The Effects of Setting Deposit Insurance Premiums to Target Insurance Fund Reserves

A common feature of many insurance systems is that they are backed by an insurance fund and insurance premiums are adjusted to target this fund's reserves. This study analyzes the fund targeting policy of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). It examines the distortions to banks' cost of deposit financing that result from setting premiums in this manner. The study's framework is a multiperiod, multibank contingent claims model where the stochastic rates of return on individual banks' assets are assumed to be correlated and match the actual empirical distribution of a sample of U.S. banks. The model identifies factors that are likely to exacerbate distortions due to insurance mispricing. The relative merits of a targeting policy and a flat-rate insurance policy are discussed, and the real effects of insurance mispricing are estimated. A method for valuing a government subsidy under a reserve targeting policy is also presented.     

Party realignments and the growth of federal economic regulation, 1861–1986

This article explains when and why the federal government passed laws with the intended goal of maintaining or improving a particular industry or segment of an industry. The adoption of regulatory laws across time will be described, and the surges and declines in the distribution explained. The empirical analysis covers the years 1861–1986.This article is an abbreviated version of a paper prepared for the 1988 Conference Perspectives on Banking Regulation, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, November 3–4, 1988. I am very indebted to George J. Benston who allowed me to revise the paper in response to his criticisms.     

Securities activities of commercial banks: Recent changes in the economic and legal environments

Despite the lack of changes in the Glass-Steagall Act, commercial banks have expanded their securities activities substantially in recent years. The increase reflects more liberal interpretations of the Glass-Steagall restrictions by the bank regulatory agencies and the courts, greater aggressiveness by the banks in searching out new areas of profitability to offset declining profitability in some traditional banking activities, advances in data processing technology that both permit the design of new securities and promise economies of scope, and increased internationalization of financial markets that provide U.S. banks with experience in securities activities abroad. As a result of the de facto dismantling of the Glass-Steagall Act that is documented in this article, de jure dismantling is less important than in the past, although it is still desirable for the sake of increased efficiency.Loyola University of ChicagoThis article was prepared to accompany the author's statement before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, Washington, D.C., August 6, 1987. An earlier version was presented to a conference on Future Directions in the Financial Services Industry, Georgetown University Law School, Washington, D.C., March 5–6, 1987. Sections of the article are included in a longer article, The Securities Activities of Commercial Banks: The Current Economic and Legal Environment, by the author and Larry Mote, Staff Memoranda (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago), forthcoming. The author is indebted to Larry Mote for comments, suggestions, and corrections throughout the development of this article.     

Comments on ‘The role of technological and market structure in regulatory reform’ by Ronald R. Braeutigam

These comments were prepared for 1988 Conference on Perspectives on Banking Regulation held at the Cleveland Federal Bank, November 3 and 4, 1988.     

Government Deposit Insurance and the Diamond-Dybvig Model

The apparent banking market failure modeled by Diamond and Dybvig [1983] rests on their inconsistently applying their sequential servicing constraint to private banks but not to their government deposit insurance agency. Without this inconsistency, banks can provide optimal risk-sharing without tax-based deposit insurance, even when the number of type 1 agents is stochastic, by employing a contingent bonus contract. The threat of disintermediation noted by Jacklin [1987] in the nonstochastic case is still present but can be blocked by contractual trading restrictions. This article complements Wallace [1988], who considers an alternative resolution of this inconsistency.     

The Impact of Risk-Based Premiums on FDIC-Insured Institutions

This paper examines the effect of a series of announcements leading to the approval of risk-based deposit insurance premiums on returns to stockholders of commercial banks. Utilizing risk-weighted capital ratios and measures of overall risk, we group banks according to one of the nine-tier insurance categories subsequently defined by the FDIC. During the period in which the new insurance system was considered and approved, we found that stockholders of well-capitalized, healthy banks experienced wealth changes significantly different from those experienced by less than well-capitalized, less than healthy banks. Although many argued the premium range in the initial insurance schedule was insufficient, the results show that this initial risk-basing marked an important change in the relative burdens imposed by FDIC insurance.     

Banking lessons from the past: The 1938 regulatory Agreement interpreted

We show that the interagency 1938 Uniform Agreement on Bank Supervisory Procedures set the precedent for dynamically varying supervisory standards to conform to national macroeconomic policies and political agendas. Our evidence indicates that the conferences leading to the Agreement were motivated and dominated by the Federal Reserve. Contrary to the goals of the other banking agencies, the Fed sought greater leniency in bank examination in order to stimulate bank credit creation. This precedent for softening examination standards was paralleled in 1991–1992 when the administration and regulatory agencies attempted to offset a proclaimed credit crunch by subordinating bank examinations to the perceived need for more bank credit. The implied risk of trading off bank safety for short-lived economic policies merits more open national debate.Our earlier work on this topic was partially supported by the National Center on Financial Studies, University of California, Berkeley.     

Using HMDA Data as a Regulatory Screen for Fair Lending Compliance

This paper describes and evaluates the Federal Reserve System's recently developed program designed to use HMDA data as a screening device for fair lending enforcement. The program is designed to identify institutions showing potentially discriminatory patterns in their treatment of minority mortgage applicants vis-a`-vis nonminority applicants. The program also selects specific loan files to pull for additional information in cases where a more comprehensive evaluation might be appropriate. This paper discusses the motivation behind the adoption of the program and its innovative matched-pair method and assesses its value and potential shortcomings.     

Local economic effects of bank failures

This study tests the hypothesis that bank failures have adverse effects on economic activity in the communities where the failed banks are located. The literature on the economic effects of credit constraints provides the theoretical foundation for adverse economic effects of bank failures. The data are for rural counties in Kansas, Nebraska, and Oklahoma. The measures of local economic activity are the value of sales and employment. The empirical results indicate that bank failures depress local sales, and, for some of the states, the closing of failed banks depresses local employment.Federal Reserve Bank of St. LouisThe views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis or the Federal Reserve System.     

Supervisor and Market Analysts: What Should Research be Seeking?

This article is primarily directed towards examining the desirability of incorporating market signals in the process of supervision of commercial banks by regulators and insurers. But the ideas developed here can also be applied to the general problem of using market information to assess the solvency and safety of any financial or non-financial institution.Market prices and yields of securities anticipate actions by regulators, central banks, and other players due to the fact that such actions may materially influence the risk and the expected return associated with investment decisions pertaining to those securities. It is well known that the yield curve of government securities such as T-bills, T-notes and T-bonds reflect the market's consensus regarding the actions that the Federal reserve may take as they pertain to the valuation of such securities. The extent to which the market has already discounted the future actions of the central bank will no doubt play a role in the way in which the central bank may think about its actions, its actual effect and how it relates to its intended effects.The extent to which market prices can provide useful guides depends on the underlying market structure and the practices in the industry.While markets may do lot of the hard work in aggregating and incorporating future actions, the task of supervision and regulation can never be put on automatic pilot. Ideally, supervisory policies should effectively combine the market signals with initiatives that serve to maintain the safety and the soundness of the underlying markets. I will begin by exploring the extent to which equity prices may be used as a signal of bank credit risk. I will then explore the advantages and disadvantages of using subordinated debt securities to derive a market signal.     

Company Tax Structure and Company Tax Incidence

This paper reviews conflicting theories of company tax incidence impliedby the alternative new and traditional views of dividends andexamines their contrasting policy implications. Whereas, under thetraditional view, closer integration of the corporate and personalincome tax systems is suggested, an alternative policy orientationemphasizing the non-distorting features of the classical system is impliedby the new view. Even if the traditional view is accepted, theimplications for design and reform of the company tax vary widely underalternative specifications of domestic and international tax policy objectives. Schedular alternatives to global income taxation are alsoconsidered.     

Banks, markets, and efficiency

A competitive financial system can help reduce banks’ monopoly power and the associated inefficiencies. However, according to Diamond (J Polit Econ 105: 928–956, 1997) and Fecht (J Eur Econ Assoc 6(2), 2004) competition with the financial sector may also constrain the amount of liquidity insurance that banks can provide to households affected by unobservable idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. To study this trade-off, we model competition between banks and between banks and financial markets. Our analysis shows that competition between banks and financial markets can constrain the risk-sharing offered by deposit contracts. This effect is the same if competition between banks mainly affects the reallocation of deposits. However, if banking competition primarily affects new deposits, then such competition only limits inefficient monopoly rents without restraining risk-sharing. We would like to thank Diemo Dietrich, Phil Dybvig, Hans Peter Grüner, Martin Hellwig, Elu von Thadden, Uwe Vollmer, Wolf Wagner as well as seminar participants at the Bundesbank, at the University of Mannheim, at the University of Tilburg, at the 3rd Workshop on Monetary and Financial Economics in Halle, at the University of Lausanne, at the First ProBanker Symposium in Maastricht, at the Global Finance Conference 2005 in Dublin, at the European Economic Association Meeting 2005 in Amsterdam, at the International Finance Conference 2005 in Copenhagen, and at the German Economic Association Meeting 2005 in Bonn. We thank Mike Demott for editorial assistance. The views expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, or the Federal Reserve System.     

“Investor sentiment” and the closed-end fund puzzle: A 7 percent solution

Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) argue that the irrational noise trader model of DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) ... is consistent with the published evidence on closed-end fund prices. ... However, Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler provide no indication of how much of the variability of a closed-end fund's discounts and premiums is due to such investor sentiment. Using the signal extraction technique of French and Roll (1986) to measure noise, this article estimates that on average only 7 percent of the variance of a standardized measure of weekly changes in discounts and premiums can be attributed to noise-trading activity. Investor sentiment, therefore, seems to account for very little of a closed-end fund's discount and premium variability over time.     

Statement no.133 proposed legislation on enterprise resource banks (The “Baker Bill”, H.R. 3167)

Statement no.133 proposed legislation on enterprise resource banks (The Baker Bill, H.R. 3167)May 6, 1996     

Does the Presence of Big Banks Influence Competition in Local Markets?

This paper examines whether the biggest organizations in the banking industry influence competition differently than their smaller rivals. Big bank financial strength, multimarket links, diversified operations, status as too big to fail, economies of scale and scope, and in some cases, weak incentives to be aggressive may result in big banks affecting competition in a given local market differently than would be suggested by market shares and other structural measures. Understanding the influence of big banks on competition has important implications for antitrust policy toward bank mergers. Empirical results reveal that, in rural markets where big banks operate, competition may be reduced, thereby enabling all banks in those markets to earn greater returns. The presence of a big bank is associated with an approximately 0.09 percentage point effect on a bank's return on assets, which represents about a 7.7% performance advantage for firms that face big banks over firms that do not. The relationship between big banks and profitability holds only when banks are classified as big if they are both very large and regionally prominent. The presence of banks that possess only one of these characteristics does not appear to substantially influence competition. Finally, no clear and consistent patterns of variation are found in the relationship between the profitability of small banks and the presence of big banks. The number of big banks, the market shares of big banks, and the level of concentration in markets with big banks do not strongly influence the relationship.     

Cultural Affinity and Lending Discrimination: The Impact of Underwriting Errors and Credit Risk Distribution on Applicant Denial Rates

We examine the impact of underwriting errors on marginal loan denial rates when these errors or average creditworthiness differ across racial groups. We find that the noise in evaluating applicant credit risk can have a differential impact on marginal borrowers across racial groups. Consequently, discrimination can go undetected in an examination of relative loan denial rates when it is present. We also show that discrimination can be detected where none exists. Furthermore, we argue that it is likely that the errors a bank makes in assessing applicant credit risk are a consequence of its skill or affinity, which, in turn, is shaped by the underwriting experiences in the bank's market. A resulting implication is that banks that develop affinities in serving different market segments may have substantially different denial rate experiences across racial groups. This observation can shed light on the puzzling result that minority-owned banks tend to perform poorly in studies of lending discrimination. We conclude that underwriting errors call into question the reliability of the fair-lending guidelines used to assess all banks.     

Bank lending ‘manias’ in theory and history

A popular view of banking crises sees them as consequences of prior bank lending manias. Such manias are supposed to be especially likely in legally unrestricted banking systems, where banks can issue notes and are not subject to statutory reserve requirements. Here it is argued that the bank lending mania hypothesis (1) exaggerates the role of subjective factors, including bankers' confidence or optimism, as a stimulus to bank lending, and (2) is not supported by evidence from past, legally unrestricted banking systems.     

金融危机中的货币政策理论分析与启示

全球经济危机袭来,各国在推出巨额经济刺激计划的同时,其央行也采取了激进的政策措施,实施了降息甚至零利率的货币政策,美联储等还采取了购买长期国债的非常规手段.本文分析了金融危机中货币政策选择人的困局,指出货币政策的首要作用是提供流动性和稳定金融体系,并可以通过量化宽松、征收持有货币税等操作改变投资者预期、降低长期利率甚至突破零利率的限制,从而进一步发挥货币政策的作用.最后,本文分析了制约货币政策手段生效的因素,得出其对我国货币政策选择的若干启示.     

How Much Do Banks Use Credit Derivatives to Hedge Loans?

Before the credit crisis that started in mid-2007, it was generally believed by top regulators that credit derivatives make banks sounder. In this paper, we investigate the validity of this view. We examine the use of credit derivatives by US bank holding companies with assets in excess of one billion dollars from 1999 to 2005. Using the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Bank Holding Company Database, we find that in 2005 the gross notional amount of credit derivatives held by banks exceeds the amount of loans on their books. Only 23 large banks out of 395 use credit derivatives and most of their derivatives positions are held for dealer activities rather than for hedging of loans. The net notional amount of credit derivatives used for hedging of loans in 2005 represents less than 2% of the total notional amount of credit derivatives held by banks and less than 2% of their loans. We conclude that the use of credit derivatives by banks to hedge loans is limited because of adverse selection and moral hazard problems and because of the inability of banks to use hedge accounting when hedging with credit derivatives. Our evidence raises important questions about the extent to which the use of credit derivatives makes banks sounder.

The Information Content of Bank Examinations

We identify three types of information from bank examinations—auditing information from verifying the honesty and accuracy of the bank's books, regulatory discipline information about the treatment of the bank by regulators, and private information about bank condition. We estimate these information effects by comparing the cumulative abnormal market returns associated with examinations in which the CAMEL rating remained unchanged, improved, and worsened. All three information effects are found to be greater for banks entering the examination process with unsatisfactory ratings from prior examinations. The only consistently strong effect found is that examination downgrades appear to reveal unfavorable private information about bank condition. The evidence also suggests that the information may reach the market in part through loan quality data released in quarterly financial statements.