Status Quo Bias in Bargaining: An Extension of the Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem with an Application to the Coase Theorem

We generalize the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem to study inefficiencies in bilateral bargaining over a divisible good, with two-sided private information on the valuations. For concave quasi-linear preferences, the ex ante most efficient Bayes equilibrium of any mechanism always exhibits a bias toward the status quo. If utility functions are quadratic every Bayes equilibrium is ex post inefficient, with the expected amount of trade biased toward the disagreement point. In other words, for the class of preferences we study, there is a strategic advantage to property rights in the Coase bargaining setup in the presence of incomplete information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D23, D62, D82.     

科斯三定理的新表述与新证明

科斯第二定理指出,在交易费用大于零的现实世界,产权的不同界定会对资源配置效率产生影响。政府(或法院)的基本原则应该是把权利界定给能以较低交易费用解决外部性问题的一方。科斯第三定理的准确含义是,在交易费用大于零的现实世界,制度安排的生产本身是有成本的,净收益最大的制度安排就是最佳的选择。科斯第二、三定理为市场经济中普遍存在的外部性问题提供了新的解决措施和科学的决策原则,间接意味着科斯并非政府干预的完全反对者,科斯定理也不足以成为有些学者把新制度经济学定性为新自由主义的充分理由。     

The role of strategic uncertainty in games: An experimental study of cheap talk and contracts in the Nash demand game

We utilise results from a human-subjects experiment to examine the connection between strategic uncertainty and outcomes in games. Our basic game is a Nash demand game where one player has an outside option available. A “chat” treatment allows bargainers to send cheap-talk messages prior to playing the basic game, and in a “contracts” treatment, they can additionally propose and accept binding contracts. We propose that strategic uncertainty comprises at least two facets: “coordination-type”, which is lower in the chat game than in the basic game, and “rationality-type”, which is lower in the contracts game than in the chat game. We find that both types of strategic uncertainty impact bargaining outcomes: moving from the basic game to the chat game, and thence to contracts, improves several aspects of outcomes, such as higher efficiency, less opting out and less under-demanding. Other results include a treatment effect on the types of agreements that are reached.     

A New Variant of the Winner's Curse in a Coasian Contracting Game

We examine behavior in a Coasian contracting game with incomplete information. Experimental subjects propose contracts, while automaton property right holders or robot players with uncertain preferences respond to those proposals. The most common pattern of proposals observed in these games results in too many agreements and, in some games, payoffs that are stochastically dominated by those resulting from rational proposals (which imply fewer agreements). In this sense, we observe a winner's curse similar to that observed in bidding games under incomplete information, such as the common value auction (Kagel, J.H. and Levin, D. (1986) American Economic Review. 76, 894–920) and the takeover game (Samuelson, W. and Bazerman, M.H. (1985) In Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 3. JAI Press, Greenwich, pp. 105–137; Ball, S.B., Bazerman, M.H., and Carroll, J.S. (1990) Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 48, 1–22; Holt, C. and Sherman, R. (1994) American Economic Review. 84, 642–652). While the naïve model of behavior nicely predicts the winner's curse in those previous bidding games, it does not do so here. Instead, an alternative model we call the guarantor model explains the anomalous behavior best. Hence, we suggest this is a new variant of the winner's curse.     

Private and Public Information in Self-fulfilling Currency Crises

Received November 9, 2000; revised version received July 24, 2001     

中国国防支出对居民消费影响的实证研究

在改革开放的前10年,中国国防建设与经济发展的矛盾比较突出,国防支出对居民消费产生替代效应。此后,随着国家经济实力的增强,国防与经济建设的矛盾得到缓解,国防支出对居民消费产生互补效应并趋于稳定。为保证国防与经济协调发展,在促进经济快速健康增长的基础上要保持国防支出的稳步增长,并不断优化国防支出结构。     

基于博弈论的上市公司会计信息披露失真成因分析

笔者运用博弈论作为主要的分析工具,通过对证券市场各利益主体逐个分析,揭示了信息披露失真的主要成因。上市公司会计信息披露失真是各参与方利益冲突而相互博弈的结果,是由个体理性出发而导致的集体非理性。在分析信息披露失真原因基础上,给出了相应的治理对策建议和应达到的理想的纳什均衡。     

Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Exploitation of the Arcto-Norwegian Cod Stock

A two-agent model for the exploitation of the Arcto-Norwegian cod stock is developed to investigate the economic benefits that can be realized from the resource, and the effect of exploitation on stock sustainability under cooperation and non-cooperation. The two agents are identified in this study as a trawl fishery versus a coastal fishery. Unlike in Munro (1979), where conflicts in the management strategies of agents arise from differences in the perceptions of the discount factor, fishing effort costs, and consumer preferences, here conflicts arise mainly from the differences in fishing gear and grounds, and the age group of cod targeted by the two agents. Using a game theoretic framework, we show that given available data, the optimum optimorum is obtained under cooperation with side payments and no predetermined harvest shares, in which case the coastal fishery buys out the trawl fishery. However, sensitivity analysis shows that if the price premium assumed for mature cod is taken away, the trawl fishery takes over as the producer of the optimum optimorum.     

Playing monopoly in the creek: Imperfect competition, development, and in-stream flows

Land ownership and control of development in new and frontier cities is often concentrated. Local public goods, such as wetlands and riparian habitats, can be adversely affected by development. Regulatory pressure to protect these local public goods may not emerge until after some development has occurred. When development rights are insecure, an incentive exists to accelerate early development, an incentive that increases with the number of firms. Further, multiple equilibria may exist, which can result in large increases in development for small increases in the number of firms. When firms are uncertain about how the regulator values the local public good, development may be further accelerated and there may be even more equilibria.     

论后危机下的浙江民企转型升级

后危机下给各国政府、企业带来的最重要的反思是如何改变造成这场全球金融危机的增长模式,可以说危机成为＂倒逼＂转型升级的难得机遇。而浙江民企在经历三十多年的高速发展之后,也面临经济周期中的转折,危机的爆发加速暴露了其发展中的问题。同时以此为契机,分析了转型升级面临的国内外经济环境,提出后危机下浙江民营企业如何谋求转型升级的路径。     

供应链战略联盟的信息共享研究——以零售业供应链为例

随着时代的发展和市场竞争的加剧,供应链中的某些企业不再单独作为供应链中的一个个体而存在,而是逐渐形成了供应链中的战略联盟,他们之间同时存在着竞争与合作。而随着供应链管理的研究深入,供应链企业间的信息共享变得越来越重要。虽然现代信息技术的发展为企业间的信息共享构建了必要的基础平台,但是依然存在着信息技术以外的原因影响企业间的信息共享。本文在总结前人工作的基础上,运用博弈论,以零售业供应链为例,分析了供应链战略联盟的企业间竞争与合作并存情况下的信息共享,并给出了实现信息共享的对策。     

Coordination and Information in Critical Mass Games: An Experimental Study

We present experimental results on a repeated coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria in which a payoff from choosing an action is positive only if a critical mass of players choose that action. We design a baseline version of the game in which payoffs remain constant for values above the critical mass, and an increasing returns version in which payoffs keep increasing for values above the critical mass. We test the predictive power of security and payoff-dominance under different information treatments. Our results show that convergence to the payoff-dominant equilibrium is the modal limit outcome when players have full information about others' previous round choices, while this outcome never occurs in the remaining treatments. The paths of play in some groups reveal a tacit dynamic coordination by which groups converge to the efficient equilibrium in a step-like manner. Moreover, the frequency and speed of convergence to the payoff-dominant equilibrium are higher, ceteris paribus, when increasing returns are present. Finally, successful coordination seems to crucially depend on players' willingness to signal to others the choice of the action supporting the efficient equilibrium.     

信息化对内部控制影响的理论研究

安然、世通等舞弊事件的发生,让投资者认识到内部控制的重要性。各国政府陆续发布有关内部控制的法律法规,使得如何更有效的提高内部控制绩效变得迫在眉睫。目前,不少学者都试图利用信息技术研究内部控制,取得了一些成果,但是却缺乏相关的理论加以解释,使得这种交叉学科的研究缺乏相应的理论支撑。利用已有的相关理论深化研究,阐述信息化如何对内部控制影响,可以为该领域未来的研究提供理论支撑。     

Detecting Failures of Backward Induction: Monitoring Information Search in Sequential Bargaining

We did experiments in a three-round bargaining game where the (perfect) equilibrium offer was $1.25 and an equal split was $2.50. The average offer was $2.11. Patterns of information search (measured with a computerized information display) show limited lookahead rather than backward induction. Equilibrium theories which adjust for social utilities (reflecting inequality-aversion or reciprocity) cannot explain the results because they predict subjects will make equilibrium offers to “robot” players, but offers to robots are only a little lower. When trained subjects (who quickly learned to do backward induction) bargained with untrained subjects, offers ended up halfway between equilibrium and $2.11. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, C9.     

我国民间金融服务机构立法研究

民间金融的蓬勃发展,势必促使民间金融服务机构的产生并就其作为一种制度安排得到立法部门的重视。然而从实践上看,我国民间金融服务机构的发展现状不容乐观,相关制度尚待确立,这严重影响了其自身发展和活跃民间金融市场作用的发挥。在总结日本、英国等国家和地区民间金融服务机构先进模式的基础上分析我国民间金融服务机构的制度设计现状及缺陷,提出我国民间金融服务机构的立法模式。     

Endogenous transfers in the Prisoner's Dilemma game: An experimental test of cooperation and coordination

We test a two-stage compensation mechanism for promoting cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games. Players first simultaneously choose binding non-negative amounts to pay their counterparts for cooperating, and then play the induced game knowing these amounts. In our games, all payment pairs consistent with mutual cooperation in subgame-perfect equilibrium transform these games into coordination games, with both mutual cooperation and mutual defection as Nash equilibria in the second stage. When endogenous transfer payments are not permitted, cooperation is much less likely. Mutual cooperation is most likely when the (sufficient) payments are identical, and it is also substantially more likely with payment pairs that bring the mutual-cooperation payoffs closer together. Both the Fehr–Schmidt and Charness–Rabin models predict that transfers that make final payoffs closer are preferred; however, they do not explain why equal transfers are particularly effective. Transfers are also effective in sustaining cooperation even when they are imposed and not chosen.     

基于金融体系自身缺陷的中小民营企业融资障碍分析

中小企业融资难是个世界性的问题,但我国中小民营企业是有其特殊性的,主要在于现有的金融体系所存在的缺陷阻碍了中小民营企业从正规渠道融得资金,这又主要体现在三个方面,即信贷机构对中小民营企业融资机制存在许多缺陷;中小民营企业信用担保机构的发展出现多样化趋势,但蕴涵较大的金融风险;直接融资渠道缺失与资本市场缺乏层次.     

论民营企业技术创新的非正式制度安排

增强民营企业的技术创新能力对化解民营经济发展瓶颈非常重要.民营企业在技术创新方面有其特有的优劣势,在高科技迅速发展的新形势下,民营企业要克服对技术创新"神秘化"、"专家化"的错觉,善于根据自身特点进行有效技术创新.观念、企业文化、企业家精神等非正式制度对企业成功创新有着重要的意义.     

Monetary and Fiscal Policy-Makers in the European Economic and Monetary Union: Allies or Adversaries?

Optimal monetary and fiscal policies within the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) are determined by simulating a global model under alternative assumptions about the objective function of the European Central Bank (ECB) and about cooperation vs. non-cooperation between monetary and fiscal policy-makers and among the latter. The results show the high effectiveness of fixed rules in the presence of supply-side shocks and the usefulness of cooperative discretionary measures against demand-side shocks. More generally, cooperation among fiscal policy-makers in the EMU is nearly always superior to non-cooperative equilibrium solutions, yielding a strong case for the coordination of fiscal policies.     

“十二五”规划期间绿色物流产业合作博弈关系的发展研究

"十一五"期间我国物流产业的发展在取得瞩目成就的同时也存在不少问题。基于目前中国的基本国情和产业结构调整的要求,物流产业在"十二五"规划期间,走物流产业绿色化的可持续发展道路无疑是最佳选择之一。从合作博弈的视角,绿色物流产业中第三方物流企业与物流需求企业的合作博弈可有一种共赢的创新方式;合作过程中要加强绿色物流企业"委托—代理"机制的建设,建造和完善产业价值链;政府要提供信息支持等公共服务和实行"绿色补贴"政策。