浅谈权力腐败的成因及对策

随着经济的迅速发展,腐败在当今社会已经成为了一种普遍现象,腐败案件发生在社会各个层面,并且在很多领域不断加深。胡景涛总书记在十八大指出:"坚定不移反对腐败,永葆共产党人清正廉洁的政治本色。反对腐败、建设廉洁政党是党一贯坚持的鲜明政治立场,是人名关注的重大政治问题。"一、权力腐败产生的根源     

政府审计腐败行为的经济学分析

一、政府审计腐败的界定 目前，还没有政府审计腐败行为的确切定义，而关于腐败的定义比较多。国际货币基金组织（IMF）对腐败的定义，认为“腐败是政府官员为了谋求个人私利而滥用公共权力”。美国著名政治学家亨廷顿把腐败定义为“腐化（败），即公职人员为实现其私利而违反公认规范的行为”，“腐化（败）的基本形式是政治权力与财富的交换。”笔者认为，政府审计腐败是指政府审计人员利用审计权力为获取不正当的个人收益而收受被审计单位贿赂，并损害国家或公众利益的行为。     

基于预防腐败健全权力监督机制的对策思考

权力监督机制在预防腐败中发挥着根本性的作用。党内监督、国家权力机关监督、行政监督、民主党派监督、群众监督、网络舆论监督等权力监督机制在预防腐败中分别发挥了重要作用。为了更好地预防腐败,还需要加强党员干部和群众的思想教育,把好用人关、突出权力监督对象,坚持党内监督与党外监督相结合,坚持专门机关监督与群众监督相结合,坚持自律与他律相结合,坚持自上而下监督和自下而上监督相结合,发挥好舆论监督作用,增强监督合力。     

防控腐败的经济学探析

腐败的成因有文化成因和经济成因,反腐要提高腐败的成本、完善反腐监督制约机制。     

对中国金融腐败经济学的分析

本文将主要从经济学的角度来分析中国的金融腐败现象,在此我是把它作为一种经营活动来分析的,并且从两方面的腐败给中国的金融腐败下了一个经济学的定义。除此之外,本文还将全面分析金融腐败的成因,并且针对腐败原因对症下药,提出相应的抑制金融腐败的经济学对策,力求减少腐败,使金融主体不能腐,不愿腐,不敢腐。     

国有企业领导权力监督制约的调研和思考

强化对权力的制约和监督,是防治腐败的根本性问题,在反腐倡廉建设中具有至关重要的地位和作用。深入认识国有企业领导权力监督和制约存在的问题,探索有效制约和监督权力的方法途径,对国有企业的改革与发展起到了一定的促进和保护作用。     

当前我国权力腐败的特点及对策研究

如何在保持经济发展、社会稳定的基础上,消除腐败现象,从根本上铲除腐败的根基成了当前人们关注的焦点。文章力图通过揭示权力腐败的表象,分析其产生的深层次原因,找出治理的应对之策。     

权力腐败的逻辑在向整个社会渗透

行业腐败是庸败扩散的一部分 前一段时间，一些行业中的福利腐败问题，曾经引起人们的广泛抨击。如一些公交、地铁等行业的职工甚至家属可以免费乘车，一些铁路职工出门坐火车不用买票甚至可以享受卧铺待遇，一些电力行业职工享受免费福利电或优惠用电。一些电信行业领导、职工免费装电话、优惠打电话，某些燃气行业职工免费或优惠使用燃气，一些医院内部职工看病免挂号费等。然而，福利腐败只是行业腐败现象中最表面的部分。     

审计权力的经济学分析

审计权力是国家或组织为监督、鉴证、评价财政、财务收支真实、合法、效益而赋予审计人员的强制力量，是一种“公权”。本仅从经济学的角度对审计人员审计权力活动对于其自身的收益与成本作一粗浅分析。     

论权力腐败、贫富悬殊与政治民主的关系

权力运用不当就会使公民收入差距明显拉大,从而在经济上使阶层现象更加明显.经济收入悬殊过大必然导致政治民主的空泛.政治民主的虚无使贫富悬殊现象进一步恶化,最终导致权力腐败滋生蔓延.权力与民主是对立的统一体,必须充分发挥民众主体之精神,权力腐败与贫富悬殊才能得到根本扭转,民主政治才能真正实现.     

高管权力与高管腐败——基于内部控制与外部市场环境的双重视角

上市公司的高管腐败及其治理是我国反腐败的重要领域。因此,高管权力与高管腐败的关系日益受学者的关注。本文运用逻辑斯蒂模型,基于内部控制与外部市场环境的双重视角分析了高管权力诱发高管腐败行为的影响。研究发现:高管权力越大,越可能诱发高管腐败行为;内部控制质量越好,高管腐败概率越低,且高质量的内部控制可以抑制高管权力过大诱发的高管腐败行为;上市公司所在地市场化进程水平越高,高管腐败概率越低,且市场化进程水平越高越能抑制企业高管权力过大诱发的高管腐败行为。研究结果表明:良好的内部控制与外部环境是可以约束高管权力减少腐败,降低权力进行寻租的空间。     

一个反映关税调整效应的投入产出优化模型

本文通过一个较详细反映进口品国内使用的价值型投入产出表，提出了一个反映关税调整效应的投入产出优化模型。该模型能够进行关税调整效应的多方案分析，并将关税调整与产业结构调整有机地结合起来。     

地区腐败、企业性质与高管腐败

企业所处的外部环境对企业高管腐败行为的影响日益引起学者的关注,地区腐败作为企业所处外部环境的重要特征,对企业高管腐败行为会产生何种影响?通过手工搜集2007-2013年我国各省市地方官员腐败和上市公司高管腐败的数据后发现:地区腐败越严重,所在地区的企业高管发生腐败的可能性越高;进一步研究发现,地区腐败对民营企业高管的影响作用更加明显,而2012年开始的反腐行动尚未对地区腐败影响高管腐败产生实质的约束作用。研究有助于深化对企业高管腐败环境诱因的理论认知,同时,将政府官员腐败的经济后果拓展至企业管理层面。     

Corruption and auctions

We investigate how corruption affects the outcome of a first-price auction (bidding behavior, efficiency and the seller’s expected revenue). The auctioneer approaches the winner to offer the possibility of a reduction in his bid in exchange for a bribe. The bribe can be a percentage of the difference between the winning and the second-highest bid or a fixed amount. We show that there exists a symmetric bidding strategy equilibrium that is monotone, i.e., higher valuation buyers bid higher. Corruption does not affect efficiency but both the auctioneer’s expected bribe and the seller’s expected revenue depend on the format of the bribe payments. We also find the optimal bribe scheme.     

Corruption,development and demography

This paper presents an analysis of the joint, endogenous determination of bureaucratic corruption, economic development and demographic transition. The analysis is based on an overlapping generations model in which reproductive agents mature safely through two periods of life and face a probability of surviving for a third period. This survival probability depends on the provision of public goods and services which may be compromised by corrupt activities on the part of public officials. The dynamic general equilibrium of the economy is characterised by multiple development regimes, transition between which may or may not be feasible. In accordance with empirical evidence, the model predicts that low (high) levels of development are associated with high (low) levels of corruption and low (high) rates of life expectancy. The authors are grateful for the comments of two anonymous referees on an earlier version of the paper. The usual disclaimer applies.     

信誉腐败和信息流通

信誉的腐败是我国商品经济过渡时期中存在的一个普遍问题,在商品交易中各种欺诈行为比比皆是,其严重性危害了有效市场体制的建立.从经济学角度分析,在单次双方博弈中,由于存在信息的不对称,各方都有进行商业欺诈的积极性.重复博弈虽能有效的解决这个悖论,但是在市场中,重复博弈的基础是信息的有效流通.缺乏这种基础,重复博弈无法采取"触发战略"(triger strategy),而只是单次博弈的简单重复,信誉腐败问题仍然不能得到解决,因此建立畅通的信息流通体制是恢复我国市场信誉的重要途径.     

Corruption, institutions and trade

The economics literature describes various factors that affect trade between countries, which, in addition to the standard economic and geographic factors, also include cultural, ethnic and historical factors. The present study is apparently one of only a few attempts in the literature to examine directly the effects of corruption on trade and the first attempt to examine trade over time in a specific country whose level of corruption changed significantly. Israel was chosen as the subject of the study mainly because of the fact that, according to international indexes, the country’s status as a civil society has declined significantly over the past decade. According to the corruption index of Transparency International, Israel was ranked 33rd in the world, at the end of the sample period in 2008, having fallen from 14th in 1995. The results of the research can serve as the basis for comparison to similar studies of other Western countries. The study’s conclusions support the hypothesis that the effect of corruption on trade of any given country is significant, stable and negative.     

Corruption, institutions and regulation

We analyze the effects of corruption and institutional quality on the quality of business regulation. Our key findings indicate that corruption negatively affects the quality of regulation and that general institutional quality is insignificant once corruption is controlled for. These findings hold over a number of specifications which include additional exogenous historical and geographic controls. The findings imply that policy makers can focus on curbing corruption to improve regulation, over wider institutional reform.     

现代企业管理理论对成本会计系统的冲击和影响

随着企业制造环境以及企业管理理论与方法的变化与创新,对成本会计的理论与方法也产生了一定的冲击与影响。     

Corruption and anxiety in Sub-Saharan Africa

This paper examines the relationship between individuals’ experience of corruption and their anxiety using microeconomic data from the Afrobarometer surveys. The results show a statistically significant and economically meaningful relationship in probit models using both an experience of corruption index and a simple dummy variable. Having to pay a bribe to obtain documents and permits, to avoid problems with the police or to access medical care are the scenarios in which this relationship is strongest. Some evidence is presented that an individual needs to experience such corruption more than ‘once or twice’ for these relationships to become evident.