服务能力、信贷环境与银行效率

新兴金融、互联网金融发展不断倒逼着银行业必须提高效率,而服务能力、信贷环境是银行效率提升的关键因素。本文运用数据包络分析方法和广义相加模型,对特定信贷环境中银行效率与服务能力的关系假设进行检验。实证结果表明,银行的信贷供给和服务配送能力对银行效率的提升具有正面影响,但信贷供给能力对银行效率的提升作用存在上限边界约束,而服务配送能力对银行效率的提升作用则受到下限边界约束;银行效率对信贷环境变化的动态响应呈“S”型变动特征。     

应在我国发展多种形式小额信贷

为稳步开放农村金融市场,提高农村金融服务效率,抑制非法融资的蔓延,应在我国农村地区发展多种形式小额信贷。应区分审慎性监管原则和非审慎监管原则,为综合性商业银行的小额信贷事业部、专业小额信贷银行（包括农村信用社和村镇银行）、专业小额贷款公司（小额贷款公司和贷款公司）、农村资金互助社、公益性小额信贷组织（项目）等各类组织创造良好的政策环境。     

影子银行对中国房价的影响

随着我国影子银行的蓬勃发展,其对经济的影响越来越不可忽视。本文针对我国的具体情况,着重探讨影子银行对房地产市场的影响。通过实证分析发现,和银行表内信贷相比,影子银行的规模对房地产价格也具有正向的影响,但是影子银行对房地产价格变动的贡献度要高于银行表内信贷对其的影响。所以监管好影子银行的发展对调控房地产市场健康发展十分关键。     

信贷配给、中小企业融资、影子银行的发展--基于租值耗散理论的分析

信贷配给会使部分财富溢入公共领域形成租值并被耗散,引致中小企业的贷款需求得不到满足,造成资源配置效率的低下。传统银行对中小企业信贷配给的程度或者信贷配给的均衡利率水平取决于信贷配给所带来的边际租值耗散和边际交易费用节约的权衡。要缓解信贷配给程度、解决中小企业融资难现状,规范发展影子银行是一条有效途径。影子银行不但可以打破传统银行对信贷市场的垄断,而且降低了金融机构向中小企业贷款时所耗费的交易成本,起到了缓解信贷配给的作用。     

开展绿色信贷会影响商业银行盈利水平吗?

绿色信贷借助金融的力量对产业结构进行绿色调整,相比于原来直接进行行政调控与通过税收调控,绿色信贷更具灵活性、针对性,更符合市场调控的原则。而银行开展绿色信贷的直接动力来源于其对自身盈利能力的影响。理论上,银行开展绿色信贷会提高其营业成本,从而降低其盈利能力,但增加贷款总额将提高其盈利能力。本文以2009年—2014年,中国银行等14家银行为样本,从银行放贷成本的角度分析开展绿色信贷对商业银行盈利水平的影响。实证结果表明,银行开展绿色信贷会增加其单位业务及管理费用,而单位业务及管理费用的增加会导致其单位营业利润的降低,但单位贷款额的增加会提高其单位营业利润,即在核心资本净额不变的情况下,开展绿色信贷会造成银行营业利润的降低,但扩大贷款总额能抵消开展绿色信贷带来的利润损失。     

信贷配给、中小企业融资、影子银行的发展——基于租值耗散理论的分析

信贷配给会使部分财富溢入公共领域形成租值并被耗散,引致中小企业的贷款需求得不到满足,造成资源配置效率的低下。传统银行对中小企业信贷配给的程度或者信贷配给的均衡利率水平取决于信贷配给所带来的边际租值耗散和边际交易费用节约的权衡。要缓解信贷配给程度、解决中小企业融资难现状,规范发展影子银行是一条有效途径。影子银行不但可以打破传统银行对信贷市场的垄断,而且降低了金融机构向中小企业贷款时所耗费的交易成本,起到了缓解信贷配给的作用。     

借鉴美国商业银行经验 强化风险信贷资产管理

美国商业银行重视和强化风险信贷资产管理,把它与银行的生存发展相联系,对我国银行加强风险信贷资产管理,促进改革与发展很有借鉴意义。 一两国银行风险 信贷资产情况比较 由于社会制度、经济环境和体制构成上的差别,我国银行与美国商业银行在风险信贷方面有所不同。 首先,对风险的理解不同。美国商业银行都是股份制银行,为股东获取最大收益是其根本目标,而高收益是建立在高风险基础上的,收益越高,风险越大。     

中国的银行体系特征与货币政策信贷传导有效性

我国的金融体系是典型的大银行主导型,银行信贷仍旧是我国企业外部资金供给的主要渠道。我国商业银行的资金来源绝大部分依靠存款,资产也仍旧以贷款为主,有价证券所占比重较小,商业银行对央行货币政策的变动往往较为敏感,信贷渠道在我国货币政策的传导中具有重要的地位。我国银行业的垄断型市场结构特征进一步产生了信贷配给问题,这种信贷配给机制会强化货币政策传导的银行借贷渠道效应。     

美、日、欧跨国银行的比较研究

近年来,由于国际金融环境的变动,尤其是国际金融市场直接融资的迅速增长、资产证券化趋势的加强,加上世界经济的不景气,国际银行信贷总体呈现下降趋势。同时由于美、日、欧各国银行体系、政策不同,国际金融环境对美、日、欧各国银行的影响程度也不同,相比之下,美国银行在经历了80年代的急剧下降后,目前地位有所回升;日本银行在经历了80年代的迅速扩张后。     

大型银行、中小企业与贸易融资:青岛案例

长期以来,商业银行尤其是大银行拓展中小企业信贷市场一直面临困境。但中国工商银行青岛分行却以中小企业商品交易为基础,较为成功地开发了一系列贸易融资产品。由此可以看出,在特定的产品、制度和技术保证下,大银行也可以成为中小企业信贷市场上的有效资金供给者。     

Rediscounting under Aggregate Risk with Moral Hazard

Freeman (1999) proposes a model in which discount window lending and open‐market operations have different effects. This is important because in most of the literature these policies are indistinguishable. However, Freeman's argument that the central bank should absorb losses associated with default to provide risk sharing stands in stark contrast to the concern that central banks should limit their exposure to credit risk. We extend Freeman's model by introducing moral hazard. With moral hazard, the central bank should avoid absorbing losses and Freeman's argument breaks down. However, we show that policies resembling discount window lending and open‐market operations can still be distinguished in this new framework. The optimal policy is for the central bank to make a restricted number of creditors compete for funds. By restricting the number of agents, the central bank can limit the moral hazard problem. By making them compete with each other, the central bank can exploit market information that reveals the state of the economy.     

On the determinants of bank interest margins under credit and interest rate risks

This paper explores the determinants of optimal bank interest margins based on a simple firm-theoretical model under multiple sources of uncertainty and risk aversion. The model demonstrates how cost, regulation, credit risk and interest rate risk conditions jointly determine the optimal bank interest margin decision. We find that the bank interest margin is positively related to the bank's market power, to the operating costs, to the degree of credit risk, and to the degree of interest rate risk. An increase in the bank's equity capital has a negative effect on the spread when the bank faces little interest rate risk. The effect of rising interbank market rate on the spread is ambiguous and depends on the net position of the bank in the interbank market. Our findings provide alternative explanations for the empirical evidence concerning bank spread behavior.     

中国个人消费信贷状况及风险防范研究

随着个人信用消费的不断扩大,消费信贷的比重不断提高,在整个市场个人信用制度不完善的情况下,个人信贷风险凸现,银行个人信贷中的不良资产率上升。本文从中国消费信贷的总量状况出发,对于银行消费信贷内部结构展开探讨,继而分析消费信贷的客户风险、制度风险及法律政策风险,并以此为基础提出了建立个人信用管理制度、充分利用客户信用分析法、逐步试点个人破产制度、建立银行内控体系及风险转嫁渠道以及完善个人消费信贷的相关法律保障等防范措施。     

Bank risk and monetary policy

We find evidence of a bank lending channel operating in the euro area via bank risk. Financial innovation and the wider use of new ways of transferring credit risk have tended to diminish the informational content of standard bank balance sheet indicators. We show that bank risk conditions, as perceived by financial market investors, need to be considered, together with the other indicators (i.e., size, liquidity and capitalization), traditionally used in the bank lending channel literature to assess banks’ ability and willingness to supply new loans. Using a large sample of European banks, we find that banks characterized by lower expected default frequency are able to offer a larger amount of credit and to better insulate their loan supply from monetary policy changes.     

How changes in market conditions affect screening activity,credit risk,and the lending behaviour of banks

The global financial crisis dramatically transformed the market conditions in the banking industry. We construct a theoretical model of spatial competition that considers the differential information between lenders and loan applicants to explore how changes in the market structure affect the lending behaviour of banks and their incentives to invest in screening and how this, in turn, affects the level of credit risk in the economy. Our findings reveal that enhanced competition reduces lending cost thus encouraging the entry of new customers in credit markets. Also, that the transportation cost that loan applicants are required to pay to reach the bank of their interest shrinks with respect to the degree of competition. We further lend support to the view that stiffer competition has an increasing impact on the level of credit risk. Notably, we find that competition strengthens the incentives of banks to engage in screening activity and that screening serves as a protection mechanism that can provide banks with a shield against bad loans. Overall, when market conditions are substantially distorted, this has a dilutive impact on the incentives mechanism of banks to screen their applicants. We provide empirical evidence which is consistent with the conceptual underpinnings of our theoretical model and the obtained findings.     

银保协作、ART保险与银行信用风险转移

在分析银保协作与可选择性风险转移(Alternativ Risk Transfer,即 ART)保险的内在逻辑基础上,进一步分析 ART 保险实现银行信用风险转移的内在机理,并以此为依据设计银保信贷系统的 ART 保险机制。结果表明,ART 保险可以有效分担银保信贷系统的信用风险,降低银保信贷系统的风险运营成本,提升银保信贷系统的运营效率,并实现商业银行信用风险转移目标。可见,推行银保协作型信贷模式,对于治理信贷配给,从而提升信贷市场效率具有重要意义。     

Bank Branch Presence and Access to Credit in Low‐ to Moderate‐Income Neighborhoods

Banks specialize in lending to informationally opaque borrowers by collecting soft information about them. Some researchers claim that this process requires a physical presence in the market to lower information collection costs. This paper provides evidence in support of this argument in the mortgage market for low‐income borrowers whose access to credit is limited by their inadequate credit histories. Mortgage originations increase and interest spreads decline when there is a bank branch located in a low‐ to moderate‐income neighborhood.     

Bank competition,concentration and EU SME cost of debt

Despite the plentiful debate on the effects of bank competition on SME access to finance and growth, only few studies have explored the impacts on SME cost of debt. This study examines how bank market power affects the credit costs of SMEs by using unique matched SME-bank data from 17 EU countries. We show that bank market power reduces the cost of debt for SMEs. Such a favorable effect is stronger for SMEs that are less informationally transparent, and in the economies subject to less credit information depth and business extent of disclosure. These findings support the Information-based Hypothesis, whereby market power motivates banks to invest in soft information acquisition and to build lending relationships to reduce information costs. In addition, we show that despite the favorable effects of relationship lending brought by bank market power, SME credit conditions worsen in a more concentrated banking market.     

Syndicated Leveraged Loans During and After the Crisis and the Role of the Shadow Banking System

In an article published in this journal in 1998, Nobel laureate Merton Miller argued that one of the best weapons available to national economies in their defense against the macroeconomic effects of banking crises is the availability of non‐bank financial institutions and products—or what we now refer to as the “shadow banking system.” Although Miller may have exaggerated the independence of bank‐ and market‐based sources of financing, the author argues that events during and after the recent crisis have shown Miller's claims about the importance of non‐bank investors in the provision of credit to be fundamentally correct. Critics of securitization and the shadow banking system tend to focus on the subprime mortgage story in which the sudden re‐pricing of credit risk and the resulting disappearance of investment demand for ABCP, private‐label mortgage‐related ABS, and ABS CDOs created unexpected and significant downward price pressure on those asset types. But the leveraged loan market tells a very different story. In contrast to the near complete disappearance of private mortgage securitizations, the extraordinary recovery of the U.S. syndicated leveraged loan market demonstrates that the relation between commercial and shadow banking has proved to be a highly productive and resilient one—and very much a two‐way street. When leveraged loans and CLOs experienced problems from 2007 through 2009 due primarily to the widespread liquidity and credit market disruptions that affected essentially all structured credit products, institutional investors in leveraged loans disappeared and the leveraged loan primary market imploded. But when institutional participants recognized the value of the underlying asset—corporate loans—and regained confidence in shadow‐banking products, leveraged lending by banks recovered quickly and dramatically. This outcome is viewed as vindicating Professor Miller's statement about the benefits of shadow markets and securitization— namely, the role of non‐bank investors in diversifying the risk of credit creation while at the same time improving the price discovery process in different markets. The recent history of the U.S. leveraged loan market demonstrates that shadow banking system participants play a critical role in meeting the total demand for such loans, and that the ebbs and flows from institutional leveraged loan markets are strongly connected with the health and integrity of the underlying leveraged bank loan market.     

Access to external finance: Theory and evidence on the impact of monetary policy and firm-specific characteristics

This paper examines firms’ access to bank and market finance when allowance is made for differences in firm-specific characteristics. A theoretical model determines the characteristics such as size, risk and debt that would determine firms’ access to bank or market finance; these characteristics can result in greater (or lesser) tightening of credit when interest rates increase. An empirical evaluation of the predictions of the model is conducted on a large panel of UK manufacturing firms. We confirm that small, young and risky firms are more significantly affected by tight monetary conditions than large, old and secure firms.