Disentangling the effects of process and product innovation on cost and demand

ABSTRACT

We explore in this note different structural models of the impact of process and product innovation on firms' demand and production cost functions. We find that the introduction of process and product innovations affects them differently as could be expected. Both product and process innovation shift forward the demand for the products of the firm. Process innovation reduces production marginal cost, but not always. A possibility, that we cannot prove or reject with the current specification of our models and available data, is that process innovation associated with product innovation raise marginal cost. Interestingly, we also find that advertising significantly augments demand but does not affect production marginal cost. To obtain broader conclusions, richer data will be needed allowing an enlargement of the model, in which process and product innovations could be specified distinctively and well identified.     

Optimal disaster-preventive expenditure in a dynamic and stochastic model

The purpose of this study is to present an analytical framework for publicly optimal disaster-preventive expenditure. We examine the optimal policy combination of tax rate, disaster-preventive expenditure, and productive government expenditure in a neoclassical growth model, in which natural disasters occur stochastically and partially destroy existing capital. Based on this model, we can decompose the welfare effect of raising preventive expenditure into three effects: the damage reduction, crowding out, and precautionary effects. By identifying these marginal benefits and costs, we obtain the policy conditions that maximize household welfare. Furthermore, we show that optimal prevention is increasing in disaster probability, and by using a numerical example, we show that there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between the expected growth rate and disaster probability.     

Optimal price regulation in a growth model with monopolistic suppliers of intermediate goods

Abstract. In this paper we investigate the trade‐off faced by regulators who must set a price for an intermediate good somewhere between the marginal cost and the monopoly price. We utilize a growth model with monopolistic suppliers of intermediate goods. Investment in innovation is required to produce a new intermediate good. Marginal cost pricing deters innovation, while monopoly pricing maximizes innovation and economic growth at the cost of some static inefficiency. We demonstrate the existence of a second‐best price above the marginal cost but below the monopoly price, which maximizes consumer welfare. Simulation results suggest that substantial reductions in consumption, production, growth, and welfare occur where regulators focus on static efficiency issues by setting prices at or near marginal cost. JEL Classification: D42, D61, D92, O38 Régulation du prix optimal dans un modèle de croissance où existent des fournisseurs monopolistes de biens intermédiaires. Dans ce mémoire, on enquête sur la relation d’équivalence à laquelle les régulateurs doivent faire face au moment de définir le prix quelque part entre le niveau du coût marginal et le niveau du prix de monopole. On utilise un modèle de croissance dans le cas où existent des fournisseurs monopolistes de biens intermédiaires. Des investissements dans l’innovation sont nécessaires pour produire un nouveau produit intermédiaire. La tarification au coût marginal décourage l’innovation alors que la tarification au niveau du prix de monopole maximise l’innovation et la croissance au prix d’une certaine inefficacité statique. On montre que l’existence d’un prix qui est un optimum de second ordre et se situe au‐dessus du coût marginal mais au dessous du prix de monopole maximise le niveau de bien‐être des consommateurs. Des résultats de simulation suggèrent que des réductions substantielles dans la consommation, la production, la croissance, et le niveau de bien‐être se produisent quand les régulateurs sont focalisés sur les problèmes d’efficacité statique et fixent les prix au niveau (ou près du niveau) du coût marginal.     

Taxation,corruption, and growth

We build an endogenous growth model to analyze the relationships between taxation, corruption, and economic growth. Entrepreneurs lie at the center of the model and face disincentive effects from taxation but acquire positive benefits from public infrastructure. Political corruption governs the efficiency with which tax revenues are translated into infrastructure. The model predicts an inverted-U relationship between taxation and growth, with corruption reducing the optimal taxation level. We find evidence consistent with these predictions and the entrepreneurial channel using data from the Longitudinal Business Database of the US Census Bureau. The marginal effect of taxation for growth for a state at the 10th or 25th percentile of corruption is significantly positive; on the other hand, the marginal effects of taxation for growth for a state at the 90th percentile of corruption are much lower across the board. We make progress towards causality through Granger-style tests and by considering periphery counties where effective tax policy is largely driven by bordering states. Finally, we calibrate our model and find that the calibrated taxation rate of 37% is fairly close to the model׳s estimated welfare maximizing taxation rate of 42%. Reducing corruption provides the largest potential impact for welfare gain through its impact on the uses of tax revenues.     

Does Technological Innovation Really Reduce Marginal Abatement Costs? Some Theory,Algebraic Evidence,and Policy Implications

The existing literature models innovation in pollution control as a reduction in marginal abatement costs. We show that this assumption is inappropriate for production process innovations such as fuel switching. Algebraically, we examine the effects of different innovation types on marginal abatement cost curves, showing that some desirable innovations increase marginal abatement costs. Empirically, we estimate marginal abatement costs for sulfur dioxide by measuring the output distance function for electric power in Korea. Regression results confirm that production process innovations did raise marginal abatement costs in this case. One policy implication: economic instruments do not always provide stronger innovation incentives than command-and-control policies.      

A Schumpeterian growth model with random quality improvements

A common assumption in the Schumpeterian growth literature is that the innovation size is constant and identical across industries. This is in contrast with the empirical evidence which shows that: (1) innovation size is not identical across industries and (2) the size distribution of profit returns from innovation is highly skewed toward the low value side, with a long tail on the high value side. In the present paper, we develop a Schumpeterian growth model that is consistent with this evidence. In particular, we assume that when a firm innovates, the size of its quality improvement is the result of a random draw from a Pareto distribution. This enables us to extend the class of quality-ladder growth models to encompass firm heterogeneity. We study the policy implications of this new setup numerically and find that it is optimal to heavily subsidize R&D for plausible parameter values. Although it is optimal to tax R&D for some parameter values, this case only occurs when the steady-state rate of economic growth is very low.     

The Optimal Timing of Adoption of a Green Technology

We study the optimal timing of adoption of a cleaner technology and its effects on the rate of growth of an economy in the context of an AK endogenous growth model. We show that the results depend upon the behavior of the marginal utility of environmental quality with respect to consumption. When it is increasing, we derive the capital level at the optimal timing of adoption. We show that this capital threshold is independent of the initial conditions on the stock of capital, implying that capital-poor countries tend to take longer to adopt. Also, country-specific characteristics, as the existence of high barriers to adoption, may lead to different capital thresholds for different countries. If the marginal utility of environmental quality decreases with consumption, a country should never delay adoption; the optimal policy is either to adopt immediately or, if adoption costs are “too high”, to never adopt. The policy implications of these results are discussed in the context of the international debate surrounding the environmental political agenda.      

The effects of probabilistic innovations on Schumpeterian economic growth in a creative region

We analyze the impact that stochastically occurring innovations have on Schumpeterian economic growth in a region that is creative in the sense of Richard Florida. Our analysis leads to four findings. First, we delineate the so called balanced growth path (BGP) equilibrium and then compute the BGP growth rate in our creative region. Second, we discuss why the lower limit of the support of the random variable that describes the outcome of innovation quality improvements, takes the value that it does. Third, we solve the social planner's problem and derive the Pareto optimal growth rate in our creative region. Finally, we compare the BGP and the Pareto optimal growth rates, we discuss when there is either too much or too little innovation, and we conclude by commenting on the implications of our findings for future research on Schumpeterian economic growth in creative regions.     

Modelling dynamic storage function in commodity markets: Theory and evidence

In this work, we derive a model to investigate the optimal storage policy in metal commodity markets. From an inter-temporal setting, we carry out a criterion driving the stockholding decisions based on Tobin's q rule in which marginal benefits from holding inventories can be compared with marginal storage costs.We estimate the model for the world copper market by taking into account both spot price and convenience yield equations. In our sample, the estimated models are statistically robust and economically coherent with the theory, even though the patterns of the inventory accumulation process show high sensitivity to the uncertainty about worldwide economic conditions.     

Climate threshold,financial hoarding and economic growth

We use an iterative finite difference method to establish theoretical models that reflect the relationships among climate threshold, financial hoarding and economic growth. We build a simultaneous equations model to conduct an empirical analysis based on China’s statistical data from 1979 to 2012. Our study yields the following results: China’s climate threshold has shown a zigzag-shaped rising trend since 1979; the main reasons for the rapid expansion of financial hoarding were high savings rate, savings leakage, higher marginal efficiency of financial hoarding compared to capital efficiency or higher internal creativity of the financial sector; there were positive cumulative effects between financial hoarding and economic growth, which were significantly inhibited by climate threshold; the climate threshold had discrepant influences on different industries. To achieve a balanced economy, more money should be invested in the real sector to appropriately reduce the rate of savings leakage; the financial sector should move from scale expansion to service efficiency improvements to increase its marginal contribution to the economy and to enhance capital efficiency; the real sector should improve technological innovation and speed up the adaptive adjustment in climate-sensitive industries to move from economic growth to advanced development.     

From command-and-control to market-based environmental policies: Optimal transition timing and China’s heterogeneous environmental effectiveness

Despite the rich literature on command-and-control and market-based environmental policies, the transition between them has received relatively less attention. This paper identifies that there exists an optimal transition timing from command-and-control policies to market-based policies by analyzing the trade-off between the abatement cost and innovation compensation effects of environmental regulations, and the optimal transition timing occurs when the marginal opportunity cost of pollution abatement equals the marginal output of capital input. Using province-level data of 30 regions in China from 2007 to 2015, we measure environmental efficiency by the slack-based model with desirable and undesirable output, and adopt the spatially adaptive semi-parametric model to carry out our empirical research, which shows that command-and-control policies, rather than market-based policies, promote China’s environmental efficiency. Enhancing investment in technological innovation contributes to improving environmental efficiency for both types of policies. Finally, the effect of such policies on environmental efficiency remains heterogeneous across regions.     

OPTIMAL TRANSITION DYNAMICS IN THE LEONTIEF TWO‐SECTOR GROWTH MODEL WITH DURABLE CAPITAL: THE CASE OF CAPITAL INTENSIVE CONSUMPTION GOODS*

We present results on undiscounted optimal policies in the Leontief two‐sector growth model with durable capital. Unlike the results with a labour intensive consumption goods sector, we show that a monotonic optimal programme is only one special case out of many richer possibilities of transition dynamics. Depending on the initial capital stock, and a key parameter ζ that could be interpreted as a marginal rate of transformation of capital between today and tomorrow, an optimal programme may converge to a period‐two cycle; and even when it converges to the golden rule stock, it can do so (damped) cyclically or with a “jump”.     

Government financing in an endogenous growth model with financial market restrictions

Summary. In this paper, we develop an endogenous growth model with market regulations on explicitly modeled financial intermediaries to examine the effects of alternative government financing schemes on growth, inflation, and welfare. In the presence of binding regulation, there is always a unique equilibrium. We perform four alternative policy experiments; a change in the seigniorage tax rate, a change in the seigniorage tax base, a change in the income tax and a change in the fiscal-monetary policy mix. We find that in the presence of binding legal reserve requirements, a marginal increase in government spending need not result in a reduction in the rate of economic growth if it is financed with an increase in the seigniorage tax rate. Raising the seigniorage tax base by means of an increase in the reserve requirement retards growth and it has an ambiguous effect on inflation. An increase in income tax financed government spending also suppresses growth and raises inflation although not to the extent that the required seigniorage tax rate alternative would. Switching from seigniorage to income taxation as a source of government finance is growth reducing but deflationary. From a welfare perspective, the least distortionary way of financing an increase in the government spending requirements is by means of a marginal increase in the seigniorage tax rate. Under the specification of logarithmic preferences, the optimal tax structure is indeterminate. Received: March 20, 2000; revised version: June 26, 2001     

沟通管理在科研团队知识创新过程中的反馈机制研究

知识创新是一个复杂的过程,如何设计合理科学的管理机制来优化创新过程,从而提高团队创新绩效,已成为众多学者关注的焦点。很多学者提出沟通管理对知识创新过程及其绩效有较大的影响,但是沟通管理如何优化知识创新过程进而影响其创新绩效,在此之后创新绩效会发生怎样的变化,是值得我们思考的问题。以系统动力学理论为基础,考察了沟通管理在科研团队知识创新过程中正、负反馈的动态特性;对沟通管理在科研团队知识创新绩效中的反馈机制进行了数学描述,并解释了知识创新绩效形成S型曲线的原因;最终提出了科研团队知识创新过程中沟通管理的具体实施策略。     

Competing engines of growth: Innovation and standardization

We study a dynamic general equilibrium model where innovation takes the form of the introduction of new goods whose production requires skilled workers. Innovation is followed by a costly process of standardization, whereby these new goods are adapted to be produced using unskilled labor. Our framework highlights a number of novel results. First, standardization is both an engine of growth and a potential barrier to it. As a result, growth is an inverse U-shaped function of the standardization rate (and of competition). Second, we characterize the growth and welfare maximizing speed of standardization. We show how optimal protection of intellectual property rights affecting the cost of standardization vary with the skill-endowment, the elasticity of substitution between goods and other parameters. Third, we show that, depending on how competition between innovating and standardizing firms is modelled and on parameter values, a new type of multiplicity of equilibria may arise. Finally, we study the implications of our model for the skill premium and we illustrate novel reasons for linking North–South trade to intellectual property rights protection.     

区域技术市场发展对创新的驱动作用

利用我国2002-2015年省级面板数据，考察技术市场对创新的影响，研究区域研发环境与技术创新的协同作用。首先，通过构建GMM模型稳健性检验，发现在控制物质资本、人力资本、制度因素、R&D投入、FDI、对外贸易、市场化程度等各种影响因素后，技术市场对创新具有显著影响，且对技术含量较高的发明专利的影响弹性最大；其次，通过交互项检验和门槛回归，发现R&D物质资本和人力资本对技术市场存在两个门槛，跨越门槛将增加技术市场的边际创新产出；再次，技术市场发展对各类专利贡献率的测度结果显示，发达地区技术市场对发明专利的贡献最大。据此提出加速我国技术市场发展、因地制宜改善区域研发环境、进一步强化技术市场驱动高质量创新发展等政策建议。     

Testing a model of UK growth: A role for R&D subsidies

R&D is a main driver of growth, whether by generating new ideas for production or increasing technological transfer. However, R&D itself is risky and faces numerous barriers which may reduce its marginal return. Direct R&D subsides are intended to counteract such barriers, but whether they lead empirically to increased economic growth is unclear. In our structural model of the UK, subsidies offset the frictional costs associated with R&D, incentivising innovation and so stimulating productivity growth. We estimate and test this structural model by indirect inference, a method not previously used in work on R&D. We find that even temporary cuts to R&D funding have long-lasting impacts on UK economic growth. The power of the test allows us to calculate tight accuracy bounds for our results and for policy reform impacts calculated using the model. These findings are of high relevance to the ongoing debate around the future UK innovation environment.     

On the optimal income taxation: Some further numerical results

Using numerical calculations we show in the optimal income tax model that a realistic value for the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure (?=0.5) leads to conclusions different from some of those drawn by Mirrlees (1971) and Atkinson (1973). The marginal tax rates are not so low and the shape of the tax schedule is for a great majority of the population substantially nonlinear. A new feature in our calculations is that both results come out without going to maximin, as done by Atkinson (1973). We study in special cases the locality of the zero limit of the marginal tax rate at the upper end of the ability distribution and we achieve a very definite conclusion: this result is really very local. We also present an interesting approximation result concerning the relationship between the level of the government revenue and the marginal tax rate for individuals with high ability. An important methodological remark analogous to Sen's critique on the ethical measures of inequality is made on the interpretation of optimal income tax calculations.     

Strategic R&D and the innovation of products: understanding the role of time preferences and product differentiation

We evaluate the effects of innovation on competition using an optimal control approach that incorporates firms' time preferences. Using a model where firm(s) innovates by investing in research and development to create a more appealing product for heterogeneous consumers, we examine conditions that maximize social welfare. When firm(s) choose discount rate regardless of market structure, a monopoly will develop more innovative products. However, we show that duopolies may increase innovation if competition alters firms' outlook. Finally, we identify firm incentives to behave myopically, which in the context of collusion may impede industry-wide innovation.     

Structural change and international competitiveness in Canada: an alternative approach

The neoclassical theory of international trade says little of relevance about the dramatic shifts in world trade patterns in the postwar period. Much of the weakness of the Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson model has been attributed to its assumption of globally uniform technology and thus the instantaneous international diffusion of technological innovation. In this paper we relax these assumptions, focusing instead on the role of innovation in the determination of international trade flows. We develop a disaggregated, dynamic Ricardian trade model (based on Pasinetti's 1981 growth model), in which the sectoral rate of process innovation is important in relation to the average innovation rate in the economy. The level of this ratio compared to that of foreign rivals drives long-run trends in international competitiveness. This is called the Pasinetti Trade Hypothesis (PTH). Ricardian comparative cost considerations form the logical foundation for the PTH in that they establish the conditions under which dynamic considerations are relevant. The model is tested for the case of Canada, during the period 1961–72, with the USA serving as a proxy for Canada's international competition. The rate of process innovation in a sector is measured as the rate of change in the vertically integrated labour coefficient in that sector. The results support the PTH in its pure and modified form and provide much weaker support for the static Ricardian hypothesis, indicating that in a world in which more than one country exports each good, the dynamics of structural change - process innovation - may be as important as static comparative cost considerations as a determinant of a sector's international competitiveness. The focus on international differences in technology and innovation rates gives support to government policies aimed at boosting sectoral innovation in relation to foreign rivals. At the least, a laissez-faire response to such ‘industrial tinkering’ by foreign competition may be extremely costly.