What drives the performance of convertible-bond funds?

This paper examines the performance of US mutual funds that invest primarily in convertible bonds. Multivariate cross-sectional analyses show a significant relation between a fund’s performance and its asset composition: the higher the difference in the percentage of assets invested in convertible bonds compared to the percentage invested in stocks, the higher the performance, on average. We show that this result can be explained by factors associated with investment opportunities in the convertible-bond market and trading strategies related to convertible arbitrage, as typically performed by hedge funds. Overall, convertible-bond fund performance measured by alpha is comparable to a passive investment in stocks, bonds, and convertible bonds. This performance is the result of weak selection skills and successful timing strategies related to convertible arbitrage.     

Are IPO investors rational? Evidence from closed-end funds

Why buy a closed-end fund at IPO, when it is likely to trade at a discount in a few months’ time? One theory suggests that buying a new fund is justified by an initial period of investment outperformance. A second theory is that new funds are launched to provide access to assets that are temporarily illiquid and to exploit the subsequent liquidity gain while a third theory asserts that buyers of new issues are not fully rational but are influenced by time-varying sentiment. This paper tests the three theories using data from UK-traded closed-end equity-fund IPOs over 1984–2006. The empirical results provide strong support for the influence of sentiment but provide little or no support for the two other theories.     

Should investors invest in hedge fund-like mutual funds? Evidence from the 2007 financial crisis

This study empirically examines the value added for investors during the 2007–2009 financial crisis from hedge fund-like equity mutual funds, including 130/30, market neutral, and long/short equity funds. We find that based on the information ratio, all market neutral funds, top 90% of long/short funds, and top 25% of 130/30 funds outperform a long-only passive index fund over the crisis period. However, we find little evidence of abnormal performance by the average and median funds in our sample, based on either unconditional or conditional four-factor alphas. The reason for the overall under-performance in the crisis period is that while short positions taken by these funds do generate alpha, the gain from their short positions is not sufficiently large to offset the loss from their long positions. Finally, the abnormal performance of short positions is found to be attributable to managers’ characteristic-adjusted and industry-adjusted stock selection skills. One implication of this study is that even though market neutral and long/short funds on average may not generate alpha, investors can benefit from holding these funds, especially the former, that can provide a hedge against down markets due to their low betas and that can be useful for asset allocation.     

Can small investors exploit the momentum effect?

This study uses UK data and investigates whether small investors can exploit the continuation effect in share prices. Individual traders are not in a financial position to buy and sell short hundreds of firms, as suggested by existing academic research, and thus this study uses extreme performance companies to implement the strategy. We find that strong momentum gains appear when extreme winners and losers are employed. These returns remain strong even after considering the transaction costs of implementing such strategies, including commissions, stamp duty, selling-short costs, and bid-ask spread. Overall, we show that a relatively large number of small investors can enjoy momentum gains, providing some evidence against stock market efficiency.     

Do investors value smooth performance?

This paper presents empirical evidence that cash-flow volatility is negatively valued by investors. The magnitude of the effect is substantial with a 1% increase in cash-flow volatility, resulting in approximately a 0.15% decrease in firm value. We show that this increase, however, is not associated with earnings smoothing resulting from managers’ accrual estimates. Our results are consistent with a preference by the market for less volatile cash flows and suggest that managers’ efforts to produce smooth financial statements add value, but only via the cash component of earnings.     

Does auditor choice matter to foreign investors? Evidence from foreign mutual funds worldwide

This study explores whether a firm’s auditor choice affects its ability to access foreign equity capital. Using the equity holdings of 35,665 foreign mutual funds from 30 countries for the period 1998–2009, we find evidence that appointing a Big 4 auditor is associated with the increased level of foreign mutual fund ownership in firms. Our results are robust when conditioned on firm-level information asymmetries, country-level information disclosure quality, and when employing the Enron–Andersen fiasco as the natural experiment. Furthermore, appointing Big 4 auditors is particularly important for firms to attract foreign capital during the 2008 global financial crisis.     

Does educational diversity of managers matter for the performance of team‐managed funds?

We study the effect of the educational diversity of managers on the performance of team‐managed mutual funds using a large sample of U.S. equity funds from 1994 to 2013. We consider diversity in terms of both final educational degree and field of educational specialisation. We find that, in general, both types of diversity have a positive impact on fund performance, and our results are robust over a wide range of performance metrics and changes in market conditions.     

Herding by mutual funds: impact on performance and investors’ response†

In this paper we investigate whether herding by actively managed equity funds affects their performances and flows over the 1980–2013 period. We show that during the herding quarter, on average, funds that trade with the herd benefit from this behavior. Although this does not directly translate into a positive association between the extent to which funds herd and their subsequent performance, we find that the funds that follow the herd earn negative abnormal returns whereas the ones that lead earn no abnormal returns. Our results also indicate that investors react adversely to follower funds while they are neutral towards the leader funds.     

Do locals know better? A comparison of the performance of local and foreign institutional investors

We compare the performance of local versus foreign institutional investors using a comprehensive data set of equity holdings in 32 countries during the 2000–2010 period. We find that foreign institutions perform as well as local institutions on average, but only domestic institutions show a trading pattern consistent with an information advantage. Our results suggest a smart-money effect of local institutions in countries subject to higher information asymmetry, non-English speaking countries, countries with less efficient stock markets, with poor investor protection, or high levels of corruption. The local advantage is more pronounced in periods of market turmoil and in illiquid stocks.     

The performance of precious-metal mutual funds: Does uncertainty matter?

We studied the relative risk-adjusted returns and downside risk performance of precious-metal mutual funds (PMFs) in different uncertainty periods (pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis) using propensity score matching techniques and difference-in-differences matching regression. For a sample of PMFs and global corporate funds quoted in USD over the period January 2005 to June 2015, we found that the relative performance of PMFs differed across uncertainty periods. Thus, they performed similarly to corporate funds in the pre-crisis period, they outperformed corporate funds regarding risk-adjusted returns but underperformed in terms of downside risk in the crisis period and they displayed a similar risk-return performance to corporate funds in the post-crisis period. Difference-in-difference estimates indicate that a shift from low to high uncertainty had a positive impact on risk-adjusted returns for PMFs, whereas this advantage dissipated when uncertainty was reduced. However, fluctuations in uncertainty had mixed effects on the relative downside risk associated with PMFs. This evidence has implications for investors who seek to gain exposure to precious metals using PMFs.     

Can SRI funds better resist global financial crisis? Evidence from Japan

This paper compared Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) funds and conventional funds in the Japanese market with respect to the impact of the global financial crisis in 2008. Taking the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers as a particular event, we estimated the average cumulative abnormal returns of both funds by event study methodology using a Fama–French three-factor model and EGARCH model. Our results suggest that SRI funds better resisted the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers than conventional funds. We also found that this result can be attributed to the existence of international funds, possibly because investors might evaluate the CSR activities of international firms more than those of domestic firms. Alternatively, it can be interpreted that the universe of domestic SRI funds is too limited to enjoy risk diversification.     

Can hedge funds time global equity markets? Evidence from emerging markets

This paper examines the ability of global hedge funds to time a particularly volatile asset class — emerging market equities. In particular, we study whether or not these funds can either time emerging markets as a whole, or time their exposures to different regions. Using both pooled and calendar-time approaches, we generally find no evidence of overall timing ability. However, we do find some evidence of period-specific timing ability during the financial crisis and subsequent recovery.     

Should smart investors buy funds with high past returns?

We fully characterize the equilibria in a gme between a fundmanager of unknown ability who control the riskiness of hisportfolio and investors who only observe realized returns. Wederive two types of equilibria. The first one is such that (i)investors invest in the fund if the realized return falls withinsome interval, i.e., is neither too low nor too high, (ii) agood manager picks a portfolio of minimal riskiness and (iii)a bad manager picks a portfolio with higher risk, "gambling"on a lucky outcome. The second type of equilibrium is more traditional:(i) investors invest in the fund if the observed return is largerthan some threshold, and (ii) good and bad managers choose thesame risk level.     

Why are some mutual funds closed to new investors?

Fund families typically claim that closing a fund protects the fund's superior performance by preventing it from growing too large to be managed efficiently. Even though funds with better performance and larger size are more likely to be closed, there is no evidence that closing a fund can indeed protect its performance. Instead, fund closing decisions are more likely to be motivated by spillover effects – by closing a star fund, the fund family signals its superior performance and also brings investors' attention and investments to other funds in the family. Some evidence exists to suggest that the closing strategy is effective in generating higher inflows into the rest of the family, at least in the short run.     

Can mutual funds time investor sentiment?

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - This paper examines the ability of mutual fund managers to time aggregate investor sentiment. Our results indicate that mutual fund managers alter...     

Can hedge funds time market liquidity?

We explore a new dimension of fund managers' timing ability by examining whether they can time market liquidity through adjusting their portfolios' market exposure as aggregate liquidity conditions change. Using a large sample of hedge funds, we find strong evidence of liquidity timing. A bootstrap analysis suggests that top-ranked liquidity timers cannot be attributed to pure luck. In out-of-sample tests, top liquidity timers outperform bottom timers by 4.0–5.5% annually on a risk-adjusted basis. We also find that it is important to distinguish liquidity timing from liquidity reaction, which primarily relies on public information. Our results are robust to alternative explanations, hedge fund data biases, and the use of alternative timing models, risk factors, and liquidity measures. The findings highlight the importance of understanding and incorporating market liquidity conditions in investment decision making.     

The performance of venture capital investments: Do investors overreact?

Using a unique proprietary data set of over 5400 realized and unrealized venture capital investments between 1980 and 2005, we examine the impact of demand-related factors, e.g. entrepreneurial activity, as well as supply-related factors, i.e. money provided by VC investors, on the return of individual VC investments. This way, we are able to shed more light on the question whether volatile VC investment returns are rather driven by fundamental changes with regard to the number of attractive investment opportunities or by the overreaction by investors. We find that rising demand for VC, i.e. an increase in entrepreneurial activity, results initially in higher returns. However, our results also indicate that overreaction on the supply side can be observed, destroying deal-level results. Overfunding, specifically overinvesting seems to be a recurring characteristic of the VC industry. In fact, contra-cyclical investment strategies yield highest deal-level returns.     

Multi-asset class mutual funds: Can they time the market? Evidence from the US,UK and Canada

The importance of asset allocation decisions in wealth management is well established. However, given its importance it is perhaps surprising that so little attention has been paid to the question of whether professional fund managers are skilful at timing market movement across asset classes over time. The timing literature has tended to concentrate on the timing skill of single asset class funds. Using data on US, UK and Canadian multi-asset class funds, we apply two alternative methodologies to identify the asset class timing abilities of managers. Overall, whether we apply a returns-based method or a holdings-based testing approach, we find evidence of only a tiny minority of funds with asset class timing ability.