陕西省水权交易模式探析

水权交易是我国利用市场机制促进环保节水的方向,陕西省水权交易的基础性工作也已经展开.虽然陕北、关中和陕南都有水权交易的需求,但三地交易的目的不同,交易方式和制度机制设计也应当有所不同.陕北以跨流域水权转换来解决水资源不足的问题,关中以跨行业的水权交易来提高灌区的用水效率,陕南以跨区域的水权交易来建立市场化的生态补偿机制,提供生态保护的长久动力.     

最严格水资源管理制度的落实与《水法》的修订

最严格水资源管理制度是中国确保水安全的基本制度,包括用水总量控制制度、用水效率控制制度和水功能区限制纳污制度。在依法治国和依法治水的背景下,《水法》作为落实最严格水资源管理制度的基本法律,需要根据落实这三项制度的要求对相关条款和制度进行修订和完善。其中,落实用水总量控制制度需要《水法》完善水量分配和使用制度;落实用水效率控制制度需要《水法》建立水权交易机制,改革水价制度,健全节水管理制度;落实水功能区限制纳污制度需要《水法》完善水资源和水域的保护制度。     

广东水权制度改革与水市场建设思路

水权是水资源管理机制的重要构成部分。在水资源短缺的情况下,建立可交易的水权制度能够提高水资源在不同用水部门或用水地区的配置效率。本文在剖析广东省现行水权制度的基础上,探讨了合理配置水资源的水权制度,提出了建设水市场的建议。     

论我国水权制度创新

现行水权制度的缺陷为 :一是缺乏提高用水效率的激励机制和低效率过量用水的约束机制 ;二是存在市场失灵和政府失灵。加强水权制度研究与加快水权制度建设是解决水问题的关键。现代可交易水权制度的建立与完善 ,将为缺水地区的大开发和发展起到极为重要的推动作用     

关于我国水银行制度建设几个问题的思考

水银行作为水权租赁和水量买卖双方的中介,是调剂用水余缺、节约水交易成本和促进水资源可持续利用的一个有效工具。水银行制度建设要解决与水资源行政主管部门的关系、规避运作风险及化解交易外部性等三个大问题。作为一个经济组织,水银行要独立于水资源行政主管部门,水资源行政主管部门可以运用行政手段和经济手段来管理水银行,还可以参加水银行交易以满足公共利益的用水需求。在水银行交易出现“空头”,即买入量小于卖出量时,可以运用休耕、水库余水、地下水、节水和水管部门“公开市场业务”等方法来调整,或在出现“空头”之前就采取向卖方预订一定水量的选择权等方法。水交易具有很强的外部性,降低水银行交易外部性的方法有预防性措施和补偿性措施。     

论水权交易

水权交易制度是促进水资源合理开发利用的有效途径。在我国,水权交易制度刚刚起步,相关立法尚未到位。文章在分析探讨水权交易基本理论、我国水权交易现状的基础上,提出了关于加快水权交易立法进程、培育水权交易市场、完善政府服务和管制的几点建议。以期建立适合我国国情的水权交易制度。     

水权交易管理比较研究

水权交易是解决水资源短缺问题,进行水资源优化配置的重要手段之一,我国的水权交易尚在探索阶段。文章通过对中外水权交易的比较研究,得出水权交易的关键问题为初始水权配置、水权交易制度和水权交易价格。由此提出了我国发展水权交易的建议：建立与完善相应的水权交易制度;加强流域统一管理,进行水权初始分配;引入水权期权交易方式。     

试论水权转让过程中农民用水权益的保护

我国水资源严重短缺的基本国情使农村的供水与用水的矛盾越来越突出,加上城市和工业对水的需求日益扩大,农业水权的转让逐渐成为一种趋势。在农业水权转让的过程中,农民用水权益的保护成为了亟须重视的问题。目前我国农业水权转让制度不健全,使农业水权在向其他领域转让过程中出现了损害农民用水权益的现象。因而,分析农业水权在转让过程中对农民用水权益的影响因素,从而提出保护对策,为完善农民用水权益保障机制提供基础。     

我国水权交易制度变迁及交易市场中政府的角色定位

我国现行水资源使用制度的不完善致使水资源的利用矛盾重重,面临的是一种“内卷”问题,这要求我们探索建立一种新的水权制度。水权是用水主体依法取得的基于消费性用途的配水量权,针对该水权概念,水价只是水产品价格中的资源水价。水权制度本身的型构是一个缓慢地演进、发育和成型的过程,而并非只是一个国家简单设立、界定和实施的短期过程。所以,政府的行为须谨慎。     

东阳义乌首例水权交易目前看法各异

水权交易也是生态补偿的一种方式。此次来浙江调研,东阳义乌的水权交易也是记者关注的话题。令人意外的是,这桩几年前的创新性水权交易如今却成了交易双方的难言之隐。     

总收益最大的交易策略求解算法

本文应用动态规划的原理,讨论了多期投资决策中基于总收益率最大的交易策略的设计和实现问题。通过比较随机交易方法、局部最优方法和全局最优方法下的投资表现,在交易费用存在的情况下,基于动态规划的算法给出问题的全局最优解,该方法的优越性随着交易费用的增长而加强。     

水权交易第三方效应的类型和成因初探

水权交易是提高水资源配置效率和利用效率的有效途径,但交易过程中第三方效应的存在是对水权市场的严峻挑战。在研读大量国内外文献研究的基础上,探讨水权交易第三方效应的内涵,并尝试从作用主体、时间跨度、作用机理、波及领域等不同角度对水权交易第三方效应进行分类,揭示水权交易第三方效应的丰富外延,最后分析水权交易第三方效应产生的原因。     

WATER BANKING AND RESTORATION OF ENDANGERED SPECIES HABITAT: AN APPLICATION TO THE SNAKE RIVER

Most river basins have experienced development of water projects to promote flood control, recreation, and hydropower and agricultural production. Though the projects helped establish stable economies, there have been adverse impacts to the natural environment and wildlife that reside in these river basins. One of the key policy tools for habitat restoration is management of instream flows. Alternative water banking policies for restoring habitat are compared using a spatial optimization model to identify which policies work best to augment instream flows for habitat restoration. Results indicate that policy goals dictate what type of water bank is preferred.     

CHANGES IN WATER ALLOCATION MECHANISMS FOR CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE

Existing institutions allocating water in California reflect prior appropriation water rights established when water was abundant. These allocation rules queue users and do not encourage water conservation. Increased water scarcity and growing valuation of water's environmental benefits are inducing a transition to water allocation mechanisms that increase water efficiency in agriculture. Transferable rights systems will lead to market-like water allocation, induce farmers to adopt water conservation technology, and may not face strong objection from senior water rights holders. One must weigh the efficiency gains associated with transition from water rights to water markets against the transaction costs associated with installing facilities that enable water exchange and trading .
Transition to water markets may preserve the agricultural sector's well-being while allowing the transfer of some water outside of agriculture—in particular, for environmental benefit. The cost of policies proposed to reduce agricultural water supply while encouraging water trading are inversely related to the extent of trading allowed. The more farmers trade water, the less costly reducing water supply is to agriculture. Policies reducing water supply to Central Valley Project contractors and allowing trading only among these contractors are much more expensive than are policies encouraging trading among all agricultural water users in California .     

DYNAMIC STOCK RETURN–VOLUME RELATION: EVIDENCE FROM EMERGING ASIAN MARKETS

This paper empirically examines the dynamic stock return–volume relations for six emerging Asian markets: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Evidence is found that trading volume Granger causes stock return in quantiles and the causal effects of volume are heterogeneous across quantiles. This shows that volume carries some information to the return and could be interpreted in light of theoretical models. In addition, we find that there is bi‐directional causality between stock return and trading volume in most of the markets. The finding indicates that those Asian emerging markets with different institutions and information flows than more mature markets have present similar causal effects on the stock return–volume relation. Furthermore, the cross‐country evidence shows that the US market helps to predict the returns of the emerging Asian markets.     

ON THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS

This article studies the welfare effects of credit arrangements and how these effects depend on the trading mechanism and inflation. In a competitive market, credit arrangements can be welfare reducing, because high consumption by credit users drives up the price level, reducing consumption by money users who are subject to a binding liquidity constraint. By adopting an optimal trading mechanism, however, these welfare implications can be overturned. Both price discrimination and nonlinear pricing are essential features of an optimal mechanism.     

融资融券交易的市场冲击效应研究——基于中国台湾证券市场的经验与启示

融资融券交易是证券市场的重要组成部分,它的推出会对整个市场产生何种影响是非常值得研究的问题.文章利用中国台湾证券市场的融资融券交易数据,从市场流动性与波动性角度研究融资融券交易对整个市场的冲击效应.研究结果表明,融资买空交易有助于提升整个市场的流动性水平,在一定程度上可以改善市场流动性水平相对不足的状况,但融券卖空交易对市场流动性水平没有显著影响;融资买空与融券卖空交易并未显著影响整个市场的波动性水平.文章建议证券监管部门可以将融资融券交易保证金率作为市场调控工具,通过适时调整保证金率调控整个市场,避免市场出现大幅震荡.     

Water markets design and evidence from experimental economics

Market mechanisms are gaining increasing acceptance all over the world as a way of making more efficient use of scarce water resources. Designing regulatory frameworks that ensure both inter- and intra-temporal efficient allocations is a daunting task, especially if supply is stochastic and there is ample storage capacity. In addition to defining tradable rights, specific provisions must regulate the use of reservoirs. Commonly, water statutes include provisions that establish asymmetries regarding the allocation of water, and market restrictions that ban water trading across different users. In this article, we use data collected in a laboratory to test two specific market regulations included in the 1999 Water reform in Spain. First, junior right holders are not allowed to buy water from senior users. Second, the law does not explicitly define water rights over units left in reservoirs for the following season. Results suggest that trading restrictions among water right holders lead to welfare losses for senior users. It is shown that removing this restriction would increase senior right holders’ benefits, without reducing those of junior users. Results show that defining water rights over saved units across periods would increase the average stock levels of reservoirs, and reduce market price instability. The lessons learned from the Spanish experience are applicable to settings characterized by unstable natural water supply and the availability of large storage facilities.      

Public Goods and Minimum Provision Levels: Does the Institutional Formation Affect Cooperation?*

We investigate experimentally the role of institutional formation on the implementation of a binding minimum contribution level to a public good. Groups either face the minimum level exogenously imposed by a central authority, or are allowed to decide for themselves by means of a group vote whether a minimum level should be implemented. We find that a binding minimum contribution level has a positive and substantially significant effect on cooperation. Interestingly, we do not find an additional positive effect of democracy in the context of our experiment; the minimum‐level intervention is as effective when exogenously implemented as when endogenously chosen.     

Predictability of equity returns during a financial crisis

An occurrence of a market crash or a financial crisis has long been considered a cause of market inefficiency. An inefficient market commonly implies return predictability and the existence of profitable opportunities for traders and speculators. Technical analysis has been a popular tool to identify predictable patterns in asset prices. The usefulness of a large universe of technical trading rules popularized in the existing literature on technical analysis is tested when they are applied to a set of equity markets that are generally considered developed and efficient during the two most recent periods of major financial turmoil: the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2008 global financial crisis. Three major statistical deficiencies that existing studies on return predictability are commonly criticized for – data snooping bias, nonsynchronicity bias and transaction costs – have been incorporated in the analysis. Technical trading rules are largely unable to yield abnormal excess returns over the passive benchmark after data snooping bias, nonsynchronous pricing and transaction costs are accounted for. Chaotic price movements typical for a volatile market during a financial crisis are likely to have an adverse effect on the performance of active trend chasing trading strategies.