Multiple directorships and acquirer returns

This paper examines the impact of multiple directorships on stockholder wealth around the announcements of mergers and acquisitions. Grounded in agency theory, we argue that multiple directorships affect the quality of managerial oversight and thus influence agency conflicts in acquisition decisions. We show that acquiring firms where directors hold more outside board seats experience more negative abnormal returns. This adverse effect, nonetheless, does not extend across the entire range of multiple directorships. Rather, the detrimental impact is significant only when the number of outside board seats surpasses a certain threshold. We interpret this result as suggesting that directors serving on multiple boards allow value-destroying acquisitions when they become too busy beyond a certain point, and the effect of directors’ busyness on acquisition performance appears to be nonlinear. We employ several alternative definitions of directors’ busyness and obtain consistent results.     

Multiple directorships and the value of cash holdings

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - This study examines the impact of multiple directorships on the value destruction associated with increases in cash holdings. We find that the...     

Trends in corporate diversification

This paper studies the diversification and refocusing strategies of firms in the last three decades. The 1980s were characterized by a trend towards greater focus. This trend slackens in the 1990s to be replaced by a surge in the number of newly listed single-segment firms. From 2000 to 2007 there is very little change in the proportion of diversified firms. Overall, the proportion of conglomerates declines from 40% to 17% from 1980 to 1997. In addition, about one third of the diversifying firms reverse the diversification decision within four years. The analysis of the statements made by these firms suggests that there is significant heterogeneity in the motivations behind diversification.     

Bankruptcy risk,costs and corporate diversification

This paper studies the impact of diversification on firms that file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Prior research suggests that diversification affects both the probability and costs of distress. Treating bankruptcy as a special case of distress, we find that diversification reduces the likelihood of bankruptcy and liquidation in Chapter 11, which is consistent with the coinsurance hypothesis. However, we observe higher bankruptcy costs as measured by time spent in Chapter 11 and inefficient segment investment for diversified firms. Our evidence is consistent with the idea that diversification provides benefits to managers in terms of job security rather than to firms. Our findings may help firms to make diversification decisions and creditors determine lending policies toward different forms of organizations.     

Firm diversification and the value of corporate cash holdings

This paper studies the effect of firm diversification on the value of corporate cash holdings. We develop two hypotheses based on efficient internal capital market and agency problems. We find that the value of cash is lower in diversified firms than in single-segment firms, and that firm diversification is associated with a lower value of cash in both financially unconstrained and constrained firms. We find that firm diversification has a negative (zero) impact on the value of cash among firms with a lower (higher) level of corporate governance. These findings are consistent with the interpretation that firm diversification reduces the value of corporate cash holdings through agency problems.     

Entrenched controlling shareholders and the performance consequences of corporate diversification in Taiwan

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the value/performance effects of corporate diversification in an emerging market. Prior evidence on this issue is still mixed. The present study adds the role of entrenched controlling shareholders into this issue. We argue that when controlling shareholders have larger excess board seats control rights, they have higher ability and incentive to expropriate minority shareholders through corporate diversification. Using a sample of firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange in 2003, we find that controlling shareholders’ excess board seats control is negatively associated with the market valuation of corporate diversification. Consistently, we also document that highly diversified firms run by more entrenched controlling shareholders have lower future financial performance than otherwise similar firms. Overall, our findings imply that corporate diversification is not necessarily harmful or beneficial for firms. We conclude that the agency problem arising from the excess board seats control rights owned by controlling shareholders is an influential factor leading to negative performance consequences with regard to firm diversification.     

The effect of corporate diversification on credit risk: new evidence from European credit default swap spreads

This article investigates the impact of corporate diversification on credit risk. To our best knowledge, this is the first paper to use credit default swap (CDS) spreads instead of bond yield or revalued book values to test the risk‐reduction hypothesis. The analysis relies upon a sample of STOXX^® EUROPE 600 index members and covers the years 2010–2014. After controlling for various CDS‐ and firm‐specific variables, we find that diversification strategies do not significantly lower CDS premiums. Multilevel mediation analysis further shows that information asymmetries overcompensate the risk‐reducing effects resulting from corporate diversification.     

International diversification and Microfinance

International commercial banks, institutional investors, and private investors have become increasingly interested in financing microfinance institutions (MFIs). This paper investigates whether adding microfinance funds to a portfolio of risky international assets yields diversification gains. By using mean-variance spanning tests with short-sale constraints, we find that investing in microfinance may be attractive for investors seeking a better risk-return profile. Specifically, the analysis suggests that investing in MFIs from Latin America, or microfinance and rural banks yields more efficient portfolios. In contrast, adding MFIs from Africa or microfinance NGOs to a portfolio of international assets is not beneficial for a mean-variance investor.     

Financial market frictions and diversification

We find new facts that relate the evolution of firm scope to the changing frictions in external capital markets over the last three decades. We find that large, diversified publicly traded firms increase their scope during times of high external capital market frictions, such as in the recent Great Recession. Moreover, during these times firms diversify their investment needs and cash flow across industries. We also find similar phenomena outside diversified public firms. Examining the mergers and acquisitions activity of stand-alone and diversified private firms, we uncover similar patterns. In aggregate data, we find that the composition of mergers shifts from focused to diversifying and back with changes in external market conditions. Our evidence is broadly consistent with the notion that firms diversify their scope in response to tightening in external capital markets.     

Accounting and corporate accountability

The rationale for and techniques of social responsibility accounting are examined analytically. The fear that corporate managers might act contrary to the interests of shareholders and not be concerned with those with whom the corporation contracts (creditors, workers and consumers) is not supported. But others may be harmed by corporate actions (externalities). The ways in which social responsibility accounting can be used to measure and serve as a means of controlling externalities are delineated, analyzed and rejected.     

Behavioral consistency in corporate finance: CEO personal and corporate leverage

We find that firms behave consistently with how their CEOs behave personally in the context of leverage choices. Analyzing data on CEOs' leverage in their most recent primary home purchases, we find a positive, economically relevant, robust relation between corporate and personal leverage in the cross-section and when examining CEO turnovers. The results are consistent with an endogenous matching of CEOs to firms based on preferences, as well as with CEOs imprinting their personal preferences on the firms they manage, particularly when governance is weaker. Besides enhancing our understanding of the determinants of corporate capital structures, the broader contribution of the paper is to show that CEOs' personal behavior can, in part, explain corporate financial behavior of the firms they manage.     

Alliances and corporate governance

We study the link between a firm's quality of governance and its alliance activity. We consider alliances as a commitment technology that helps a company’ Chief Executive Officer overcome agency problems that relate to the inability to ex ante motivate division managers. We show that well-governed firms are more likely to avail themselves of this technology to anticipate ex post commitment problems and resolve them. The role of governance is particularly important when the commitment problems are more acute, such as for significantly risky/long-horizon projects (“longshots”) or firms more prone to inefficient internal redistribution of resources (conglomerates), as well as in the absence of alternative disciplining devices (e.g., low product market competition). Governance also mitigates agency issues between alliance partners; dominant alliance partners agree to a more equal split of power with junior partners that are better governed. An “experiment” that induces cross-sectional variation in the cost of the alliance commitment technology provides evidence of a causal link between governance and alliances.     

Time-varying Integration and International diversification strategies

This paper investigates the impact of globalization and integration on the relative benefits of country and industry diversification. Unlike previous models, our factor model allows asset exposures and volatilities to vary with both structural changes and temporary fluctuations in the economic and financial environment. First, we find that globalization and integration have lead to a gradual convergence of country to industry betas, especially in Europe. Second, the structurally-driven increase in market betas is accompanied by a gradual decrease in country-specific risk. Third, even though the edge has structurally decreased, geographical diversification continues being superior to industry diversification.     

Financial sector diversification and MNC valuation

We extend the literature on MNC performance by examining the relationship between market valuation of MNCs and intangibles associated with financial expertise. We identify firms as having financial expertise if they have diversified their business in the financial sector. We argue that financial expertise enhances the ability of MNCs to internalize financial transactions and take advantage of financing and investment opportunities around the world. Therefore, it is a potentially significant source of market power. Our test results demonstrate that as the degree of multinationality increases market valuation is positively related with financial expertise even after we account for several other control factors. Our findings imply that MNCs with financial expertise can be viewed as possessing an additional intangible, which essentially is the financial equivalent of the traditionally examined intangible assets, such as technological “know-how,” goodwill, and managerial expertise.     

Debt,diversification and earnings management

In this article we use panel-estimation techniques to calculate discretionary accruals (DAC) and to produce a better understanding of the nature of the relation between debt and earnings management. Consistent with the transparency hypothesis (which suggests that diversification increases the complexity of firms’ activities and reduces their transparency to outsiders), we find that for less-diversified (more transparent) firms, debt reduces positive discretionary accruals, whereas in relatively more-diversified (less transparent) firms the impact of debt becomes positive. Our paper shows that marginal increases in debt provide the incentives for managers to manipulate earnings, and diversification provides the needed context for this accounting practice to be possible. We have also found that only in the sub-sample of aggressive firms, those that manage discretionary accruals with enough magnitude to increase income, do lenders exert their control. Some firms, however, take advantage of diversification to avoid this control. Our findings are robust to several earnings-management measures and methodologies.     

Firm location and corporate debt

This study examines the influence of a firm’s geographical location on corporate debt and provides evidence that the higher cost of collecting information on firms distant from urban areas has significant implications on a wide array of corporate debt characteristics. We find that rural firms face higher debt yield spreads and attract smaller and less prestigious bank syndicates than urban firms. Rural firms attempt to reduce their informational disadvantage by relying more on relationship banking. Our results on the effect of location on corporate debt are robust to the inclusion of an extensive set of firm and issue characteristics.     

Languages and corporate tax avoidance

Review of Accounting Studies - This paper examines the effect of languages on corporate tax avoidance. We hypothesize and find that managers of firms in countries with languages that grammatically...     

Pilot CEOs and corporate innovation

We find evidence that chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) hobby of flying airplanes is associated with significantly better innovation outcomes, measured by patents and citations, greater innovation effectiveness, and more diverse and original patents. We rule out alternative explanations, leading us to conclude that CEO pilot credentials capture the personality trait of sensation seeking. Sensation seeking combines risk taking with a desire to pursue novel experiences and has been associated with creativity. Our evidence highlights sensation seeking as a valuable personality trait that can be used to identify CEOs who are likely to drive innovation success.