Capitalism and democracy in the 21st Century: from the managed to the entrepreneurial economy*

 This paper explains how and why the developed countries are undergoing a fundamental shift away from a managed economy and towards an entrepreneurial economy. This shift is shaping the development of western capitalism and has triggered a shift in government policies away from constraining the freedom of business to contract through regulation, public ownership and antitrust towards a new set of enabling policies which foster the creation and commercialization of new knowledge. The empirical evidence from a cross-section of countries over time suggests that those countries that have experienced a greater shift from the managed to the entrepreneurial economy have had lower levels of unemployment.     

Viability of pay-as-you-go systems

When the dependency ratio inactive/active increases to intolerable proportions, the question arises as to how and when pay-as-you-go social security systems can be controlled so as to safeguard a decent way of life to everyone. Between uncertainty linked to wages and the interest rate, and room to manœuvre the age of retirement and the immediate transfer from workers to pensioners, not just any route permits this objective. The set of those which do is here delineated (the viability kernel tube), and the operations at any time necessary to control trajectories so as they remain in this set are identified (the regulation map). Finally, the flexibility necessary to avoid failure, from any state reached by the pay-as-you-go system, is inferred in timing and magnitude.     

Interactive expectations

In modeling expectation formation, economic agents are usually viewed as forming expectations adaptively or in accordance with some rationality postulate. We offer an alternative nonlinear model where agents exchange their opinions and information with each other. Such a model yields multiple equilibria, or attracting distributions, that are persistent but subject to sudden large jumps. Using German Federal Statistical Office economic indicators and German IFO Poll expectational data, we show that this kind of model performs well in simulation experiments. Focusing upon producers' expectations in the consumption goods sector, we also discover evidence that structural change in the interactive process occurred over the period of investigation (1970–1998). Specifically, interactions in expectation formation seem to have become less important over time. RID="*" ID="*"We would like to thank Ulrich Witt, Director of the Evolutionary Economics Unit, The Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Jena, Germany, for providing the intellectual stimulus for this project and arranging the necessary financial support from the Max Planck Society to facilitate our collaboration. Thanks are also due to the IFO Institute for providing the data for this study. However, the usual caveat applies.     

Uncertainty and the size distribution of rewards from innovation

 Previous research has shown that the distribution of profit outcomes from technological innovations is highly skew. This paper builds upon those detailed findings to ask: what stochastic processes can plausibly be inferred to have generated the observed distributions? After reviewing the evidence, this paper reports on several stochastic model simulations, including a pure Gibrat random walk with monthly changes approximating those observed for high-technology startup company stocks and a more richly specified model blending internal and external market uncertainties. The most highly specified simulations suggest that the set of profit potentials tapped by innovators is itself skew-distributed and that the number of entrants into innovation races is more likely to be independent of market size than stochastically dependent upon it.     

Theoretical perspectives on strategic environmental management

Strategic Environmental Management (SEM) incorporates into firms' core strategies the transformation of products and processes that they believe an environmentally concerned society will increasingly demand. Significant threads have to do with the discovery of cost savings and market opportunities from reducing environmental impacts. SEM, like the environmental regulation hypothesis associated with Michael Porter, implies that society's efforts to reduce external environmental costs often lead to identification of hitherto-ignored or undeveloped profit possibilities. This would be surprising from the standpoint of neoclassical economic theory, to the extent that SEM utilizes available information about the potential costs and benefits of projects. Within the framework of evolutionary, capabilities-based theories of the firm, however, this discovery and its exploitation in SEM make perfect sense. Capabilities theory would imply that firms' intrinsic path dependence may previously have obscured such opportunities. This paper examines the theory of SEM, its implications for neoclassical and capabilities theories of the firm, and survey results drawn from the author's work with member companies in a regional pollution prevention roundtable. RID="*" IDI have enjoyed the able and insightful research assistance of Justin Vernon. Cooperation from the companies that participated in the survey, and financial support from Allegheny College and its Center for Economic and Environmental Development, are gratefully acknowledged. Reviewers for this journal provided numerous, valuable suggestions. Responsibility for the material herein remains mine alone.     

Democracy and capitalism: Are they compatible in the long-run?

Starting from a discussion of Schumpeter's analysis of the relationships of capitalism, socialism and democracy, it is shown that, in a complex society, democracy is only compatible with a decentralized market economy with safe property rights. But in time democracy shows a tendency to weaken the capitalist system by more and more regulations and an ever-increasing share of government (including the social security system) in GDP. This tendency is a consequence of political competition because of the development of interest groups and the presence of rationally uninformed voters. It leads to a weakening of efficiency, investment, innovation and thus to lower growth rates of GDP. But in time forces opposing this development arise. First, because of the negative consequences of growing government the welfare and regulatory state is bound to move into a crisis in the long run. Thus innovative politicians have a chance to win the support of a majority of voters for reform projects, who perceive finally the ever-increasing burden of higher taxes and regulations and realize that these burdens are not worth the benefits bestowed on them. In doing so, they may face, however, the competition of ideologies. Second, there are other states with lower taxes and less unnecessary regulations which show higher growth rates of GDP, and gain thus relative advantages in international political and military competition since they can command greater resources with the passage of time. To maintain their relative international power position, reforms are thus considered as necessary by rulers. This may be helped by pressure resulting from comparisons of the standards of living done by their citizens.     

Numerical solution of dynamic oligopoly games with capital investment

Summary. This paper discusses how numerical techniques may be used to solve the simultaneous functional equations that arise in general dynamic stochastic games. Unlike the conventional linear-quadratic approach, our methods may be used to address general model specifications that may include non-quadratic objective functions, non-linear equations of motion, and constraints on decision variables. As an illustration, we apply our methods to a dynamic duopoly game in which competing firms play short-run quantity game subject to production cost that can be lowered through investment in capital stock in the long run. Received: June 1, 2000; revised version: December 27, 2000     

Capitalism and democracy at a crossroads: the civilizational dimension

This paper evaluates Schumpeter's grand vision as reflected in his Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, and elaborates it in conjunction with the so-called “globalization” trends characteristic of the wake of the twenty-first century. In addition to the evolutionary nature of his methodology, the institutionalist dimension of Schumpeter's definitions are brought to light. A case is made for a fundamental process of “uncreative destruction” as far as the institutional setup of the economy is concerned. The contention of this paper is that there is ample support in Schumpeterian analysis for a counterpoint to the liberal thesis that envisages the worldwide spread of individualism, market economies, and democratic forms of government.     

Industrial policy, competence blocs and the role of science in economic development

Government is studied as supporter of science and of the transformation of scientific discoveries into new technology and firm formation. The importance of scientific discovery outside academe is recognized as is the experimental nature of the transformation process entailing frequent business failure. Competence bloc theory is used to understand the minimum set of actors with competence needed for the incentive structure to be complete and the risk of losing the winners minimized. Competence bloc analysis also helps clarify the theoretical foundations of industrial policy and useful roles for science parks. I find that to succeed as a catalyst for industrial competitiveness park management should be less concerned with science and technology and more with the economics of the transformation process.     

Satiation in an evolutionary model of structural economic dynamics

This paper presents the problem of satiation of consumption and technology in relation to a model of evolutionary endogenous growth. The model represents an attempt to provide an evolutionary economic micro foundation to Pasinetti's scheme of the structural economic dynamics of an economy that is based on only labour and knowledge. The micro foundation is based on a set of rules that makes endogenous the demand coefficients, the labour coefficients, and the number of available sectors. Through process innovations firms increase their productivities with respect to individual goods, but a growth slowdown takes place unless the benefits from specialisation are exploited at still higher levels. Another cause for slowdown is related to an Engelian hierarchy of goods. As the standard of living grows, existing sectors and consumption goods satiate, so new sectors need to be provided by product innovations in a sufficient pace to keep up with the labour that is displaced from old sectors.     

Endogenous fluctuations in the demand for education

Abstract. Enrollment rates to higher education reveal a quite large variation over time which cannot be explained by productivity shocks alone. We develop a human capital investment model in an overlapping generations framework that features endogenous fluctuations in the demand for education. Agents are heterogeneous in their beliefs about future wage differentials. An evolutionary competition between the heterogeneous beliefs determines the fraction of the newborn generation having a certain belief. Costly access to information on the returns to education induces agents to use potentially destabilizing backward looking prediction rules. Only if previous generations experience regret about their human capital investment decisions, will agents choose a more sophisticated prediction rule that dampens the cycle. Access to information becomes key for stable flows to higher education. RID="*" ID="*"We would like to thank Cars Hommes, Florian Wagener, seminar participants at the University of Amsterdam, participants of the workshop on ‘Skill Needs and Labor Market Dynamics’ at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) for helpful discussions, and an editor of this Journal and three anonymous referees for their comments. Tuinstra's research is supported by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) under a MaG-Pionier grant. Neugart acknowledges financial support from the German Ministry of Education. Parts of the research were done while Tuinstra was visiting the WZB and when Neugart was visiting CeNDEF. Correspondence to: The research for this paper was done while the first author was affiliated with the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung.     

Persistent unemployment and co-ordination issues: an evolutionary perspective

Abstract. In this paper we look at unemployment as a phenomenon which reflects the co-ordination problems that characterize out-of-equilibrium processes of adjustment. The analysis carried out shifts the focus from structural factors to the economic process. It shows that unemployment cannot be satisfactorily explained – and policy interventions devised – by focusing only on specific characters of the technology or confining the analysis to structural factors concerning the labour market. The co-ordination mechanisms of adjustment processes rather than the fundamentals of the economy appear, in this light, as the main determinants of differences in unemployment trends in different economies; and monetary policy comes back to the center of the stage as an essential element of the working of these mechanisms. RID="*" ID="*" We thank anonymous referees for their very useful comments, and Elena Lega for the helpful support to the simulation analysis carried out. Correspondence to: J.-L. Gaffard     

Schumpeter and the revival of evolutionary economics: an appraisal of the literature

During the last two decades we have seen a revival of interest in the works of Joseph Schumpeter and “evolutionary” ideas in economics more generally. A professional society honouring Schumpeter's name has been founded, and linked to it we have had for more than fifteen years now a professional journal devoted to this stream of thought. However, it has been argued that, despite these developments, the link between Schumpeter's own work and the more recent contributions to evolutionary economics is in fact rather weak. This paper considers this claim. Based on an analysis of Schumpeter's contribution to economics the paper presents an overview and assessment of the more recent literature in this area. It is argued that although there are important differences between Schumpeter's work and some of the more recent contributions, there nevertheless remains a strong common core that clearly distinguishes the evolutionary stream from other approaches (such as, for instance, so-called “new growth theory”). RID="*" ID="*" Many people have contributed to this paper in various ways. Jon Hekland at the Norwegian Research Council started it all by asking me to make an overview of the contribution from “evolutionary economics” to our understanding of contemporary economies. Several people helped me on the way by supplying written material, comments and suggestions, and I am indebted to all of them. Brian Arthur, Stan Metcalfe, Keith Pavitt, Erik Reinert, Paolo Saviotti and Bart Verspagen may be particularly mentioned. A preliminary version was presented at the conference “Industrial R&D and Innovation Policy Learning – Evolutionary Perspectives and New Methods for Impact Assessment” organised by the Norwegian Research Council (“SAKI”) at Leangkollen, Asker, April 18–19.2002. I wish to thank the discussant, Tor Jakob Klette, and the participants at the conference for useful feedback. Moreover I have benefited from comments and suggestions from the editors and referees of this journal. The final responsibility is mine, however. Economic support from the Norwegian Research Council (“SAKI”) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Sophisticated imitation in cyclic games

Individuals belonging to two large populations are repeatedly randomly matched to play a cyclic game such as Matching Pennies. Between matching rounds, individuals sometimes change their strategy after observing a finite sample of other outcomes within their population. Individuals from the same population follow the same behavioral rule. In the resulting discrete time dynamics the unique Nash equilibrium is unstable. However, for sample sizes greater than one, we present an imitation rule where long run play cycles closely around the equilibrium.     

Regulation of the evolution of the architecture of a network by tensors operating on coalitions of actors

Socio-economic networks, neural networks and genetic networks describe collective phenomena through constraints relating actions of several actors, coalitions of these actors and multilinear connectionist operators acting on the set of actions of each coalition. We provide a class of control systems governing the evolution of actions, coalitions and multilinear connectionist operators under which the architecture of the network remains viable. The controls are the “viability multipliers” of the “resource space” in which the constraints are defined. They are involved as “tensor products” of the actions of the coalitions and the viability multiplier, allowing us to encapsulate in this dynamical and multilinear framework the concept of Hebbian learning rules in neural networks in the form of “multi-Hebbian” dynamics in the evolution of connectionist operators. They are also involved in the evolution of coalitions through the “cost” of the constraints under the viability multiplier regarded as a price.     

Market institutions and economic evolution

Our cognitive limitations cause us to rely on institutions to guide reasonable behaviour; market institutions reduce the costs of search, negotiation, and monitoring entailed in making single transactions. The making of markets requires an investment of immaterial capital, the major share of which typically is provided by those who expect to be very active on one side of the market. This `external organisation' provides producers with information for the development of new products; by simplifying transactions it also allows consumers greater scope for developing consumption capabilities. Thus the evolution of institutions guides the evolution of goods and services.     

Beyond natural selection and divine intervention: The Lamarckian implication of Adam Smith's invisible hand

Adam Smith's invisible hand metaphor (IH) is examined in light of two different accounts of the origin of traits: Charles Darwin's theory of evolutionary optimization and William Paley's theory of divine intervention. Smith's stand supersedes both accounts. For Smith, intermediating drives, such as the sexual one, neither arise accidentally and favored according to their fitness à la Darwin nor planted by the Deity à la Paley. For Smith, such drives are adopted in light of their ultimate end. Smith did not provide an account of how the drives are connected to their far-reaching, invisible beneficial ends or why do agents become dimly aware of that causality.     

Multimarket contact and inter-firm cooperation in R&D

Research joint ventures (RJVs) have been widely acclaimed for their alleged ability to restore private incentives to undertake R&D. Economists have, however, also sounded the alarm concerning the opportunities RJVs may create for collusion between partners. The danger of anti-competitive behavior increases significantly when repeated R&D collaboration occurs between firms that also “meet” in many product markets. This phenomenon is shown to be present in a large set of U.S.-based RJVs. The question is about the incentive trade-off: Are the alleged advantages of RJVs in terms of enhancing incentives for R&D sufficient to overcome the potential disadvantages in terms of decreasing incentives for R&D due to simultaneous multiproject and multimarket contact? Significant foreign participation, high technological and market uncertainties, and the set up of “porous” RJVs may operate as a check to anti-competitive behavior.     

The denominations of US coins: a case of institutional evolution

Abstract. The system of denominations of US coins, which the paper treats as a quasi-genetic trait of the US monetary system, has not been constant since inception but rather has evolved over time in the sense of being subject to innovation and selection. However, all the innovations have disappeared, as have a number of the original denominations. Abstract theories of optimal systems of denominations provide a good explanation of one selection factor, but other important influences include limiting the number of separate denominations and accommodating the requirements of decimal counting. However, even some innovations that ultimately disappeared survived for decades.     

Technology transfer in United States universities

This paper examines the role of offices of technology transfer (OTT) in 12 U.S. universities in 1998 in commercializing research results in the form of patents, licenses, and start-ups of new companies. We study the organization and place of OTTs within the university structure, the process of technology transfer, and the staffing and funding of the office. Data were collected through a mail questionnaire followed up through telephone interviews. We also conducted a statistical analysis of data for 170 U.S. universities, hospitals, and research institutes for the period 1991–1996. Our findings suggest that technology transfer from universities to the commercial sector needs to be understood in its broader context. The primary purpose of a technology transfer program is for the university to assist its researchers in disseminating research results for the public good. Success in this endeavor is only partially reflected in income generated for the university or the number of business start-ups. The degree of success depends not only on the nature of the interface between the university and the business community but also on the receptivity in the surrounding community as well as the culture, organization, and incentives within the universities themselves.