Is Transparency To No Avail?*

Transparent decision‐making processes are widely regarded as a prerequisite for the working of a representative democracy. It facilitates accountability, and citizens might suspect that decisions, if taken behind closed doors, do not promote their interests. Why else would there be the secrecy? We provide a model of committee decision‐making that explains the public's demand for transparency, and committee members' aversion to it. In line with case study evidence, we show how pressures to become transparent induce committee members to organize pre‐meetings away from the public eye. Transparency does not improve accountability, but it might improve the decision.     

Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games

Research on ultimatum and dictator games has found that because of "fairness" first movers in such games offer more than noncooperative game theory predicts. We find that if the right to be the first mover is "earned" by scoring high on a general knowledge quiz, then first movers behave in a more self-regarding manner. We also conducted dictator double blind experiments, in which the experimenter could not identify the decision maker. The results yielded by far our largest observed incidence of self-regarding offers, suggesting that offers are due to strategic and expectation considerations. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, C91.     

Strategic sophistication of individuals and teams. Experimental evidence

Many important decisions require strategic sophistication. We examine experimentally whether teams act more strategically than individuals. We let individuals and teams make choices in simple games, and also elicit first- and second-order beliefs. We find that teams play the Nash equilibrium strategy significantly more often, and their choices are more often a best response to stated first order beliefs. Distributional preferences make equilibrium play less likely. Using a mixture model, the estimated probability to play strategically is 62% for teams, but only 40% for individuals. A model of noisy introspection reveals that teams differ from individuals in higher order beliefs.     

Group and individual risk preferences: A lottery-choice experiment with self-employed and salaried workers

This paper focuses on decision making under risk, comparing group and individual risk preferences in a lottery-choice experiment. In the individual treatment, subjects make choices individually; in the group treatment, each subject placed in a group made lottery choice via voting. In the choice treatment, subjects choose whether to be on their own or in a group. The originality of this research lies in the fact that we introduced variability in socio-demographic characteristics by recruiting salaried and self-employed workers. Our main findings indicate that groups are more likely than individuals to choose safe lotteries. Our results also show that individuals risk attitude is correlated with both the type and the sector of employment.     

Asymmetric Information in Simple Bargaining Games: An Experimental Study

Bilateral bargaining situations are often characterized by informational asymmetries concerning the size of what is at stake: in some cases, the proposer is better informed, in others, it is the responder. We analyze the effects of both types of asymmetric information on proposer behavior in two different situations which allow for a variation of responder veto power: the ultimatum and the dictator game. We find that the extent to which proposers demand less in the ultimatum as compared to the dictator game is (marginally) smaller when the proposer is in the superior information position. Further we find informed proposers to exploit their informational advantage by offering an amount that does not reveal the true size of the pie, with proposers in the ultimatum game exhibiting this behavioral pattern to a larger extent than those in the dictator game. Uninformed proposers risk imposed rejection when they ask for more than potentially is at stake, and ask for a risk premium in dictator games. We concentrate on proposers, but also explore responder behavior: We find uninformed responders to enable proposers’ hiding behavior, and we find proposer intentionality not to play an important role for informed responders when they decide whether to accept or reject an offer by an (uninformed) proposer.     

Are benevolent dictators altruistic in groups? A within-subject design

We use a within-subject experimental design to investigate whether systematic relationships exist across distinct features of individual preferences: altruism in a two-person context, risk aversion in monetary outcomes, and social preferences in a group context. We find that altruism is related to demographic variables, including years of education, gender, and age. Perhaps most importantly, self allocation in a two-person dictator game is related to social preferences in a group context. Participants who are more generous in a dictator game are more likely to vote against their self-interest in a group tax redistribution game which we interpret to be an expression of social preferences.     

Which type of producer organization is (more) inclusive? Dynamics of farmers’ membership and participation in the decision‐making process

Producer organizations (POs) provide benefits to smallholders by alleviating market access challenges. However, whether all farmers benefit from a PO is still a question. Limited evidence is available on whether POs are inclusive of poor farmers. Even if the poor join, do they participate in decision‐making? We conducted interviews with 595 smallholder dairy farmers in Kenya. We distinguish three groups; members of a bargaining PO, members of a processing PO and non‐members. We show that membership is related to the structural characteristics of the organization: processing POs favor membership of farmers that are wealthier, more educated and more innovative. As to participation in the decision‐making process: older, male and specialized farmers have a higher chance of being involved than poor farmers. Factors distinguishing farmer participation in decision‐making between bargaining and processing POs are highlighted. We find that a bargaining PO is more inclusive of all groups of farmers, while women and poor farmers are excluded from decision‐making in a processing PO. Our findings contribute to policymaking on inclusive development.     

Contributing for Myself,but Free riding for My Group?

Many real‐world decisions are made by individuals as representatives of groups. Most research, however, studies either individuals or groups as decision‐makers. This paper explores whether there is a general difference between a decision made as an individual and as a representative of a group in the context of a public good game. We conducted a series of experiments to test this question and to understand mechanisms contributing to potential differences. We found that representatives contributed less than individuals when they could not communicate with their constituency. However, when they could discuss their strategy before playing, they contributed at least as much as individual decision‐makers. Furthermore, when they could justify their decision after playing, they contributed even more than individual decision‐makers. We discuss potential reasons for this and directions for future research.     

Effect of religious priming in prosocial and destructive behaviour

In this paper, we study the behavioural impact of religious priming by showing participants religious words in a scrambled sentence task before a dictator game and a joy‐of‐destruction game. We also elicited data on individual religiosity and religious affiliation using a questionnaire. Priming religious words significantly increased prosocial behaviour in the dictator game, and the effect was especially striking among those reporting no religion, atheists and agnostics. The religious prime has no significant effect in mitigating destructive behaviour or own expectations of the other's destruction choice, but both destructive behaviour and expectations correlate positively with the multi‐dimensional religiosity measure.     

Digit ratios,the menstrual cycle and social preferences

We examine whether social preferences are partially determined by biological factors. We do this by investigating whether digit ratios (2D:4D) and menstrual cycle information are correlated with choices in ultimatum, trust, public good and dictator games. Digit ratios are thought to be a proxy for prenatal testosterone and oestrogen exposure and the menstrual cycle is a proxy for contemporary variations in a range of hormones. We find that digit ratios predict giving in all games. In our preferred specification, giving in the trust and public good games as well as reciprocity in the trust and ultimatum games vary significantly over the menstrual cycle. We discuss possible mechanisms behind these effects and conclude that biological factors play an important role in shaping social preferences.     

Do watching eyes affect charitable giving? Evidence from a field experiment

The presence of implicit observation cues, such as picture of eyes, has been shown to increase generosity in dictator games, and cooperative behavior in field settings. I combine these approaches, by testing if a picture of watching eyes affects unconditional giving in a natural environment, where the recipient is a charity organization. Taken together, this study reduces the influence of three potential confounding factors in previous experiments: (i) experimenter demand effects, (ii) that the facial cue reminds subjects of a human counterpart, and (iii) a social multiplier effect. Specifically, the paper reports results from an experiment, conducted in a Swedish supermarket chain, where customers face a naturally occurring decision problem. People who recycle cans and bottles have to choose whether to keep the recycled amount or donate it to a charity organization. By posting a picture of human eyes on recycling machines, I am able to test whether this causes an increase in donations to the charity. Based on a sample covering a 12-day period, 38 stores and 16775 individual choices, I find no general effect. However, when controlling for store and day fixed effects, and using a proxy for store attendance, the picture of eyes increased donated amount by 30 percent during days when relatively few other people visited the store. This result gives further support to the conclusion that subtle social cues can invoke reputation concerns in humans, although the relatively small effect suggests that previous estimates could be biased upward, or at least that the influence of observational cues is context dependent.     

基于云模型的大型工程机械企业项目融资决策研究

针对大型工程机械企业项目融资决策的多指标性和复杂性,提出了一种基于云模型的大型工程机械企业项目融资群决策方法。首先,利用云模型将决策群体语言偏好形式的评价矩阵转化为云决策矩阵;然后,利用浮动云的概念进行决策群体偏好集结;接着计算各方案的群体效益值和个体遗憾值,在此基础上,计算各方案的折衷排序值,并据此对方案进行排序;最后,应用该方法进行大型工程机械企业项目银行贷款决策,验证了该方法的可行性和有效性。     

论协商民主视角下高校管理决策中的问题

随着高校改革的不断推进,高校管理决策的结果涉及校内各类主体的权益。从在协商民主的视角下探讨高校管理决策中存在主体参与积极性不高、参与过程少辩论、少协商、多妥协、多看齐,缺乏及时的反馈和监督机制的问题。提出鼓励参与、普及协商民主理论知识,引入辩论机制,公开决策结果、完善反馈程序、建立规范的监督机制的对策。以期提高高校管理决策的科学性和实效性。     

Revisiting the impact of impure public goods on consumers’ prosocial behavior: A lab experiment in Shanghai

In this study, we implemented a dictator game experiment to examine how the increase of the public characteristic in an impure public good affects individuals’ prosocial behaviour. A within‐subject design was used in the experiment. The dictator game was repeated six times with an impure public good introduced in four of them. We observe that the increase of the public characteristic in an impure public good partly crowds out individuals’ subsequent donations, which could be explained by a seemingly ‘mental accounting’ mental process. In addition, we also find that the selfish behaviour of individuals in dictator games with impure public goods, to some extent, has an inertia influence on their subsequent donations when the impure public good is removed.     

Social norms of sharing in high school: Teen giving in the dictator game

We conduct a study of altruistic behavior among high school students using the dictator game. We find a much stronger norm of equal splitting than previously observed in the typical university student population, with almost 45% of high school subjects choosing an equal split of the endowment. Tests indicate that this difference is not due to factors traditionally considered in the analysis of these games, such as demographics. Rather, we find that dictators who score higher on a Social Generosity measure are much more likely to conform to the 50/50 norm. Additionally, high school students who score in the high range of an Independence measure send significantly less to recipients.     

On the governmental use of multi-criteria analysis

Public decision making, especially about our natural environment, is inherently exposed to a high conflict potential. The necessity to capture the complex context has led to an increasing request for decision analytic techniques as support for the decision process. Multi-criteria analysis (MCA) is deemed to overcome the shortcomings of traditional decision-support tools used in economics, such as cost-benefit (CBA) or cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA). This is due, among other, to its ability of dealing with qualitative criteria (e.g. sensitive ecological factors), as well as with uncertainties about current or future impacts. Unlike CBA or CEA, MCA is rarely required by national laws or directives. Nonetheless, a number of recent MCA applications were supported by public authorities who either initiated or directly participated in such analyses. Given the theoretical assumptions about MCA's potential to support complex decision problems, as is often the case for environmental or sustainability policies, the key concern in our paper is to evaluate whether this potential has already been recognised in public decision making. For limitation purposes, the present work focuses on real-life case studies reported during the last decade with an insight in the initiation, the actors involved and the importance of the MCA results in the decision process. We argue that the significance and role played by MCA so far reaches beyond its current legal requirements.     

基于语言型多属性决策的人才培训与开发项目优选

人才培训与开发项目优选是人才培训与开发决策的一项重要内容。本文结合项目优选的多属性、不确定性和群决策等特征,运用群组层次分析法赋予指标权重,构建了人才培训与开发项目优选的语言型不确定多属性决策模型。实例表明,该方法切实可行,操作简便,为人才培训与开发项目优选提供了新的思路。     

Dissertation abstract: Experiments on fairness and reputation

The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration. The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: in one treatment the paired player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has information on the paired player’s reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictators’ behavior towards a stranger is not statistically significantly different from their behavior towards an individual with an established reputation. The findings arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. The data also provides evidence that dictators are more generous when they know that their choices (but not their identities) will be revealed in the future. In the second experiment the dictators’ choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation. The second essay explores the ways in which information about others’ actions affects one’s own behavior in a dictator game. The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient’s within-game reputation on the dictator’s decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of motives helps to identify the mechanisms of social transmission of impulses towards selfish or generous behavior. The data analysis reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than social influence and identification. In the third essay¹ we examine the reputation effects in a labor market setting by analyzing the influence of negative technological shocks on long run relationships between firms and workers. The positive correlation between wage and effort in static conditions has been demonstrated in many experimental studies and has been one of the prominent explanations for the existence of wage rigidity. We subject these findings to further tests in a non-stationary environment that better corresponds to outside-the-lab market conditions. We observe the positive correlation of wages and effort but do not find support for downward wage rigidity in our data. Once the shocks occur, firms lower the wages and relationships often break down. The workers who accept a lower wage respond with exerting a lower effort. JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64 ¹Co-authored with Ninghua Du. Dissertation Committee: Dissertation Advisor: James C. Cox Martin Dufwenberg, Price V. Fishback, Ronald L. Oaxaca     

WHEN YOU ASK ZEUS A FAVOR: THE THIRD PARTY'S VOICE IN A DICTATOR GAME

We conducted a laboratory experiment on a dictator game with the option for a “voice” by a third party and compared it with the dictator game with a “voice” by the recipient. Our findings are as follows. The dictators' offers in response to an aggressive voice of the recipients are significantly lower than the dictators' offers in response to the corresponding voice of the third party. The dictators' responses to an aggressive voice differentiate the effects of the recipient's voice from those of the third party's.     

Correspondence to what? Coherence to what? What is good scenario-based decision making?

This paper provides a framework for the evaluation of scenario planning and other strategic decision making methods or techniques. If scenario planning is useful, we should be teaching it in schools and we as individuals should be using it to cope with the uncertainty inherent in modern life. A prerequisite to this is the need to identify why, where and how (in what way) scenario planning and other methods or techniques are useful. Here, I review evaluations of scenario planning. Taking a Brunswikian perspective, I highlight the issues that have failed to be addressed in this evaluation. I demonstrate that there are many ways in which scenario planning could be useful other than those that have appeared in previous discussions. These multiple routes are dependent upon the interaction between the individual organisation, the environment in which they are operating and the method being followed.