On the paradoxical case of a consumer-based environmental subsidy policy

We apply an environmentally differentiated duopoly model to the analysis of environmental policy involving consumer subsidies based on the emission levels of the products consumers purchase. More specifically, we consider the environmental and welfare effects of subsidizing consumers who purchase environmentally friendly goods in the case of a partially covered market with a Cournot duopoly. We show that, paradoxically, the subsidy policy degrades the environment, and that the optimal policy depends on the degree of marginal social valuation of environmental damage. That is, if the marginal social valuation of environmental damage is larger than a certain value, a consumer-based environmental subsidy policy is not socially optimal.     

Environmental Tax in a Green Market

We examine the impact of an emission tax in a green market characterized by consumers’ environmental awareness and competition between firms for both environmental quality and product prices. The unique aspect of this model comes from the assumption that the cost for an increase in quality is fixed. We show that the emission tax improves welfare, thanks to a decline in pollution and despite an accentuation of product differentiation. The higher the marginal environmental damage is, the higher the optimal tax will be. The optimal tax, however, becomes lower than the marginal damage when the market is not too large. Finally, when marginal environmental damage is not too low, the optimal tax leads to a green product monopoly.     

Emission tax and optimal privatization in Cournot–Bertrand comparison

We compare a Cournot with a Bertrand duopoly in a differentiated mixed market when both emission tax and privatization policies are used together. We find that the optimal emission tax is always lower than the marginal environmental damage, and it is always lower under Cournot than under Bertrand. We also find that the optimal privatization is always a partial privatization, and it is always higher under Cournot than under Bertrand. The socially optimal combinations of emission tax and privatization will damage the environment most, but Cournot yields lower environmental damage and social welfare than those under Bertrand. Finally, we show that the environmental damage is non-monotone in the level of privatization under both Cournot and Bertrand competitions.     

Qualitative valuation of environmental criteria through a group consensus based on stochastic dominance

This paper introduces a qualitative valuation method to elicit stakeholders' intensities of preferences for a complex environmental issue and multiple social groups. Environmental valuation studies have shown that in any complex environment with a diversity of environmental services, stakeholders have difficulties using a monetary valuation to make trade-offs between different environmental services. Stated preference methods such as the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) have been criticised for their individualistic format and assumptions of commensurability between environmental criteria. To alleviate both of these criticisms, we propose a qualitative valuation method. The method contains a discursive step to allow stakeholders to discuss and construct a list of environmental criteria and alternative plans. The list of criteria and plans is subsequently used by a group of experts to formulate an Impact Matrix (IM), which is to be used in the succeeding individualistic steps of the methodology. The first individualistic step consists of asking the stakeholders to rank Alternative Impacts (AIs) in the IM for each single criterion. The stakeholders are then asked to express intensities of their preferences through pairwise comparisons between the AIs of the constructed rank order on each single criterion. These intensities are expressed on a qualitative scale. Subsequently, to provide social intensities of preferences, a social preference (social rank order) is first determined for each single criterion. We propose to use the median value among the intensities of preferences as the social intensity of preference by assuming interpersonal comparability and taking into account stochastic monotonocity. This is a pre-processing step, which allows us to reach social intensities of preferences in the Lar rangeland (Iran), where several social groups have conflicting interests on rangeland services, leading to conflicting preferences on environmental criteria.     

The Welfare Effects of Environmental Taxation on a Green Market Where Consumers Emit a Pollutant

This paper examines the welfare impact of emission taxes and subsidies in a green market where consumers emit a pollutant through their usage of products produced by duopolists. For this purpose, we employ a discrete?Ccontinuous model including both consumer choice and usage of an environmentally differentiated product in a utility-consistent framework. The findings indicate that an emission tax is always welfare dominant over a subsidy on consumer purchases of the clean product because of its contribution to a reduction in environmental damage. It does this by both inducing firms to improve the environmental qualities of their products and by constraining consumer usage of these products.     

Integrating public demands into model-based design for multifunctional agriculture: An application to intensive Dutch dairy landscapes

The contribution of agriculture to the welfare of society is determined by its economic, social and environmental performance. Although theoretical discussions can be found in the literature, few reports exist that integrate the social demand for multifunctional agriculture in the evaluation of the sustainability and the global welfare of society. This paper presents a methodology that combines economic valuation, integrated modelling, stakeholder analysis, and multi-criteria evaluation. It consists of three steps to determine: (1) social demands for multifunctional agriculture; (2) feasible technical alternatives available from the supply part of the market; (3) the net utility of alternatives for society measured as the change in social net benefit, i.e. the sum of changes compared to the current situation expressed in utility of market and non-market net benefits. Market net benefits are represented by their monetary value. Quality Function Deployment combined with Analytic Network Process (QFD/ANP) were used to estimate the non-market net benefits. The methodology is applied to the case study of a dairy-farming based agricultural landscape in the Northern Friesian Woodlands, The Netherlands. Social net benefit depended on land use, i.e. pasture management regimes on each of the agricultural fields and on presence or absence of hedgerows around the fields. Changes in market net utility were expressed in terms of changes for farmers, consumers and government. Changes in non-market net utility were expressed in terms of changes in landscape quality, nature value and environmental health for Dutch society as a whole, as estimated from European public surveys (Eurobarometer). The complete solution space defined by the market and non-market net benefits of landscapes with alternative patterns of land use was estimated to offer insight in the trade-off between market and non-market performance and enable selection of ‘icon’ landscapes to target or avoid. Improvement of the current landscape towards the social optimum would involve changes in pasture management resulting in higher gross margin for farmers, slightly relaxing current environmental restrictions, which could be reached at lower levels of subsidies in agri-environmental programs. In addition to such overall optimum the results demonstrate the trade-off between market and non-market benefits and the characteristics of current, utopian and dystopian landscapes. The approach provides an alternative to current economic valuation methods which focus on assessment of economic value as an input to analysis. Here, economic value emerges as the trade-off between market and non-market functions which is an output of the analysis.     

Strategic Voting for Noncooperative Environmental Policies in Open Economies

In this paper, we construct a political-economy model of strategic environmental policymaking with different degrees of product differentiation and different market structures, and examine how strategic voting decisions are affected by the choice of environmental policy instruments (tax or standard). We show that in a Cournot market structure, voters elect tax-setting policymakers who are more green than themselves when product differentiation and/or environmental externalities are more prominent. In a Bertrand market structure, they elect more green tax-setting policymakers than themselves. On the other hand, they elect standard-setting policymakers who are less green than themselves. The results confirm the advantage of the overall use of emission tax over that of emission standard regarding the welfare effect of strategic voting.     

NONMARKET VALUATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE EXXON VALDEZ

This paper examines a natural resource damages case, the Exxon Valdez, and contrasts the use and acceptance of market and nonmarket valuation methods in two related sectors: commercial fishing and Alaska native subsistence use of fish and wildlife. Much economic literature focuses on how, in principle, one should value environmental injury. These principles and methods have been codified in the Department of Interior and National Oceanic and Atmospheric and Administration natural resource damage regulations that implement the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. However, these liability rules are fairly new, and thus little evidence exists on the acceptance of valuation methods by the courts and juries. In this regard, the Exxon Valdez case is of particular interest because substantial resources were at stake and much of the case went all the way through to a jury verdict. The two major plaintiff classes—commercial fishermen and Alaska natives—are market and nonmarket versions, respectively, of otherwise fairly similar economic sectors. However, the court's acceptance of the "correct in principle" valuation methods appropriate to each sector was asymmetric. The court accepted as admissible the market valuation procedures (primarily "diminution in market price") used by the commercial fish experts but rejected the nonmarket valuation procedure applied to subsistence uses (a hedonic price model).     

Environmental Research Joint Ventures under Emission Taxes

The effect of environmentalpolicy depends crucially on the strategicbehavior of firms. Firms can undertakepollution abatement innovation cooperativelythrough environmental R&D joint ventures(RJVs). Environmental RJVs have not onlyenvironmental but also economic impacts. Threetypes of environmental RJV are discussed inthis paper: R&D cartelization in which firmschoose R&D efforts to maximize the jointprofit, RJV competition in which firms sharethe R&D fruits to maximize their own profits,and RJV cartelization in which firms share R&Dfruits and maximize the joint profit. An R&Dcartelization minimizes output quantities,maximizes the total emission, and minimizes thesocial surplus. An RJV cartelization with asufficiently high spillover coefficientmaximizes R&D efforts, minimizes the totalemission, and maximizes the social surplus.     

Optimal Tax Policy under Environmental Quality Competition

This paper studies the socially optimal emission and commodity tax policy when consumers are willing to pay a price-premium for environmentally friendlier variants of a commodity vertically differentiated in environmental quality. The first-best levels of quality can be obtained by a combination of a uniform ad valorem tax and an emission tax (or a subsidy for buying green products). The first-best emission tax is higher than the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality. Regardless of environmentally conscious consumers, if only one instrument is available, the second-best emission tax is equal to the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality. A uniform ad valorem tax increases welfare only if the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality is low enough.     

Price Competition and Product Differentiation When Consumers Care for the Environment

Increasing environmental awareness may affect the pleasure of consuming a good for which an environment friendly substitute is available. In this paper, we investigate the market implication of product differentiation when customers are concerned about environmental aspects of the good. We use the spatial duopoly model to determine how environmental concern affects prices, product characteristics and market shares of the competing firms. Our analysis is based on a two-stage game, where at the first stage each firm chooses the characteristic of its product. At the second stage, each firm chooses its price. Equilibrium prices and market shares are affected by consumer awareness of the environment and by the higher costs for producing those goods. As for the Nash equilibria in the characteristics, we find three equilibria depending on the parameter constellation. In order to find out whether the market functions in an optimal way, we determine the choice of environmental characteristics by a welfare maximizing authority. The objective of the paper is to understand the environmental quality choices facing firms and to provide policies that would align private choices with the social optimum.JEL classifications: L11, Q38, H23     

从经济学及博弈角度分析环境污染

环境资源是一种公共资源,是典型的公共财产,其特点表现为产权规定不明晰、外部性及资源配置的市场失灵,这些特性导致环境资源的过渡使用、环境污染、生态破坏。从博弈角度分析:环境污染事实上是囚徒困境;污染治理的方法是大型企业采取内部治理,小型企业通过税收政府集中治理。     

Tradeable Emission Permits Regulations in the Presence of Imperfectly Competitive Product Markets: Welfare Implications

In the present paper, we analyse the interaction of a competitive market for emission permits with an oligopolistic product market. It is well known that a competitive permits market achieves the cost minimizing distribution of abatement effort among the polluting firms for a given reduction in emissions. However, when the product market is oligopolistic, it may redistribute production inefficiently among firms. It has been suggested that this inefficiency can outweigh the gains obtained from using emission permits instead of command and control. Although this argument is clearly correct under full information, it is shown in the present paper that it reverses under incomplete information. In particular, it is shown that when tradeable emission permits are specified according to the standard textbook example, they yield higher social welfare than the command and control regulation.     

Should environmental R&D be prioritized?

An innovator may not be able to capture the full social benefit of her innovation and, therefore, governments support private R&D through various measures. We compare a market good innovation—to develop a more efficient technology to produce a standard market good—with an environmental innovation—to develop a more efficient abatement technology—that has the same potential to increase the social surplus. In the first-best outcome, which can be achieved by offering an R&D subsidy and a diffusion subsidy, the R&D subsidy should be greatest for an environmental innovation, whereas the diffusion subsidy should be greatest for a market good innovation. The ranking of the two types of subsidies reflects that the appropriability problem is greater for an environmental innovation than for a market good innovation.     

论环境公益诉讼原告主体的多元化

随着社会经济的不断发展以及法治的不断完善,人们对保护环境以及维护公共利益的意识逐渐增强。环境公益诉讼作为保护环境的重要法律武器,也越来越为人们所认同。适格的原告主体是环境公益诉讼制度之核心部份,实现原告主体的多元化,是环境公益诉讼制度以及环境法律发展的必然趋势。而我国现行环境公益诉讼原告主体是模糊的、缺位的,其应当确定为环保行政机关、检察机关、社会团体和公民个人。     

Short-selling constraints and stock-valuation pattern: a regime–event analysis

Employing a novel approach of integrating regime analysis with event analysis, we examine the overall valuation pattern of stocks that traverse the short-sale-ban and the no-ban regime, employing data from the Hong Kong market. Switching from the ban to the no-ban regime, stocks initially undergo net cumulative undervaluation and then revert to fundamental valuation. Switching from the no-ban to the ban regime, stocks initially experience net cumulative excessive overvaluation and then revert to permanent overvaluation. The amount of net cumulative undervaluation is greater than the amount of net cumulative excessive overvaluation. This documented overall pattern offers a broad perspective on short-sale constraints and stock valuation.     

Consumer confusion over the profusion of eco-labels: Lessons from a double differentiation model

How are eco-label strategies affected by consumer confusion arising from the profusion of eco-labels? This article provides a theoretical insight into this issue using a double differentiation framework. We assume that consumers perceive a label as a sign of quality compared to an unlabeled product, but that they cannot fully assess the environmental quality associated with each label and only see each label as a particular variety of a similar product. We analyze the pricing strategies of three firms, each one providing one product: a labeled product, with high or medium environmental quality, according to the eco-label, or an unlabeled product. We infer lessons for eco-labeling policies, according to the identity of the certifying organization: the regulator, an NGO or the firms. We show that the firm supplying the eco-labeled product with a high environmental quality is weakened by consumer confusion while the firm selling the unlabeled product suffers from strict labeling standards, to the benefit of the firm providing the labeled product with a lower environmental quality, which gains a competitive advantage. Most labeling policies consist of harmonizing labeling criteria, but only certification by a third party, the regulator or a NGO, guarantees the high environmental quality of labeled products, whereas certification by firms leads to a uniform undemanding standard. However, when both labels are provided by two different certifiers, including a firm, harmonization of environmental standards does not occur and the NGO's or regulator's eco-labeling standard will be much more stringent than the firm's one, preventing NGO's or public eco-labeling policy to significantly enhance quality of the environment and welfare.     

Environmental Product Standards in North–South Trade

Consumption is one channel through which the environment is damaged. To protect the environment, various product standards have been introduced across the world. This paper uses a new economic geography framework to explore the effects of environmental product standards on environment in a North–South trade model. It examines the situation in which the North unilaterally introduces an environmental product standard. Specifically, those products that do not meet the standard are not allowed to be sold in the North's market. It is found that such a standard may worsen the North's environment but improve the South's environment as a result of firm relocation.     

Price discrimination with a resource constraint

Introducing an aggregate resource constraint into Mussa and Rosen's [Mussa, M., Rosen, S., 1978. Monopoly and product quality. Journal of Economic Theory 18 (2), 301–317] model of monopoly price discrimination induces an upwards distortion in product quality for high valuation consumers because the standard downward distortions in product quality for other consumers relax the resource constraint.     

Supply function competition in a mixed electric power market

In this paper, we present a mixed oligopoly model where electric power generators compete in supply functions in a liberalized market. A former monopolist, the state‐owned generator, is assumed to be (partially) privatized. First, we obtain that there is a relationship between privatization and the number of electric power generators concerning the level of consumer surplus and total welfare. Indeed, a fully state‐owned generator is socially optimal, lowering private generators' profits and enhancing consumer surplus; that is, if the degree of privatization decreases, consumer surplus increases compensating the damage imposed on generators' profits. Second, as the number of generators increases, full privatization may provide similar levels of consumer surplus and social welfare than those observed in a mixed oligopoly. Moreover, it is also obtained that price‐cost margins increase as marginal cost increases. Overall, our results suggest that the state‐owned generator should be privatized when entry barriers are low enough, and competitiveness is enhanced. Otherwise, a state‐owned generator may protect consumers, enhancing consumer surplus.