共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 171 毫秒
1.
Consistent with real option theory, the authors argue that the value of the Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) in rural India and its impact on workers' behavior does not depend so much on its income supplementation as on enlargement of opportunities in the uncertain local labor market. The choice between the EGS and other activities is modeled in a dynamic optimization framework, taking into account a fixed wage rate and certainty of employment under the EGS and a stochastic wage rate under other activities. Specifically, volatility of wages in the rural labor markets has important implications for switches into the EGS and for concomitant welfare effects. Under such conditions, the higher the EGS wage, the greater is its attractiveness to relatively skilled and affluent workers, and for those already in it to continue. These and related predictions of the model are validated by panel data estimation. 相似文献
2.
本文针对我国不完全的劳动市场,建立了一个短视一搜寻模型,目的是要说明,第一,虽然政府直接干预下的就业率高于无政府干预的劳动市场的均衡就业率,但是后者的社会总福利水平高于前者,而且,无政府干预情形下失业者的福利水平不会低于政府干预时在低工资岗位上的就业者的福利水平.这说明政府直接干预劳动市场虽然有可能降低失业率,但可能导致整个社会福利损失,也不利于提高低收入人群的福利水平.第二,我国现行的社会保障制度、户籍制度以及地方保护政策妨碍城乡劳动力自由流动,造成城市居民一般占据了工资较高的岗位,农村居民一般只能找到工资较低的岗位.这种匹配过程达到的劳动市场均衡,虽然有可能最大限度降低城镇失业率,但不是使得全国总失业率最低的均衡. 相似文献
3.
This paper studies the effects of cash transfers to the poor on the labor market. This is investigated in a matching model with endogenous labor market participation and job destruction. Depending on their productivity, workers might want to stay in the job, become unemployed, or leave the labor market; in addition, workers out of the labor force might decide to search for a job. Cash transfers are introduced to all agents with income below a given level. Two qualitative results are found: (i) The size of cash transfers has a negative effect on the employment rate, but an ambiguous effect on the unemployment rate; and (ii) the coverage of this welfare program has a positive effect on the employment rate, and an ambiguous effect on the unemployment rate. The numerical simulations also show that: (i) if the government target is to reduce inequality and poverty, the more efficient policy is to increase the level of benefits instead of increasing the eligibility of the program; (ii) compared with a welfare program that condition eligibility to labor market participation, the “unconditional” cash transfer program has a stronger impact on inequality and poverty, but with a reduction in labor market participation and output. 相似文献
4.
We investigate the labor market effects of immigration in Denmark, Germany and the UK, three countries which are characterized by considerable differences in labor market institutions and welfare states. Institutions such as collective bargaining, minimum wages, employment protection and unemployment benefits affect the way in which wages respond to labor supply shocks, and, hence, the labor market effects of immigration. We employ a wage-setting approach which assumes that wages decline with the unemployment rate, albeit imperfectly. We find that the wage and employment effects of immigration depend on wage flexibility and the composition of the labor supply shock. In Germany immigration involves only moderate wage, but large unemployment effects, since immigrants are concentrated in labor market segments with low wage flexibility. The reverse is true for the UK and Denmark. 相似文献
5.
《Review of Economic Dynamics》2008,11(1):133-154
Often an increase in the minimum wage is accompanied by a reduction in the capital tax. This paper analyzes the effects of interactions between the minimum wage and the capital tax in the general equilibrium framework. The analysis is conducted in an inter-temporal search model in which firms post wages. A (binding) minimum wage provides a lower support for the distribution of wages. The paper finds that the interaction of these two policy instruments significantly modify labor market outcomes and welfare cost. In the presence of a binding minimum wage, a decrease in the capital tax leads to an increase in wage dispersion. In contrast, when it is not binding, a lower capital tax may reduce the dispersion in wages. A binding minimum wage magnifies the positive effects of a lower capital tax on labor supply, employment, and output. It also enhances the welfare cost of capital tax. A policy change which involves an increase in the minimum wage and a fall in the capital tax such that employment level remains constant increases welfare and output. 相似文献
6.
《Journal of development economics》2005,76(1):127-146
This paper presents a welfare economic analysis of the benefits of various labor market policies in the Harris–Todaro labor market model. The policies considered are a policy of modern sector job creation, which I call modern sector enlargement (MSENL); a policy of rural development, which I call traditional sector enrichment (TSENR); and a policy of wage limitation in the urban economy, which I call modern sector wage restraint (MSWR). First, I analyze the inequality effects of these policies. I then perform two welfare economic analyses, the first based on summary measures of labor market conditions (total labor earnings, unemployment, inequality of labor incomes, and poverty rates) and the second based on dominance analysis in the labor market, in both cases assuming that the costs are borne elsewhere. The results of the welfare analyses are compared, and it is shown that TSENR unambiguously increases welfare in the labor market using both approaches, the other policies yield ambiguous results, and no policy is unambiguously welfare-decreasing. 相似文献
7.
In this paper, we evaluate the impact of commodity tax competition on welfare and employment under the destination and origin principles, when the labor market is imperfectly competitive owing to a binding fixed wage. Our main finding is that commodity taxation causes an employment externality whose signs may be opposite under the two principles. While tax competition leads to inefficient tax rates under both principles, we also prove that the origin principle guarantees lower unemployment and higher welfare when the fixed wage is high. Finally, we show that the employment externality still exists in a standard union model of wage determination. 相似文献
8.
《Feminist Economics》2013,19(3):60-81
Current anti-poverty policy proposals focus on welfare reform to the exclusion of reforming the low-wage labor market. In contrast, we compare two policy proposals aimed at low-wage labor markets: a national comparable worth policy and an increase in the minimum wage. With both policies we pay specific attention to their impact by gender. Our findings suggest that while both would reduce poverty among working women, the impact of a comparable worth policy on female poverty would be greater under most scenarios presented. It is estimated that an increase of 96 cents per hour in the national minimum wage would be necessary to equal the poverty reduction effect for women workers of a comparable worth policy which excludes small employers. Both policies decrease the incidence of povertylevel wages less among men, since roughly 60 percent of minimum wage workers are women. Additionally, not only would a national comparable worth policy improve the economic status of low-waged women workers, it would also narrow the gap between male and female poverty. While an increase in the minimum wage would also reduce this gap, comparable worth would virtually eliminate it. 相似文献
9.
This paper analyzes the effect of labor-tax progression on employment and welfare in an economy with a unionized labor market. The government influences wage bargaining through its tax policies. Wages can be reduced by increasing the marginal labor-tax rate. If there are no restrictions on profit taxation, a first-best optimum with full employment is realized; this first-best optimum can always be implemented by a progressive tax schedule. If profit taxation is restricted, unemployment may arise. For this case, we show that the welfare-maximizing degree of tax progression is influenced by a variety of factors, in particular the wage elasticity of labor demand, the distribution of bargaining power, and the existence of unemployment benefits. Examples are given for both progressive and regressive tax structures. Comparative-static analysis reveals that a decline in union bargaining power, an increase in unemployment benefits, and an increase in the overall work force reduce the efficient degree of tax progression. 相似文献
10.
Bharati Basu 《International economic journal》2013,27(2):101-120
This paper evaluates migration policies for an open economy in the presence of unemployment resulting from a minimum wage. Migration between countries is triggered by an expected wage differential which depends both on the market wage and the level of unemployment. Workers therefore can move in either direction. The paper shows that labor outflow raises employment and welfare. Distortion-ridden free trade with this out-migration is therefore better than distortion-ridden free trade with no migration. It might also be better than autarky. Under the scenario, free migration is an alternative to restricted trade often recommended to deal with this type of distortion. Labor inflow on the other hand generates unfavorable terms of trade, raises national and global unemployment, and reduces welfare. [F 2] 相似文献
11.
Panagiotis Nanos 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2023,25(4):753-802
In this paper, I carry out a welfare analysis of the minimum wage in the framework of a Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides model with stochastic job matching. I explore the role of the minimum wage in a labor market with trading externalities and present the necessary and sufficient condition for a minimum wage hike to be efficiency enhancing. In this context, I characterize minimum wage spillover effects and demonstrate that there is a direct link between the welfare effects and spillover effects of a minimum wage. This theoretical finding suggests that the welfare impact of minimum wage changes can be inferred from the empirical observation of spillover effects on the wage distribution. 相似文献
12.
In this paper we study how the attitudes toward higher education may affect labor market outcomes in the context of globalization. In particular, we show that different educational attitudes are responsible for differences in the wage differential among countries. Using a matching model with two types of workers and firms, we find that there is a trade-off between the wage differential and the workers’ welfare, namely, that an economy that is less willing to educate itself will display a lower wage differential but will lose in terms of welfare. Moreover, from a policy perspective, we show that the negative effects on welfare due to this disinclination to study can be offset by increased labor market flexibility. All things considered, policy makers ought to keep in mind that both a positive attitude toward higher education and labor market flexibility, can lead to improved overall performance in this increasingly globalized world. 相似文献
13.
现阶段我国整体就业形势不容乐观,分析最低工资对就业的影响具有重要的现实意义。通过对我国劳动力市场分割条件下最低工资的就业效应进行实证分析发现,最低工资对竞争性行业劳动力市场(城市二级劳动力市场)就业有显著的正面影响,对行政垄断行业劳动力市场(城市一级劳动力市场)就业的正面影响则很小。因此,根据我国劳动力市场的具体情况,合理设置最低工资标准有利于促进就业。 相似文献
14.
This paper analyzes the impact of product market competition on unemployment, wage and welfare in a model where unemployment is caused by the efficiency wage consideration and oligopolistic firms compete in quantity. It is shown that while more intense competition in the product market increases output and reduces price, it does not necessarily lead to a lower unemployment rate or a higher wage for workers. Depending on the technologies, the relationship between the intensity of competition and the level of employment (respectively, wage, welfare) is not always monotonic, and, in some instances, has an inverted U‐shape. 相似文献
15.
Samuel M. Lundstrom 《Contemporary economic policy》2017,35(1):29-52
I analyze changes in the target efficiency of the federal minimum wage over the past 25 years. Using static simulation methods I find that minimum wage target efficiency is currently close to its 25‐year peak—of the total monetary benefits generated by a 12% increase in the federal minimum wage, 16.8% would flow to workers in poverty. This exceeds the least target efficient year over this period by 4.7 percentage points and is only 0.6 percentage points below the peak. Furthermore, I find a very strong positive relationship between minimum wage target efficiency and the real federal minimum wage. The implication is that, from an efficiency standpoint, a good time to raise the minimum wage is when it is already high. This discovery raises the possibility that the minimum wage increases the employment of low‐skilled poor individuals relative to the employment of low‐skilled non‐poor individuals. Moreover, this discovery may bolster the rationale for an indexed minimum wage whereby it is prevented from falling to less efficient levels. (JEL J21, J31, J38) 相似文献
16.
Thomas Aronsson 《Review of Income and Wealth》2010,56(3):559-571
This paper concerns welfare measurement in an economy with union wage setting, where the equilibrium is characterized by unemployment. Contrary to results derived in the first best, the current value Hamiltonian is not an exact welfare measure in an economy with unemployment. Instead, the welfare measure also depends on “employment effect,” which are caused by the discrepancy between supply and demand in the labor market. In addition, since unemployment gives rise to heterogeneity, distributional effects will also characterize the welfare measure. 相似文献
17.
We consider an economy with a tax on all labor earnings. We discover that a slightly binding minimum wage on one sector can enhance efficiency. The minimum wage attracts high‐reservation wage workers into the minimum‐wage sector. If the labor demand curve in the free sector is quite flat, the vast majority of workers displaced by the minimum wage find employment in the free sector, raising aggregate employment. This displacement of workers by the only slightly binding minimum wage has negligible effects on efficiency. So efficiency and tax revenue rise as the minimum wage pulls labor out of untaxed leisure, where too much of the labor force is lurking, into taxed work. 相似文献
18.
Kerstin Schneider 《The Scandinavian journal of economics》1997,99(1):45-59
An environmental tax reform might bring about gains over and above improved environmental quality. In particular, if tax revenues from environmental taxes are used to reduce the tax on wage income, positive employment effects can result in second-best economies. An efficiency wage model is used to analyze the impact of an ecological tax reform on involuntary unemployment. The government controls emissions by selling emission permits. Employment of labor and wages are determined endogenously. Conditions are identified under which an environmental tax reform reduces unemployment and increases welfare. 相似文献
19.
Aspects of International Fragmentation 总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5
Wilhelm Kohler 《Review of International Economics》2004,12(5):793-816
The paper uses a specific‐factors framework to address efficiency and distributional implications of international fragmentation which is driven by a low foreign wage rate. Focusing on the cost‐savings linkage between fragmentation and labor demand in the remaining domestic activities, the author establishes a fragmentation surplus. If capital is an indivisible asset specific to the fragment produced abroad, then fragmentation may cause a domestic welfare loss, because outsourcing takes place in discrete steps where it affords firms “quasi‐market‐power” on the domestic labor market. The regime shift from domestic production to fragmentation is modeled as a two‐stage game. In stage one, firms locate indivisible assets at home or abroad; in stage two they choose optimal employment. The share of fragmented firms is endogenously determined. The paper explores conditions under which outsourcing is beneficial for the domestic economy. 相似文献
20.
We analyze the employment and income effects of a needs-based minimum benefit system (“Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung”) which has recently been introduced in Austria. The aim of this reform was to reduce poverty as well as to increase work incentives for recipients of social assistance. On the basis of a behavioral microsimulation model we show that this new system slightly increases employment but reduces incomes for the poorest households remaining unemployed. As an alternative, we analyze a budgetary neutral reform proposal which reduces financial incentives for marginal employment and provides a wage subsidy rewarding working longer hours. This alternative reform would yield larger positive employment effects, but more households would suffer from income losses. Overall, income inequality and poverty are affected little, however, both under the new social welfare system and the alternative reform proposal. 相似文献