The tax subsidy to owner-occupied housing: Who benefits?

This paper reexamines the question of the incidence and effects of the U.S. Federal income tax subsidy of owner-occupied housing. We demonstrate that supply elasticity considerations are crucial in determining the incidence and efficiency effects of the subsidy and that the hitherto neglected problem of the transfer of resources to subsidized owner-occupiers from unsubsidized renters is substantial. We provide estimates of the transfer and deadweight loss effects for the current program.     

The effects of regional tax and subsidy coordination on foreign direct investment

This paper analyses the effects of a regionally coordinated profit tax or location subsidy in a model with three active countries, one of which is not part of the union, and a globally mobile firm. We show that regional coordination can lead to two types of welfare gain. First, for investments that would take place in the union in the absence of coordination, a coordinated tax increase can transfer location rents from the firm to the union. Second, by internalising all of the union's benefits from foreign direct investment, a coordinated tax reduction can attract more welfare-enhancing investment than when member states act in isolation. Depending on which motive dominates, tax levels may thus rise or fall under regional coordination.     

The effect of subsidy policies on the product quality improvement

This paper analyzes the effect of government subsidy policies on creating an incentive for domestic firms to improve their product quality before exporting to an outside market. The goal of the government is to minimize the time it takes to reach the appropriate product quality level at low costs. We simulate a dynamic profit maximization problem of the firm and derive the optimal path of the product quality development, then test the efficiency of the three types of subsidy methods: Constant Subsidy, Quality Matching Subsidy and Time-limited Subsidy methods. Our model yields a number of intriguing results: (i) not every subsidy methods guarantee product quality development, although the same amount is subsidized. (ii) the matching fund style subsidy is more efficient than providing constant amount of subsidy. (iii) Time-limited Subsidy improves product quality faster than the unlimited subsidy method. (iv) Time-limited Subsidy improves quality much faster than other methods with less subsidy cost. (v) there is an optimal combination between the subsidy and the time limits.     

Tax competition,tax coordination and tax harmonization: The effects of EMU

There is little doubt that the step towards a monetary union in Europe will increase both the distorionary effects of existing differences in national tax systems and the intensity of tax competition for internationally mobile commodity and factor tax bases. This paper discusses selected issues of commodity and capital tax coordination that are likely to be affected by monetary unification. Starting from the distortive present scheme of value-added taxation in Europe we first analyze the effects of a switch to a general origin-based VAT as a way to maintain national tax rate autonomy over this important tax base. While an origin-based VAT would neither distort trade flows — both within the EU and with third countries — nor investment decisions in the long-run, its short-run effects are likely to be severe in the absence of exchange rate flexibility. In the field of capital taxation the focus switches to the feasibility of regional harmonization measures when there is no cooperation with the rest of the world. We argue that in a monetary union the mobility costs of capital will be significantly lower within the EU as compared to outside investments. This provides an efficiency argument for minimum source taxes on both interest income and corporate profits even if cooperation with third countries is infeasible.     

The effect of marginal tax rates on taxable income: a panel study of the 1988 tax flattening in Canada

Federal tax reform in 1988 flattened the Canadian personal income tax schedule, changing the marginal tax rates for many individuals. Using methods similar to those applied by Auten and Carroll [Rev. Econ. 81(4) (1999) 681] in the study of the effects of the 1986 U.S. Tax Reform Act, we estimate the responsiveness of income to changes in taxes to be substantially smaller in Canada. However we find evidence of a much higher response in self-employment income, in the labor income of seniors and from those with high incomes.     

Endogenous timing in tax competition: The effect of asymmetric information

This study explores the effects of asymmetric information on endogenous leadership in a simple tax competition environment. The study models a two-country economy where one country is informed about its own and opponent's productivity of private goods, while the other country only knows its productivity. The results show that each type of informed country has an incentive to pretend to be the other type, which leads to a Stackelberg outcome endogenously, while the simultaneous move is the unique outcome under complete information. Under the Stackelberg outcome, the uninformed country moves first and the informed country moves second. Moreover, ex-post social welfare under asymmetric information can become larger than that under complete information, because the uninformed country chooses a less aggressive tax rate under asymmetric information. These results depend on the type of uncertainty, and capital ownership and share.     

R&D subsidy and output subsidy in a duopoly: The role of technology spillover and R&D budget

Technology spillover and research and development (R&D) budget are relevant on government subsidies that aim at improving social welfare through enhancing R&D incentives of firms. However, there has not been related literature considering these two factors. To fill this gap, this paper examines the effect of technology spillover and R&D budget on R&D competition of duopolistic firms and government subsidies by constructing a game-theoretic model. We find that while each firm's profit sometimes increases with R&D budget for low coefficient of technology spillover, this profit may decrease with R&D budget for high coefficient of technology spillover due to the intensified R&D competition. We show that when both R&D budget and the coefficient of technology spillover remain high, R&D subsidy leads to higher social welfare than output subsidy and otherwise R&D subsidy results in lower social welfare.     

The fertility effect of dependent tax exemptions: estimates for the United States

The effect of the dependent tax exemption on the fertility rate in the United States is estimated. The estimation is an improvement on previous work in that a non-linear specification is used to better capture the shape of the demand for children. It is found that the marginal effect of the dependent exemption decreases with the level of the exemption. This suggests that although subsidies for childbearing will increase fertility, it becomes increasingly difficult for countries to increase fertility through this type of scheme.     

The fertility effect of dependent tax exemptions: estimates for the United States

Many developed countries allow tax subsidies for families to help reduce the costs of bearing and rearing children. Whittington et al. in 1990 developed a theoretical model in which they estimated the effect of tax deductions for dependent children on fertility in the US. This paper develops an empirical model of estimation and reconsiders Whittington's work. Nonlinear specification of the demand curve for children is central to the new model. This change is made based on the hypothesis that nonlinear specification will better capture the shape of demand. Using annual time-series data over the period 1913-84, the study found the marginal effect of dependent exemptions to decrease with exemption level. Given the historically low recent levels of exemptions in real terms, increasing current exemptions will affect fertility to a greater extent than previously estimated. Graphically, results point to the existence of a concave demand for children.     

Lobbying,political competition and the welfare effect of campaign contribution tax

This paper develops a probabilistic voting model in which a single lobby group commits campaign contributions to parties, contingent on the policy position the party adopts. Parties may have different propensities for diverting campaign funds towards rents. We show that a party that skims more from contributions mobilises fewer uninformed voters but places more value on receiving greater contributions. Further, the contributions and vote share of the party increases with the distance between the lobby's preferred policy and the median voter's ideal policy. Finally, we show that the equilibrium policy is between the median voter's ideal point and the lobby's preferred policy. Such an equilibrium policy does not maximise the aggregate social welfare due to the distortionary nature of lobbying. However, when an appropriate contribution tax is introduced to limit this distortion, social welfare will be maximised.     

The effects of tax reform on labor supply, tax revenue and welfare when tax avoidance matters

We examine how tax avoidance in the form of trade in well-functioning asset markets affects the study of labor supply. We discuss the implications for tax policy analysis, and we show that a failure to account for avoidance responses may lead to huge errors when analyzing how tax reform affects labor supply, tax revenue and the welfare cost of taxation. Our model may explain a number of otherwise hard to understand dimensions of taxpayer response.     

The excise tax effects of the property tax

This paper constructs a theory of how differences across regions in property tax rates affect product prices and factor prices. For a model where labor and capital are perfectly mobile between regions, it is shown that consumers residing in different regions face the same nontraded good prices, even when property tax rates differ across regions.     

The effect of potential emigration on the optimal linear income tax

This paper amends a standard model of optimal linear income taxation to allow individuals to escape taxation by migrating. The income tax is used only to redistribute income in this model. It is found that, if individuals with low and high ability levels are prevented from migrating, then the optimal marginal tax and poll subsidy increase. But preventing migration at ability levels in some intermediate interval lowers the optimal marginal tax.     

Service outsourcing: The home,the host and the provider

Although offshoring service providers have grown meteorically in the last two decades, the phenomenon is still primarily analyzed through the lens of a home country and its firms. This paper presents a framework for explaining some of the stylized facts of the offshore service provider industry. The model characterizes the service choice of offshore service providers under alternative skill distribution and also explains why complex service providers employ more skilled workers, pay higher wages, and have a lower scale of provision. Finally, it sheds light on the relationship between partnering country sizes and wage inequality.     

The learning path of the hidden economy: the tax burden and tax evasion in New Zealand

This paper considers the ‘learning curve’ relationship between the aggregate tax rate and the relative size of the hidden economy in New Zealand. Some simple non-linear models are estimated so that the effects of changes in the effective tax rate on the underground economy can be simulated. This study finds that about half of the hidden activity in New Zealand is a learned response to changing opportunities and constraints in fiscal policy, but this amount varies over the business cycle. Simulating a zero tax rate permits us to discover the ‘natural rate’ of underground and criminal activity. Some partial lessons are drawn for taxation policy in that country.     

The effect of death tax on the labour supply of donors: evidence from TRA97

Exploiting estate tax cuts from the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA97), this paper estimates the effect of death tax on the labour supply of living potential donors. To this end, difference-in-difference with multiple imputation approach is applied to micro-level panel data. This paper finds that the estate tax cuts makes no difference in labour force participation or working hours of potential donors in a statistically meaningful way, although the TRA97 reduces marginal estate tax rates by 37.51% on average. This finding suggests that the death tax causes no meaningful distortion of living potential-donors’ labour supplies at either extensive or intensive margin.     

个税免征额、税率与拉弗曲线

本文基于个人所得税改革对经济主体行为产生激励的理论,尝试将个税免征额引入拉弗曲线(Laffer curve),分析了收入变化时收入税率曲线位置的移动与拉弗曲线的形态变化,以及个税免征额与最优税率之间的运动规律,发现随着个税免征额的提高,最优税率有下降的趋势,对我国当前个税免征额的提高与税率级次级距调整现象做出了较严密的数理分析。而在分析个税免征额的选择及其与税率之间的关系时,为我们找到在当前地区收入水平不均与居民收入分布多样的状况下的最优个税免征额以及实践差别化税制的理论依据,回答了原来仅考虑税率变化的拉弗曲线所不能回答的问题。     

The effect of risk-sharing government subsidy on corporate R&D investment: Empirical evidence from Korea

Despite the wide belief that the high social rates of returns to R&D investment justify government subsidy policy in advanced countries, there are only limited studies about whether the R&D subsidy as a means of risk-sharing stimulates R&D investment of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in developing countries. This paper empirically investigates the issue, using a unique data set on government subsidy for new technology development of Korean manufacturing firms, listed and non-listed, for the period from 2000 to 2007. The paper employs the DID estimation procedure and controls for simultaneity of the subsidy for new technology development using 2SLS and two step Tobit procedure. Our empirical results show that there is no solid evidence for crowding-out effects of the government subsidy. These results suggest that government subsidies could help SMEs to overcome the barriers to risky R&D projects through sharing R&D failure risk with government and by reducing capital costs to undertake new technology development projects, and thus the subsidy policy for new technology development seems to be partly successful in promoting the R&D investment of the Korean SMEs.     

The incentive effect of fiscal equalization transfers on tax policy

A theoretical analysis considers the impact of a typical system of redistributive “fiscal equalization” transfers on the tax effort of local jurisdictions. More specifically, it shows that the marginal contribution rate, i.e. the rate at which an increase in the tax base reduces those transfers, might be positively associated with the local tax rate while the volume of grants received is likely to be inversely related to the tax rate. These predictions are tested in an empirical analysis of the tax policy of German municipalities. In order to identify the incentive effect the analysis exploits discontinuities in the rules of the fiscal equalization system as well as policy changes. The empirical results support the existence of an incentive effect, suggesting that the high marginal contribution rates induce the municipalities to set significantly higher business tax rates compared with a situation without fiscal equalization.     

Mobile capital and the home market effect

Abstract Most existing studies examine the home market effect (HME) in a framework with immobile labour as the only production factor and the assumption of a freely traded homogeneous good is known to be crucial for the HME to emerge. This study explores the HME in the presence of mobile capital by use of a footloose capital model allowing for positive transport costs of the homogeneous good. The mobile capital generates a channel to offset the trade imbalance of a country. As a result, the HME always appears for arbitrary transport costs in both sectors of differentiated and homogeneous goods.