Optimal monetary policy in a currency area

This paper investigates how monetary policy should be conducted in a two-region general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and price stickiness. This framework delivers a simple welfare criterion based on the utility of the consumers that can be used to evaluate monetary policy in a currency area. If the two regions share the same degree of nominal rigidity, the terms of trade are completely insulated from monetary policy and the optimal outcome is obtained by targeting a weighted average of the regional inflation rates. These weights coincide with the economic sizes of the region. If the degrees of rigidity are different, the optimal plan implies a high degree of inertia in the inflation rate. But an inflation targeting policy in which higher weight is given to the inflation in the region with higher degree of nominal rigidity is nearly optimal.     

Fiscal and monetary rules for a currency union

This paper addresses the optimal joint conduct of fiscal and monetary policy in a two-country model of a currency union with staggered price setting and distortionary taxes. A tractable linear-quadratic approximation permits a representation of the optimal policy plan in terms of targeting rules. In the optimal equilibrium, monetary policy should achieve aggregate price stability following a flexible inflation targeting rule. Fiscal policy should stabilize idiosyncratic shocks allowing for permanent variations of government debt but should abstain from creating inflationary expectations at the union level. Simple policy rules can approximate the optimal commitment benchmark through a mix of strict inflation targeting and flexible budget rules. Conversely, the welfare costs of balanced budget rules are at least one order of magnitude higher than conventional estimates of the costs of business cycle fluctuactions.     

ACCELERATING INFLATION OR RISING UNEMPLOYMENT -IS THERE AN ALTERNATIVE?

Empirical observations suggest the existence of an unstable inflation-unemployment trade-off: whereas high levels of employment generate accelerating inflation rates, stability of the price level seems to require growing rates of unemployment. Under these conditions, macroeconomic policy has to produce countervailing economic fluctuations in order to limit the extent of the two-sided instability. This is discussed within the framework of a macroeconomic model, in which prices and wages are determined by potential competition, and in which employment depends on monetary demand. The model is confronted with prevailing natural rate theories in which a stable equilibrium rate of employment is determined by supply conditions.     

Monetary Dynamics of Inflation in China

This paper investigates both the short‐run and the long‐run relationships between monetary growth and inflation in China between 1980 and 2010. We construct multivariate dynamic models based on Friedman’s quantity theory of money (but permitting money to be endogenous) and Meltzer’s monetarist model. The empirical results provide robust evidence that there is a bilateral causal relationship between monetary growth and inflation as well as between monetary growth and output growth. An indirect and implicit causal relationship between monetary growth and inflation is found through the asset inflation channel. There are also long‐run equilibrium relationships between money stock, price index and other relevant variables. The present paper further provides a historical exploration of the mechanism of the monetary dynamics of inflation in China over the underlying period. We conclude that the monetary growth rule is likely to be the most promising policy orientation for China to manage its inflation.     

地方政府财政支出对中国通货膨胀的冲击效应研究——基于凯恩斯 AD - AS 视角

基于国家干预的凯恩斯 AD - AS 视角,主要对财政货币政策与通货膨胀之间的关系进行研究,并采用 1952—2010 年中国宏观经济数据进行实证分析,结果表明: ( 1) 长期内,地方财政支出的扩张是导致通货膨胀的关键性因素; 而中央财政支出的扩张却有利于控制通货膨胀; 不同层次的货币供应量对通货膨胀的冲击则并不显著; 除此之外,通货膨胀还受到消费者预期、人民币汇率、职工工资水平和原材料购进价格的正向影响。(2) 短期内,无论是中央抑或是地方财政支出都能对通货膨胀产生负向的冲击作用; 然而,货币供应量( M0、M1、M2) 却对通货膨胀起到了明显的助推作用,且 M0与通货膨胀具有双向的 Granger 因果关系。( 3) 新时期,财政货币当局不仅需要高度关注高通胀惯性对政策效果的影响,尤其应注重财政货币政策的多重目标分解、梳理及协调配合,而且要处理好反通胀、保增长、调结构之间困难而复杂的关系,寻求三者之间的有效"平衡点"。     

最优货币政策分析的一般框架理论综述

随着货币政策在宏观经济调控中的重要性日益提高,对于最优货币政策分析框架的研究也迅速兴起。从最优货币政策的目标出发,本文分析了货币政策的内涵、类型和最优货币分析框架的特征,及政策目标之间的相互关系,货币政策决策方式和几个典型的货币政策规则,特别是通货膨胀目标制及中国的最优货币政策设计,旨在为我国确立的最优货币政策框架提供参考。     

货币供给冲击、货币需求冲击与中国宏观经济波动

基于由贝叶斯技术估计的新凯恩斯动态随机一般均衡(DSGE)模型,识别和分析货币供给与货币需求冲击对产出和通货膨胀波动的影响,结果表明:货币供给冲击对产出和通货膨胀波动均能够产生同向影响,但对产出波动的影响不明显,仅能解释其不足2%的波动,而对通货膨胀波动的影响比较强,长期内可以解释其26%以上的波动;货币需求冲击对产出和通货膨胀波动的影响都不明显,长期内对二者波动的解释能力均低于0.6%。因此,在应对通胀压力时,央行可以运用数量型货币政策工具,对高通胀势头实施积极的紧缩性宏观调控。     

Monetary policy and welfare in a small open economy

This paper analyzes optimal monetary policy in a small open economy featuring monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities. It shows that the utility-based loss function for this economy can be written as a quadratic expression of domestic inflation, output gap and real exchange rate. The presence of an internal monopolistic distortion and a terms of trade externality drives optimal policy away from domestic inflation targeting and affects the optimal level of exchange rate volatility. When domestic and foreign goods are close substitutes for each other, the optimal policy rule implies lower real exchange rate volatility than a domestic inflation targeting regime. The reverse is true when the elasticity of substitution between goods is low.     

Inflation,R&D and growth in an open economy

This study explores the long-run effects of inflation in a two-country Schumpeterian growth model with cash-in-advance constraints on consumption and R&D investment. We find that increasing domestic inflation reduces domestic R&D investment and the growth rate of domestic technology. Given that economic growth in a country depends on both domestic and foreign technologies, increasing foreign inflation also affects the domestic economy. When each government conducts its monetary policy unilaterally to maximize the welfare of domestic households, the Nash-equilibrium inflation rates are generally higher than the optimal inflation rates chosen by cooperative governments who maximize the welfare of both domestic and foreign households. Under the CIA constraint on R&D (consumption), a larger market power of firms amplifies (mitigates) this inflationary bias. We use cross-country panel data to estimate the effects of inflation on R&D and also calibrate the two-country model to data in the Euro Area and the US to quantify the welfare effects of decreasing the inflation rates from the Nash equilibrium to the optimal level.     

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a micro-founded model of a monetary union

This paper analyzes in detail the mechanisms behind fiscal stabilization policy and the role of policy commitment in a micro-founded New-Keynesian model of a two-country monetary union, which is hit by supply shocks. We also explore the determinants of the gains from fiscal stabilization. While monetary policy with identical union members is concerned with stabilizing the union-wide economy, fiscal policy aims at stabilizing inflation differences and the terms of trade. Besides exploring optimal policies, we also consider monetary and fiscal rules. We study these rules both under coordination and non-coordination by the fiscal authorities.     

Mean reversion of inflation rates in seven Eastern European countries: An application of a fourier quantile unit root test

This paper applies recently developed Fourier quantile unit root test to investigate time-series property of inflation in seven Eastern European countries. This method combines the quantile unit root test with smooth unknown multiple breaks through Fourier function, and has good size and power when the data follows heavy tailed distribution. Our results show that the inflation rates are stationary within each quantile for Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Lithuania, while the other four countries contain a unit root within some quantiles. We also find the speed of inflation adjustment towards to its long-run equilibrium for each country is asymmetric. Our results have important policy implications for monetary authorities in these Eastern European countries.     

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a micro-founded model of a monetary union

This paper analyzes in detail the mechanisms behind fiscal stabilization policy and the role of policy commitment in a micro-founded New-Keynesian model of a two-country monetary union, which is hit by supply shocks. We also explore the determinants of the gains from fiscal stabilization. While monetary policy with identical union members is concerned with stabilizing the union-wide economy, fiscal policy aims at stabilizing inflation differences and the terms of trade. Besides exploring optimal policies, we also consider monetary and fiscal rules. We study these rules both under coordination and non-coordination by the fiscal authorities.     

通货膨胀目标制的政策内涵及其应用

本文从分析货币政策的规则和相机抉择之争入手，分析通货膨胀目标制作为名义锚在货币政策中的作用与政策含义，在此基础上探讨如何有效地设计和实行通货膨胀目标制。本文认为，我国货币政策在向通货膨胀目标制过渡过程中，要明确货币政策和汇率政策的主从地位，增强中央银行的独立性以及对宏观经济的分析和预测能力，解决中央银行承担最后贷款人义务而造成的通货膨胀隐患，建立核心通货膨胀指标。     

我国货币政策调控对产出和通胀影响的水平效应和波动率效应研究——基于VAR模型和局部投影模型冲击反应函数的实证分析

在“三重压力”下，我国货币政策调控要实现“稳增长”和“防通胀”在水平值和波动率上的“双重稳定”,既要保持适度经济增速，又要防止通货膨胀快速上升，还要防止产出和通胀波动形成的经济风险。为此，文章使用了局部投影方法和VAR模型方法计算了数量型和价格型货币政策的冲击反应函数，以此刻画货币政策对产出增长率和通货膨胀率的水平值和波动率的动态效应。实证结果表明，数量型货币政策对经济增长率和通货膨胀率均具有水平值上的显著正向效应，同时具有降低产出波动而提升通胀波动的冲击效应；价格型货币政策也对经济增长率和通货膨胀率具有显著正向效应，同时具有降低产出波动率和通胀波动率的双重稳定功能。因此，当前货币政策操作仍然要以价格型货币政策为主，以此实现货币政策逆周期和跨周期调控功能。     

Optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a currency union

We lay out a tractable model for the analysis of optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a currency union. The monetary authority sets a common interest rate for the union, whereas fiscal policy is implemented at the country level, through the choice of government spending. In the presence of country-specific shocks and nominal rigidities, the policy mix that is optimal from the viewpoint of the union as a whole requires that inflation be stabilized at the union level by the common central bank, whereas fiscal policy has a country-specific stabilization role, one beyond the efficient provision of public goods.     

通货膨胀预期陷阱理论新探——基于货币政策时间非一致性视角

在货币政策时间非一致性的视角下,借鉴国内外现有研究成果,综合运用宏微观经济模型组的均衡与非均衡分析方法,探究通货膨胀预期陷阱的基本范畴、理论模型、生成机理、社会经济效应和对策等理论问题,这有别于目前主要运用货币政策效用函数和损失函数来分析货币政策时间非一致性问题的一般研究方法。     

How to reduce inflation: an independent central bank or a currency board? The experience of the Baltic countries

Countries in transition often face high levels of inflation. This paper discusses two ways to reduce inflation: the creation of an independent central bank; and the introduction of a currency board. It is shown that both options have advantages and disadvantages. This framework is used for a normative analysis of the policy choices of the Baltic states. It is argued that, while Estonia's currency board based on the D-mark is very much in line with the criteria for an optimal monetary regime, Lithuania's initial choice of a US dollar-based currency board is not. The peg to the SDR — which very much looks like a currency board — as (eventually) adopted by Latvia is an intermediate case. Some policy recommendations and the problem of exit strategies towards the Euro zone are discussed.     

Global monetary policy under a dollar standard

This paper derives an optimal monetary policy in a world with a dollar standard, defined as an environment in which all traded goods prices are set in US dollars, so that exchange rate pass-through into the US price level is zero. We show that the US is essentially indifferent to exchange rate volatility, while the rest of the world places a high weight on exchange rate volatility. In a Nash equilibrium of the monetary policy game, US preferences dominate; the equilibrium is identical to one where the US alone chooses world monetary policy. Despite this, we find surprisingly that the US loses from the dollar's role as an international currency, since the absence of exchange rate pass-through leads to inefficient expenditure allocations within the US. Finally, we derive the conditions for a dollar standard to exist.     

Optimal monetary policy in a currency union with interest rate spreads

We introduce “financial imperfections” – asymmetric net wealth positions, incomplete risk-sharing, and interest rate spreads across member countries – in a prototypical two-country currency union model and study implications for monetary policy transmission mechanism and optimal policy. In addition to, and independent from, the standard transmission mechanism associated with nominal rigidities, financial imperfections introduce a wealth redistribution role for monetary policy. Moreover, the two mechanisms reinforce each other and amplify the effects of monetary policy. On the normative side, financial imperfections, via interactions with nominal rigidities, generate two novel policy trade-offs. First, the central bank needs to pay attention to distributional efficiency in addition to macroeconomic (and price level) stability, which implies that a strict inflation targeting policy of setting union-wide inflation to zero is never optimal. Second, the interactions lead to a trade-off in stabilizing relative consumption versus the relative price gap (the deviation of relative prices from their efficient level) across countries, which implies that the central bank allows for less flexibility in relative prices. Finally, we consider how the central bank should respond to a financial shock that causes an increase in the interest rate spread. Under optimal policy, the central bank strongly decreases the deposit rate, which reduces aggregate and distributional inefficiencies by mitigating the drop in output and inflation and the rise in relative consumption and prices. Such a policy response can be well approximated by a spread-adjusted Taylor rule as it helps the real interest rate track the efficient rate of interest.     

ARE LONG‐RUN PRICE STABILITY AND SHORT‐RUN OUTPUT STABILIZATION ALL THAT MONETARY POLICY CAN AIM FOR?

A central tenet of the so‐called new consensus view in macroeconomics is that there is no long‐run trade‐off between inflation and unemployment. The main policy implication of this principle is that all monetary policy can aim for is (modest) short‐run output stabilization and long‐run price stability, i.e. monetary policy is neutral with respect to output and employment in the long run. However, research on the different sources of path dependency in the economy suggests that persistent but nevertheless transitory changes in aggregate demand may have a permanent effect on output and employment. If this is the case, then, the way monetary policy is run does have long‐run effects on real variables. This paper provides an overview of this research and explores conceptually how monetary policy should be implemented once these long‐run effects are acknowledged.