Do Chinese managers listen to the media?: Evidence from mergers and acquisitions

This study investigates whether listed companies in China are sensitive to public media coverage when making investment decisions regarding mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We find that the likelihood of abandoning a proposed M&A transaction is positively associated with negative media coverage, and this association is stronger with lower announcement abnormal returns. Our analysis demonstrates that the negative information effect is amplified for glamour acquirers. We argue that negative media reactions drive the external feedback mechanism of M&A attempts and help guard against managerial hubris.     

When do managers listen to the market? Impact of learning in acquisitions of private firms

We study the influence of market signals and agency problems on the decision to cancel an announced acquisition. We find major differences between deals involving private vs. public targets. First, controlling for the value of expected synergies, acquisitions are less likely to be cancelled when the target is private rather than public. This finding supports learning rather than the alternative common-information hypothesis. Second, better manager-shareholder interest alignment makes the cancellation of a “bad” deal more likely only when the target is a private firm. This suggests bidder agency problems have a greater influence on acquisition outcome (i.e., learning) when the target is private. Third, cancellation is more likely for private targets when their post-announcement abnormal returns are low, especially if the method of payment includes stock. This indicates that it is important to control for bidder overvaluation when testing the managerial learning hypothesis. Overall, both the learning and agency hypotheses help explain observed differences in deal completion by target type.     

Do mutual fund managers time market liquidity?

This paper examines mutual fund managers' ability to time market-wide liquidity. Using the CRSP mutual fund database, we find strong evidence that over the 1974–2009 period, mutual fund managers demonstrate the ability to time market liquidity at both the portfolio level and the individual fund level. Liquidity timing predicts future fund performance and the difference in the risk-adjusted returns between top and bottom liquidity-timing funds is approximately 2% per year. Funds exhibiting liquidity-timing ability tend to have longer histories, higher expense ratios, and higher turnover rates.     

Institutional underperformance: Should managers listen to the sell-side before trading?

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - This study examines the performance of institutional trades in the context of recent analyst recommendation changes. We report several findings....     

Do investment banks listen to their own analysts?

To what extent conflicts of interest affect the investment value of sell-side analyst research is an ongoing debate. We approach this issue from a new direction by investigating how asset-management divisions of investment banks use stock recommendations issued by their own analysts. Based on holdings changes around initiations, upgrades, and downgrades from 1993 to 2003, we find that these bank-affiliated investors follow recommendations from sell-side analysts in general, increasing (decreasing) their relative holdings following positive (negative) recommendations. More importantly, these investors respond more strongly to recommendations issued by their own analysts than to those issued by analysts affiliated with other banks, especially for recommendations on small and low-analyst-coverage firms. Thus, we find that investment banks “eat their own cooking,” showing that these presumably sophisticated institutional investors view sell-side recommendations as having investment value, particularly when the recommendations come from their own analysts.     

Do jumps mislead the FX market?

This paper investigates the link between jumps in the exchange rate process and rumours of central bank interventions. Using the case of Japan, we analyse specifically whether jumps trigger false reports of intervention (i.e. an intervention is reported when it did not occur). Intraday jumps are extracted using a non-parametric technique recently proposed by Lee and Mykland in 2008 and by Andersen et al. in 2007, and later modified by Boudt et al. in 2011. Rumours are identified by using a unique database of Reuters and Dow Jones newswires. Our results suggest that a significant number of jumps on the YEN/USD have been falsely interpreted by the market as being the result of a central bank intervention. The paper has policy implications in terms of central bank interventions. We show that in times where the central bank is known to intervene, some investors may attach a lot of weight to central bank interventions as a source of exchange rate movement, leading to a false ‘intervention explanation’ for observed jumps.     

Do managers use earnings guidance to influence street earnings exclusions?

Despite the apparent importance of “street earnings” to investors, we know relatively little about the process through which this earnings metric is determined. The limited evidence in the extant literature provides analyst-centric explanations, suggesting that analysts’ abilities and incentives influence which line items forecast-tracking services exclude from GAAP earnings to arrive at street earnings. We propose an alternative explanation: managers actively influence analysts’ forecast exclusion decisions via earnings guidance. We test this explanation by examining how earnings guidance influences two aspects of analysts’ exclusions: (1) special item exclusions (i.e., nonrecurring items) and (2) incremental exclusions (i.e., recurring items). We find that for firms with no special items in the previous year, when managers guide, analysts exclude almost all current-year special items, whereas when managers do not guide, the proportion that analysts exclude is significantly lower. More importantly, we that analysts’ incremental exclusions are significantly higher when managers guide than when they do not guide. Overall, our evidence suggests that managers play an active role in influencing the composition of street earnings via earnings guidance.     

Do accruals exacerbate information asymmetry in the market?

A considerable body of evidence, both archival and experimental, suggests that accounting accruals are heterogeneously interpreted by investors. We examine whether the information asymmetry among investors arising from this heterogeneous interpretation, implied in these empirical results, affects transactions costs in the form of the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread. We examine this impact both, in a yearly setting and around the first release of quarterly accrual information. The results of the study provide empirical evidence of a positive association between the adverse selection component and accruals in the yearly analysis. Since wider bid-ask spreads are both theoretically and empirically linked to higher stock returns (Brennan & Subrahmanyam, 1996), our results provide a transaction cost basis for understanding one possible factor underlying the linkage between accruals and cost of equity capital, and accruals and information risk pricing as documented in Francis et al. (2005) and Ecker et al. (2006).     

Is sustainability rating material to the market?

This study examines whether information about a firm's engagement in environmental, social, and governance (ESG) practices is material to market participants. Evidence from a sample of 1856 initial public offerings (IPOs) by U.S. companies for the 2007–2018 period robustly documents that firms for which there is available ESG performance information prior to going public exhibit higher underpricing due to a positive market response. Such a reaction is validated by agency cost-reducing practices that ESG-rated firms follow prior to the IPO, the superior post-IPO market performance they exhibit in terms of equity financing, and the higher share of financially sophisticated investors they attract compared to their ESG-unrated peers. Overall, our results highlight that it pays off to do good and to have the right investors; however, firms’ good ESG practices need to be visible to the market, through rating practices, to reap the benefits.     

Do managers seek control and entrenchment?

A unique dataset of post-IPO thrifts with heterogeneous initial insider ownership allows us to use revealed preferences to determine the level of ownership insiders believe to be optimal. We find strong evidence that insider ownership converges to the 20% to 30% range, whether insiders begin with diffuse or concentrated ownership. This range of ownership has been found consistent with entrenchment and control in the literature. Our results are robust to a battery of variables related to insider ownership such as moral hazard, adverse selection, market timing, insider characteristics, and firm characteristics. Furthermore, we find that managers with diffuse ownership accumulate shares most aggressively during the period of regulatory anti-takeover protection, consistent with an entrenchment motive. We find that managers with above-average pay are more likely to seek higher ownership, consistent with the existence of private benefits of control. Finally, we find that insider ownership determines equity issuance, leverage, and share liquidity in ways consistent with expected accumulation or reduction in insider ownership for control purposes.     

The market reaction to cross-listings: Does the destination market matter?

This paper examines (i) whether market reactions to cross-listings differ across destination markets and (ii) to what extent the following explanations for value creation around cross-listings can account for differences in market reactions across cross-listings on various destination markets: overcoming market segmentation, increased market liquidity, improved information disclosure, and better investor protection (“bonding”). We analyze 526 cross-listings from 44 different countries on eight major stock exchanges and document significant announcement returns of 1.3% on average for cross-listings on US exchanges, 1.1% on London Stock Exchange, 0.6% on exchanges in continental Europe, and 0.5% (not significant) on Tokyo Stock Exchange. We find evidence consistent with improved disclosure and bonding creating value for cross-listings on US exchanges, while overcoming segmentation and bonding are associated with higher announcement returns on the London Stock Exchange. The evidence is mixed for continental European exchanges and for Tokyo. Our results highlight the role of the destination market in value creation around cross-listings.     

Do bank managers use securitization gains to smooth earnings in the post- FAS 166/167 period?

Previous literature has documented that securitization gains were used for income smoothing in the era before FAS 166 and FAS 167,¹ which tightened the requirements for sale accounting for securitizations. Using securitizing bank holding companies, we examine whether FAS 166/167 has reduced this income smoothing behavior. Our findings include two facets. First, at the aggregate level, time series statistics show that both the frequency of non-zero securitization gains reported and the magnitude of reported securitization gains are significantly reduced in the post- FAS 166/167 period. Second, at the firm level, our regression results indicate that even though the extent of this income smoothing behavior decreased after the issuance of FAS 166/167, securitization gains continue to be used to smooth earnings by securitizing banks in the post-FAS 166/167 period. Overall, our findings convey that FAS 166/167 has reduced the securitization gains recorded by banks but that after the regulation, banks still use securitization gains to smooth earnings.     

Do corporate managers believe in luck? Evidence of the Chinese zodiac effect

We study the responses of Chinese public firm chairpersons to their perceptions of bad luck pertaining to the Chinese zodiac year. We find that these perceptions of bad luck increase managers' sense of risk and lead them to increase their corporate cash holdings, even though the actual underlying risk remains unchanged. The effect is temporary and begins at the end of the quarter prior to the commencement of the zodiac year. When the zodiac year has passed, the level of risk perceived decreases and the bias disappears. The distortion between perceived and actual risk is significant, and the increase in cash holdings is both suboptimal and inefficient, in our view. Overall, these managerial reactions to the zodiac year are consistent with theories about belief in luck.     

Do China's macro-financial factors determine the Shanghai crude oil futures market?

Existing studies have investigated the Chinese Shanghai crude oil futures (INE) from price efficiency, cross-futures transmission, etc., but neglected the potential links with China. This paper is committed to filling this gap by conducting an initial discussion from the perspective of macro-financial factors. Applying the dynamic model averaging (DMA) approach, we examine the time-varying importance of the six potential factors that drive the INE prices. The results based on the overall conditions of all determinants and based on individual predictors both support the crucial roles of some Chinese macro-financial factors. The pricing effects of these factors almost display upward features within 6 months since the INE establishment. Thereafter, it maintains an overall stable trend, though some abnormal turmoil is found after the COVID-19 outbreak. According to the multi-scale analysis, the importance of China's macro-financial factors mainly reveals the INE market at the low-frequency components. To confirm the robustness of the estimation and the uniqueness of such effects on the INE, we utilize an alternative forecast accuracy criterion to confirm stability, accommodate the DMA estimation on the WTI and Brent oil futures prices as comparisons, and discuss the frequency domain through another decomposition procedure. These all mirror our findings.     

Do bank managers signal through cash flow statements?

We empirically examine the cash flow statements for Japanese banks and whether their managers engage in classification shifting to temper concerns about risk exposure. To create a buffer against liquidity shocks, they shift cash flows from investing and/or financing activities to operating activities. We also find robust evidence that classification shifting intensifies in higher risk situations. Although prior research on managerial discretion focuses on earning management, we are the first to show cash flow management to avoid sequential negative changes in operating cash flows. We show that these activities convey valuable information about changes in banks' risk exposure.     

Do more able managers provide better non-GAAP earnings?

This paper investigates whether managerial ability is associated with non-GAAP earnings quality. I find that the quality of non-GAAP earnings is greater for high-ability managers than low-ability managers. I also find that investors consider non-GAAP earnings released by high-ability management to be informative. Additional tests show that the positive association between managerial ability and the quality of non-GAAP earnings is stronger when return volatility or managerial stock ownership is greater. The results are robust to alternative measures of managerial ability and non-GAAP earnings quality and to controlling for endogeneity bias. Overall, this paper provides evidence that managers of high ability use non-GAAP reporting as a signalling tool to reduce information asymmetry.     

Is the market underreacting or overreacting to open market share repurchases? A UK perspective

Using UK open market repurchases, we reject the market underreaction hypothesis and the market overreaction hypothesis proposed by Ikenberry et al. (1995) and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009), respectively. The evidence suggests that the UK market reacts slowly to actual repurchases made by value firms. UK repurchases on average do not suffer from share undervaluation prior to the announcement. Value firms perform just as well as glamour firms during the authorisation period but outperform glamour firms significantly 2 years following the announcement. It turns out that value firms repurchase over 6% more shares than glamour firms during the authorisation period.     

Do the prices of stock index futures in Asia overreact to U.S. market returns?

We extend the overreaction study to interaction of international markets and find that intraday price reversals exist in Asian index futures markets following extreme movement in U.S. market. Profitable opportunities exist after considering transaction cost. We show that the reversal cannot be explained by rational arguments such as risk, liquidity and bid-ask spread. We further observe that a magnitude effect exists. Overreaction is more prominent in the latter period than in the initial period. After calm-down periods, overreaction is greatly reduced. These observations support the explanation that the source of price reversals lies in behavioral biases.     

The role of the carbon market in relation to the cryptocurrency market: Only diversification or more?

The role of the carbon market in relation to the cryptocurrency market is still unclear. Given the carbon-intensive nature of the cryptocurrency industry, whether the carbon market is able to capture the carbon footprint of the cryptocurrency market (i.e., diversification) or act as a safe haven or a hedge against it remain unexplored issues. To address this issue, this paper employs the generalized autoregressive score-dynamic conditional score-Copula (GAS–DCS–Copula) model, incorporating the asymmetric tail distribution. We identify the asymmetric tail properties of both the carbon and cryptocurrency markets with significant otherness. Further, to account the importance of China in mining the cryptocurrencies, we incorporate Chinese carbon market in our analysis to investigate the difference with the European carbon market. Finally, we provide evidence that the European carbon market provides a safe haven and a hedge against the cryptocurrency market while Chinese carbon market is not. Our findings have implications for both investors and policymakers.