Unintended Effects of Targeting an Environmental Rebate

When designing schemes such as conditional cash transfers or payments for ecosystem services, the choice of whom to select and whom to exclude is critical. We incentivize and measure actual contributions to an environmental public good to ascertain whether being excluded from a rebate can affect contributions and, if so, whether the rationale for exclusion influences such effects. Treatments, i.e., three rules that determine who is selected and excluded, are randomly assigned. Two of the rules base exclusion on subjects’ initial contributions. The third is based upon location and the rationales are always explained. The rule that targets the rebate to low initial contributors, who have more potential to raise contributions, is the only rule that raised contributions by those selected. Yet by design, that same rule excludes the subjects who contributed the most initially. They respond by reducing their contributions even though their income and prices are unchanged.     

Aggregation and the existence of a social utility function

In a well-known paper Gorman (Econometrica21 (1953)) established that the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an aggregate, or social, utility function, independent of the distribution of income, is that all individuals' income consumption paths be parallel straight lines. Recently Chipman (J. Econ. Theory8 (1974)), building on the paper of Hurwicz and Uzawa (in “Preference Utility and Demand”) has shown that if the distribution of income is proportional and individual preferences are homothetic, aggregate consumption behavior obeys the necessary integrability conditions. It is shown here that the consistency of aggregate behavior can be derived from more general conditions than the ones used by Chipman and Gorman. Examples of demand systems from which aggregate behavior implies a social utility function are provided. It is then shown that if individual demand functions are linear in income—a form employed by both Gorman and Chipman—it is not necessary that the distribution of income be fixed.     

Dissertation abstract: A status theory of collective action

The “collective action problem” describes situations where each person in a group can individually profit more by withholding contributions to group goals. However, if all act in their material self-interest no public good is produced and all are worse off. I present a new solution to the collective action problem based on status. I argue that contributions to collective action increase an individual’s status in the group because contributions create perceptions of high group motivation, defined as the relative value an individual places on group versus individual welfare. Individuals are predicted to receive a variety of social and material benefits for their contributions to the group. These rewards can help explain why individuals contribute to collective action. Four laboratory studies tested the theory. In Study 1, following interaction in a 6-person public goods game, participants reported viewing higher contributors as more group motivated and higher status. Higher contributors also wielded more interpersonal influence in task interactions with participants. Participants also cooperated with higher contributors more, and allocated greater altruism to them in a Dictator game. Study 2 addressed an exchange-theoretic alternative explanation for the findings of Study 1, showing that observers of collective action who did not benefit from higher contributors’ contributions to the public good, nonetheless rated them as higher status, cooperated with them more, and gave them greater altruistic gifts. These results show that collective action contributors can earn social and material benefits even outside the group. Study 3 more directly tested the mediating role of group motivation. Contributors who sacrificed a greater proportion of resources for the collective action were rated as more group motivated and higher status than a moderate proportional contributor, even though the amounts they contributed were the same. These findings support the theory, and underscore the significance of self-sacrifice in the acquisition of status in collective action. Study 4 investigated the effects of status rewards on contributors’ behavior towards and perceptions of the group. Participants who received positive status feedback for their contributions subsequently contributed more than those who did not. Rewarded participants also identified more with the group and saw it as having greater solidarity and cohesion. I conclude by discussing theoretical implications and future research. JEL Classification C71     

Non-Laplacian beliefs in a global game with noisy signaling

In standard global games, individual behavior is optimal if it constitutes a best response to agnostic—Laplacian—beliefs about the aggregate behavior of other agents. This paper considers a standard binary action global game augmented with noisy signaling by an informed policy-maker and shows that in this game, equilibrium beliefs depart in quite stark ways from the Laplacian benchmark. In the limit as signals become arbitrarily precise, so that all fundamental uncertainty is removed (leaving only strategic uncertainty), the equilibrium beliefs of the marginal individual concerning the aggregate action collapse to a discrete Bernoulli distribution, giving probability mass only to the polar extreme outcomes. By contrast in the underlying standard global game the marginal individual believes the aggregate action has a continuous uniform distribution, giving equal likelihood to all possible outcomes.     

Effective Demand: Securing the Foundations

Abstract

This paper is one of three contributions to a symposium commenting on papers previously published by the other authors. Allain (Allain, O. (2009) Effective demand and short-term adjustments in the General Theory, Review of Political Economy, 21, pp. 1–22) argues that Keynes elides a distinction between aggregate demand and global expenditure that is necessary to explain the formation of price expectations by individual entrepreneurs. Allain's conclusions depend upon redefinitions of aggregate and effective demand and the consumption function. Hartwig (Hartwig, J. (2007) Keynes vs. the Post Keynesians on the principle of effective demand, European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 14, pp. 725–739) argues that entrepreneurs must take into account the state of the economy as a whole, in order to form price expectations independently and not as a market equilibrium determined by aggregate supply and demand. This leaves demand price expectations to be determined outside the principle of effective demand. Neither author does full justice to Keynes's own treatment. We still need to agree by what mechanism individual entrepreneurs form a collective and mutually consistent state of expectation in The General Theory.     

On the theory of effective demand under stochastic rationing

The concept of effective demand under stochastic manipulable quantity rationing is shown to be compatible with the existence of nontrivial equilibrium. It is argued that stochastic rationing is unavoidable for any satisfactory definition of effective demand. Moreover, manipulability of the rationing mechanism is necessary for reasons of logical consistency, at least if the distribution over realisations for each agent depends on his own action and on the aggregate values of demand and supply only. In that case, anonymous stochastic rationing schemes reduce to those random functions, the mean value function of which is the uniform proportional rationing mechanism.     

Efficient price and capacity choices under uncertain demand: An empirical analysis

Traditional economic analyses of the peak-load problem typically assume an unrealistic degree of regularity in demand during well-defined peak and off-peak periods. This issue is addressed through a comprehensive statistical model that separates demand into its systematic and stochastic components. This model is combined with a traditional economic model and applied to local telephone service, leading to substantive conclusions relevant for managerial decisions as well as further research, among them:

? Neglecting the systematicand stochastic structure of demand may lead to inefficient tariffs. Efficient measured service structures typically price individual callsbelow incremental capacity cost.

? Industry wide capacity decision rules that are exclusively driven by blockage probability targets during narrowly defined time periods may be economically inefficient.

? For telephone service, spot pricing, which sets high prices during periods ofactual congestion, has the potential to be considerably more efficient than traditional tariffs that set high prices during periods ofexpected congestion.

     

The micro economics of group behavior: General characterization

We study the demand function of a group of S members facing a global budget constraint. Any vector belonging to the budget set can be consumed within the group, with no restriction on the form of individual preferences, the nature of individual consumptions or the form of the decision process beyond efficiency. Moreover, only the group aggregate behavior, summarized by its demand function, is observable. We provide necessary and (locally) sufficient restrictions that fully characterize the group's demand function, with and without distribution factors. We show that the private or public nature of consumption within the group is not testable from aggregate data on group behavior.     

Taxing Super

Australia's taxation arrangements for retirement saving are among the most complicated in the world. It is almost unique in applying taxat all three possible points in the retirement saving cycle: contributions, earnings and benefits. Starting from the proposition that the 'best' pension tax is to tax benefits under the personal income tax, this paper proposes a 'withholding tax' arrangement which would have impacts on individual contributors equivalent to a benefit tax, while altering the time profile of tax collections to address cash-flow concerns on the part of the revenue authorities. Simulations are presented to show that individual contributors benefit from the proposed reform, and that equity across contributors in different wage bands is broadly maintained.     

Campaigning for retirement: State teacher union campaign contributions and pension generosity

Since Tullock (1972) first asked why there is so little money in U.S. politics, several studies have found evidence that political activism has the potential to yield significant returns. This study is the first to directly investigate the returns to public sector union activism by leveraging a transactions-level dataset from the National Institute on Money in Politics to estimate the relationship between teachers' union campaign contributions and the generosity of teacher pension systems. Our results show that more politically engaged teachers’ unions, as evidenced by their aggregate campaign contributions, are successful at both securing a higher level of retirement benefits and at shifting a greater burden of the financing of those benefits to the sponsoring government. Our estimates are in line with recent related studies and imply an investment return on campaign contributions of nearly 1500%.     

On the disaggregation of excess demand functions when prices and aggregate income vary independently

Under the assumption that prices and aggregate income can vary independently and that the income distribution scheme is known and homogeneous of degree 1 in prices and aggregate income, I raise the question of the restrictions on aggregate excess demand behavior implied by the postulate of rationality of individual agents. If the number of agents is at least as high as the number of commodities, aggregate excess demand need not satisfy, at a point, any restrictions other than homogeneity of degree 0 and Walras' law. Furthermore, if the number of agents, m, is less than the number of commodities, l, aggregate excess demand can be locally arbitrary when projected on an m-dimensional subspace of the commodity space.     

Measures of inequality as an aggregation of individual preferences about income distribution: The arrowian case

An inequality preorder is a preorder on a simplex which satisfies symmetry and strict Schur-convexity (the mathematical equivalent of the principle of transfers of Pigou and Dalton). It is shown that we cannot aggregate individual inequality preorders to a collective one if we are interested in Arrow's aggregation rules. The proof uses an interesting result of Kalai, Muller and Satterthwaite (Public Choice 34 (1979), 87–97). Moreover, we prove further results for the aggregation of individual inequality indices when we allow cardinality and interpersonal comparibility of utility.     

Power sharing and electoral equilibrium

This paper considers a model of (consensual) democracy where political parties engage first in electoral competition, and they share policy-making power afterward according with the votes gathered in the election. The paper uncovers the difficulties to guarantee stability in this institutional setting; and it provides a condition of symmetry on parties’ political motivations that ensures the existence of pure strategy equilibrium under a broad family of power sharing rules, ranging from fully proportional to winner-take-all. The equilibrium analysis shows that power sharing and ideology exert a centrifugal force on policy platforms that increases party polarization, with the paradoxical result that consensual democracies can actually lead to more radical electoral campaigns than winner-take-all.     

Can second-order punishment deter perverse punishment?

Recent experiments have shown that voluntary punishment of free riders can increase contributions, mitigating the free-rider problem. But frequently punishers punish high contributors, creating “perverse” incentives which can undermine the benefits of voluntary punishment. In our experiment, allowing punishment of punishing behaviors reduces punishment of high contributors, but gives rise to efficiency-reducing second-order “perverse” punishment. On balance, efficiency and contributions are slightly but not significantly enhanced. JEL Classification C91 · C73 · C41 · D71     

Equal,proportional, and mixed sharing of cooperative production under the threat of sabotage

This paper analyzes the consequences of a parametrized class of sharing rules on the propensity of individuals to sabotage each other in a cooperative production framework. The considered sharing rules include equal and proportional sharing as special cases and are parametrized with respect to their sensitivity to relative input contributions. This parameter affects the equilibrium provision of productive individual labor (that increases the respective individual input contribution) but also the propensity to sabotage others (which decreases the input contributions of sabotaged individuals). The theoretical analysis shows that sharing rules in which more weight is put on equal sharing induce zero sabotage in equilibrium; however, they might also lead to inefficient underproduction. In contrast, sharing rules that are highly sensitive with respect to relative input contributions lead to destructive sabotage activities and moreover to inefficient overproduction.     

Information and IRA participation: the influence of tax preparers

The steep drop-off in the number of Individual Retirement Account (IRA) contributors after 1986 has led to suggestions that taxpayers misunderstood and over-reacted to the restrictions on deductible contributions imposed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Tax panel data is used to investigate the role of taxpayer misunderstanding in the drop-off in IRA contributors after 1986. The hiring of a tax preparer is the transmission mechanism for knowledge of the deductibility rules after 1986. The results suggest that more information and promotion of IRAs would have increased the probability of contributing to an IRA in 1987 for high income taxpayers, but would have decreased this probability for middle-income taxpayers. Taxpayer confusion over the deductibility restrictions appears to have been resolved by 1988. Therefore, taxpayer misunderstanding did not play a major role in the steep drop-off in the number of IRA contributors after 1986.     

Assigning agents to a line

We consider the problem of assigning agents to slots on a line, where only one agent can be served at a slot and each agent prefers to be served as close as possible to his target. Our focus is on aggregate gap minimizing methods, i.e., those that minimize the total gap between targets and assigned slots. We first consider deterministic assignment of agents to slots, and provide a direct method for testing if a given deterministic assignment is aggregate gap minimizing. We then consider probabilistic assignment of agents to slots, and make use of the previous method to propose an aggregate gap minimizing modification of the classic random priority method to solve this class of problems. We also provide some logical relations in our setting among standard axioms in the literature on assignment problems, and explore the robustness of our results to several extensions of our setting.     

The demand functions that satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preference and generalized monotonicity

We prove that the individual demand function satisfying the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference and the excess demand function satisfying the Wald’s Axiom are pseudomonotone_*⁺, a new class of generalized monotonicity. With this new concept, we refine the characterization of Zhou for the individual demand function. In particular, a full characterization for the excess demand functions satisfying the Wald’s Axiom is derived.     

Sequentially consistent rules of choice under complete uncertainty

This work analyzes the problem of individual choice under complete uncertainty. In this context, each alternative action consists of a set of different possible outcomes with no associated probability distribution. The work examines and defines a class of rules such that: (a) the evaluation of sets (actions) follows a certain procedural pattern; and (b) an assumption of sequential contraction consistency, which is an adaptation of Sen's α condition, is satisfied. In this framework, some results of characterization show that several well-known rules for comparing sets of outcomes can be reinterpreted in procedural terms.     

Modelling the demand for housing over the life cycle

We model individual demand for housing over the life cycle, and show the aggregate implications of this behaviour. Individuals delay purchasing their first home when incomes are low or uncertain. Higher house prices lead households to downsize, rather than to stop being owners. Fixed costs (property transactions taxes) have important impacts on welfare (a wealth effect) and house purchase decisions (substitution effect). In aggregate, positive house price shocks lead to consumption booms among the old but falls in consumption for the young, and reduced housing demand; positive income shocks lead to consumption booms among the young and increased housing demand.