公司投资决策过程中管理者非理性行为分析

在公司投资决策过程中,公司内部管理者和公司外部投资者是影响公司价值最大化的两大财务决策主体.他们的理性与非理性行为对公司投资决策具有不同的影响.本文主要关注的是公司内部管理者的非理性行为对公司投资决策的影响,从分析理性和理性决策的缺陷入手,研究总结了管理者的一些非理性行为表现及其原因.     

管理者过度自信与公司财务决策研究综述

<正>随着行为财务学的兴起,公司财务理论研究已经认识到投资者和管理者的非理性行为可能对公司财务决策产生影响。而在管理者非理性行为中,以过度自信最为引人注目。管理者过度自信是指管理者在进行决策时会因为高估自身能力和知识而产生偏差,从而导致管理者高估决策成功的可能性并低估与决策相关的风险。本文试图梳理和总结国内外有关管理者过度自信对投资、融资和股利决策影响的研究成果。     

基于行为公司财务的上市公司异常财务政策分析

上市公司进行财务决策时表现出许多异常行为,传统公司财务理论往往对此无法做出圆满解释。本文基于新崛起的行为公司财务理论,从一个新的视角进行了分析,结果发现：资本市场上投资者的非理性行为以及企业管理者自身的非理性行为都会导致企业财务政策的扭曲。     

基于投资者非理性行为的公司金融决策研究

本文将传统理论中完全理性的投资者还原为更接近现实的非理性投资者,从行为金融的投资者非理性的角度研究公司的融资、投资和股利政策三种最重要的金融决策,将公司金融理论与行为金融理论结合起来,在行为金融的投资者非理性的研究范式下来研究外部市场的无效性对公司的融资、投资和股利政策决策的影响,以及被假定为理性和忠诚的公司管理者又应该怎样正确决策,以达到公司价值的最大化这个目标。     

行为经济学视角下的财务风险成因与防范

除外部宏观因素外,企业的财务风险很大程度源自利益相关者的非理性行为,尤其是管理者和投资者的非理性行为.从行为经济学视角分析,这种非理性行为产生的原因在于行为人在不确定条件下决策时的各种认知偏差.其对企业决策有重要影响,会使决策偏离最优,给企业带来财务风险,损害企业价值.因此,应防范非理性行为的发生,以降低企业财务风险.     

管理者非理性行为与资本结构决策研究综述

资本结构理论的研究至今是财务研究领域的一大热点,影响资本结构各因素的实证分析以及与之相关的战略决策,行业竞争,市场结构等一一给与研究.本文在介绍资本结构和管理者非理性行为相关理论的基础上,重点对管理者非理性行为与资本结构之间关系进行评述,最后对资本结构决策未来的方向进行展望     

关于行为财务理论的研究综述

行为财务是在对“有效市场假说”（EMH）和资本资产定价模型（CAPM）的质疑和挑战中提出来的。自进入20世纪80年代以来,出现了大量与EMH相矛盾的市场异象,如：阿莱悖论、日历效应、股权溢价之谜等,这些异像给传统财务理论造成了极大的冲击,并且大量心理学和行为学研究显示,投资者表现出非理性的特征。于是行为财务理论在这种投资者非理性决策的背蒂下应运而生了。     

公司金融决策的分析:一个行为金融的视角

本文将以公司金融行为为研究主体,对基于行为金融理论的公司金融决策进行分析。将公司金融决策的参与者:投资者和公司管理者,分为理性和非理性并分别从公司投资决策、融资决策两个方面进行分析,结合以上研究对我国上市公司的金融决策给出政策建议。     

金融市场投资行为分析

金融市场中的投资活动是个体或群体以有限理性为前提并在非理性因素的作用下产生满意决策并时常伴随非理性行为的投资行为。本文首先阐述了投资活动中的有限理性及非理性因素,最后重点分析了金融市场中的重要现象即羊群行为。以期为投资者行为决策提供借鉴。     

企业投资的行为公司财务研究综述

近年来,新兴的行为财务学将管理者与投资者非理性纳入企业投资研究视野,有效弥补了理性人假设下传统理论的不足。本文就这一领域研究进行梳理,着重总结了管理者过度自信、从众心理和投资者情绪对投资决策影响的研究成果,对现有研究的主要贡献、关键问题、政策含义进行了比较系统的阐述,以利于更好地理解企业投资行为、提高投资效率、完善公司治理。     

个人投资者的行为金融学分析

行为金融是当前金融经济学的研究热点。它注重研究投资者的实际决策行为，解释金融市场上的各种现象。个人投资者行为分析是行为金融研究的重要组成部分。行为金融较为成功地解释了个人投资者的判断与决策、投资组合、策略与交易以及退休储蓄等方面的行为。     

投资者有限理性行为的认知、心理基础

行为金融目前已经成为金融研究和实践的前沿领域。本文通过对国内外投资者有限理性行为的相关研究进行梳理,对投资者认知偏差和心理偏差进行分析,得到一个结论：只有准确把握有限理性投资者的各种认知、心理偏差,才能更深入理解市场异象和行为金融模型、优化投资决策。     

关于规范非标准化债权投资的研究与思考

为规范商业银行理财业务投资运作,中国银行业监督管理委员会对外发布了《关于规范商业银行理财业务投资运作有关问题的通知》,从非标准化债权资产的界定、理财产品与投资资产的对应、信息披露、规模控制、管理流程等不同角度,防范化解理财业务风险。该文件的出台对商业银行、非银行金融机构及投资者产生了多方面影响,可能导致银行强弱的进一步分化,促进理财产品的研发创新,以券商为主的非银行金融机构将长期受益。各银行、非银行金融机构及投资者应积极寻求应对措施,充分利用新规的利好空间。     

内审转型与发展中的人民银行财务审计

财务审计作为人民银行传统的内审项目,在严格财经纪律、监督财务活动中发挥了重要作用.内审转型给财务审计的发展带来了新的契机,因而财务审计必须抓住这一有利时机,充分利用内审转型平台作出相应调整,不断提高财务审计的质量与水平.本文从解读内审转型与发展的内涵出发,审视当前财务审计的现实,提出有效推进财务审计转型与发展的建议.     

Outside directors and corporate board decisions

Between 1993 and 2000, at least 18 countries saw publication of guidelines proposing minimum representation of outside directors on corporate boards. Underlying this movement is an apparent presumption that boards with significant outside directors will make different and, perhaps, better decisions than boards dominated by insiders. As the first-mover in this movement, the United Kingdom provides a laboratory for a “natural experiment” to examine this presumption empirically. We find that UK boards that complied with the exogenously imposed standard were more likely to appoint outside chief executive officers (CEOs). Additionally, announcement period stock returns indicate that investors appear to view appointments of outside CEOs as good news. Apparently, boards with more outside directors make different (and perhaps better) decisions.     

Financial Accounting Research,Practice, and Financial Accountability

Financial accounting is essential to financial accountability, which is essential to a prosperous society. There are many examples of how improvements to financial accounting, supported by research, have enhanced financial accountability. Such research requires a strong relation between accounting academics and practice; this relation has ebbed and flowed during the life of Abacus. The relation seems to ebb when accounting academics embrace related fields and flows when the relevance to accounting practice emerges. Economics and finance have provided new perspectives and meaningful insights about the information investors need to make informed decisions. Regardless, there are many intriguing and open questions awaiting accounting research that can provide insights into how financial accounting—and thus financial accountability—can be improved. The future is bright for financial accounting researchers who do research relevant to accounting practice and want to contribute to a prosperous society.     

Millionaire investors: financial advisors,attribution theory and gender differences

To date little attention has been paid to how social cognitive bias can influence how financial advisors interpret and respond to the needs of millionaire investors, and if this varies depending on the gender of the investor. This research investigates whether experienced professional financial advisors who work with millionaire investors make different attributions for the control and knowledge that investors have of their investments, and if they make different investment portfolio recommendations to equivalent male and female investors. Using methodology novel to finance, this vignette-based study that controls for gender finds evidence that professional financial advisors judge millionaire female investors to have less control over their investment portfolios relative to men. Empirical results also show that female advisors judge women to be less knowledgeable about investments than men. Despite such perceptual differences, advisors recommend equally risky portfolios to male and female investors. These results have implications for wealth management institutions and the monitoring of financial advisors for millionaire individuals.     

Upheaval in the boardroom: Outside director public resignations,motivations, and consequences

We investigate the motives and circumstances surrounding outside directors' decisions to publicly announce their board resignations. Directors who leave “quietly” are in their mid-sixties and professional directors, i.e., retirees, who are retiring entirely from professional life. Directors who announce their resignation are in their mid-fifties and active professionals. Half the time they say they are leaving because they are “busy.” These directors leave from firms with some weakness in their performance, but with no overt manifestations of cronyism such as excessive compensation of either the CEO or directors. The other half of the time directors leave while publicly criticizing the firm. These directors are finance professionals who were members of the audit and compensation committees. They resign from firms with weak boards and financial performance with evidence that managers have manipulated earnings upwards. Public criticism appears to pressure these boards to make management changes associated with improved stock price performance. We conclude that while such public resignations are motivated by the reputational concerns of directors, they can act as a disciplining device for poor board performance.     

Individual investors’ information use,subjective expectations,and portfolio risk and return

What information do individual investors use when making their financial decisions and how is it related to their stock market expectations, their confidence in these expectations, and the risk and return of their stock portfolios? I study these questions by combining survey data on the information usage among individual investors in Sweden with detailed registry data on their stock portfolios. I find that investors use filtered financial information (e.g. information packaged by a professional intermediary) more frequently than they use unfiltered financial information (e.g. information from annual reports and financial statements). Investors who frequently use filtered financial information are, however, more confident in their stock market expectations and take larger risks in their stock portfolios. Investors that instead use unfiltered financial information take lower portfolio risks and obtain higher portfolio returns. The findings in this paper thus suggest that investors can improve their financial decisions by using more unfiltered financial information rather than filtered financial information when they make their financial decisions.     

Making honest men of them: Institutional investors,financial reporting,and the appointment of female directors to all-male boards

In this paper, we theorize that dedicated institutional investors are more likely than transient institutional investors to appoint female directors to investee firms with all-male boards, particularly those with high opacity. We conjecture that dedicated investors appoint female directors as a governance mechanism to improve the financial reporting quality of these investee firms. Specifically, we find that through the appointment of female directors, dedicated institutional investors trigger the release of stockpiled negative accounting information, thereby increasing the likelihood of a stock price crash risk. We also show that dedicated investors, through the appointment of female directors, improve investee firms' corporate disclosure environment by decreasing earnings management. Finally, we find that through continued service on investee firms' boards, female directors reduce the future likelihood of a stock price crash.