THE EFFECTS OF BORROWING ON THE RATE OF GROWTH OF CAPITAL AND THE RISK OF RUIN OF A FIRM

The research reported in this paper used Monte Carlo simulation to study the long term effects of borrowing policy on the rate of growth of capital and the risk (probability) of ruin of hypothetical firms, operating in explicitly described, realistic capital budgeting environments. The capital rationing environment is described explicitly. The debt policies modeled were based on the results of interviews with senior financial executives in eight major firms. The results indicate that three intuitively appealing ranking procedures performed equally well and all out-performed a random selection decision procedure: yielding higher rates of capital growth with lower risks of ruin. In general, an aggressive borrowing policy resulted in a higher average capital growth rate for a firm but a conservative borrowing policy resulted in a lower risk of ruin. It is believed that the results provide some interesting insights which indicate that a computer simulation model could be used to aid management in the evaluation of their capital budgeting procedures and borrowing policies.     

IS THE BOOK‐TO‐MARKET RATIO A MEASURE OF RISK?

We develop a leverage‐based alternative to traditional asset pricing models to investigate whether the book‐to‐market ratio acts as a proxy for risk. We argue that the book‐to‐market ratio should act as a proxy because of the expected relations between (1) financial risk and measures of capital structure based on the market value of equity and (2) asset risk and measures of capital structure based on the book value of equity. We find no relation between average stock returns and the book‐to‐market ratio in all‐equity firms after controlling for firm size, and an inverse relation between average stock returns and the book‐to‐market ratio in firms with a negative book value of equity.     

THE CAPITAL BUDGETING BEHAVIOUR AND CORPORATE CHARACTERISTICS OF CAPITAL-CONSTRAINED FIRMS

This paper addresses (1) the nature and pervasiveness of organisational constraints, frnancial and otherwise, on investment, and (2) the corporate characteristics and capital budgeting behaviour of capital-constrained firms for a sample of 126 UK companies. The results indicate that corporate size, risk and profitability are important corporate characteristics in this regard, and that financially-constrained firms tend to adopt naive capital budgeting methods in resolving the capital rationing problem.     

ALL-EQUITY FIRMS AND THE BALANCING THEORY OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE

Despite the benefits of leverage, many firms exist that at some point in their corporate history had no debt. This study provides evidence that the balancing theory of capital structure can predict the behavior of such firms. All-equity firms allow a more precise measurement of firm market value and risk, and provide a less ambiguous relationship between independent variables and dependent variables than the firms used in previous studies. Using a logit function to avoid spurious correlation between the dependent and independent variables, we find that for most years during 1964–88 all-equity firms listed in the Compustat industrial file exhibited a consistently significant negative relationship between the Myers growth option variable and the probability of borrowing. Positively significant but less consistent relationships exist between the risk measures and the nondebt tax shields, and the probability of borrowing. These results do not qualitatively change when the data are aggregated over twenty years or over five-year subperiods. The tests are also conducted by industry according to the one-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. Significant relationships are found in the 2000 and 3000 SIC code manufacturing industries.     

MEASURING THE COST OF CAPITAL IN AN INTERNATIONAL CAPM FRAMEWORK

This paper can be viewed as extending the traditional CAPM framework in two important ways. The first expands the concept of the market portfolio to include international securities. The second extends the definition of systematic risk to include currency risk.
What becomes clear in estimating the cost of capital for an international asset is that both extensions have become necessary if the traditional CAPM is to remain relevant. International markets have become increasingly integrated over the past two decades and so all assets might now be considered "international" and priced accordingly. The inclusion of the currency risk factor is not an ad hoc addition to the CAPM but rather results quite naturally from the fact that foreign returns need to be converted into a domestic currency.
Based on an examination of 18 companies, the article shows that the use of a broader market portfolio will tend to lower the estimated cost of capital for most firms, but in some cases could actually raise it. (In the case of Singapore Airlines, for example, the currency risk factor adds substantially to the cost of capital, while materially reducing it in the case of Nestlé.) Using a simple regression, the authors also attempt to show how the specifics of a particular company—for example, the currencies that are part of their cost/ revenue structure—determine the impact of currency risk on the cost of capital.     

AN ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES CURRENTLY EMPLOYED BY LARGE U.S. CORPORATIONS

Economic conditions have placed increased importance upon rigorous financial analysis. In order to determine which analytical techniques are currently emp loyed by management, a questionnaire was sent to each fm on the May 1980, FORTUNE 500 list. The researchsought to establish a profile of the respondents' organizational structure and to identify the primary procedures used in risk assessment, working capital management, capital budgeting, and operations research modeling. The results do suggest a basic profile of the more active employers of analytical techniques. Relatively sophisticated capital budgeting procedures appear to be accepted across most industries, and many firms support their decision making with a "package" of formal tools.     

A NOTE ON THE MARGINAL COST OF DEBT CAPITAL

The firms marginal cost of debt capital was interpreted in this author's previous publications as the "full marginal cost of relaxing the money capital availability constraint' when the incremental money capital employed takes the form of debt capital. Account is thereby taken of the effects on financing costs of the increased risk exposure that debt financing implies for both debt and equity holders. The present paper clarifies a misconception in a recently published paper by Draper and Findlay, and exhibits the linkage between concepts relevant to the firm's fmancing decision and the general marginal analysis.     

Debt,Agency Costs,and Industry Equilibrium

We show that risk characteristics of projects' cash flows are endogenously determined by the investment decisions of all firms in an industry. As a result, in reasonable settings, financial structures which create incentives to expropriate debtholders by increasing risk are shown not to reduce value in an industry equilibrium. Without taxes, capital structure is irrelevant for individual firms despite its effect on the equityholders' incentives, but the maximum total amount of debt in the industry is determinate. Allowing for a corporate tax advantage of debt, capital structure becomes relevant but firms are indifferent between distinct alternative debt levels.     

ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECTS OF WITHDRAWN SECURITY OFFERINGS: EVIDENCE ON THE WEALTH REDISTRIBUTION HYPOTHESIS

This paper employs the comparison period returns approach to examine issuance and withdrawal announcement effects for stock portfolios of firms announcing equity or debt issues that are subsequently withdrawn. In contrast to previous literature, which generally attributes financing announcement effects to capital structure changes, the conclusion of this paper is that security price changes at the time an issue is announced or withdrawn prevent wealth redistributions between insiders and outsiders. Empirical findings are inconsistent with the interpretation of announcement effects as capital structure effects.     

GOLBALIZATION, CORPORATE FINANCE, AND THE COST OF CAPITAL

International financial markets are progressively becoming one huge, integrated, global capital market—a development that is contributing to higher stock prices in developed as well as developing economies. For companies that are large and visible enough to attract global investors, having a global shareholder base means having a lower cost of capital and hence a greater equity value for two main reasons: First, because the risks of equity are shared among more investors with different portfolio exposures and hence a different “appetite” for bearing certain risks, equity market risk premiums should fall for all companies in countries with access to global markets. Although the largest reductions in cost of capital resulting from globalization will be experienced by companies in liberalizing economies that are gaining access to the global markets for the first time, risk premiums can also be expected to fall for firms in long-integrated markets as well. Second, when firms in countries with less-developed capital markets raise capital in the public markets of countries (like the U.S.) with highly developed markets, they get more than lower-cost capital; they also import at least aspects of the corporate governance systems that prevail in those markets. For companies accustomed to less-developed markets, raising capital overseas is likely to mean that more sophisticated investors, armed with more advanced technologies, will participate in monitoring their performance and management. And, in a virtuous cycle, more effective monitoring increases investor confidence in the future performance of those companies and so improves the terms on which they raise capital. Besides reducing market risk premiums and improving corporate governance, globalization also affects the systematic risk, or “beta,” of individual companies. In global markets, the beta of a firm's equity depends on how the stock contributes to the volatility not of the home market portfolio, but of the world market portfolio. For companies with access to global capital markets whose profitability is tied more closely to the local than to the global economy, use of the traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) will overstate the cost of capital because risks that are not diversifiable within a national economy can be diversified by holding a global portfolio. Thus, to reflect the new reality of a globally determined cost of capital, all companies with access to global markets should consider using a global CAPM that views a company as part of the global portfolio of stocks. In making this argument, the article reviews the growing body of academic studies that provide evidence of the predictive power of the global CAPM as well as the reduction in world risk premiums.     

Investment,leverage and political risk: Evidence from project-level FDI

Does capital structure influence firms' FDI capital expenditure decisions into countries with varying degrees of political risk? We explore this question using a novel dataset that matches 10,000 unique outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) projects with 1135 distinct U.S. firms over the period 2003–2014. We find that capital expenditures allocated to FDI projects are significantly lower for highly leveraged firms, in particular for firms with low growth opportunities. Firms also commit lower capital amounts to investments located in countries characterized by higher political risk. Furthermore, leverage and political risk interact with one another in determining the financial commitment of the FDI, with leverage exerting a significantly stronger negative effect on capital expenditures in countries where political risk is elevated. Our findings are consistent with the monitoring role of debt in curbing exposure to political risk in multinational firms' foreign operations, and corroborate the disciplinary role of leverage on firms' investment decisions.     

Small Firm Capital Structure and the Syndicated Loan Market

We show that small firms using syndicated loans for their mid- and long-term financial needs have significantly higher leverage than firms that do not borrow in this market. This difference cannot be attributed to firm characteristics like the availability of growth opportunities, asset tangibility, R&D spending, profitability and net sales that are known to influence capital structure. We also find that the capital structure of other firms that borrow in the syndicated loan market is not different from those that do not. We show that already highly leveraged small firms are more likely to borrow in the syndicated loan market than other firms. The higher debt in the capital structure of small firms that rely on syndicated loans consequently can be attributed to the availability of capital rather than demand for capital, as shown more generally by Faulkender and Petersen (Rev Financ Stud 19(1):45?C79, 2006).     

UNITS OF DEBT WITH WARRANTS: EVIDENCE OF THE “PENALTY-FREE” ISSUANCE OF AN EQUITY-LIKE SECURITY

While units of debt with warrants are not structured as perfect substitutes for convertible bonds, there is reason to believe that firms view the two securities as viable alternative methods of raising funds. Analyses of the capital market effects of the announcement of the plan to issue and the issuance of units of debt with warrants provide unique evidence of the “penalty-free” issuance of an equity-like security. Evidence is found to support the conjecture that units are typically issued by smaller, riskier firms than are convertible bonds. However, there is no evidence that the use of this security is interpreted by the market as a sign of financial distress.     

THE EFFECT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MULTIDIVISIONAL STRUCTURE ON SHAREHOLDER'S WEALTH: THE CONTINGENCY OF DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGY

This paper presents evidence on the price effect of US firms announcing the implementation of a multidivisional management structure (M-form) and whether these effects are contingent on the existing diversification strategy (either unrelated, related, or vertical integration). Differnt patterns of excess returns and systematic risk (beta) changes are associated with different diversification strategies.     

DETERMINANTS OF THE RATINGS AND YIELDS ON CORPORATE BONDS: TESTS OF THE CONTINGENT CLAIMS MODEL

A contingent claims model for corporate bonds is tested on newly issued bonds of firms with very simple capital structures. Two default risk measures derived from the model — firm return standard deviation (σ) and leverage (D/V) — explain approximately 78 percent of the variation in the agency ratings on the bonds, based on a probit analysis. Model yield premiums explain almost 60 percent of the variation in market yield premiums. In both analyses, however, firm size is a significant additional variable, suggesting that the contingent claims model is not robust to changes in scale. The assumption of nonstochastic interest rates also appears to be an important misspecification. Institutional restrictions on investments in speculative grade bonds, however, do not affect market yield premiums on such bonds, and thus do not appear to represent a serious misspecification.     

SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE USE OF FINANCIAL LEASES

In this paper, the impact of certain firm-specific factors on the level of financial leases used by corporations is examined. An industry analysis indicates that firms in certain industries tend to lease more than other firms. A Tobit analysis of the degree to which approximately 600 firms lease assets indicates that certain factors—including the debt ratio, presence of mortgage debt, level of subordinated debt, presence of restrictions on leasing, number of bonds in a firm's capital structure, and the firm's debt rating—are significantly related to the degree of leasing. Other factors, including the firm's tax rate, were not found to be significant, contrary to popular expectations.     

The effects on investment incentives of an allowance for corporate equity tax system: the Belgian case as an example

The Modigliani–Miller theorem serves as the standard finance paradigm on corporate capital structure and managerial decision making. Implicitly, it is assumed that the market possesses full information about the firm. However, if firm managers have insider information, they may attempt to ‘signal’ changes in the firm’s financial structure and, in competitive equilibrium, shareholders will draw deductions from such signals. Empirical work shows that the value of underlying firms rises with leverage because investors expect such firms to implement positive NPV projects. We empirically examine this view using a sample of debt issue announcements by publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. We argue that the timing of debt issues is fundamental in determining the relationship between leverage and risk-adjusted returns. We show that an announcing firm’s intrinsic value may not rise depending on when management publicly ‘signals’ changes in their firm’s capital structure. Specifically, we show that risk-adjusted returns rise positively for firms that make debt announcements during normal economic conditions while they tend to decline for firms making debt announcements during recessionary periods. During recessionary periods, market risk and loss aversion rise and investors focus less on the potential growth of debt announcing firms and focus more on potential losses instead. We conclude that the timing of new debt is of paramount importance and managers’ inability to prudently time such announcements can lead to exacerbated levels of systematic risk coupled with a significant erosion in shareholder wealth.     

How Do Capital Structure Policies of Emerging Markets Differ from Those of Developed Economies? Survey Evidence from Korea

We examine the capital structure policies of Korean firms using survey data for business group (chaebol) firms and independent firms. Our results are compared with findings in earlier studies for developed economies: Graham and Harvey (2001) for the United States and Brounen et al. (2004, 2006) for Europe. Korean chief financial officers are concerned about financial flexibility and volatility of earnings when issuing debt; they are concerned about target debt ratio maintenance and recent stock price increases when issuing equity. In contrast to independent firms, chaebol firms are more concerned about differences in corporate tax rates between foreign and domestic markets and the risk of refinancing in bad times. Chaebol firms are less likely to issue debt when faced with insufficient internal funds, which indicates that active internal capital markets are at work among the firms in a business group. Our results suggest that, compared to U. S. and European firms, Korean firms are under more pressure from their peers in formulating capital structure policies, consider equity a cheap source of financing, are less concerned with the dilution of earnings per share, and less frequently provide shares to employees as compensation.     

Risk in Banking and Capital Regulation

This paper investigates the role of bank capital regulation in risk control. It is known that banks choose portfolios of higher risk because of inefficiently priced deposit insurance. Bank capital regulation is a way to redress this bias toward risk. Utilizing the mean-variance model, the following results are shown: (a) the use of simple capital ratios in regulation is an ineffective means to bound the insolvency risk of banks; (b) as a solution to problems of the capital ratio regulation, the “theoretically correct” risk weights under the risk-based capital plan are explicitly derived; and (c) the “theoretically correct” risk weights are restrictions on asset composition, which alters the optimal portfolio choice of banking firms.