商业银行股权激励的特殊意义与现实问题分析

银行业普遍存在的管制,使银行面临着有限的控制权市场和接管威胁,从而大大降低了市场约束银行管理者的能力,因此对银行而言,通过股权激励机制协调股东和管理者的利益、降低代理成本显得尤为重要.我国商业银行实施股权激励不应盲目照搬西方国家的范例,应慎重选择股权激励的实施范围,目前最好只局限在高级管理人员,通过对股权激励机制的合理设计来充分发挥其长期激励效应,切不可盲目扩大激励范围,将股权激励演变成一种新的福利措施.应尽快建立起以经济资本为核心的业绩考核体系,在经济资本的约束下实现业务发展模式和盈利模式的转变.股权激励机制的有效实施离不开完善的银行治理结构.     

限制性股票激励和股票期权激励实施效果分析

自2006年以来,股权激励开始在我国迅速盛行开来,到2014年为止已有500多家企业提出过股权激励方案,大部分会选择限制性股票或者股票期权这两种最常见的激励方式。本文通过统计分析检验发现,限制性股票的激励效果往往优于股票期权。     

股票期权激励能在境内上市公司大规模推行吗

2005年8月23日，中国证监会、国资委、财政部等国务院五部门联合发布的《关于上市公司股权分置改革的指导意见》第10条指出，完成股权分置改革的上市公司可以实施管理层股权激励。9月9日，国务院国资委发布的《关于上市公司股权分置改革中国有股股权管理有关问题的通知》指出，完成股权分置改革的国有控股上市公司，可以探索实施管理层股权激励。股权激励问题成为市场关注的热点之一。     

商业银行股权激励的特殊意义与现实问题分析

银行业普遍存在的管制,使银行面临着有限的控制权市场和接管威胁,从而大大降低了市场约束银行管理者的能力,因此对银行而言,通过股权激励机制协调股东和管理者的利益、降低代理成本显得尤为重要.我国商业银行实施股权激励不应盲目照搬西方国家的范例,应慎重选择股权激励的实施范围,目前最好只局限在高级管理人员,通过对股权激励机制的合理设计来充分发挥其长期激励效应,切不可盲目扩大激励范围,将股权激励演变成一种新的福利措施.应尽快建立起以经济资本为核心的业绩考核体系,在经济资本的约束下实现业务发展模式和盈利模式的转变.股权激励机制的有效实施离不开完善的银行治理结构.     

七种股权激励模式的利弊评析

现代企业要保持持续稳定的发展，具有持久不衰的发展动力，就必须重视人力资源，建立一套行之有效的激励制度。目前国内公司制企业采用较多的主要有七种股权激励模式，企业可根据其利弊并结合实际选择不同的激励模式。     

我国上市公司股权激励方式的比较研究

所有权和经营权分离,是现代企业的重要标志。当所有者与经营者的目标之间产生不一致的时候,所有权和经营权的分离就会带来问题。股权激励是解决公司股东与经营者之间委托代理问题的一种有效激励制度。本文通过对目前主要的三种股权激励方式进行对比分析,进而对我国上市公司实施股权激励的方式进行了初步的探讨。     

创业企业股票期权激励研究

本文根据股票期权的理论、方法,结合我国创业企业的背景和特点,探讨股票期权激励在我国创业企业中的实际应用。文章具体研究了创业公司股权激励的可行性、股权激励的作用,从股票期权的制度原则、激励对象、行权方式、授予时机选择、退出机制等条款的制订方面来设计股票期权激励方案。文章最后分析了股权激励为创业公司带来的风险,提出了适合我国创业企业的股票期权激励方案和注意点。     

股权激励的几种主要方式

股票期权是公司给予高级管理人员的一种权利。美国迪斯尼公司和华纳传媒公司最早在高级管理人员中大量使用股票期权。随着20世纪90年代美国股市出现牛市，股票期权给高级管理人员带来了丰厚的收益。全球500家大型企业中已有89％对高层管理实施了股票期权。     

浅议经理股票期权激励制度

在美国和欧洲各国企业中经理股票期权激励制度被广泛采用,我国企业也纷纷试行.但在股票期权的实践中出现了一些问题,美国财务造假丑闻使其受到许多批评.从经理股票期权激励的实践和效应分析,经理股票期权激励制度完全可以加以完善并发挥其应有的作用.     

股票期权激励制度不是灵丹妙药

向公司高层管理人员乃至普通员工发放股票期权是美国企业重要的长期激励方式,在提升企业业绩、降低代理成本、积聚人力资源等方面发挥了显著的作用,因此被称作经理人的“金手铐”。然而,安然、世通、施乐等公司的财务丑闻爆发后,一直备受推崇的美国式的公司治理模式受到人们的重新审视,作为美国公司治理中激励机制基石的股票期权制度,也引发了较大     

Incentives of Stock Option Based Compensation

We introduce explicitly the effort as a choice variable in a continuous time utility maximisation framework of an executive who is partly compensated with stock options. We solve the model in the case where the executive is not allowed to trade in the company’s stock but is able to achieve a partial insurance through trading in a correlated market portfolio. We define the executive’s value of the options through a certainty equivalence approach both in the case of European call options and non-standard capped stock options and study the behaviour of the reservation price as relevant parameters change.JEL Classification: G13, G30, G32, J33, M12     

Stock Option Measures and the Stock Repurchase Decision

The major purposes of this study are two fold. First, we investigate whether or not the dilutive effect from stock options on the denominator of earnings per share is associated with the incurrence of stock repurchases. We use the FASB dilution and the economic dilution as the direct dilution measures and examine their relationship with stock repurchase decision. Second, we explore which of the extant measures of stock options can better explain the incurrence of stock repurchases. Six extant measures of stock options from previous studies are used: (1) the FASB's treasury-stock EPS dilution method, (2) the economic dilution measure based on Core, Guay and Kothari (2002), (3) the number of employee stock option exercises, (4) the number of stock option grants, (5) the number of total stock options outstanding, and (6) the number of exercisable stock options.Using a pooled cross-sectional sample from 1996–2000, we find a positive association between the likelihood of stock repurchases and the FASB dilution as well as the economic dilution in EPS, respectively. Thereby providing support for the undo-dilution hypothesis. The highest incremental explanatory power is found when we add the number of stock options exercisable to the baseline model. However, further analysis does not support the option-funding hypothesis suggested by Kahle (2002). We provide two explanations for why exercisable stock options better explain the stock repurchase decision.     

CEO Stock Options and Equity Risk Incentives

Abstract:   We test the hypothesis that the risk incentive effects of CEO stock option grants motivate managers to take on more risk than they would otherwise. Using a sample of mergers we document that the ratio of post‐ to pre‐merger stock return variance is positively related to the risk incentive effect of CEO stock option compensation but this relationship is conditioned on firm size, with firm size having a moderating effect on the risk incentive effect of stock options. Using a broader time‐series cross‐sectional sample of firms we find a strong positive relationship between CEO risk incentive embedded in the stock options and subsequent equity return volatility. As in the case of the merger sample, this relationship is stronger for smaller firms.     

Downsizing decisions: The joint influence of equity incentives and behavioral biases

Although new investment can be viewed as a decision to pursue projects from a wide number of growth opportunities with easily discernible (and presumably preferable) risk profiles, downsizing (e.g., through layoffs, plant closings, asset divestitures, etc.) is a dichotomous choice to either abandon or continue an existing project where the relative risk between these options is not clear. Our evidence suggests that vega in the pre-downsizing period is associated with risky investment that necessitates future downsizing. We further find that contemporaneous vega is associated with a greater likelihood of downsizing. On the other hand, our evidence suggests that delta is a significant impediment to downsizing. We examine the influence of behavioral factors in the decision-making process and find downsizing decisions are discouraged by managerial overconfidence but encouraged by managers’ aversion to ambiguity. Finally, we investigate whether equity incentives and behavioral factors lead to better downsizing decisions. We find that downsizing firms with high ambiguity perform better after downsizing relative to their matched pair with lower ambiguity.     

Incentive Efficiency of Stock versus Options

This paper examines the relative incentive costs of using stockversus options in management incentive contracts that use market priceas the performance measure. We establish that if the manager'seffort has little or no effect on a firm's operating risk, thenthe cost of incentive risk is less using stock rather than options.However, this result is reversed if the manager's effort has asignificant impact on the firm's operating risk.     

Stock Market Reaction to the Appointment of Outside Directors

This paper examines the UK stock market's reaction to the appointment of outside (non‐executive) board members. Tests conducted using a sample of 714 appointments reported by EXTEL between 1 July, 1993 and 31 December, 1996, indicate a strong interaction between appointee characteristics and the magnitude of the agency problem: the share price reaction to outside director appointments is significantly more favourable when board ownership is low and the appointee possesses strong ex ante monitoring incentives. In contrast, the appointment of independent and manager‐affiliated outside directors does not appear to benefit shareholders on average, even in the presence of serious agency problems.     

American-style Indexed Executive Stock Options

This paper develops a new pricing model for American-style indexed executive stock options. We rely on a basic model framework and an indexation scheme first proposed by Johnson and Tian (2000a) in their analysis of European-style indexed options. Our derivation of the valuation formula represents an instructive example of the usefulness of the change-of-numeraire technique. In the paper's numerical section we implement the valuation formula and demonstrate that not only may the early exercise premium be significant but also that the delta of the American-style option is typically much larger than the delta of the otherwise identical (value-matched) European-style option. Vega is higher for indexed options than for conventional options but largely independent of whether the options are European- or American-style. This has important implications for the design of executive compensation contracts. We finally extend the analysis to cover the case where the option contracts are subject to delayed vesting. We show that for realistic parameter values, delayed vesting leads only to a moderate reduction in the value of the American-style indexed executive stock option.     

Convertible Securities,Employee Stock Options and the Cost of Equity

We provide a method for calculating the cost of equity and the cost of capital in the presence of convertible securities and employee stock options. We demonstrate how this approach can be applied if a company already has issued convertible claims or if it is considering doing so for the first time. We provide several numerical examples illustrating the significance of errors in estimating the cost of capital that can result when (1) employee stock options are ignored or (2) the observable stock price is used as a proxy for the unobservable underlying asset.