网络外部性与补偿激励下的非线性定价

本文构建了一个一般性模型用以说明在非对称信息与网络外部性并存时,垄断厂商如何设计非线性价格合约甄别不同类型的消费者。模型表明两者的并存修正了经典逆向选择模型中“顶部无扭曲”和“单向扭曲”的基本结论。具体的消费量扭曲方式取决于网络是否存在拥挤：对于非拥挤性网络,消费量表现为单向扭曲;对于拥挤性网络,表现为双向扭曲;而对于中性网络则仍为顶部无扭曲。此外,本文还分析了引起双向扭曲的另一种原因,即由类型依赖的保留效用引起的补偿激励问题。     

带网络外部性寡头垄断的定价策略

1引言 许多产品当它们被独立起来时没有任何价值或者是价值非常小，但当他们组合起来形成一个网络时它们自生的价值在这个网络中会明显提高，在一般意义上把由于相互关联而带来产品价值的变化称为网络效应。     

网络外部性与基于行为的区别定价

近年来,基于行为的区别定价成为区别定价领域研究的热点,但是这方面的文献却鲜有涉及到市场中存在着网络外部性的情形。在理性预期的假设下,本文通过一个两阶段双寡头博弈模型分析了网络外部性与基于行为的区别定价对子博弈精炼纳什均衡的影响。在成熟市场上,网络外部性会对具有不同初始市场份额的厂商产生不同影响;在新兴市场上,无论厂商采取何种定价策略,网络外部性都会加剧市场上的竞争,导致厂商利润下降。与统一定价下的子博弈精炼纳什均衡相比,基于行为的区别定价会加剧竞争从而导致厂商利润的下降,但是会造成较多社会福利的无谓损失。     

基于网络正外部性的信息产品定价策略研究

文章首先分析了网络信息产品具有网络正外部性等特点,在此基础上重点研究了在资源总量一定的限制条件下,该类产品被消费的各不同时期的最优定价策略等问题。研究结果表明:在一定的条件下,该类产品的使用高峰时期,商家为了确保一定的利润,可以确定一个最优价格。但是,根据产品的特点与顾客消费需求的差异性,应该在这个最优价的基础之上,对顾客进行差别定价,这更有利于社会福利与经济效益的提高。     

考虑网络外部性的信息产品定价与政府反盗版政策研究

网络外部性是信息产品的重要特性.从消费者效用函数出发,通过建立两阶段博弈模型分析了网络效应对信息产品垄断市场上正版厂商、盗版厂商、消费者及政府政策的影响.研究表明,网络外部性不改变正版厂商和盗版厂商的均衡定价,但提高了厂商的市场覆盖率,使厂商利润和社会福利增加.研究还表明,网络外部性会影响政府反盗版监管政策的实施效果,使反盗版的难度增加、成本上升,并加大了使盗版厂商退出市场所需的最小监管力度.政府在制定反盗版政策时应考虑网络效应对市场及政策实施的影响.     

网络外部性、研发激励与技术标准化:以激光视盘业为例

在网络外部性主导的市场,企业具有强烈的研发激励.技术标准作为研发的成果对于产业发展和国际贸易格局都具有重要的影响.本文建立了激光视盘业标准发展和演变的理论模型,揭示了在网络外部性主导的信息产业领域论坛标准与事实标准的形成机理.结果显示:当第三方企业能够形成占优战略时,标准化的结果是形成论坛标准;当第三方企业不能形成占优战略时,标准竞争的结果是形成事实标准.这两种结果具有不同的社会福利意义.     

再论外部性与网络外部性——兼论克服网络外部性的一般性方法

网络外部性虽属于外部性的一种,但是它有许多自己独特的性质,导致的市场结果也有异于一般的外部性,同时网络外部性对市场有效性的危害,也应区别对待.在清楚了网络外部性的特点及其危害的具体情形的基础上,笔者进一步提出了克服外部性的一般性方法.本文的创新之处有以下几点:对网络外部性与外部性的差异提出了几点新的看法;对网络产品造成的市场失灵进行归类总结;提出克服网络外部性的一般性方法.     

外部性补偿与西部开发

本文认为我国西部落后于东后,根本的症结是外部的存在,由于外部性的存在,使得西部地区得自于全国的收益小于它给予全国的收益,投入资源,但不能取得完全收益,西部产权遭受损害。所以,开发西部,有必要从根本上解决西部地区的外部性问题,通过把外部性内化为西部地区的要素投入,维护西部产权的完整性,进而为西部开发奠基持续而稳固的根基,把西部开发顺利推向前进。     

基于外部性的企业家创新激励

企业家作为经济人和社会人的集合体,在现代社会中作用独特。企业家创新因具有一定的外部性,成为具有局部排他性和一定竞争性的非纯公共物品。企业家创新的总外部性对社会来说是有利的,它会带来全社会创新成果的共享和福利的提高;但对于企业家而言,却是几乎以接近零的利润提供企业家创新成果,即企业家的收益很低,这使得企业家创新缺乏动力。以鲍莫尔提出的"外溢比率"为基础,以企业家双重社会角色的定位以及外部性的客观存在为前提,分析了创新激励的方向和手段。     

浅议网络外部性

网络外部性是网络系统共同具有的一个基本特征，它的存在给传统经济学理论带来了一定的冲击，也给市场经济运行产生了许多影响。近年来网络外部性成为网络产业和高科技产业中广泛讨论的一个焦点。本文试图对网络外部性本身的含义、分类和产生原因做一个基本探讨，为网络外部性的进一步研究奠定初步的基础。同时也就网络外部性对市场经济运行的影响做一筒单研究。     

CONTRIBUTIONS AND ELECTIONS WITH NETWORK EXTERNALITIES

This paper develops a model of campaign contributions and electoral competition. Contributors have separable preferences over policy and the electoral success of the candidate they support, as in influence buying. Policy preferences are single peaked over a single policy dimension. A candidate's chances of victory are increasing in the relative size of her war chest. In equilibrium, potential contributors balance incentives to donate to a candidate that is desirable on policy grounds and ensuring that they back the likely winner. With exogenous candidate positions, we find conditions under which, in equilibrium, contributors donate to the candidate that is less desirable on policy grounds solely because they consider the candidate viable . We also find that there is a degree of indeterminacy, wherein multiple equilibria inducing different lotteries over the final policy often exist. With endogenous candidate locations, we find that while median policies are always supportable as equilibrium, it is often the case that any pair of candidate locations is supportable in equilibrium. These results suggest that in settings with substantial influence buying, median policy interests may not be represented.     

NETWORK EXTERNALITIES AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE

In this article, I examine how the network externalities of communications activities and trading opportunities interact to determine the structure of comparative advantage. These interactions are examined by constructing a two‐country, three‐sector model of trade involving a country‐specific communications network sector. The role of the connectivity of network providers, which allows users of a network to communicate with users of another network, is also explored.     

WELFARE‐MAXIMISING PRICING IN A MACROECONOMIC MODEL WITH IMPERFECT COMPETITION AND CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITIES

This paper develops a simple macroeconomic model with imperfect competition and consumption externalities, and uses it to examine whether the marginal cost pricing rule in the partial equilibrium framework can apply to the general equilibrium framework. It is shown that, for welfare to be maximised, average revenue should be set equal to marginal cost if consumption externalities are either absent or positive. However, for welfare to be maximised, average revenue should be set higher than marginal cost in the presence of negative consumption externalities.     

GROWTH AND BUBBLES WITH CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITIES*

This paper explores the role of consumption externalities in an overlapping generations economy with capital accumulation. If consumers in each generation are concerned with other agents’ consumption behaviours, there exist intergenerational as well as intragenerational consumption externalities. It is the presence of intergenreational consumption externalities that may produce fundamental effects both on equilibrium dynamics and on steady‐state characterization of the economy. This paper demonstrates this fact in the context of a simple model of endogenously growing, overlapping‐generations economy with or without asset bubbles.     

EXTERNALITIES AGGREGATION IN NETWORK GAMES

We generalize the results on the monotonicity of equilibria for network games with incomplete information. We show that not only the distinction between strategic complements and strategic substitutes is important in determining the nature of the Bayesian Nash equilibria, but the nature of the statistic itself is also determinant. We show that understanding the underlying forces behind people's choices may be of fundamental importance for a policymaker that wants to incentivize efficient behavior.     

THE EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM IN A DIFFERENTIATED DUOPOLY WITH NETWORK EXTERNALITIES*

The existence of a pure‐strategy subgame‐perfect equilibrium in qualities and prices is investigated in a duopoly model of vertical differentiation where quality improvements require a quadratic variable cost and network externalities operate. We show that there exists a parameter region where the incentive to predate at the quality stage prevents firms from reaching a pure‐strategy non‐cooperative equilibrium with prices above marginal costs. If network externalities are sufficiently large, a Bertrand equilibrium with zero profits may arise, although the amount of product differentiation is strictly positive.     

WAGE BARGAINING AND MERGER INCENTIVES WITH ASYMMETRIC COSTS

This paper examines how wage bargaining within each firm influences the relationship between an equilibrium ownership structure and the most preferred ownership structure from the viewpoint of social welfare, in a unionized oligopoly of asymmetric firms with respect to productivity of capital. We consider the merger incentive of each firm’s owner when the wage level is determined through bargaining between the firm’s owner and union. We derive a condition for both the degree of cost asymmetry among existing firms and the relative bargaining power of each firm’s owner to her/his union such that each ownership structure can be observed in equilibrium. We also show that although the two types of ownership structures with the merger involving the least efficient firm can be equilibria and socially optimal, these structures are observed only when both the degree of cost asymmetry and the relative bargaining power of each firm’s owner are moderate. Finally, we analyse the relationship among the cooperative game approach employed in this paper and two non‐cooperative merger formation approaches, and examine the robustness of the results obtained in this paper against the change in the assumption regarding each firm’s cost function.     

COMPETITION,REGULATION AND WELFARE IN THE PRESENCE OF NETWORK EXTERNALITIES*

In this paper we consider a simple model of an industry with network externalities, where a benefit to each consumer from network services depends on the size of the network. We first consider a single network and cover the cases with and without fixed cost of entry. We then turn to the two‐network industry, where the incumbent network and a new entrant network compete for the market and may differ both in their marginal costs and demand structures. In addition, we identify several situations where public policy may play a crucial role in sustaining socially advantageous network service provision.     

NONLINEAR PRICING IN ASYMMETRIC DUOPOLY

We characterise, for both separate and interdependent markets, the local pure-strategies Nash equilibrium of a spatial duopoly game, where consumers are horizontally and vertically heterogeneous, and firms have different cost structures and ranges of product lines. We show that standard results which emerged in the monopoly context can not be generalised to strategic contexts where firms retain market power and there is sufficient competitive pressure. We prove that in the asymmetric duopoly case, when markets are interdependent, the incentive compatibility constraints are slack, and there is no quality distortion.     

PRICING REGULATIONS AND NETWORK TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS: A RETROSPECTIVE EVALUATION

This article evaluates the impact of the introduction of incentive regulation on technology deployment, as evaluated using two technology deployment metrics, among the population of local exchange carriers in the USA between 1988 and 2001. The regulatory schemes are disaggregated into five categories, permitting examination of heterogeneity among regulatory schemes. The results show that the rate of return method and the other intermediate incentive schemes implemented have had a negative impact on technology deployment. Conversely, the introduction of pure price caps schemes had a positive and significant impact on firms’ technology deployment. These results highlight the importance of appropriate incentive compatible mechanism design in motivating firms to adopt the new and important technologies that have been developed.