Local bank office ownership,deposit control,market structure,and economic growth

This paper tests empirical associations between banking market structure, banking regulation, and subsequent growth rates in local real per capita personal income. Our findings suggest that out-of-market bank mergers or acquisitions need not, ceteris paribus, impair local economic growth, and may even have beneficial effects in rural markets with the possible exception of farm-dependent areas. These findings derive from empirical models that relate both short-run and long-run growth rates to geographic restrictions on bank activity, concentration in local banking markets, in-market versus out-of-market ownership of local bank offices, and in-market versus out-of-market control of local bank deposits.     

Monetary Policy and Banking Structure

In this paper, I examine the differences in optimal monetary policy in various banking systems. In particular, I compare two monetary economies: one with a competitive banking system and the other with a monopolistic one. In addition, the optimality of the discount window policy is considered. It is shown that the Friedman rule is the optimal monetary policy in a monopolistic banking economy, and the zero‐inflation policy is optimal in a competitive banking economy under appropriate parameters. In addition, the combination of the Friedman rule and the discount window policy can achieve efficient allocation in both banking systems.     

Geographic Deregulation and Competition in the U.S. Banking Industry

We examine the effects of geographic deregulation on state‐level competition in U.S. banking markets over the period 1976‐2005. The empirical results confirm that the U.S. banks in general operated under monopolistic competition during the period examined. After partitioning the sample based on bank size we find that the market competition for large banks in Delaware, Oregon, and Rhode Island can be characterized as monopolistic while small banks in Arizona and Massachusetts seem to have operated under the conditions of perfect competition. The removal of geographic restrictions appears to have very limited and non‐uniform effect on state‐level competitive conduct. There is some evidence that the U.S. banking industry might have actually experienced a less competitive behavior in recent years due to increased market power of larger banks.     

Cross-border interbank networks,banking risk and contagion

Recent events have highlighted the role of cross-border linkages between banking systems in transmitting local developments across national borders. This paper analyzes whether international linkages in interbank markets affect the stability of interconnected banking systems and channel financial distress within a network consisting of banking systems of the main advanced countries for the period 1994–2012. Methodologically, I use a spatial modeling approach to test for spillovers in cross-border interbank markets. The results suggest that foreign exposures in banking play a significant role in channeling banking risk: I find that countries that are linked through foreign borrowing or lending positions to more stable banking systems abroad are significantly affected by positive spillover effects. From a policy point of view, this implies that in stable times, linkages in the banking system can be beneficial, while they have to be taken with caution in times of financial turmoil affecting the whole system.     

Geographical deregulation and competition in U.S. banking markets

The effects of geographical deregulation on competition in banking markets is examined. Using a model that develops an index of competition as proposed by Bresnahan and applied to banking markets by Shaffer, the empirical evidence suggests that geographical deregulation has not had a significant impact on competition. The limited effects of geographical deregulation on competition is consistent with other evidence presented, suggesting that banking markets were already highly competitive. In those states where a significant effect was observed, geographical deregulation increased the degree of competition in some states but had the opposite effect in others.     

Finance as a Barrier to Entry: Bank Competition and Industry Structure in Local U.S. Markets

This paper tests how competition in local U.S. banking markets affects the market structure of nonfinancial sectors. Theory offers competing hypotheses about how competition ought to influence firm entry and access to bank credit by mature firms. The empirical evidence, however, strongly supports the idea that in markets with concentrated banking, potential entrants face greater difficulty gaining access to credit than in markets in which banking is more competitive.     

The Relaxation of Entry Barriers in the Banking Industry: An Empirical Investigation

Until recently, state laws restricted entry into local banking markets in many states by limiting both branching and multibank holding company (MBHC) operations. To the extent that these laws impeded entry into local banking markets, the removal or relaxation of the restrictions should have reduced barriers to entry, leading to more competitive price levels in the affected markets. This paper tests for such effects by examining the changes in deposit interest rates offered by banks operating in markets affected by liberalization of state banking law relative to the changes in deposit interest rates offered during the same time period by banks operating in markets not affected by such liberalization. We find evidence that liberalization of state laws restricting intrastate MBHC operations, interstate branches, and interstate MBHC operations caused deposit interest rates to become more competitive. We, however, find no evidence of such effects associated with the removal of restrictions on intrastate branching.     

Restructuring,consolidation and competition in Latin American banking markets

This study examines the competitive conditions in the banking industries of eleven Latin American countries for the period 1993–2000. For these countries, the time interval under examination corresponds to an era characterized by substantial reforms to restructure their banking systems, increased consolidation and foreign bank penetration. The banks in our sample are found to be earning their revenues as if operating under monopolistic competition, as in many other developed and emerging financial systems. The results indicate that, overall, market concentration is not significantly related with competitive conduct. At the country level, however, we do observe a decline in competition for Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela in late 1990s which may be attributable to increased consolidation. Further, we observe that deregulation and opening up of the financial markets for foreign participation serves as an important catalyst to increase the competitiveness of banking markets. Higher degree of competition in the sector, in return, is associated with reduced bank margins and profitability but improved cost efficiency.     

Should the Federal Reserve Pay Competitive Interest on Reserves?

In 2008, the Federal Reserve began paying interest on reserves. How should the Fed use this new policy instrument? As the Fed reduces its balance sheet, should it continue to satiate reserve demand and pay competitive interest on reserves? Here, we argue that this may be an inefficient use of the new policy instrument. Using a standard Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model (DSGE), augmented to include a banking sector and an interbank market, our benchmark calibration implies an optimal tax on reserves of about 20 to 40 basis points in the steady state, and a fluctuating tax rate in response to shocks.     

Consolidation and Competition in the Banking Industries of the EU Member and Candidate Countries

This paper investigates competitive conditions in the banking markets of all EU member and candidate countries over the period 1995-2007. The Panzar and Rosse (1987) model is implemented on bank-level data. In particular, the unscaled revenue equation is employed to assess market structure. Country-specific empirical results suggest a wide variation in the competitive conditions of the banking systems in the sampled countries. Nineteen banking systems are characterized as monopolistically competitive, nine as monopolies or perfectly colluding oligopolies, and two as perfectly competitive over the sample period. This study also investigates whether competition conditions changed over the sample period, using 2001 as an endogenously determined break year. The empirical evidence reveals that banking systems became less competitive after that time.     

Is there an alternative way to avoid another eurozone crisis to the Five Presidents' Report?

The EU Commission's Five Presidents' Report proposes new rules for the eurozone covering fiscal policy, banking and financial markets designed to avert another eurozone crisis. This paper examines the causes of the current eurozone crisis and discusses whether the Report's proposals are likely to succeed. It is argued that the main causes of the crisis were EMU and the failure of financial markets to price risk correctly. It is claimed that the Report may not solve these problems. Having already lost their monetary policy instrument, the Report's fiscal proposals would remove countries' fiscal policy instrument too and deprive countries of the means of economic stabilisation. The proposals would also transfer to an undemocratic and unaccountable Commission important national competences.     

Bank Forward Lending in Alternative Funding Environments

This paper examines the effects of loan commitments on bank lending behavior in both deposit-funding and liability management environments. Assuming that the bank lends exclusively under commitments and that the number of commitments exercised is uncertain, the bank must choose its supply of commitments. Given this choice, the bank becomes a passive lender to commitment holders. Our focus on forward credit markets sheds new light on the private bankers' assertion that they do not directly determine their level of lending, but merely “accommodate” the credit needs of their customers. Similarly, the central banker's claimed inability to control monetary aggregates in the short-run becomes understandable in a new context. It is shown that the advent of liability management will reduce the volume of loan commitments and the expected size of the bank and of the banking system. It is also shown that increased uncertainty regarding borrower takedown behavior diminishes the volume of commitments, expected bank and banking system size.     

On the effects of banks�� equity ownership on credit markets

Recent deregulation of the banking sector in the US and in Europe allows commercial banks to hold equity in non-financial firms. We develop a model to investigate the effects of bank equity stakes in firms on credit market competition. The main result is that an equity stake confers a competitive advantage to the holding bank, which in equilibrium results in decreased competition in credit markets and higher interest rates being charged to firms. However, regulatory limits on the size of a bank’s stake may, under certain conditions, be counterproductive: they could actually strengthen the equity-owning bank’s competitive advantage. Our findings shed new light on the role of equity in lending relationships, and highlight that, in addition to the well-known prudential aspects, there is an antitrust dimension in the separation of banking and commerce.     

Does market structure matter on banks’ profitability and stability? Emerging vs. advanced economies

We empirically investigate the effects of market structure on profitability and stability for 1929 banks in 40 emerging and advanced economies over 1999–2008 by incorporating the traditional structure-conduct-performance (SCP) and relative-market-power (RMP) hypotheses. We observe that a greater market share leads to higher bank profitability being biased toward the RMP hypothesis in advanced economies, yet neither of the hypotheses is supported for profitability in emerging economies. The SCP appears to exert a destabilising effect on advanced banks, suggesting that a more concentrated banking system may be vulnerable to financial instability, however, the RMP seems to perform a stabilising effect in both economies. Evidence also highlights that profitability and stability increase with an increased interest-margin revenues in a less competitive environment for emerging markets. Overall, these results suggest that although policy measures to promote competition may dampen economic rent, excessive implementation may have an undesired destabilising impact on banks.     

How do UK financial institutions really price their banking products?

This paper has several objectives. The first is to explore the type (or types) of imperfect competition that prevailed in the retail banking sector in the 1990s. A general linearised pricing model is employed to test for the degree to which competition in certain markets deviated from the competitive ideal. The key finding, is that, with the exception of mortgage products, deposit and loan rate setting by UK financial institutions is best described by the Salop–Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition, with bargain and rip-offs. Cournot type behaviour is evident in some cases. Indirectly, the presence of perfect contestability is largely ruled out. Another objective is to compare these findings with the results of a similar study conducted nearly a decade ago, when financial reforms introduced to encourage greater competition were relatively recent. Based on the results of this study, the policy lesson is that financial firms exhibit different types of price setting behaviour depending on the banking product. The policy implication is to require firms to produce comparable information for consumers, thereby helping to contain the loss of consumer surplus in imperfectly competitive markets.     

Banking market conditions and deposit interest rates

This paper shows that the impact of market structure on bank deposit interest rates is complex. Both market size structure and multimarket bank presence have independent effects on rates. There is evidence that mid-size banks were more aggressive competitors than other banks, but that the effect of market structure on deposit rates has evolved over time, with mega-banks recently becoming more aggressive competitors. This may be related to the growth of mega-banks in many markets. These findings have implications for existing theories of deposit pricing and, by extension, antitrust policy in banking.     

European banking: An overview

Against a background of far-reaching structural change in the banking sector, this article reviews the recent academic literature on developments in European banking. European banking markets have become increasingly integrated in recent years, but barriers to full integration, especially in retail banking, still remain. European integration has possible implications for systemic risk, and poses various challenges for the current supervisory framework. The banks’ responses to the changing competitive environment include the pursuit of strategies of diversification, vertical product differentiation and consolidation. European integration has implications for competition in banking markets, for the nature of long-term borrower-lender relationships, and for the relationships between ownership structure, technological change and bank efficiency. The article concludes by reviewing recent literature on the credit channel in the monetary transmission mechanism, and interest rate pass-through.     

Exchange rate regimes, banking and the non-tradable sector

This paper presents a small-open-economy, two-good version of the Diamond and Dybvig model with cash constraints to analyze the implications on banking of different exchange rate regimes and monetary policies. I show that fixed exchange rates with a Central Bank providing liquidity in local currency imply Pareto efficiency, with conditions for a run equilibrium stronger than in the literature. In a flexible exchange rate regime, multiple equilibria may not be eliminated. In particular, for very a expansive monetary policy there exists an equilibrium where a fraction of patient consumers purchases dollars in the interim period, which constitutes a partial currency run. A dollarized banking system without international short-run credit may also implement the efficient allocation under certain conditions.     

Financial innovation, multinational banking, and monetary policy

The subject of the paper is the causal chain from financial innovation to multinational banking and further on to the conduct of monetary policy. The second section identifies the salient features of the present phase of financial innovation. The third section analyzes the consequences for the structure of international banking. The remaining three sections discuss the probable implications for, respectively, (1) the alleged disturbances from international capital flows (which, it is argued, are usually overestimated), (2) the effectiveness of monetary policy (where the principal consequence seems to be the competitive dismantling of discriminatory regulation), and (3) the viability of intermediate targets (which is impaired).     

影子银行对货币政策的影响

随着2007年全球金融危机爆发,学界和社会公众再度提高对金融监管与宏观货币政策的重视。影子银行是金融创新的产物,在给资本市场和产品市场带来活力的同时也使得人们更加关注影子银行对货币市场和货币政策的影响。本文基于信用与宏观经济学理论并利用中国化宏观数据进行论证,将市场利率划分为商业银行体系利率与影子银行体系利率并以贷款基准利率作为商业银行的总体利率,以一年期国债到期收益率作为影子银行利率,以市盈利率作为整个经济体系的实际利率,并利用线性回归给出三者间的关系。结果表明我国的影子银行在一定程度上可以起到降低社会总体融资成本、促进经济增长的作用,但也给物价和金融稳定施加一定的压力,在短期内会加快我国的货币流通速度,降低我国货币政策有效性。