Rescue packages and bank lending

This paper examines whether the rescue measures adopted during the global financial crisis helped to sustain the supply of bank lending. The analysis proposes a setup that allows testing for structural shifts in the bank lending equation, and employs a novel dataset covering large international banks headquartered in 14 major advanced economies for the period 1995–2010. While stronger capitalisation sustains loan growth in normal times, banks during a crisis can turn additional capital into greater lending only once their capitalisation exceeds a critical threshold. This suggests that recapitalisations may not translate into greater credit supply until bank balance sheets are sufficiently strengthened.     

Credit risk transfer in U.S. commercial banks: What changed during the 2007–2009 crisis?

Following the debate on the role of credit risk transfer (CRT) in exacerbating the 2007–2009 crisis, this paper investigates the usage and effects of loan sales, securitization, and credit derivatives in U.S. commercial banks over the last decade, with special emphasis on the financial crisis. We find that in times of severe funding constraints, the need to raise financial resources becomes the principal incentive behind CRT. We document some beneficial effects of CRT on the economy, since the funds released through CRT are subsequently invested by banks to sustain credit supply, also in recession. However, we report higher overall riskiness in banks that engage intensively in loans sales and securitization, which translates into higher default rates during the crisis. Interestingly, the benefits and drawbacks of CRT are much stronger for loan sales and securitization than for credit derivatives.     

Banking crises and market discipline: International evidence

This paper analyzes the effect of banking crises on market discipline in an international sample of banks. We also evaluate how bank regulation, supervision, institutions, and crisis intervention policies shape the effect of banking crises on market discipline. We control for unobservable bank, country, and time specific effects using a panel data set of banks from 66 countries around 79 banking crises. The results suggest that on average market discipline weakens after a banking crisis. This weakening is higher in countries where bank regulation, supervision, and institutions promoted market discipline before the banking crisis, and where a more accommodative approach is adopted to resolve it.     

Safer ratios,riskier portfolios: Banks׳ response to government aid

Using novel data on bank applications to the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), we study the effect of government assistance on bank risk taking. Bailed-out banks initiate riskier loans and shift assets toward riskier securities after receiving government support. However, this shift in risk occurs mostly within the same asset class and, therefore, remains undetected by regulatory capital ratios, which indicate improved capitalization at bailed-out banks. Consequently, these banks appear safer according to regulatory ratios, but show an increase in volatility and default risk. These findings are robust to controlling for credit demand and account for selection of TARP recipients by exploiting banks? geography-based political connections as an instrument for bailout approvals.     

A perspective on the symptoms and causes of the financial crisis

Prior to the 2007–2008 financial crisis, banking sector profits were very high but the profitability of financial intermediation was poor. Using a novel model of banking, this article argues that the high profits were achieved through balance sheet expansion and growing default, liquidity, and term risk mismatches between assets and liabilities. As a result, large banks’ financial leverage rose as they became less liquid, setting the conditions for a systemic banking crisis. This article argues that the increase in financial leverage was possible due to misguided changes in the regulatory framework, specifically, the Basel I capital accord and reductions in reserve requirements. Finally, this article overviews and assesses the policy response in the aftermath of the crisis.     

Dynamic debt runs and financial fragility: Evidence from the 2007 ABCP crisis

We use the 2007 asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) crisis as a laboratory to study the determinants of debt runs. Our model features dilution risk: maturing short-term lenders demand higher yields in compensation for being diluted by future lenders, making runs more likely. The model explains the observed tenfold increase in yield spreads leading to runs and the positive relation between yield spreads and future runs. Results from structural estimation show that runs are very sensitive to leverage, asset values, and asset liquidity, but less sensitive to the degree of maturity mismatch, the strength of guarantees, and asset volatility.     

How does capital affect bank performance during financial crises?

This paper empirically examines how capital affects a bank’s performance (survival and market share) and how this effect varies across banking crises, market crises, and normal times that occurred in the US over the past quarter century. We have two main results. First, capital helps small banks to increase their probability of survival and market share at all times (during banking crises, market crises, and normal times). Second, capital enhances the performance of medium and large banks primarily during banking crises. Additional tests explore channels through which capital generates these effects. Numerous robustness checks and additional tests are performed.     

Creditor rights,information sharing,and bank risk taking

Looking at a sample of nearly 2,400 banks in 69 countries, we find that stronger creditor rights tend to promote greater bank risk taking. Consistent with this finding, we also show that stronger creditor rights increase the likelihood of financial crisis. On the plus side, we find that stronger creditor rights are associated with higher growth. In contrast, we find that the benefits of information sharing among creditors appear to be universally positive. Greater information sharing leads to higher bank profitability, lower bank risk, a reduced likelihood of financial crisis, and higher economic growth.     

The credit crisis around the globe: Why did some banks perform better?

Though overall bank performance from July 2007 to December 2008 was the worst since the Great Depression, there is significant variation in the cross-section of stock returns of large banks across the world during that period. We use this variation to evaluate the importance of factors that have been put forth as having contributed to the poor performance of banks during the credit crisis. The evidence is supportive of theories that emphasize the fragility of banks financed with short-term capital market funding. The better-performing banks had less leverage and lower returns immediately before the crisis. Differences in banking regulations across countries are generally uncorrelated with the performance of banks during the crisis, except that large banks from countries with more restrictions on bank activities performed better and decreased loans less. Our evidence poses a substantial challenge to those who argue that poor bank governance was a major cause of the crisis because we find that banks with more shareholder-friendly boards performed significantly worse during the crisis than other banks, were not less risky before the crisis, and reduced loans more during the crisis.     

Paulson's gift

We calculate the costs and benefits of the largest ever US government intervention in the financial sector announced during the 2008 Columbus-day weekend. We estimate that this intervention increased the value of banks’ financial claims by $130 billion (bn) at a taxpayers’ cost of $21–$44 billion with a net benefit between $86 and $109 bn. By looking at the limited cross section, we infer that this net benefit arises from a reduction in the probability of bankruptcy, which we estimate would destroy 22% of the enterprise value. The big winners of the plan were the bondholders of the three former investment banks and Citigroup, while the losers were JP Morgan shareholders and the US taxpayers.     

Does market structure matter on banks’ profitability and stability? Emerging vs. advanced economies

We empirically investigate the effects of market structure on profitability and stability for 1929 banks in 40 emerging and advanced economies over 1999–2008 by incorporating the traditional structure-conduct-performance (SCP) and relative-market-power (RMP) hypotheses. We observe that a greater market share leads to higher bank profitability being biased toward the RMP hypothesis in advanced economies, yet neither of the hypotheses is supported for profitability in emerging economies. The SCP appears to exert a destabilising effect on advanced banks, suggesting that a more concentrated banking system may be vulnerable to financial instability, however, the RMP seems to perform a stabilising effect in both economies. Evidence also highlights that profitability and stability increase with an increased interest-margin revenues in a less competitive environment for emerging markets. Overall, these results suggest that although policy measures to promote competition may dampen economic rent, excessive implementation may have an undesired destabilising impact on banks.     

Operational risk

This paper provides an economic and mathematical characterization of operational risk useful for clarifying the issues related to estimation and the determination of economic capital. The insights for this characterization originate in the corporate finance literature. Operational risk is subdivided into two types, either: (i) the risk of a loss due to the firm’s operating technology, or (ii) the risk of a loss due to agency costs. These two types of operational risks generate loss processes with different economic characteristics. We argue that the current methodology for the determination of economic capital for operational risk is overstated. It is biased high because the computation omits the bank’s net present value (NPV) generating process. We also show that although it is conceptually possible to estimate the operational risk processes’ parameters using only market prices, the non-observability of the firm’s value makes this an unlikely possibility, except in rare cases. Instead, we argue that data internal to the firm, in conjunction with standard hazard rate estimation procedures, provides a more fruitful alternative.     

The performance of banks around the receipt and repayment of TARP funds: Over-achievers versus under-achievers

In this paper, we look at how the pre-crisis health of banks is related to the probability of receiving and repaying TARP capital. We find that financial performance characteristics that are related to the probability of receiving TARP funds differ for the healthiest (“over-achiever”) versus the least healthy (“under-achiever”) banks. We find that TARP under-achievers have some, but not consistent, weaknesses in income production. These banks also are experiencing liquidity issues as customers, shut out of public debt markets, get bank loans through drawdowns of loan commitments. Unlike TARP under-achievers, TARP over-achievers’ loans are performing well. Yet, liquidity issues (from low levels of liquid assets and core deposits and drawdowns of loan commitments) hurt the abilities of these banks to continue their lending. Differences between under-achiever and over-achiever banks are also found for repayment and deadbeat TARP banks.     

Financial dollarization: The role of foreign-owned banks and interest rates

Why in many economies households and firms borrow and make deposits in foreign currency? Expanding on the existing literature, our framework addresses this question allowing for interest rate differentials and access to foreign funds to play a role in explaining this process of asset substitution or financial dollarization. Using a newly compiled data set on transition economies and employing a standard panel as well as a panel-VAR methodology we find that increasing access to foreign funds leads to higher credit dollarization, while it decreases deposit dollarization. Interest rate differentials matter for the dollarization of both loans and deposits.     

Identifying the effects of a lender of last resort on financial markets: Lessons from the founding of the fed

We use the founding of the Federal Reserve to identify the effects of a lender of last resort. We examine stock return and interest rate volatility during September and October, when markets were vulnerable because of financial stringency from the harvest. Stock volatility fell by 40% and interest rate volatility by more than 70% following the monetary regime change. The drop is insignificant if major panic years are omitted from the analysis, however. Because business cycle downturns occurred in the same year as financial crises, our results suggest that the existence of the Federal Reserve reduced liquidity risk.     

Bank capital regulation and credit supply

Banks can meet the need to increase their capital ratio either by issuing new equity or by reducing loans. It is generally known that banks prefer to reduce assets due to the high cost of equity. With a simple banking model we show that, if incumbent shareholders are to benefit, banks may prefer to reduce loans, even though they can recapitalize by issuing new equity without any cost. The result holds when banks hold relatively small amounts of long-term loans, or when the economy is in downturn.