How a Bank Bailout may Increase Systemic Risk

In 2008–2009, the US government spent trillions of dollars to bailout its financial system and prevent insolvency due to a deterioration in domestic loan portfolios. The following dips in US bond prices suggest that global investors feared that the US was over-extending itself and might be unable to repay its debt with taxes rather than inflation. The paper illustrates that if uncertainty arises about a large government's ability to raise taxes to repay its debt, then a debt-financed bailout which initially restores bank health may inadvertently contribute to the financial system's ultimate demise if banks are important lenders to a foreign country that pegs its currency to the domestic money.     

Assessing Recent Determinants of Borrowing Costs in Sub‐Saharan Africa

This study explores macroeconomic implications of the sovereign bond rush that has been taking place in sub‐Saharan Africa since 2006. The focus is on the sub‐Saharan sovereign bond yields as proxies for the region's ability to raise new funds on international markets. Despite the subcontinent's tour‐de‐force entrance to the international bond market, this paper reveals that recent (since early 2000s) borrowing in foreign currency is not without macroeconomic risk. Empirically this paper finds that sovereign bond yields are significantly influenced by global volatility, commodity prices and global liquidity—all factors that are out of the control of the sub‐Saharan economies in question. These findings suggest that portfolio repositioning by institutional investors prompted by improved growth prospects and implicit monetary policy tightening in the advanced economies or heightened risk perceptions, are likely to result in increased borrowing costs for the sub‐Saharan bond issuers and affect their ability to raise funds in international markets. Furthermore, a change in borrowing costs might lead to higher debt‐service costs and policy uncertainty, which in turn could lead to suboptimal investment levels and, ultimately, hinder economic development.     

迪拜债务危机:原因、影响及启示

2009年11月25日,迪拜政府宣布将重组旗下最大的主权投资公司迪拜世界,延迟6个月偿还其即将到期的约600亿美元债务。此事引起全球金融市场对迪拜未来偿还能力的担忧,多国股市出现下跌。迪拜债务危机的爆发主要是迪拜的发展模式出现问题,导致在金融危机冲击下房地产价格大幅度下跌。欧洲银行业在此次危机中风险敞口最大。此次事件会使新兴市场资金流向和美元汇率短期受到影响,但对世界经济的长期影响有限。迪拜危机对中国影响较小,但其所暴露的问题值得我们关注。     

Sovereign default risk premia,fiscal limits,and fiscal policy

We develop a closed economy model to study the interactions among sovereign risk premia, fiscal limits, and fiscal policy. The fiscal limits, which measure the government's ability to service its debt, arise endogenously from dynamic Laffer curves. The state-dependent distributions of fiscal limits depend on the growth of lump-sum transfers, the size of the government, the degree of countercyclical policy responses, and economic diversity. The country-specific fiscal limits imply that the market perceives the riskiness of sovereign debt issued by different countries to be different, which is consistent with the observation that developed countries are downgraded at different levels of debt. A nonlinear relationship between sovereign risk premia and the level of government debt emerges in equilibrium, which is in line with the empirical evidence that once risk premia begin to rise, they do so rapidly. Nonlinear simulations show that fiscal austerity measures that aim to balance the government budget in the short run fail to contain the default risk premium, even with sizeable cuts in government purchases; but a long-term plan for fiscal reform, if it credibly changes the market's expectation about future fiscal policies, can alleviate the rising risk premium.     

Odious Debt in an Imperfect World

The odious debt problem refers to a government's ability to borrow for elite consumption while the general population repays. Although an intuitive response is to ban lending to such regimes, this paper shows that if a government faces endogenous replacement risk, then an international odious debt doctrine which (i) decreases the country's debt ceiling; (ii) decreases the likelihood that the citizens must repay the debt; or (iii) increases the government's cost of borrowing for a given default risk can all decrease citizens' welfare. These findings suggest that, even when a regime is clearly odious, allowing it to borrow up to a point may be preferable to a complete lending ban.     

Self-fulfilling crises with default and devaluation

We characterize optimal debt policy in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of defaults and devaluations in which self-fulfilling crises can arise. When the government cannot commit to repay its debt and cannot commit to maintain the exchange rate, consumers’ expectations of devaluation make the safe level of government debt very low. We show that, when the debt is in the crises zone—where self-fulfilling crisis can occur—the government finds it optimal to reduce the debt to exit the zone. The lower the probability that consumers assign to devaluation, however, the greater is the number of periods that the government will choose to take to exit the crisis zone. We argue that our model can help understand events in Argentina in 2001–2002 and throw light on some aspects of the current EMU sovereign debt crisis.     

Sovereign bond market dependencies and crisis transmission around the eurozone debt crisis: a dynamic copula approach

We examine the dependency between the European government bond markets around the recent sovereign debt crisis. A dynamic copula approach is used to model the time-varying dependence structure of those government bond markets, evaluate the nature and strength of their dependencies over time, and gauge the transmission of the crisis shocks. Our results can be summarized as follows: i) the eurozone sovereign bond markets under consideration have a significant and positive dependence with the Greek and the EMU benchmark sovereign bond markets; ii) the dynamic-BB7 copula function best describes the dependence structure between these sovereign bond markets and provides evidence of asymmetric tail dependence; iii) the conditional probability of crisis transmission from Greece to other eurozone countries is higher than the other way around; and iv) Greece is the most vulnerable country when the eurozone entered into the sovereign debt crisis.     

Stock-bond decoupling before and after the 2008 crisis

In this article, we analyse the co-movements of daily stock prices and government bond prices during the last 25 years, in major Western stock markets, extending previous results to take into account the impact of the current crisis. Our results confirm that bonds are viewed as instruments for improving portfolio diversification in periods of high volatility and falling stock market levels, which is when such diversification is most needed. The possibility of using government debt in portfolios as a means of hedging during times of financial crisis became especially apparent in the crises of 1997, 2001 and 2008. Nevertheless, during the current one, this diversification quality of bonds has disappeared in countries like Italy or Spain, which are also affected by sovereign debt issues.     

Sovereign Debt Capacity and the Distribution of Domestic Wealth: A Common Agency Model*

This paper proposes a stylized two‐period, two‐country model illustrating the role of distribution of domestic wealth in determining a country's level of access to international lending. We model sovereign debt redemption policy in a common agency framework. Within this framework, policy is the outcome of the interaction between government and local and foreign interest groups with conflicting preferences on debt repayment. Our main result is that in full lobby competition, when all interests are represented, the only equilibrium solution is repudiation and the consequent inability of government to access international capital markets. Conversely, when the ability to lobby depends on wealth, governments can access international credit up to a given maximum external debt capacity, determined by the skew in the distribution of domestic wealth.     

Sovereign default and the sustainability risk premium effect

We analyze the joint determination of interest rate risk and debt sustainability for governments with fiscal imbalances. Because higher interest rates imply increased debt services, they worsen the government's financial situation and increase the probability of sovereign default. Thus, higher interest rates eventually lead to a decrease in the real demand for government bonds, which imposes an additional constraint on government debt sustainability.     

Real-Time Fiscal Forecasting Using Mixed-Frequency Data*

The sovereign debt crisis has increased the importance of monitoring budgetary execution. We employ real-time data using a mixed data sampling (MiDaS) methodology to demonstrate how budgetary slippages can be detected early on. We show that in spite of using real-time data, the year-end forecast errors diminish significantly when incorporating intra-annual information. Our results show the benefits of forecasting aggregates via subcomponents, in this case total government revenue and expenditure. Our methodology could significantly improve fiscal surveillance and could therefore be an important part of the European Commission's model toolkit.     

Domestic versus External Borrowing and Fiscal Policy in Emerging Markets

This paper presents a model of an emerging market sovereign that can selectively default on its domestic or external creditors. The two classes of creditors have different ways of punishing the government in the event of default, which in turn creates a differential in the sovereign's incentives to default on its domestic versus foreign creditors. We explore the extent to which the possibility of differential treatment of creditors affects the composition of debt. We find that a country characterized by volatile output, sovereign risk, and costly tax collection will want to borrow in domestic as well as in international markets.     

NOMINAL SOVEREIGN DEBT

I show that reputation alone can sustain nominal sovereign debt, which is subject to both the risks of default and opportunistic devaluations. Nominal debt combined with a countercyclical exchange rate policy allows more hedging against shocks than real savings if markets are incomplete. Thus, the loss of either repayment or monetary reputation severely affects the government's ability to smooth consumption. The model offers a simple explanation for the Bulow and Rogoff critique, while simultaneously helping explain the issuance of nominal sovereign bonds by emerging economies. The model also helps explain why many governments borrow and save at the same time.     

Sovereign credit ratings in the European Union: A model-based fiscal analysis

We present a model-based measure of sovereign credit ratings derived solely from the fiscal position of a country: a forecast of its future debt liabilities, and its potential to use fiscal policy to repay these. We use this measure to calculate credit ratings for 14 European countries over the period 1995–2012. This measure identifies a European sovereign debt crisis almost two years before the official ratings of the credit rating agencies.     

中国主权资产负债表及其风险评估(下)

2000——2010年,中国的国民资产负债表呈快速扩张之势。对外资产、基础设施以及房地产资产迅速积累,构成资产扩张的主导因素。这记载了出口导向发展战略之下中国工业化与城镇化加速发展的历史进程。在负债方,各级政府以及国有企业的负债以高于私人部门的增长率扩张。这凸显了政府主导经济活动的体制特征。对主权资产负债表的风险评估表明:(1)总体上,中国主权净值为正,因而,在相当一段时间内,发生主权债务危机的概率极低;(2)近期的风险点主要体现在房地产信贷与地方债务上,而中国的长期风险则更多集中在对外资产负债表、企业债务与社保欠账上。这些风险大都是或有负债风险,且与过去的发展方式密切相关;(3)主权债务动态的模拟进一步揭示出维持经济增长率与利率之差对于化解债务风险的重要性。因此,转变经济发展方式,保持经济可持续增长,是应对主权债务风险的根本途径。     

Fiscal limits and monetary policy: default vs. inflation

This paper studies the monetary policy trade-off between low inflation and low sovereign risk in the environment where fiscal authorities fail to fully ensure the sustainability of government debt. Building on the Fiscal Theory of Price Level (FTPL) and the Fiscal Theory of Sovereign Risk (FTSR), this paper differs in its baseline assumption about the monetary policy objective, which is neither to rule out defaults regardless of inflation costs (as in FTPL), nor to follow inflation targeting regardless of associated sovereign risk (as in FTSR). Instead, we study the case in which the central bank controls the risky interest rate to minimize the probability of default while ruling out large inflation hikes. We show that this policy regime can mitigate default risks only when the central bank is expected to allow sufficient increases in inflation. When agents believe that the central bank's tolerance toward inflation hikes has increased, equilibrium risk premium goes down, suggesting that information concerning changes in the central bank's preferences over inflation directly impacts default risks.     

Can fiscal rules improve financial market access for developing countries?

A number of countries have introduced fiscal rules to deter fiscal profligacy, enhance the credibility of fiscal policy, and reduce borrowing costs. In this paper, we examine the outcome of fiscal rules in terms of improving financial market access for developing countries. We use entropy balancing and various propensity score matching. We find that the adoption of fiscal rules reduces sovereign bond spreads and increases sovereign debt ratings for a sample of 36 developing countries, which are part of the JP Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index Global (EMBIG), for the period 1993-2014. We explain this finding by the effect of fiscal rules on the credibility of a country's fiscal policy: more credible governments are rewarded in the international financial markets by low sovereign bond spreads and high sovereign debt ratings. These results are robust to a wide set of alternative specifications. We also show that this favorable effect is sensitive to several country structural characteristics. Our findings confirm that the adoption and sound implementation of fiscal rules is an instrument for policy makers to improve developing countries’ financial market access.     

The Price Relevance of Fiscal Developments

We use Seemingly Unrelated Regressions Estimation methods to assess the link between prices, bond yields and the fiscal behavior. A first equation determines the country-specific cost of government financing via the long-term government bond yield, as a function of budget balance positions. A second equation links the price level to the cost of government financing. Our results for 15 EU countries in the period 1980Q1–2013Q4 show that improvements in the fiscal stance lead to persistent falls in sovereign yields; higher sovereign yields are reflected in upward price movements; improvements in the fiscal stance in recession times lead to short-term decreases in yields and better fiscal stance in expansions induce downward movement in bond yields only after 8 quarters.     

Sovereign Reputation and Yield Spreads: A Case Study on Retroactive Legislation

This paper uses recent legislation in Austria to establish a link between sovereign reputation and yield spreads. In 2009, Hypo Alpe Adria International, a bank previously co‐owned by the regional government of Carinthia, had been nationalized by Austria's central government in order to avoid a default triggering multi‐billion Euro local government guarantees. In 2015, special legislation retroactively introduced collective action clauses allowing a haircut on both the bonds and the guarantees while avoiding formal default. We document that legislative and administrative action designed to partly abrogate the guarantees resulted in a loss of reputation, leading to higher yield spreads for sovereign debt. Our analysis of covered bonds uncovers an increase in yield spreads on the secondary market and a deterioration of primary market conditions.     

LEVERAGED BUYBACKS OF SOVEREIGN DEBT: A MODEL AND AN APPLICATION TO GREECE

The model presented in this article shows that the outcome of a leveraged buyback of sovereign debt depends on the priority structure of the deal. If the institution lending the funds needed for the buyback is senior, the debtor country benefits from the deal: the government debt is reduced, implying a lower probability of default; at the same time, the deal makes the price of outstanding bonds go down, since their recovery rate declines. The opposite holds if the lending institution is junior. If the loan is underpriced, the implied subsidy is shared between the borrowing country and its bondholders, who can benefit from a price increase of their bonds. This is actually what happened with the buyback of Greek sovereign bonds in 2012, as it is shown in the empirical section. Those results do not depend on the share of country's endowment devoted to debt repayment, which instead plays a crucial role in shaping the outcome of unlevered buybacks. (JEL F34, H63)