Analyst target price revisions and institutional herding

We document that institutional herding behavior is associated with analyst target price revisions even after controlling for the effects of analyst recommendations and earnings forecasts, and provide insights into the price impact of institutional herding. Institutional investors tend to buy the same stocks following an upward target price revision and sell the same stocks following a downward price revision. Moreover, institutional investors tend to overreact to analysts' target price revisions, which exacerbates the mispricing in the stock market. Such price destabilizing effect is particularly pronounced for herding among investment firms.     

The term structure of mutual fund herding

This paper investigates institutional herding behaviours in the U.S. Treasury market. We find that the level of herding is higher for bonds with a longer time to maturity and this pattern is significant only for buy herding, not sell herding. This term structure of herding is stronger for funds with a shorter investment horizon. These patterns remain strong for Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities and for Treasuries with high coupon rates. Overall, our findings support investors' short-termism as a channel for the term structure of herding and are inconsistent with other herding explanations, such as spurious herding, reputational concerns and information cascades.     

Individual and institutional herding and the impact on stock returns: Evidence from Taiwan stock market

Using high frequency intraday data, this paper investigates the herding behavior of institutional and individual investors in the Taiwan stock market. The study finds evidence of herding by both investors but a stronger herding tendency among institutional than among individual investors. Institutional investors herd more on firms with small capitalizations and lower turnovers and they follow positive feedback strategies. The portfolios that institutional investors herd buy outperform those they sell by an average of 1.009% during the 20 days after intense trading episodes. By contrast, individual investors herd more on firms with small sizes and higher turnovers, and they crowd to buy (sell) stocks with negative (positive) past returns. The portfolios that individual investors herd buy underperform those they sell by an average of − 0.829% during the following 20 days. Moreover, these return differences of both investors are more pronounced under a market with higher pressure and among small stocks. These findings suggest that the herding of institutional investors speeds up the price-adjustment process and is more likely to be driven by correlated private information, while individual herding is most likely to be driven by behavior and emotions.     

International Evidence on Institutional Trading Behavior and Price Impact

This study characterizes institutional trading in international stocks from 37 countries during 1997 to 1998 and 2001. We find that the underlying market condition is a major determinant of the price impact and, more importantly, of the asymmetry between price impacts of institutional buy and sell orders. In bullish markets, institutional purchases have a bigger price impact than sells; however, in the bearish markets, sells have a higher price impact. This differs from previous findings on price impact asymmetry. Our study further suggests that price impact varies depending on order characteristics, firm‐specific factors, and cross‐country differences.     

Retail investor attention and herding behavior

In this paper, we argue that when individual investors can obtain information from public resources such as Google search, the degree of investor attention to a particular underlying company is positively linked with herding behavior for retail investors. Empirical results confirm that Google Search Volume Index can be a proxy for the information demand of uninformed individual investors. Empirical evidence also shows that reaching the price limit generates an attention-grabbing effect. Further, in general, small cap firms generate more intensive individual investor herding. In addition, we explore the asymmetric impact of abnormal search volume index on individual investor herding behavior for bull and bear markets, and confirm that the individual investor buy herding phenomenon is stronger in bull markets, especially for small capitalization firms. In bear markets, with greater price deterioration for large cap firms, we detect herding behavior on the sell side.     

Regulatory pressure and fire sales in the corporate bond market

This paper investigates fire sales of downgraded corporate bonds induced by regulatory constraints imposed on insurance companies. As insurance companies hold over one-third of investment-grade corporate bonds, the collective need to divest downgraded issues may be limited by a scarcity of counterparties. Using insurance company transaction data, we find that insurance companies that are relatively more constrained by regulation are more likely to sell downgraded bonds. Bonds subject to a high probability of regulatory-induced selling exhibit price declines and subsequent reversals. These price effects appear larger during periods when the insurance industry is relatively distressed and other potential buyers' carpital is scarce.     

Size Effects in the Pricing of Corporate Bonds

Large orders for corporate bonds get preferential treatment unlike large orders for stocks on the NYSE. A structural explanation, namely, that the corporate bond market is dealer‐dominated, has been offered for the favorable pricing. In this paper, we offer an additional explanation, namely, that the improved pricing for large orders is due to the net impact such orders have on a market maker's costs. Using a data sample that is substantially free of timing mismatch, we support our assertion by sorting the sample into ‘brokered’ trades, which are trades where the dealer merely crosses buy and sell orders and ‘inventoried’ trades, where the dealer trades out of his inventory. We find that large orders raise information costs, but lower inventory costs for ‘inventoried’ trades. The net result is a smaller price advantage than received by large orders on ‘brokered’ trades which are not subject to these costs.     

Leading the herd: evidence from mutual funds’ buy and sell decisions

This article investigates whether a mutual fund’s performance is related to its herding behavior. Using the methodology of Sias (Rev Finance Stud 17:165–206, 2004), we develop a measure to capture the magnitude that a fund’s buy (sell) decisions are leading other funds’ buys (sells), and find that a fund’s performance is positively (negatively) related to its “buy leading” (“sell leading”). We interpret these findings as evidence that “buy leaders” (“sell leaders”)’ performance benefits (suffers) from the positive (negative) price effect associated with buy (sell) herds. Additionally, we find a positive relationship between fund performance and valuation-motivated “buy leading”, while we find weak evidence on the relationship between performance and valuation-motivated “sell leading”. We interpret these results as evidence that leading funds’ outperformance is due, in part, to their ability to value stocks.     

Does Investment Horizon Matter? Disentangling the Effect of Institutional Herding on Stock Prices

This study finds that, over short horizons, herding by short‐term institutions promotes price discovery. In contrast, herding by long‐term institutions drives stock prices away from fundamentals over the same periods. Furthermore, while the positive predictability of short‐term institutional herding for stock prices is more pronounced for small stocks and stocks with high growth opportunities, the negative association between long‐term institutional herding and stock prices is stronger for stocks whose valuations are highly uncertain and subjective. Finally, we show that the destabilizing effect of institutional herding persistence documented in the recent literature is entirely driven by persistent herding by long‐term institutions.     

Herding and Feedback Trading by Institutional and Individual Investors

We document strong positive correlation between changes in institutional ownership and returns measured over the same period. The result suggests that either institutional investors positive-feedback trade more than individual investors or institutional herding impacts prices more than herding by individual investors. We find evidence that both factors play a role in explaining the relation. We find no evidence, however, of return mean-reversion in the year following large changes in institutional ownership—stocks institutional investors purchase subsequently outperform those they sell. Moreover, institutional herding is positively correlated with lag returns and appears to be related to stock return momentum.     

On the behavioral differences between professional and amateur investors after the weekend

This paper compares the trading patterns of amateur and professional investors during the days following the weekend. The comparison is based on all the daily transactions of a large sample of both amateurs and professionally managed investors in a major brokerage house in Israel from 1994 to 1998. We find that weekends influence both amateurs and professional investors; however they affect them in opposite directions. Individuals increase both their buy and sell activities, and their propensity to sell rises more than their propensity to buy. Professionals on the other hand tend to perform fewer buy as well as sell trades after the weekend, but unlike individuals, the drop in their activity is almost the same for buy trades and for sell trades.     

Institutional investors,intangible information,and the book-to-market effect

This paper establishes a robust link between the trading behavior of institutions and the book-to-market effect. Building on work by Daniel and Titman (2006), who argue that the book-to-market effect is driven by the reversal of intangible returns, I find that institutions tend to buy (sell) shares in response to positive (negative) intangible information and that the reversal of the intangible return is most pronounced among stocks for which a large proportion of active institutions trade in the direction of intangible information. Furthermore, the book-to-market effect is large and significant in stocks with intense past institutional trading but nonexistent in stocks with moderate institutional trading. This influence of institutional trading on the book-to-market effect is distinct from that of firm size. These results are consistent with the view that the tendency of institutions to trade in the direction of intangible information exacerbates price overreaction, thereby contributing to the value premium.     

Mutual Fund Herding and the Impact on Stock Prices

We analyze the trading activity of the mutual fund industry from 1975 through 1994 to determine whether funds "herd" when they trade stocks and to investigate the impact of herding on stock prices. Although we find little herding by mutual funds in the average stock, we find much higher levels in trades of small stocks and in trading by growth-oriented funds. Stocks that herds buy outperform stocks that they sell by 4 percent during the following six months; this return difference is much more pronounced among small stocks. Our results are consistent with mutual fund herding speeding the price-adjustment process.     

Institutional herding in international markets

This paper studies herding behavior of institutional investors in international markets. First, we document the existence of wide-spread herding in 41 countries (referred to as “target countries” hereafter) in the sample. We then examine the relation between contemporaneous institutional demand and future returns and find that institutional herding stabilizes prices. Next, we examine the relation between institutional investors’ herding behavior and the level of information asymmetry in the target countries. We measure the degree of information asymmetry in each target country along five dimensions: (1) stock market development, (2) ease of access to information, (3) corporate transparency, (4) investor rights, and (5) macroeconomic factors that relate to the information environment. We find evidence that institutional investors herd more in markets characterized by low levels of information asymmetry (high level of information transparency). This result suggests that institutional investors’ herding behavior is likely driven by correlated signals from fundamental information. Lastly, we show that price adjustment is faster in informationally transparent markets.     

Large Shareholders,the Board of Directors and the Allocation of Cash Proceeds from Corporate Asset Sell‐offs

Recent finance literature suggests that managers of divesting firms may retain cash proceeds from corporate asset sell‐offs in order to pursue their own objectives, and, therefore, shareholders' gains due to these deals are linked to a distribution of proceeds to shareholders or to debtholders. We add to this literature by examining the role of various corporate governance mechanisms in the context of the allocation of sell‐off proceeds. Specifically, we examine the impact of directors' share‐ownership and stock options, board composition and external large shareholdings on (1) shareholders' abnormal returns around asset sell‐off announcements, and (2) managers' decision to either retain or distribute (to shareholders or to debtholders) sell‐off proceeds. We find that non‐executive directors' and CEO's share‐ownership and stock options are related to shareholders' gains from sell‐offs for firms that retain proceeds. However, corporate governance mechanisms are not significantly related to shareholders' gains for firms that distribute sell‐off proceeds. Furthermore, we find that the likelihood of a distribution of proceeds, relative to the retention decision, is increasing in large institutional shareholdings, executive and non‐executive directors' share‐ownership and non‐executive representation in the board.     

Sell-order liquidity and the cross-section of expected stock returns

We estimate buy- and sell-order illiquidity measures (lambdas) for a comprehensive sample of NYSE stocks. We show that sell-order liquidity is priced more strongly than buy-order liquidity in the cross-section of equity returns. Indeed, our analysis indicates that the liquidity premium in equities emanates predominantly from the sell-order side. We also find that the average difference between sell and buy lambdas is generally positive throughout our sample period. Both buy and sell lambdas are significantly positively correlated with measures of funding liquidity such as the TED spread as well option implied volatility.     

Does insider trading have information content for the bond market?

This study documents that there is significant information content in stock trading by registered corporate insiders for the bond market. We report significant positive price reactions for convertible and straight bonds in response to the Wall Street Journal's Insider Trading Spotlight publication of insider buy transactions and significant negative reactions for insider sell transactions. The stock market response to the publication of the insider transactions, although weaker than the bond market reaction, is also found to be significant. Cross-sectional results suggest that bond market participants extract the quality of the insider-trading signal by observing factors such as the dollar volume of the trade, the percentage change in the holding of the insider, and the insider's position in the firm. Lower-rated (riskier) bonds are found to be more sensitive to the information than higher-rated issues. The empirical evidence presented in this paper suggests that the absence of any reporting requirement for insider bond transactions may create aan enhanced opportunity for the insiders to exploit private information to expropriate wealth from uninformed bond traders.     

Buy high,sell low: How listed firms price asset transfers in related party transactions

We examine a sample of 254 related party and arms’ length acquisitions and sales of assets in Hong Kong during 1998–2000. Our analysis shows that publicly listed firms enter deals with related parties at unfavourable prices compared to similar arms’ length deals. Firms acquire assets from related parties by paying a higher price compared to similar arms’ length deals. In contrast, when they sell assets to related parties, they receive a lower price than in similar arms’ length deals. With the exception of audit committees, corporate governance characteristics have limited impact on transaction prices. Firms with audit committees on their boards pay lower prices to related parties for acquisitions and receive higher prices from related parties from divestments.     

Stock price fragility

We study the relation between the ownership structure of financial assets and non-fundamental risk. We define an asset to be fragile if it is susceptible to non-fundamental shifts in demand. An asset can be fragile because of concentrated ownership, or because its owners face correlated or volatile liquidity shocks, i.e., they must buy or sell at the same time. We formalize this idea and apply it to mutual fund ownership of US stocks. Consistent with our predictions, fragility strongly predicts price volatility. We then extend the logic of fragility to investigate two natural extensions: (1) the forecast of stock return comovement and (2) the potentially destabilizing impact of arbitrageurs on stock prices.