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We address multinational capital structure decisions when firms have varying degrees of financial flexibility for shifting income and/or tax shields between subsidiaries. We find: (1) firms can use leverage to dramatically reduce negative valuation effects from operating in a high-tax country; (2) financial flexibility is a key determinant of optimal capital structure, acting as both a substitute and a complement for leverage; (3) multinational firms derive a synergistic effect from financial flexibility, which can enhance their value beyond that for a single-country firm from a low-tax jurisdiction; and (4) optimal capital structure typically differs substantially across subsidiaries, with each having positions in multiple currencies. 相似文献
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We explore the effect of financial development on corporate capital structure and the tightness of financial constraints that firms face. We employ an econometric technique that allows us to explicitly test for convergence in capital structure. This technique increases the power of our statistical tests. In doing so, we identify a group of convergent firms. The driving force of convergence is financial development, which positively affects the firms' leverage ratio. We also identify a group of firms, whose leverage is not affected by financial development, because they are financially constrained. 相似文献
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Tax planning, regulatory capital planning, and financial reporting strategy for commercial banks 总被引:9,自引:0,他引:9
We test whether banks' investment and financing policies canbe explained by tax status. We document changes in bank holdingsof municipal bonds in response to changes in tax rules relatingto deductibility of interest expense. We also document an associationbetween banks' marginal tax rates and their investment and financingdecisions, which is consistent with the existence of tax clienteles.However, banks do not sort themselves perfectly into investmentand financing clienteles because of adjustment costs. We positspecific types of transaction-cost impediments to tax planning,and document that banks apparently trade off these costs againsttax-planning benefits. 相似文献
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《Journal of Financial Intermediation》2007,16(2):151-174
In single period models, financially constrained firms invest more in response to increases in their net worth or interest rate cuts. We examine whether or not these results necessarily hold in a multi-period setting. We present a multi-period version of the Holmstrom and Tirole moral hazard model and show that the probability of investment (or the hurdle rate for investment) in the first period of a two-period model is non-monotonic in the level of liquid balances [Holmstrom, B., Tirole, J., 1997. Financial intermediation, loanable funds, and the real sector. Quart. J. Econ. 112 (3), 663–691. August; Holmstrom, B., Tirole, J., 1998. Private and public supply of liquidity. J. Polit. Economy 106 (1), 1–40. February; Holmstrom, B., Tirole, J., 2000. Liquidity and risk management. J. Money, Credit, Banking 32 (3), 295–319. August]. When a risk-free interest rate is introduced in the model, we show that a lower interest rate (or a downward shift or the yield curve) can lead to less current investment due to the interaction of future financial constraints and discounting of cash flows. Our results have implications for the effect of monetary policy on investment by financially constrained firms. They also address several recent empirical debates, such as the relationship between liquidity and the cash-flow sensitivity of investment, and whether or not accumulation of cash balances by Japanese firms can be consistent with the existence of financial constraints affecting investment. 相似文献
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Optimal capital structure and endogenous default 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
In a sequence of fascinating papers, Leland and Leland and Toft have investigated various properties of the debt and credit
of a firm which keeps a constant profile of debt and chooses its bankruptcy level endogenously, to maximise the value of the
equity. One feature of these papers is that the credit spreads tend to zero as the maturity tends to zero, and this is not
a feature which is observed in practice. This defect of the modelling is related to the diffusion assumptions made in the
papers referred to; in this paper, we take a model for the value of the firm's assets which allows for jumps, and find that
the spreads do not go to zero as maturity goes to zero. The modelling is quite delicate, but it just works; analysis takes
us a long way, and for the final steps we have to resort to numerical methods. 相似文献
7.
Haitham A. Al-Zoubi Jennifer A. O’Sullivan Abdulaziz M. Alwathnani 《Annals of Finance》2018,14(1):105-123
We perform peridogram based cycle analysis of firm capital structure and find evidence that firms’ leverage is both persistent and cyclical. The cyclicality of leverage is supported by the trade-off, pecking order and market timing capital structure theories (Korajczyk and Levy in J Financ Econ 68:75–109, 2003; Bhamra et al. in Rev Financ Stud 23:645–703, 2010). Although market timing theory research supports persistence, previous literature dictates that the trade-off and pecking order theories may predict either persistent or mean reverting leverage. Our tests reject mean reversion in favor of persistent and cyclical leverage. We corroborate pecking order theory literature that predicts leverage is persistent. In these models, when firms’ investment spending is below earnings, leverage decreases. In addition, we examine whether firms change their capital structure as a result of business and financial cycles. Since financial cycles last longer than business cycles, financial cycles should have a long term effect on leverage. Our findings confirm the persistent leverage business cycle models that suggest firms change their capital structure due to financial and credit cycles (Jermann and Quadrini in Am Econ Rev 102:238–271, 2012; Azariadis et al. in Rev Econ Stud 83:1364–1405, 2016). We conclude that leverage is persistent due to the cyclicality of the financing decision. 相似文献
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This paper studies the optimal compensation problem between shareholders and the agent in the Leland (1994) capital structure model, and finds that the debt-overhang effect on the endogenous managerial incentives lowers the optimal leverage. Consistent with data, our model delivers a negative relation between pay-performance sensitivity and firm size, and the interaction between debt-overhang and agency issue leads smaller firms to take less leverage relative to their larger peers. During financial distress, a firm's cash flow becomes more sensitive to underlying performance shocks due to debt-overhang. The implications on credit spreads and debt covenants are also considered. 相似文献
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《Quantitative Finance》2013,13(6):611-620
This paper proposes a jump-diffusion model, in closed form, to price corporate debt securities, senior and junior, with the same maturity and violation of the absolute priority rule. We take the structural approach that the firm's asset value follows a jump-diffusion process in a stochastic interest rate economy. Default occurs only if the firm value at the maturity of the corporate debts is less than the sum of the prespecified face values. Unlike previous models in the structural approach, our model is consistent with the current term structures of credit spreads for both senior and junior debts. In particular, it captures realistic short maturity credit spreads observed in the market. The key idea is to allow the jump intensity to be a time-dependent function. As an application, valuation of credit spread options is presented. 相似文献
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In this paper, a model of corporate leverage choice is formulated in which corporate and differential personal taxes exist and supply side adjustments by firms enter into the determination of equilibrium relative prices of debt and equity. The presence of corporate tax shield substitutes for debt such as accounting depreciation, depletion allowances, and investment tax credits is shown to imply a market equilibrium in which each firm has a unique interior optimum leverage decision (with or without leverage-related costs). The optimal leverage model yields a number of interesting predictions regarding cross-sectional and time-series properties of firms' capital structures. Extant evidence bearing on these predictions is examined. 相似文献
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We develop a dynamic investment options model with optimal capital structure and evaluate the effect of time-to-build on firm value and leverage choices. With time-to-build the firm increases initial leverage in order to reduce the impact of delayed cash flows resulting from time-to-build. The impact of time-to-build is more severe the higher the revenue volatility and competitive erosion, and when the firm issues long-term debt. Time-to-build is shown to have a substantial impact on firm values for plausible parameter values. 相似文献
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This paper studies the relationship between firm leverage and supplier market structure. We find that firm leverage decreases with the degree of competition between suppliers. Specifically, leverage decreases with the elasticity of substitution between suppliers. Leverage also decreases with the number of suppliers when the elasticity of substitution is high, and increases with the number of suppliers when the elasticity is low. We also provide empirical evidence that is consistent with the model predictions. 相似文献
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Contingent Convertible Bonds (CoCos) with conversion ratios that dilute issuer's shareholders generate incentives to preemptively raise equity capital to avoid triggering conversion. Our dynamic model provides an interior solution for the unique optimal conversion ratio and the capital structure policies that maximizes issuer's value net of deadweight costs. Preemptive recapitalization induced by moderately dilutive conversion terms leads to fewer defaults, lower borrowing rates, and higher debt capacity when compared to less dilutive terms. However, highly dilutive conversion ratios do not always enhance efficiency because issuers facing very high dilution risk recapitalize too frequently, generating excessive adjustment costs. Conversely, if CoCo's principal is written-down at the conversion without diluting shareholders, then the issuer will have perverse incentives to destroy a portion of its capital (“burn money”) to force conversion and generate windfall gains for shareholders. 相似文献
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We present a novel asset pricing model that captures the investment wisdom and stock-selection approach of the long-term value-investors Benjamin Graham and Warren Buffett. Taking a longer term view of business prospects and business risks, we explicitly consider the time period in which a business enjoys a competitive advantage over its peers as the central tenet of our model and capture the eventual demise of this competitive advantage in a probabilistic manner. Assuming that our investor has log utility, our model answers the question of capital allocation in a two-asset scenario. The model does not enforce the Efficient Market Hypothesis and is shown to explain some well-known empirical studies on stock returns. 相似文献
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Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - This paper analyzes the simultaneous and dynamic multi-directional interrelationships between bank capital structure, capital requirements and SRISK... 相似文献
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要改革当前金融体系的结构性问题,就应该大力发展资本市场,改变资本市场本身结构的不合理以及充分发挥资本市场本身的特有功能,而且这已经显得刻不容缓了当前中国金融体系的结构性矛盾中国金融体系的结构问题主要体现在直接融资规模过小,间接融资规模过大,传统意义上的股票市场规模较大,创业板、场外以及债券市场等规模较小。 相似文献
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Joel M. Vanden 《Annals of Finance》2016,12(2):245-273
This article shows how to construct an optimal capital structure for a private firm. Since the agents who supply the firm’s capital are risk averse, they diversify by holding both debt and equity. This can mitigate, or even eliminate, the classical risk shifting problem. There is a wealth effect since the optimal capital structure, which can involve multiple types of debt, depends on the amount of wealth that each agent contributes to the firm. However, it is shown that the agents’ equity holdings do not depend on the contributed amounts of wealth. Thus the model can produce a wedge between ownership rights and equity cashflow rights. These features are illustrated in a firm with three agents. 相似文献
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Poggio FL 《Hospital financial management》1979,33(11):32-4, 36-7, 40
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François Marini 《The GENEVA Risk and Insurance Review》2006,31(1):61-66
This note provides an example of an optimal banking panic. We construct a model in which a banking panic is triggered by the
banker, not the depositors. When the banker receives a pessimistic information on the return on the bank’s assets, he liquidates
them prematurely in order to protect his capital. In the face of this liquidation, all depositors withdraw their funds prematurely.
The premature liquidation of the bank’s assets strengthens the bank’s balance sheet. As a result, the banking panic does not
cause bank failure and the government should not try to prevent the panic. Such a panic occured in 1857 in the United States.
JEL Classification G21 相似文献