income Shifting

In this paper, we analyze whether a dividend tax cut for owner‐managers of closely held corporations encourages income shifting, income generation, or both. We use rich Swedish administrative micro data from 2000 to 2011 comprising detailed firm‐ and individual‐level information. We find robust evidence of extensive income shifting across tax bases in response to the 2006 Swedish dividend tax cut. Owner‐managers of closely held corporations reclassify earned income as dividend income but do not increase total income. The response is more pronounced for owner‐managers with tax incentives and with easier access to income shifting through a high ownership share.     

Achieving the triple dividend in Portugal: a dynamic general-equilibrium evaluation of a carbon tax indexed to emissions trading

Using a dynamic general equilibrium model, we simulate the environmental, economic, and budgetary effects in Portugal of a new carbon tax indexed to the carbon price in the European Union’s Emissions Trading System market. Through careful recycling of the carbon tax revenues to finance lower personal income taxes, lower Social Security contributions, and higher investment tax credits – in particular when changes are directed at promoting energy efficiency – we show that it is possible to design a carbon tax reform that boosts economic growth and strengthens fiscal consolidation. These results served as the basis for a new carbon tax eventually approved by the Portuguese Parliament.     

Investment with Uncertain Tax Policy: Does Random Tax Policy Discourage Investment

We consider the impact of tax policy uncertainty on firm level and aggregate investment, comparing investment behaviour when uncertainty is due to a shock following Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) versus when random discrete jumps in tax policy occur. Expectations of the likelihood of a tax policy switch have an important negative impact on the gain to delaying investment in the latter model and time to investment can fall with increasing tax policy uncertainty. Aggregate investment simulations indicate that capital formation is adversely affected by increases in uncertainty in the traditional GBM model but can be enhanced in the jump process model.     

Fiscal shocks and their consequences

This paper investigates the response of hours worked and real wages to fiscal policy shocks in the post-World-War II US. We identify these shocks with exogenous changes in military purchases and argue that they lead to a persistent increase in government purchases and tax rates on capital and labor income, and a persistent rise in aggregate hours worked as well as declines in real wages. The shocks are also associated with short lived rises in aggregate investment and small movements in private consumption. We describe and implement a methodology for assessing whether standard neoclassical models can account for the consequences of a fiscal policy shock. Simple versions of the neoclassical model can account for the qualitative effects of a fiscal shock. Once we allow for habit formation and investment adjustment costs, the model can also account reasonably well for the quantitative effects of a fiscal shock.     

The asset price incidence of capital gains taxes: evidence from the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and publicly-traded real estate firms

We provide new evidence on the asset price incidence of corporate-level investment subsidies by examining the relative stock price performance of publicly traded companies in the real estate industry that should have been differentially affected by the capital gains tax rate reduction enacted in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. By comparing real estate firms that have an organizational structure that allows entities who sell property to it to defer capital gains taxes and that plan to use the structure to acquire property with those that do not, we isolate the effect of the tax cut from industry trends and firm-level heterogeneity. When we examine the time period surrounding the reduction in the capital gains tax rate, our results suggest the tax change was substantially capitalized into lower share prices for these firms and the benefit of the seller’s capital gains tax deferral accrued mainly to the buyer of an appreciated property.     

The repatriation incentive of the foreign dividend exemption system

Due to the high taxation of domestic corporate income, Japanese multinational enterprises have avoided to repatriate foreign profits to Japan for quite some time. As a consequence, the Japanese government introduced a new taxation system in 2009 – the so called dividend exemption system – which was aimed at reducing the effective tax burden of foreign dividends of Japanese multinational companies in order to increase tax revenue and stimulate economic growth. Applying a theoretical framework which allows comparing the repatriation incentive of the old and new Japanese tax systems, we find that in the long-run the tax regime change fails to incentivize foreign subsidiaries to repatriate foreign profits. Especially subsidiaries with high leverage located in countries with low corporate taxes and low dividend taxes might reinvest rather than distribute their earnings in the dividend exemption method.     

MONETARY TARGETING IN WEST GERMANY,HOLLAND, AND SWITZERLAND

Links between fluctuations in domestic money supplies and subsequent fluctuations in rates of real output have been less visible in Western Europe than in the United States. This paper discusses some of the causes and investigates the stability of the demand for money in West Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. In all three countries, temporary changes in short-term interest rates temporarily affect the demand for money. These temporary changes in the demand for money are reflected in temporary blips in the monetary statistics, as agents substitute among various monetary assets. The hypothesis that aggregate demand responds only to longer-lasting changes in interest rates is tested by a two-step procedure. First, the official data on European money supplies are corrected for temporary disturbances caused by temporary changes in domestic interest rates. Second, changes in real activity are regressed on a measure of monetary stimulus, which takes into account the correction for temporary disturbances. This two-step procedure avoids some of the bias present in ordinary estimates of the demand-for-money function. The results show that the links between changes in money and subsequent changes in output are somewhat more tenuous in West Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland than in the U.S. but significant effects do exist. These effects are more easily documented when corrected time series for the European money supplies are used.     

International corporate taxation and U.S. multinationals' behaviour: an integrated approach

Abstract .  This paper explores the effects of corporate taxation on U.S. capital invested abroad and on tax planning practices. The econometric analysis first indicates that investment is strongly influenced by average tax rates, with a magnified impact particularly for low-tax rates, implying that the attractiveness of low-tax countries is not weakened by anti-deferral rules and cross-crediting limitations. Further explorations suggest that firms report higher profit, higher Subpart F income, and are less likely to repatriate dividends when they are located in low-tax jurisdictions. Finally, when the role of effective transfer pricing regulations is estimated, it appears that low degrees of law enforcement are associated with higher income shifting.