信息不对称条件下离任审计制度的创新

现行离任审计制度有很多缺陷厂长(经理)在离任时的财务收支审计和经济效益审计合理、合法、合规,但企业实际上已成"空壳",没有发展后劲,资产匹配不合理,人力资源结构失调,市场竞争力低.其原因是因为厂长(经理)掌握了任期内的许多"私人信息",这些信息是审计机构利用目前的审计方法不能完全挖掘出来的.本文从委托代理理论出发,分析现代企业的委托受托关系实质,阐述运用离任审计的必要性,并从激励和监督两个角度对现行离任审计制度进行了完善.     

Multidimensional Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information

A buyer with private information regarding marginal valuation bargains with a seller to determine price and quantity of trade. Depending on parameter values, a high‐valuation buyer wants either to reveal information to create value or to conceal it to capture value. In the first case, equilibrium trades are efficient. In the second case, the low‐valuation buyer purchases less than her efficient quantity, and there can be a one‐period delay in trade. The quantity distortion is the only inefficiency that persists when time between offers approaches zero. There exist equilibria that are independent of the seller's prior beliefs.     

信息不对称下的几个经济学实验

实验方法受到经济学界的重视,不对称信息条件下的实验方法研究具有重要现实意义。笔者探讨了若干在不对称信息条件下的经济学实验,包括名誉的作用、信号传递等重要实验,认为不对称信息下的实验的方法及其研究思路值得我国经济学者借鉴和深入研究。     

Horizontal Mergers Under Asymmetric Information About Synergies

This paper analyses a situation in which there are three quantity‐setting firms, two of which are considering whether or not to merge. When these two firms have private information about the potential cost‐saving synergies of the merger, they may have an incentive to overstate them. This is because if they succeed in making the non‐merging rival firm believe that the synergies are high, the rival firm reduces output and the merger becomes more profitable. Under some conditions, anticipating that the rival will form such a belief, low‐synergy firms that would never merge under complete information will mimic high‐synergy firms by merging. Such pooling behaviour by the merging firms can have a negative impact on social welfare.     

Regulating a Polluting Firm Under Asymmetric Information

This paper reinterprets the Laffont-Tirole model of regulation under asymmetric information to cover the case of pollution control. The asymmetry of information concerns the firm's cost of lowering its pollution. The regulator has three objectives: Ensuring an efficient abatement level, generating 'green taxes' and securing the survival of the firm. We show that when optimal abatement is important relative to tax generation, the regulator cannot use the policy of offering the firm a set of linear tax schemes from which to choose. By contrast, this policy is optimal in the Laffont-Tirole model under certain not very restrictive assumptions. We proceed to establish a simple rule for when to shut-down inefficient types. In an example with specific functional forms, we derive the optimal tax function both analytically and graphically. We show the effect on the optimal tax system of a change in a technological parameter.     

积累性创新、信息不对称和激励

在积累性创新链中,创新收益在序贯创新者之间的分配是一个重要的激励问题,一个良好的创新激励机制应该使得积累性创新的利益在序贯创新者之间进行合理的分配。本文基于信息不对称的假定,研究了积累性创新中最优专利许可费大小和时序决定问题。与Green＆Scotchmer、Scotchmer的结论不同,我们发现,事前专利许可并不一定能够解决先期创新者对后续创新者的敲竹杠行为。本研究为现实中观察到的一些产业中事后专利许可现象提供了理论上的解释。     

基于资产风险信息不对称的可转债融资信号模型

主要研究了可转债与资产风险信息不对称的信号模型,通过引入信息透明度,成本等因素进一步拓展了Brennan和Kraus(1987)提出的无成本可转债融资信号模型,说明使用可转债融资有助于克服资产风险的信息不对称问题,并能提高融资效率,减少债务融资成本。     

Optimal Border Policies for Invasive Species Under Asymmetric Information

This paper analyzes the problem faced by a border protection agency if endogenous exporter abatement activities affect invasive species risk, allowing for unobservable differences in abatement cost. We show how the optimal inspection/penalty regime differs from the symmetric information case. Departing from previous literature, we allow for technical assistance, a policy instrument specifically permitted and commonly employed under Article 9 of the World Trade Organization Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement. We find the information asymmetry can make it optimal for the importing country to provide technical assistance grants for exporter risk abatement, even if it would otherwise be inefficient. Further, we show that fungibility of technical assistance with inputs in other sectors of the exporting economy affects the qualitative nature of optimal policy. If technical assistance has no outside value in the exporter’s country, optimal policy is characterized by a menu of contracts balancing higher tariffs with lower penalties for being caught with an invasive. If technical assistance can be used in other sectors of the exporter’s economy, it can introduce countervailing incentives making a uniform tariff/penalty combination optimal.     

信息不对称资本市场的实验研究

我们采用经济学实验研究方法构建了信息不对称的实验室资本市场,研究信息是否可以通过市场迅速传递。实验结果表明,在信息不对称的情况下,资本市场是非有效的;市场对信息的传递和价格反应是有条件的而且也是需要时间的;资本市场中的投资者并非完全理性,而是具有认知和行为偏差的普通人,存在过度自信和过度交易的情况;信息不对称还可能引起市场操纵行为,从而导致价格泡沫的形成。     

The Scope of Anonymous Voluntary Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information

We present a model of anonymous collective bargaining where individuals'preferences and information may be significantly interdependent. We showthat the bargaining outcome becomes independent of individuals'preferences and information as the bargaining group increases in size. As acorollary, we show that anonymous voluntary bargaining completely fails inlarge groups. Either the difference between the bargaining outcome and thestatus quo vanishes as the size of the group becomes larger, or, thebargaining becomes coercive and results in a violation of at least someindividuals' rights. The result provides a rationale for the inherentdifficulty of reform in the presence of asymmetric information.
"There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful ofsuccess, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order ofthings."
Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince (1532)     

信息不对称条件下产品转让价格的确定策略

本文讨论了两种情况下产品转让价格的确定问题：(Ⅰ)签约前生产商不了解销售商的销售能力。可能出现“逆向选择”问题。(Ⅱ)签约后生产商不了解销售商的销售努力，可能出现“道德风险”问题。针对这两种情况，运用信息经济学中的委托代理理论讨论了最优转让价格的确定思路。     

Collusion Under Asymmetric Information: The Role of the Correlation

We consider the regulation of a duopoly under incomplete information. When firms act noncooperatively, the regulator uses yardstick mechanisms to bridge his informational gap at no cost. However, this provides the firms with an incentive to collude.
We interpret the correlation as a measure of the congruence/divergence between individual and coalitional incentives. Under positive correlation, these incentives are aligned: the threat of collusion forces the regulator to distort the allocation. Under negative correlation, these incentives are opposed: the regulator can, sometimes, exploit this conflict of interest inside the coalition to eradicate the stakes of collusion at no cost.     

创新技术价值信息不对称下厂商的许可策略

本文构建了创新技术商业价值信息不对称情况下在位创新厂商和生产厂商间的技术许可博弈模型,并运用逆向归纳法分别寻求混同均衡和分离均衡。分析结果表明,若运用两部制许可方式,从创新厂商的角度出发,当创新技术高经济价值的可能性较大时,高提成费用混同许可最优;当创新技术低经济价值的可能性较大时,低提成费用混同许可最优。此外,本文还得出固定费用许可条件下的最优许可策略。无论厂商选择何种许可方式,均不存在分离均衡。     

创新的价值、非对称信息与终身教职制度——兼论中国的高等教育改革

本文将高校的终身教职制度视为在非对称信息条件下鼓励重大创新的一种合同安排。我们证明,当科研人员的能力与努力同时不可观察时,“非升即走”的终身教职合同能够替委托人节约信息租金,因而在一定条件下是一种更具有效率优势的制度安排。我们发现,终身教职制度的产生与知识价值的提高、科研活动复杂程度的增加、科研成果反映个人能力的客观性等因素密切相关。特别地,本文还比较了终身教职制度的不同实施,发现当重大科研创新的价值与难度同时提高的话,只提供终身教职的合同而不是双轨并行将会变得更优。本文的研究提示,在中国的高校中是不是实行终身教职制度且如何实施取决于高校中知识创新的价值、科研工作的复杂程度和科研评价体系等因素,因此不应草率推行。本文不仅在理论上发展了现有的对于终身教职制度的经济学解释,而且也通过分析现实中该制度的不同实施为中国的高等院校实行终身教职制度的条件与时机提供了解答。     

信息约束下的金融监管与银行声誉

如何在信息不对称的约束条件下降低金融风险、提高监管绩效,是金融监管中的一项重要课题.本文分析了信息结构对于监管的重要性,认为声誉机制的建立可以降低银行与监管部门之间信息不对称的程度和风险发生的概率,并运用KMFW模型,分析了不对称信息下银行声誉机制减少违规动机的过程,指出应该注重激励相容的制度安排,将外部监管与自律有机结合起来,促使银行自发选择接受监管且减少进行高风险投资的动机,这是信息不对称条件下提高监管效率的重要策略.结合我国实情,本文提出可通过银行风险评级、建立可置信的惩罚机制、完善银行内部治理机构、改进监管人员激励约束机制、构建和完善金融监管信息系统等措施,建立健全银行声誉机制,以进一步改善监管绩效.     

关于创新的几点思考

十六大报告指出:“创新是一个民族进步的灵魂,是一个国家兴旺发达的不竭动力,也是一个政党永葆生机的源泉。”创新同样也是一个企业在激烈的市场竞争中立于不败之地的法宝。学习十六大报告,领会十六大精神,在“三个代表”重要思想的统领下,深刻理解创新的重要作用,认识和把握创新活动的规律,对于研究、解决国有企业面临的改革发展稳定的重大问题有着现实的指导意义。     

家庭结构信息非对称下的经济适用房准入机制模型设计

经济适用房建设不仅是解决中低收入家庭住房的有效途径之一,也是关注民生、构建和谐社会所必须.但是,现行经济适用住房申购分配中出现的虚假申请、隐瞒事实等现象,严重影响着经济适用房政策的公平实施,造成社会资源的浪费.其原因之一是在政策制定的过程中,没有系统考虑家庭结构信息的非对称性、个人理性等因素.运用机制设计理论,构建基于信息非对称和个人理性的经济适用房准入机制模型.通过算例分析,验证了该模型能够使申请家庭选择真实类型上报时,不会带来利益上的损失;而采取策略性类型上报,则可能损失利益,从而引导申请家庭上报真实的家庭结构类型,从制度上消除不合理申报.     

技术创新中的配套资产研究

自1986年提斯（Teece）提出配套资产的概念以来,国内外学者利用这一概念研究了技术创新的一系列问题。本文探讨了理论界对配套资产内涵的界定,梳理了配套资产的获取途径、配套资产与创新价值分配、配套资产与构建企业合作关系等方面的研究成果,归纳了互补资产影响企业技术创新投入、类型、合作创新动机,以及利益分配的各种观点,并作出了评述。文中指出：核心技术的独占力量和商业化发挥有赖于配套资产的协助,面对制造、营销、顾客服务、财务资源等众多特质互异的配套资产的内部化与组织发展问题,企业不但需要清楚辨识配套资产的标的物,也需要以某些评估标准来决定连结这些资产的具体作法,包括：内部化、合资、联盟、授权契约和市场交易等几种方式。     

住房保障体系的认识问题探析

近年来，“保住房”成了完善社会保障体系的重点指向和社会关注的焦点。那么，保住房究竟“保”什么？     

信息不对称视角下我国工业企业碳排放权分配与定价机制研究

设计完善的碳交易体系能够为我国实现碳达峰与碳中和目标作出重要贡献,其中,合理的碳排放权分配和定价机制能够通过形成有效的价格信号来促进企业的节能减排行为。本文提出了一个信息不对称情况下的碳排放权定价与分配的混合机制,该机制通过结合单一价格机制和单一数量机制的优点,能够实现有效的信息激励,促使企业将其自身真实的排放信息上报给决策者,用以制定最优政策目标。基于我国投入产出数据以及工业企业微观数据,并利用可计算一般均衡模型的仿真模拟对理论假设进行了验证。结果表明,本文提出的混合机制的减排效果优于单一碳税机制和单一碳排放权交易机制,最接近于完全信息情景,因而能够在实现碳排放总量控制的情况下形成有效的碳价信号。