论后发大国战略性新兴产业内生增长因子累积演进

后发大国试图通过发展战略性新兴产业来改变自身在国际分工中的不利位置,实现新兴产业内生增长成为其唯一途径。后发大国战略性新兴产业内生增长所需要的知识技术、市场需求和组织制度等因子是一个累积演进过程,既包括各因子间的内部演进,又包括因子之间的协同演进,巴西乙醇燃油发展正体现了这一演进历程。     

专利保护宽度和累积创新竞赛中的信息披露

本文将专利保护宽度定义为累积创新厂商之间的许可比率，考察其对累积创新竞赛中厂商信息披露决策的影响。我们发现：强的专利保护宽度有利于信息披露，但其对社会福利和技术进步率的影响却呈近似的倒U型，故在不同的情况下都存在一令专利保护宽度的最优取值区间。与事后许可相比，事前许可能在反托拉斯法的框架下导致社会福利的帕累托改进。如果双方对专利诉讼的结果具有相同的预期，则专利保护宽度的确定和实施就是无成本的。     

专利保护宽度和累积创新竞赛中的信息披露

该文将专利保护宽度定义为累积创新厂商之间的许可比率,考察其对累积创新竞赛中厂商信息披露决策的影响.我们发现:强的专利保护宽度有利于信息披露,但其对社会福利和技术进步率的影响却呈近似的倒U型,故在不同的情况下都存在一个专利保护宽度的最优取值区间.与事后许可相比,事前许可能在反托拉斯法的框架下导致社会福利的帕累托改进.如果双方对专利诉讼的结果具有相同的预期,则专利保护宽度的确定和实施就是无成本的.     

内生创新、本土创新与自主创新辨析

针对国内学术界对内生创新、本土创新与自主创新三者之间模糊、混淆甚至是混乱的研究现状,本文从理论基础、内涵和内在联系等方面理清这三个概念.基于广泛的文献回顾,我们发现内生创新概念来源于内生增长理论,本土创新概念来源于新经济地理学理论,而自主创新概念则产生于国家创新体系理论与全球化背景下中国实践的客观要求;在内涵上,内生创新主要指R＆D努力和知识存量,本土创新侧重于产业集聚或产业关联带来的技术外部性,自主创新侧重于国家的创新战略和创新环境等综合影响;从内在联系上看,创新可理解为由企业层面的内生创新、区域与产业层面的本土创新和国家层面的自主创新而构成的复杂系统.     

内生创新增长理论研究述评

在经济增长理论的演进过程中，内生创新增长理论逐步取代其他几种研究视角，成为考察长期经济增长机理和动力问题的主流理论，各种创新要素被不断整合进理论框架，数学模型表达形式也越来越缜密和复杂。从新近研究情况来看，这套理论体系开始涉足更多新的研究领域，更加注重理论体系的完整性、适用性以及理论与经济现实的相互融合，而将制度性因素逐步纳入分析框架将成为内生创新增长理论中一个颇具现实意义的发展方向。     

内生创新努力、吸收能力与企业创新绩效

利用浙江省338家创新型企业2008～ 2010年三年数据,实证分析了企业内生创新努力的R&D经费投入、R&D人员投入与创新绩效间的关系,引入吸收能力这一变量,研究吸收能力在内生创新努力和创新绩效间是否起到中介作用.结果发现,企业内生创新努力的R&D经费投入对企业创新绩效有显著的正向影响,且具有滞后性,但是随着时间推移影响越来越小;R&D人员投入对企业创新绩效的影响不显著,且呈现不稳定的特征;吸收能力在内生创新努力和创新绩效间起到中介作用.     

创新是企业发展的内生动力

美国管理大师德鲁克认为：创新就是赋予资源以新的创造财富能力的行为。现在“创新”两个字扩展到了社会的方方面面。尤其对于企业来讲,在市场经济条件下,企业面临着极其复杂的内外部环境,要想生存,在竞争中取胜,更需要不断地创新,增强内生力。     

累积创新框架下的知识产权保护研究

本文通过构建累积创新框架下的拍卖模型来探讨知识产权制度的社会福利效应,比较各种具体制度的效率及在各种特殊的产业中的应用保护。基于存在领先厂商情况下累积创新过程中的创新竞赛问题的分析,可以得到三种不同策略情形下的社会福利函数,并确定知识产权保护程度的适用范围。研究结论的应用扩展表明:以生物技术、电子和医药等为主的行业,适用比较严格的保护制度进行保护,如专利制度;以计算机软件、音乐、书籍和期刊等为主的行业,适用比较宽松的保护制度进行保护,如版权制度。     

累积创新中动态联盟的利益分配

累积创新是一种在先导创新基础上进行的后续创新,是对已有创新成果的进一步研究和应用。运用博弈理论分析研究发现,在累积创新框架下,动态联盟是实现累积创新的一种有效的组织形式。利益分配是影响动态联盟稳定运行的关键因素之一,是联盟各方绩效得以发挥的重要保证。建立动态联盟博弈时序下的利益分配模型,假设盟主对盟员具有完全谈判能力,对联盟各方的利益进行分析,得到累积创新中动态联盟最优的分配比例。     

浅析文化产业内生式发展的创新驱动力

当前,我国文化产业的发展正方兴未艾,十七届六中全会的召开更是迎来了我国文化产业发展的春天,政府的大力推动和政策支持,为文化产业发展提供了强大的外在推动力,而市场机制作用下依靠创新驱动的产业内生式发展才是文化产业持续健康发展的根本动力。本文通过分析文化产业的发展动力构成和特点,提出了通过市场机制创新、文化科技融合创新、文化消费创新等增强文化产业内生式发展动力的解决对策。     

Differentiation of innovation strategies based on pharmaceutical licensing agreements: Insight from Korean pharmaceutical firms

The paper aims to show how licensing behaviour can be used to differentiate distinct innovation strategies. Information on in-licensing and out-licensing agreements is used to guide the development of a framework that details the licensing firm’s relational preference for internal and external orientation. Using firm-level data of the Korean pharmaceutical firms, the study categorised the distinct strategic orientations of firms based on the proposed matrix model. The results indicated that firms with higher R&D (research and development) expenditures have a tendency to greater external exploitation of technological knowledge than firms with low R&D spending. The study provides potential avenues for targeting of licensing partners from the perspective of firms seeking to in-license or out-license their innovations.     

Drastic innovations and multiplicity of optimal licensing policies

Considering the licensing of a drastic cost-reducing innovation by an outside innovator in an n-firm Cournot oligopoly, we show that when the innovator uses combinations of fees and royalties, there are either n − 1 or n optimal licensing policies.     

How do prolific inventors impact firm innovation in ICT: implications from patent co-inventing network

Prolific inventors not only own higher innovation productivity, but also impact other inventors through innovation networks. This paper contributes to existing literatures by differentiating prolific inventors from non-prolific inventors in the network context, and making an empirical analysis of the effect of prolific inventors. We use the patent filing data from the State Intellectual Property Office of China (SIPO) in investigating the effect of prolific inventors on firm innovation. We use the patents filed by 10 largest Information & Communication Technology firms during 1995–2010 and establish the innovation network with patent co-inventing data. The empirical result shows that prolific inventors positively impact their partners who used to co-invent at least one patent with them. Furthermore, prolific inventors positively impact inventors who do not have a close contact with them. The closer the inventors are to prolific inventors, the more patents they produce. Members are thereby more likely to gather around prolific inventors and formulate intensive clusters. In networks centered by prolific inventors, useful knowledge outweighs redundant knowledge, and high clustering that facilitates knowledge flow is proved to be beneficial; while in networks without prolific inventors, high clustering may not be beneficial as there are less inventors holding advanced knowledge. Policy implications are discussed at the end of this study.     

Human capital use,innovation, patent protection,and economic growth in multiple regions

We provide the first theoretical analysis of the effects of human capital use, innovative activity, and patent protection, on economic growth in a model with many regions. In each region, consumers have constant relative risk-aversion preferences, there is no human capital growth, and there are three kinds of manufacturing activities involving the production of blueprints for inputs (machines), the inputs themselves, and a single final consumption good. Our analysis generates four results. For any given region, we first describe the balanced growth path (BGP) equilibrium and show that the BGP growth rate depends negatively on the rate at which patents expire. Second, we characterize the transitional dynamics in our model. Third, we determine the value of the patent expiry rate that maximizes the equilibrium growth rate of a region. Finally, we show that a policy of offering perpetual patent protection does not necessarily maximize social welfare in a region.     

p-Dominance and Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics

This paper studies equilibrium selection based on a class of perfect foresight dynamics and relates it to the notion of p-dominance. A continuum of rational players is repeatedly and randomly matched to play a symmetric n×n game. There are frictions: opportunities to revise actions follow independent Poisson processes. The dynamics has stationary states, each of which corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of the static game. A strict Nash equilibrium is linearly stable under the perfect foresight dynamics if, independent of the current action distribution, there exists a consistent belief that any player necessarily plays the Nash equilibrium action at every revision opportunity. It is shown that a strict Nash equilibrium is linearly stable under the perfect foresight dynamics with a small degree of friction if and only if it is the p-dominant equilibrium with p<1/2. It is also shown that if a strict Nash equilibrium is the p-dominant equilibrium with p<1/2, then it is uniquely absorbing (and globally accessible) for a small friction (but not vice versa). Set-valued stability concepts are introduced and their existence is shown. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73.     

Contracting for tacit knowledge: the provision of technical services in technology licensing contracts

Recent research on the economic payoff from new technology has emphasized the importance of tacit knowledge or know-how. This paper shows that arm's length contract can overcome the problems in contracting for know-how by bundling complementary inputs with know-how in a technology package, and leveraging the superior enforceability of contracts over the latter. In the empirical part of this paper, the relationship between bundling and transfer of know-how is analyzed, using Indian data. The results imply that tied sales of inputs may increase the efficiency of contracts involving the transfer of know-how. A striking result, in the context of the current North-South debates on intellectual property rights, is the packaging of patents with know-how.     

Can people learn rational expectations?

In this note the stability of the rational expectations equilibrium for the Foster and Frierman (1990) version of the Blume and Easley (1982) model is investigated under the assumption that the learning mechanism used by economic agents is based on a selection mechanism on a class of competing models having a physical meaning for the agent and not on the interpolation of models having no clear physical meaning, as it is often the case in the literature on learning rational expectations. It is found that, under the standard assumption that the rational expectations model is in the information set of the uninformed trader no matter his degree of rationality, convergence to it is less likely the higher the uninformed agent's degree of rationality, in a sense to be specified in the paper. Some comments on the result are also provided.     

Endogenous fluctuations induced by nonlinear pollution accumulation in an OLG economy and the bifurcation control

This paper aims to study the influence of nonlinear pollution accumulation on economic growth by incorporating the nonlinear pollution accumulation into an OLG model. It is shown that the nonlinearity can yield very complex dynamics, including the flip bifurcation resulting in sustained fluctuations in economy. This indicates that the nonlinear pollution accumulation can be a source of intergenerational inequity. To stabilize the complex motion and thus to control the fluctuations, a bifurcation control method from control theory is proposed. The welfare analysis shows the sustainable development criterion can be met in the controlled system but not in the original system.     

Bootstrapping R and adjusted R in regression analysis

In this paper, using the bootstrap method, we consider to estimate the standard errors of R² and which are measures of their precision, and to construct their confidence intervals. It is shown by Monte Carlo experiments that the bootstrap standard errors are considerably accurate estimates of the exact ones. It is also shown that although the bootstrap 95% confidence interval of R² do not include the true value of the parent coefficient of determination in some particular cases, such a phenomenon does not occur when is used.     

The (S,s) Policy is an Optimal Trading Strategy in a Class of Commodity Price Speculation Problems

This paper introduces a model of commodity price speculation and proves that the optimal trading strategy is of the (S,s) form when a no expected loss condition holds. A strong form of this condition is that the retail price charged to consumers at time t exceeds the expected wholesale price of the commodity at time t+1, i.e. , where β ∈(0,1) is the speculator’s discount factor. We are extremely grateful to Herbert Scarf for pointing out an important error in a previous draft of this paper and for suggesting the key argument in a revised proof that fixed the problem. We also benefited from helpful feedback from an anonymous referee, William Brainard, Zvi Eckstein, participants of seminars at Yale, the Operations Research Center at MIT, and the Econometric Society Winter School at the Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi.