Zero‐interest Rate Policy and Unintended Consequences in Emerging Markets

Since 2009, central banks in the major advanced economies have held interest rates at very low levels to stabilise financial markets and support the recovery of their economies. This paper outlines the unintended consequences of the prolonged period of very low world funding interest rates in emerging markets. The paper is informed by a Mises–Hayek‐BIS view on credit booms and Mises' law of unintended consequences. Consistent with the presented credit boom view, I provide evidence that the very low world funding interest rates are associated with a rise in volatile capital flows and asset market bubbles in fast‐growing emerging markets. In line with Mises' law, I further show that these unintended consequences give rise to a new wave of interventionism as policymakers in emerging markets increasingly reintroduce financially repressive measures to isolate the economies from foreign capital inflows.     

The Effect of Government Spending on the Debt‐to‐GDP Ratio: Some Keynesian Arithmetic

According to the standard approach to the issue of public debt sustainability, fiscal austerity is the route that many countries must currently follow to reduce their debt‐to‐GDP ratios back to sustainable paths. We challenge this conventional wisdom and argue that, below full employment, an increase in government spending may paradoxically reduce the debt‐to‐GDP ratio. This claim is particularly relevant today because with Central Bank interest rates near zero there is no alternative to fiscal policy, and the only argument against increasing government expenditure as a way to fight unemployment is its supposed negative effect on the state of public finances.     

A comparison of monetary and fiscal policy interaction under ‘sound’ and ‘functional’ finance regimes

The interest rate and the fiscal balance can be thought of as two independent instruments to be assigned to two targets, the path of output and the path of public debt. Under what we term a ‘sound finance rule’ the interest rate targets output while the fiscal balance targets public debt; under a ‘functional finance rule’ the budget balance targets the output gap and the interest rate targets the debt ratio. The same unique combination of interest rate and fiscal balance will be consistent with output at potential and a constant debt‐GDP ratio regardless of which instrument is assigned to which target. The stability characteristics of the two rules differ, however. At low levels of debt, both rules converge to the targets, but there is a threshold debt level above which only the functional finance rule converges. Contrary to conventional wisdom, therefore, the case for countercyclical fiscal policy becomes stronger, not weaker, when the ratio of public debt to GDP is already high. We apply our framework to describe the possibility of policy‐generated cycles in the United States over the past five decades.     

Japan's Negative Risk Premium in Interest Rates: The Liquidity Trap and the Fall in Bank Lending

Japan's interest rates have been compressed toward zero because of pressure coming through the foreign exchanges. Twenty years of current‐account surpluses have led to a huge buildup of claims – mainly dollars – on foreigners. Because of ongoing fluctuations in the yen/dollar exchange rate, Japanese financial institutions will only willingly hold these dollar claims if the nominal yield on them is substantially higher than on yen assets. In the 1990s to 2002 as US interest rates have come down, portfolio equilibrium has been sustained only when nominal interest rates on yen assets have been forced toward zero. One consequence is the now infamous liquidity trap for Japanese monetary policy. A second consequence is the erosion of the normal profit margins of Japan's commercial banks, leading to a slump in new bank credit and an inability to grow out of the overhang of old bad loans.     

Niedrige Zinsen — gesamtwirtschaftliche Ursachen und Folgen

Due to the financial crises from 2008 to 2012, unconventional monetary policy caused an environment of record low interest rates around the world. Maintaining the low interest rate policy might be reasonable for the ECB in the short run in order to fight the fragmentation of the financial market and the risk of defl ation in the Eurozone. Some authors argue that permanently low interest rates lead to wrong incentives in the financial market for debtors and creditors alike. They fear potential risks for fiscal policy and financial stability in Germany and recommend macroprudential measures beyond the Basel III framework and a beginning exit of the ECB from its unconventional monetary policy. Others warn against overburdening monetary policy. They find rather that effective financial market regulation and proper fiscal rules and institutions are required to secure financial market stability and the sustainability of public debt and that a premature exit from accommodating monetary policies would do more harm than good. They argue that monetary policy alone will not solve Europe’s problems. The differing recommendations are mainly based on differing assessments of the European business cycle.     

Zinspolitik ade! Wie man Immobilienpreisblasen dennoch überstehen kann

After the financial crisis, some Euro countries are still facing major economic problems. They require favourable interest rate conditions in order to free themselves from their difficulties. But due to the low interest rate policy of the ECB, the risk of a housing price bubble in Germany is increasing. Since a rise in interest rates is not expected in the near future, other national institutional possibilities come to the fore. High capital ratios of both the borrower and the banks, and long rate fixation periods may counteract the development and impact of price bubbles. This might improve the stability of the German real estate market.     

Financial Repression — Ein neues Umfeld für die Finanzm?rkte?

High levels of debt caused by the financial crisis are forcing countries to take measures to reduce debt. Financial repression is a debt reduction opportunity based on measures imposed on the financial markets by governments which manifests itself primarily in lower real interest rates. Financial repression is regarded as another characteristic of a “new normality” in the global economy with low potential growth rates and low interest rates, high levels of public debt as a result of the financial crisis. The article describes this phenomenon and attempts to evaluate its empirical relevance.     

Wie stark und schnell wurden die Niedrigzinsen an Bankkunden weitergereicht?

In this paper it is shown that the ECB’s main refinancing rate, measured by various Taylor-rules, has for the past decade been far too low for Germany. That entails risks for the stability of Germany’s financial system. How strong these risks materialise depends on the extent to which German banks pass on the low policy rates to their customers. In this paper, the interest rate pass-through in Germany in the low interest era is investigated using error-correction models for various bank interest rates. The results indicate a stronger short-term pass-through as well as diminished interest rate margins that weigh on banks’ profits. However, there is no evidence for structural changes in the long-term relationship between policy rates and banks’ interest rates. While the latter might be soothing for monetary policy makers, the former is rather a reason for concern.     

Policy and practice in the Netherlands

Abstract: As in many other areas of public policy in the Netherlands, development of consumer protection in banking and financial services has been characterized by a consensual approach. Consumer organizations have been involved along with representative business bodies in building self-regulatory systems within a statutory framework, especially in relation to issues related to overindebtedness. This approach has characterized dispute settlement procedures as well as a code of conduct on good lending practice and a national credit registration system. The Consumer Credit Act provides a system of maximum interest rates for different kinds of credit, which may be varied according to market conditions. The needs of consumers at the lower end of the credit market are specifically catered for by a network of municipal credit banks, which also provide debt settlement services.     

The Economics of Exchange‐Rate Regimes: A Review Essay

The exchange‐rate regime issue has taken centre‐stage in discussions of international economic policy. Much of the profession appears to have been converted to ‘the hypothesis of the vanishing middle regime’; for countries well‐integrated into world capital markets, there is little, if any, middle ground between floating exchange rates and monetary unification. This paper considers the exchange‐rate‐regime issue in the context of recent books on the subject by W. Max Corden and Morris Goldstein. Both authors prescribe managed floating exchange rates, supplemented with inflation targeting, for emerging‐market economies. Under managed floating, and with a credible monetary policy, the public finances in order, and strengthened debt management and prudential regulation, the exchange rate is free to act as a market gauge for assessing policies and as a mode of conflict resolution. Both authors also argue, however, that no exchange‐rate regime is a Holy Grail. Ultimately, a credible exchange‐rate regime depends upon the trust evoked by governments. There is no exchange‐rate regime, whether of the managed‐floating or hard‐fix variety, that can eradicate a history of failed stabilisation attempts.     

The Fiscal Framework in a Currency Union: Lessons from a Comparison between the Euro Area and the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union

This paper draws out lessons from the euro area (EA) that are transferable to the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU) and other Caribbean economies with fixed exchange rates. Based on observations from both the EA and the ECCU, we present a new policy framework which is capable of imposing fiscal discipline, with the aim of avoiding the risk of unsustainable fiscal policies reappearing and of preventing monetary policy from being undermined by undisciplined national governments. In the ECCU case, we find that fiscal deficits are more a result of financial and trade imbalances than fiscal indiscipline per se. Consequently, constraints on overall debt, public and private, rather than direct limits on endogenous public deficits, appear to be the appropriate response.     

On the Link Between Exchange‐rate Regimes,Capital Controls and Monetary Policy Autonomy in Small European Countries, 1979–2000

We investigate international monetary‐policy transmission under different exchange‐rate and capital‐account regimes in eleven small, open economies during the 1980s and 1990s. We find no systematic link between ex‐post monetary‐policy autonomy and exchange‐rate regimes. Capital controls appear to have provided a degree of temporal insulation from foreign monetary policy shocks, though not strict autonomy. The results are consistent both with short‐term autonomy for small countries even under fixed exchange rates and an open capital account, and with long‐term dependence under flexible exchange rates and an independent stability target. Results also indicate that euro‐area market interest rates are significantly more responsive to the development of the corresponding US rate than were the previous national rates.     

Monetary policy and long‐term interest rates: Evidence from the U.S. economy

This paper addresses the ability of central banks to affect the structure of interest rates. We assess the causal relationship between the short‐term Effective Federal Funds Rate (FF) and long‐term interest rates associated with both public and private bonds and specifically, the 10‐Year Treasury Bond (GB10Y) and the Moody's Aaa Corporate Bond (AAA). To do this, we apply Structural Vector Autoregressive models to U.S. monthly data for the 1954–2018 period. Based on results derived from impulse response functions and forecast error variance decomposition, we find: a bidirectional relationship when GB10Y is considered as the long‐term rate and a unidirectional relationship that moves from short‐ to long‐term interest rates when AAA is considered. These conclusions show that monetary policy is able to permanently affect long‐term interest rates and the central bank has a certain degree of freedom in setting the levels of the short‐term policy rate.     

Fiscal divergence, current account divergence and TARGET2 imbalances in the EMU

Diverging fiscal policy paths, housing booms and diverging unit labour costs were driving forces of rising intra-European current account imbalances, which were underpinned by low interest rates. Since the outbreak of the crisis, the adjustment of intra-EMU current account imbalances has been postponed by a rising divergence of TARGET2 balances, as the repatriation of private international credit and deposit flight from the crisis economies is intermediated by central bank credit. Given that this process has brought the Deutsche Bundesbank into a debtor position to the domestic financial system, the article discusses options for liquidity absorption by the Bundesbank to forestall asset price bubbles in Germany.     

Banking Relationships: Effects on Debt Terms for Small Spanish Firms*

This paper analyzes the effect of banking relationships on interest rates and the probability that guarantees must be provided in a sample of small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs). The results indicate that SMEs that work with fewer banks obtain debt at a lower cost. This seems to suggest that concentrated banking relationships reduce the uncertainty of lending to risky firms, which translates into lower interest rates. Reduction in risk could come from greater flexibility in negotiations, increased control over the investment, and mitigation of the free‐rider problem. When the relationship is exclusive, which would represent the maximum concentration, a bank can take advantage of its monopoly position and require more guarantees from a firm. SMEs that have longer‐term relationships with their bank are more likely to be required to provide guarantees. This result seems to suggest that SMEs involved in longer‐term relationships are subject to the information monopoly of the lender.     

On dynamics in a Keynesian model of monetary and fiscal stabilization policy mix with twin debt accumulation

In this paper, a six‐dimensional model of flexible prices with the monetary and fiscal policy mix, describing the development of the firms’ private debt, the output, the expected rate of inflation, the rate of interest, government expenditure, and government bonds are analyzed. The stress put on the “twin debt accumulation” means that in our model both private debt accumulation and the public debt (government bond) accumulation are explicitly introduced. Questions concerning the existence of limit cycles around its normal equilibrium point are investigated. The bifurcation equation is found. The formulae for the calculation of its coefficients are gained. Numerical example illustrating the results attained is presented by means of numerical simulations.     

Driven by the markets? ECB sovereign bond purchases and the securities markets programme

At the height of the European sovereign debt crisis, the European Central Bank decided to purchase distressed European government bonds. Even worse, and more importantly, the ECB is providing direct support of several hundred billions of euros to troubled banks via its normal monetary policy operations by granting them the opportunity to refinance at an interest rate of 1%. This article argues that these purchases will result in common monetary policy being dominated by national fiscal policies. The most worrisome aspect is that the euro area appears to have stumbled into unconventional monetary policies that, once started, will be difficult to exit. In the euro area, properly functioning financial markets are at risk.     

The Choice between Bank Debt and Trace Credit in Business Start-ups

This paper investigates the choice between bank debt and trade credit in business start-ups. While trade credit is more expensive than bank debt, suppliers tend to follow a more lenient liquidation policy when client firms encounter financial distress. As a result, suppliers are more willing to renegotiate the outstanding debt or grant additional debt whereas banks are more likely to liquidate borrowers upon default. Given the risky nature of business start-ups, we argue that the entrepreneur’s choice of debt instruments reflects these differences in liquidation policy between lenders and is thus determined by the venture’s failure risk, the entrepreneur’s private control benefits that are lost upon liquidation and the liquidation value of firm assets. Using unique data on 325 first-time business start-ups, we find that firms in industries with high historical start-up failure rates and entrepreneurs who tend to highly value private benefits of control use less bank debt. These effects are especially prevalent in start-ups where assets have a high liquidation value and thus banks are more likely to liquidate the venture following default. An erratum to this article can be found at     

Do high interest rates defend currencies during speculative attacks? New evidence

Kraay [Kraay, A., 2003. Do high interest rates defend currencies during speculative attacks? Journal of International Economics 59, 297-321.] documents the lack of any systematic association between monetary policy and the outcome of a speculative attack. This paper revisits Kraay's work and modifies it by introducing an improved measure of monetary policy and an additional country-specific fundamental, short-term corporate debt, to capture balance sheet vulnerabilities emphasized by the recent currency crises literature. The results show that for low levels of short-term corporate debt, raising interest rates lowers the probability of a successful attack. This effect decreases and eventually reverses for higher levels of debt. These findings contrast earlier empirical evidence and imply a fundamental reconsideration of the role of monetary policy during currency crises.     

Bank lending channel in a dual banking system: Why are Islamic banks so responsive?

We examine the interest rate sensitivity of both deposits and credits at Islamic and conventional banks in Turkey. We find that the bank lending channel is especially operative for Islamic banks. Impulse responses for conventional and Islamic banks reveal that Islamic bank depositors’ sensitivity to policy rate changes is substantially larger than that of conventional bank depositors. Next to heavily dependence on deposit funding, we consider that inertia in Islamic bank deposit rates impedes these banks to keep those depositors who consider the opportunity cost of monetary policy rates is unbearable. On the lending side, we obtain similar results, implying that tight monetary policy leads to a larger contraction in Islamic bank credits. This finding is a reflection of the favourable attitude of Islamic banks towards small and medium‐sized enterprise (SME) financing. When similar relationships are analysed for currency and inflation shocks, we again find larger responses for Islamic banks showing the cyclical nature of SME credits.