SUBSIDIES AS OPTIMAL FISCAL STIMULI

Theoretical macroeconomic models typically take fiscal policy to mean tax‐and‐spend by a ‘benevolent government’ that exploits potential aggregate demand externalities inherent in the imperfectly competitive nature of goods markets. Whilst shown to raise aggregate output and employment, these policies crowd‐out private consumption and typically reduce welfare. On account of their widespread use to stimulate economic activity, we consider the use of ‘tax‐and‐subsidize’ instead of ‘tax‐and‐spend’ policies. Within a static general equilibrium macro‐model with imperfectly competitive goods markets, we examine the effects of wage and output subsidies and show that, for a small open economy, positive tax and subsidy rates exist which maximize welfare, rendering no intervention suboptimal. We also show that, within a two‐country setting, a Nash non‐cooperative symmetric equilibrium with positive tax and subsidy rates exists, and that cooperation between governments in setting these rates is more expansionary and leads to an improvement upon the non‐cooperative solution.     

Alternative Fat Taxes to Control Obesity

This paper examines three alternative types of fat taxes to determine how effective they may be in reducing obesity. Upon the examination of the available evidence as to the effectiveness of fat taxes in reducing obesity authors conclude that all types of fat taxes are not sufficiently specific in targeting obesity. In some cases imposition of fat tax may actually lead to reversal of the intended effect. Therefore, the use of taxes to reduce obesity and promote healthy outcomes is not recommended.     

Imports, Status Preference, and Foreign Borrowing

This paper considers the implications of consumption and borrowing externalities in a small open economy framework. The former reflect the assumption that status conscious agents care about the relative consumption of imported goods, while the latter arise because agents do not take into account the effects of their borrowing decisions on the interest rate on debt. We analyze in the paper the impact of an increase in the degree of status preference on the saddlepath adjustment of the decentralized economy. In addition, the contrasting steady‐state and dynamic properties of the social planner’s economy are derived, along with the corresponding optimal tax and subsidy policies.     

Wealth inequality, entrepreneurship and industrialization

The paper shows that in a two-good economy with a basic and a luxury good sector inequality is indeed a hindrance to provide sufficient incentive for entrepreneurship to low-wealth economic agents. In contrast to the literature it uses both demand and supply-side explanations for the analysis. An entrepreneurial subsidy policy to encourage entrepreneurship in autarky financed by a lump sum tax on the rich is not very effective in unequal economies since it hardly impacts the welfare. When trade is opened up in the luxury good sector of such an economy the sector might cease to exist. In such a scenario, the rich people being the sole consumers would reap the entire benefits of globalization via low price of the imported luxury good. The paper highlights that the crucial question is: ‘how to globalize’ rather than ‘whether to globalize’ and suggests policy measures to make globalization inclusive.     

Inflation,taxes and housing: A theoretical analysis

This paper examines the real effects of inflation under a distortionary tax system. The presence of a tax subsidy to housing substantially alters the effects of inflation on the capital intensity of production and on the market interest rate. The analysis suggests that not taxing the flow of services from housing has caused inflation to reduce capital intensity, thereby decreasing U.S. productivity. Furthermore, this tax subsidy has caused inflation to raise the real interest rate while reducing the after-tax real returns to assets.     

相关市场、生态倾销与最优战略环境政策

本文在Anam和Shiang的研究框架中,提出一个基于随机和相关需求的相互贸易模型,其中政府通过设置环境税(或提供生产补贴)来实现环境改善(或市场份额扩张)的目标。论文的结论表明,在相关需求条件下非合作与合作最优环境税均高于确定需求条件下的环境税水平,且环境税将随着随机需求风险、市场间正相关系数和风险偏好态度的增加而上升。同时,由于相关需求和跨边界污染的存在,政府在合作条件下更加关注怎样抑制生态倾销的动机,因此,合作条件下的环境税高于古诺纳什均衡条件下的水平。     

Pollution, Capital Mobility and Tax Policies with Unemployment

In this paper we highlight aspects related to the links among unemployment, international capital mobility, and tax policies in a small open developing economy. Without international capital mobility, the joint optimal trade and environmental policies require a zero tariff and an emission tax lower than the Pigouvian tax. With international capital mobility and a capital tax (subsidy), the optimal emission tax rate is smaller (larger) compared to the rate when capital is untaxed. When both the emission tax and the capital tax/subsidy are jointly chosen optimally, then the optimal policy on capital is a lower subsidy, or even a tax, compared to the standard capital subsidy of the no pollution case.     

Attracting private investment: Tax reduction,investment subsidy,or both?

This paper uses a real-option model to examine the net benefit to a government from using tax cut and/or investment subsidy as incentives to induce immediate investment. Although earlier papers generally concluded that investment subsidy dominates tax cut, it is observed that many governments use a combination of subsidy and tax cut. We show that, when the government uses a different discount rate from private firms, and when it has to borrow money to provide an investment subsidy, it is possible to get an internal optimum; that is, it might be optimal for the government to provide an investment subsidy as well as charge a positive tax rate on the profits from the project. Thus, we provide an explanation for the puzzling fact that many governments provide an investment subsidy to a firm while simultaneously taxing its profits.     

Public good differentiation and the intensity of tax competition

We show that, in a setting where tax competition promotes efficiency, variation in the extent to which firms can use public goods to reduce costs brings about a reduction in the intensity of tax competition. This in turn brings about a loss of efficiency. In this environment, a ‘minimum tax’ counters the reduction in the intensity of tax competition, thereby enhancing efficiency. ‘Split-the-difference’ tax harmonization also potentially enhances efficiency but would not be agreed upon by governments because it lowers the payoff to at least one of them. This paper also presents an explanation for how traditionally high-tax countries have continued to set taxes at a relatively high rate even as markets have become more integrated.     

Externalities,entry bias,and optimal subsidy policy for cleaner environment

This paper analyses alternative subsidy schemes and long-run entry bias in a new industry that creates positive environmental externalities (both generation externalities and externalities associated with interindustry technology spillovers). It demonstrates that per-unit subsidy scheme, despite attracting fewer firms, results in higher industry output and economic surplus in the equilibrium compared with the expenditure equivalent lump-sum subsidy scheme. However, the later leads to higher total surplus, unless spillover externalities are sufficiently small. Further, the free-entry equilibrium number of firms may be excessive or insufficient. A key finding of this paper is that the first-best equilibrium outcome can be implemented through a unique combination of per-unit subsidy and lump-sum subsidy/tax, which involves positive government expenditure in the presence of positive externalities.     

Foreign-Investment Tax and Tariff Policies in Developing Countries

In this paper we examine the welfare effects of tax on foreign capital and tariff policies for a small open economy with sectoral unemployment. The individually and jointly optimal tax and tariff rates in the absence or presence of international tax credits are derived. A subsidy on foreign capital coupled with a tariff can be jointly optimal when tax credits are absent in the source country. However, the capital subsidy policy may fail to hold when the foreign country follows a tax credit system.     

Economic growth and polluting resources: Market equilibrium and optimal policies

This paper develops an endogenous growth model to study the decentralized equilibrium and the optimum conditions in an economy which uses polluting resources. The model includes two policy instruments, a subsidy to final consumption and an emissions tax. It also considers two forms of endogenous technical change, pollution-reducing knowledge and horizontal innovation. We show that, if the efficiency of knowledge to reduce emissions is sufficiently high, a higher output is compatible with lower emissions in both levels and growth rates. Additionally, if the two instruments are used together the economy may achieve a higher output and lower emissions since the subsidy may offset, at least partially, the negative tax effects.     

Global capital markets,direct taxation and the redistribution of income

Standard fiscal theory suggests that taxation should be heaviest on the least mobile factors of production – for both efficiency and revenue reasons. A shift in tax burdens from capital to labour as economies become globally integrated is thus justified. This theoretical tradition (founded by Ramsay and continued by Mirrlees and Lucas) assumes by construction that profit taxes reduce investment and growth; and while sensitive to inter-generational equity, sidesteps the issue of income distribution within generations. In contrast, starting from Keynes’ critique of these assumptions and building on modern endogenous growth models, it can be shown that profit taxation is not necessarily injurious to productive investment. In practice, moreover, the effect of globalisation has not been to reduce tax rates on capital, but rather to erode the tax base itself (i.e. ‘tax evasion’). Improved information exchange between tax authorities, which is now being driven by fiscal insolvency in developed countries, would allow tax incidence to be shifted so as to improve income distribution within OECD countries. Such cooperation could also permit the replacement of the current discretionary system of fiscal transfers from rich to poor countries (‘development aid’) by equitable sharing of global capital tax revenue.     

Optimal Tax Policy under Environmental Quality Competition

This paper studies the socially optimal emission and commodity tax policy when consumers are willing to pay a price-premium for environmentally friendlier variants of a commodity vertically differentiated in environmental quality. The first-best levels of quality can be obtained by a combination of a uniform ad valorem tax and an emission tax (or a subsidy for buying green products). The first-best emission tax is higher than the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality. Regardless of environmentally conscious consumers, if only one instrument is available, the second-best emission tax is equal to the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality. A uniform ad valorem tax increases welfare only if the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality is low enough.     

Income distribution and equilibrium multiplicity in a stigma-based model of tax evasion

This paper incorporates continuous income distribution into the stigma-based model of tax compliance. The paper investigates the effect of income distribution on the existence of multiple equilibria, and characterizes the conditions under which multiple equilibria emerge. Precisely, multiple equilibria exist if taxpayer incomes are sufficiently homogeneous, because the ‘social coordination effect’ dominates the ‘individual characteristics effect’. Numerical simulations show that the main proposition is robust to allowing two-step audit policies on the part of the tax agency, under the presumption that the best (or good) equilibrium is selected whenever there are multiple equilibria. As a byproduct, the effect of various forms of tax reforms on the optimal two-step audit policy, the equilibrium compliance, and fiscal revenue is analyzed.     

Tax subsidies,the rational demand for insurance and the health care crisis

An individual's optimal insurance coverage depends on balancing his gain through avoiding risk against his loss through the distortion of demand. The U.S. tax system subsidizes the purchase of excessive health insurance by excluding employer premium payments from employees' taxable incomes and by permitting the deduction of a portion of individual premiums. The current operational model of demand for health insurance shows that the tax subsidy does substantially increase insurance coverage. Since much of the rise in health care costs can be attributed to the growth of insurance, the tax subsidy is responsible for much of what is widely perceived as a health care crisis.     

The effects of regional tax and subsidy coordination on foreign direct investment

This paper analyses the effects of a regionally coordinated profit tax or location subsidy in a model with three active countries, one of which is not part of the union, and a globally mobile firm. We show that regional coordination can lead to two types of welfare gain. First, for investments that would take place in the union in the absence of coordination, a coordinated tax increase can transfer location rents from the firm to the union. Second, by internalising all of the union's benefits from foreign direct investment, a coordinated tax reduction can attract more welfare-enhancing investment than when member states act in isolation. Depending on which motive dominates, tax levels may thus rise or fall under regional coordination.     

Tax havens,income shifting,and redistributive taxation

This paper investigates the effects of tax havens on nonhaven countries’ redistributive policies. We consider that a nonhaven country contains individuals with different labor productivities. A tax is imposed on the income, and the revenues are evenly distributed. The tax rate is determined by majority voting, which reflects the median voter’s preferences. The presence of havens gives rise to the mobility of tax bases, which may increase the nonhaven country’s tax rate in two ways. First, it leads to a median voter with a lower productivity; second, it may enlarge the marginal tax revenue from raising the tax rate. In addition, we find that a stricter antihavens regulation may lower the tax rate. We further show that income shifting is likely to reduce the amount of the transfers. The case of tax evasion is also taken into consideration.     

Health subsidies,prevention and welfare

People value healthy ageing but may underinvest in health-improving preventive care. This arises when they ignore the beneficial effects of healthy ageing on public health expenditures and hence on the tax burden of future generations. This health externality justifies public intervention. We build an overlapping generations model with a government subsidizing investment in health by the young generation and paying the health care costs of the old generation. We find that the welfare-maximizing subsidy rate depends positively on the health externality and the size of health care costs, and negatively on the discount factor. The subsidy rate should therefore be high when prevention is cost-effective and when the population is careless about the future. Moreover, the welfare-maximizing subsidy rate is lower than the health-maximizing rate but higher than the capital-maximizing rate. This underlines the trade-off for a policy maker between health and economy.