Nursing and technology: a love/hate relationship

The fundamental value of information technology in clinical settings is no longer in question, as clinicians enter and retrieve information in order to deliver care and the benefit of ubiquitous availability to clinical data using computers cannot be overplayed. The question now is how to increase adoption, improve productivity, and support transformational changes in health care delivery. It is important to get the interplay between people, process, and technology right for successful implementations which support care transformation. We must lead projects with the clinical practice changes being enabled by the technology, and then ensure the technology supports the practice change. Nurse leaders must consider letting the quality improvement process drive and define when and how technology is used, running our projects as practice changes and not IT implementations, with nursing sponsors owning the projects and leading the charge.     

Commitment,first-mover-, and second-mover advantage

We identify circumstances under which a firm with a first-mover advantage may get leapfrogged by a follower. At the market stage we assume a Stackelberg structure, i.e. the leader commits to a quantity and the follower reacts to it. We allow the owners of both firms to select the internal organization and the production technology before quantities are set. That is, leader and follower can additionally use two commitment strategies alternatively or in combination: investing in R&D and delegating quantity decisions to managers. Despite the symmetry of options for the two firms, we find that there is a unique equilibrium in which both firms invest in process R&D, only the follower delegates, and the follower can overcome the first-mover advantage of the quantity leader and obtain a higher profit than the leader. Our analysis reveals that there are some important differences between the two commitment devices “cost-reducing R&Dt” and “delegation to managers”.      

Regulations,Institutions, and Commitment: Comparative Studies of Telecommunications

Journal of Regulatory Economics -     

Uncertainty, Commitment, and Optimal Taxation

This paper examines the optimal tax design problem in the presence of wage uncertainty. The wage has a continuous distribution, individuals are ex ante identical, preferences are separable in labor supply and goods, public policy aims at providing the population with social insurance, and the only restriction on the tax instruments is that emanating from lack of public observability of realized wages and labor supplies. We show that optimal tax structures depend crucially on whether it is labor supply or goods that consumers have to commit to before the resolution of uncertainty. Specifically, we prove that, in the absence of commitment, the social insurance problem collapses to the traditional optimal tax problem. Second, if labor supply is precommitted, it would be possible to effect a first-best outcome. Third, commitment to goods would make indirect taxation a useful instrument of tax policy even in the presence of a general income tax; it requires differential tax treatment of committed and noncommitted goods. Finally, if preferences are separable between the two types of goods, precommitted goods must be taxed at a uniform rate lower than that on the noncommitted goods.     

UK Utility Regulation: Licences, Commitment and Judicial Review

Abstract ** :  This paper analyses critically the claim made by Levy and Spiller that, in the context of UK utility regulation, licences operate as a 'technology of commitment'. The functional logic of delegation which underpins much principal–agent analyses is discussed, together with the credibility problem emerging from a divergence between a principal's long‐term and short‐term policies. Levy and Spiller contend that the UK has a successful model of utility regulation in part because of the use of licences which restrict the regulator from deviating from the broad substantive principles settled at the time of vesting. This contention is examined through the detailed consideration of five judicial review cases which have cast light on how, and to what extent, the licences restrict regulatory discretion .     

Monetary Policy,Expectations and Commitment*

Commitment in monetary policy leads to equilibria that are superior to those from optimal discretionary policies. A number of interest‐rate reaction functions and instrument rules have been proposed to implement or approximate commitment policy. We assess these rules in terms of whether they lead to a rational expectations equilibrium that is both locally determinate and stable under adaptive learning by private agents. A reaction function that appropriately depends explicitly on private sector expectations performs particularly well on both counts.     

Managing Foreign Direct Investment: Commitment, Deterrence, And Diversion

The paper models the multinational choice between foreign direct investment in and exporting to a domestic market as an equilibrium outcome of strategic play between domestic and foreign firms. Two cases are considered, one in which the domestic firm can precommit to output levels (as, for example, through investment in a distribution network), and one in which such precommitment is not possible. The domestic firm's strategy in the case of precommitment includes aggressive efforts to deter or divert foreign investment and results in fewer observed equilibria with foreign investment than would otherwise occur. Tariffs designed to switch the foreign decision from exporting to direct investment may lead instead to monopolization of the market by the domestic firm.     

Asymmetric Information,Auditing Commitment,and Economic Growth

We analyze in this paper the growth and welfare consequences stemming from the lack of auditing commitment in a credit market with costly state verification. By studying two endogenous growth models, one of which allows lenders to commit to costly auditing strategies, whereas the other does not, we show that the inability to commit serves as a source of informational friction that results in more stringent contractual terms, which, in turn, result in lower capital accumulation, growth, and welfare. From the policy perspective, our analysis suggests a new micro‐economic channel through which institutional failings hinder economic growth and social welfare.     

Mutual Insurance,Individual Savings,and Limited Commitment

We examine a dynamic model of mutual insurance when households can also engage in self-insurance by storage. We assume that there is no enforcement mechanism, so that any insurance is informal and must be self-enforcing. We show that consumption allocations satisfy a modified Euler condition and that an enhanced storage technology can either improve or diminish welfare. Furthermore we show that the ex ante transfers introduced into dynamic informal insurance models recently by Gauthier et al. (Gauthier, C., Poitevin, M., and González, P. (1997). Journal of Economic Theory76, 106–144) are only used here in the first period, with the role of ex ante transfers being replaced by differential individual storage. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C61, C73, D90, E21.     

预期、不可置信的承诺与政策失效——来自房地产行业的实证检验

本文结合中国房地产市场的典型事实,通过建立一个完全信息动态博弈模型与实证研究,分析了公众预期对经济政策效果的影响。文章的结论表明,由于政策效果的事前不可观测与事后执行当中的逆转,房地产调控政策成为不可置信的承诺;在社会公众理性预期的基础上,政策承诺的不可信导致调控政策失效;预期与政策承诺的不可信是房价的G ranger因,且三者之间存在长期的均衡关系,预期与政策承诺的不可置信性对房地产价格有着长期的正向动态影响,且随着时间的推移其影响逐渐增加。     

Love,war and cultures: a reply to my commentators

The purpose of this short reply is to consider the issue of the evolution of the exceptional human intellectual capabilities which has been the focus of the majority of the comments to my article “love, war and culture: an institutional approach to human evolution” all published in the April 2013 of the Journal of Bioeconomics. All the contributions are submitted to the test of two plausibility conditions. The first requires that the explanation of the emergence of human capabilities should rely on circumstances peculiar, or better unique, to human evolution. The second states that the explanation should not rely on factors that require the pre-existence of these capabilities. The claim, advanced in this short article, is that only the “sexual subsidy hypothesis” satisfies these conditions.     

Commitment in sequential auctioning: advance listings and threshold prices

This paper models sequential auctioning of two perfect substitutes by a strategic seller, who learns about demand from the first-auction price. The seller holds the second auction only when the remaining demand is strong enough to cover her opportunity cost. Bidding in anticipation of such a contingent future auction is characterized, including a sufficient condition for existence of an invertible (increasing symmetric pure-strategy) bidding equilibrium that facilitates the seller’s learning. A unique invertible bidding equilibrium exists for the Dutch auction format, but only when the second auction is sufficiently discounted by the bidders. In the equilibrium, high-valuation bidders shade their bids down as if the second auction were guaranteed. To counter such strategic bidding, the seller would value ex-ante commitment to hold the second auction less often. Three forms of such commitment are analyzed: commitment to list future auctions in advance, commitment to not hold the second auction unless the first price exceeds a publicly announced threshold, and commitment to a reserve-price in the second auction. I would like to thank Georgios Katsenos, Thomas Jeitschko, Miguel Villas-Boas, George Deltas, and an anonymous referee for thorough and insightful feedback.     

Going postal: State capacity and violent dispute resolution

Scholars have long tried to understand the conditions under which actors choose to use violent versus non-violent means to settle disputes, and many argue that violence is more likely in weakly-institutionalized settings. Yet, there is little evidence showing that increases in state capacity lowers the use of violent informal institutions to resolve disputes. Utilizing a novel dataset of violence—specifically, duels—across American states in the 19th century, we use the spread of federal post offices as an identification strategy to investigate the importance of state capacity for the incidence of violent dispute resolution. We find that post office density is a strong, consistent, and negative predictor of dueling behavior. Our evidence contributes to a burgeoning literature on the importance of state capacity for development outcomes.     

Economic Surplus,Social Reproduction,Nurturance and Love

This paper examines the contributions of James Ronald Stanfield to social and political economy. We start the analysis with Stanfield’s contribution to institution building through his education of PhD students, building a graduate program in political economy, and through the associations of social and political economy. Then we go on to scrutinise his creative developments and applications of the notions of economic surplus and social reproduction. This is followed by his extensive work on Karl Polanyi and the disembedded economy. Finally we explore his path-breaking analysis of the great capitalist restoration, the nurturance gap and love. Stanfield was one of the greatest institutionalists and social economists of the last hundred years, and these four areas of energetic creativity are his prime achievements in the area.

     

Love, war and cultures: an institutional approach to human evolution

Love, war and culture have all played an important role in the evolution of human institutions and they have been characterized by complex relationships. War can select unselfish groups ready to sacrifice themselves for the love of their communities that they recognize to be culturally different from the others. At the same time, horizontal cultural differentiation cannot be taken for granted. Culture is the outcome of long evolutionary processes. It requires some human specific characteristics, including a large brain, that are likely to have been influenced by sexual selection and by the peculiar structure of human love affairs. Thus, if war may have generated love, also the reverse may be true: by favoring the development of human culture, love may have produced the conditions for war among culturally differentiated groups. In turn, war may have co-evolved with group solidarity only under the prevailing social arrangements of hunting and gathering economies. In general, human relations have been influenced by the prevailing features of the goods (private, public and positional) that have characterized production in different stages of history. They have been embedded in institutions involving very different levels of inequality, ranging from mostly egalitarian hunting and gathering societies to typically hierarchical agrarian societies and to wealth-differentiated industrial societies. The perspectives of the present-day knowledge-intensive economy can also be seen through the same institutional approach to human evolution. The different nature of contemporary production processes involves a new set of alternative possible arrangements that have different implications for social (in)equality and different capabilities to satisfy basic human needs.     

Commitment in regulation: Defense contracting and extensions to price caps

Department of Defense regulation of weapons contracting uses incentive devices common to public utility regulation. This paper examines parallels between fixed-price contracts in weapons acquisition and the use of price caps to motivate public utilities. It uses defense contracting experience to identify limits to the efficiency and administrability benefits one can expect adoption of a price caps regime to produce in practice.