Symposium: Youth labour market and the “Great Recession”

The financial crisis of 2007–2008, followed by the “Great Recession” and the additional sovereign debt crisis in some peripheral countries of the Eurozone, resulted in huge and persistent effects on European youth labour markets. Theoretical and empirical investigations on this topic are still scarce compared with the importance of the topic and the consequent economic, social and policy implications. This paper consists of a very short introduction to a symposium that contributes to filling that gap. A multifaceted picture emerges with major policy implications for the three levels of government (European, national and regional/local) in order to reduce youth unemployment and the NEET phenomenon.     

Uncertainty and the Great Recession

Has heightened uncertainty been a major contributor to the Great Recession and the slow recovery in the United States? To answer this question, we identify exogenous changes in six uncertainty proxies and quantify their contributions to GDP growth and the unemployment rate. The answer is no. In total we find that increased macroeconomic and financial uncertainty can explain up to 10% of the drop in GDP at the height of the recession and up to 0.6 percentage points of the increased unemployment rates in 2009 through 2011. Our calculations further suggest that only a minor part of the rise in popular uncertainty measures during the Great Recession was driven by exogenous uncertainty shocks.     

Great recession,slow recovery and muted fiscal policies in the US

This paper reconsiders the role of macroeconomic shocks and policies in determining the Great Recession and the subsequent recovery in the US. The Great Recession was mainly caused by a large demand shock and by the ZLB on the interest rate policy. In contrast with previous findings, the subsequent jobless recovery is explained by the ZLB effect. We estimate a fraction of Non-Ricardian households which is close to 50%, and obtain comparatively large fiscal multipliers. However we cannot detect a significant contribution of fiscal policies in stabilizing the US economy. For instance, the 2007–2009 large increase in expenditure-to-GDP ratios was apparently determined by the adverse non-policy shocks that caused the recession.     

Leverage Dynamics and the Burden of Debt

In addition to leverage, the debt service burden of households and firms is an important link between financial and real developments at the aggregate level. Using US data from 1985 to 2017, we find that the debt service burden has sizeable negative effects on expenditure. Its interplay with leverage also explains several data puzzles, including the lack of above-trend output growth during credit booms and the severity of ensuing recessions, without appealing to large shocks or nonlinearities. Estimating the model with data up to 2005, it predicts credit and expenditure paths that closely match actual developments before and during the Great Recession.     

Causes and Cures of the Great Recession

The Great Recession was not a failure of free markets. Rather it was a classic example of the undesirable unintended consequences of government intervention, both through expansionary monetary policy and misguided attempts to bolster the housing market in the USA. Getting government out of banking is the best way to end the disastrous boom and bust cycles that have characterised the last century and a half.     

The Economic Deterioration of the Family: Historical Contingencies Preceding the Great Recession

The “Great Recession” in the United States exposed contradictions between the economic well‐being of families and capital that developed in the decades prior to this latest downturn. Using social structure of accumulation theory, a qualitative institutional analysis, and quantitative time‐series models, this article investigates historically contingent relations between the nature of public assistance, family economic deterioration, and capital accumulation. To sustain the circuit of capital, I argue that the family propped up economic growth first through public cash assistance and then through private expenditures, the latter of which lead to the economic deterioration of families dependent on unprecedented levels of debt.     

The Great Recession and Marx's Crisis Theory

To help understand why the Great Recession occurred, this article focuses on its underlying causes and employs Karl Marx's theory of capitalist economic crisis. It shows that U.S. corporations' rate of return on fixed asset investment fell throughout the half‐century preceding the recession, and that this fall accounts for the entire decline in their rate of capital accumulation (productive investment). The investment slowdown led to a decline in the rate of economic growth, which was a main cause of rising debt burdens, as were stimulative fiscal and monetary policies that delayed but exacerbated the effects of the underlying economic problems. The article also refutes the claim that the rate of profit could not really have fallen because massive redistribution of income from wages to profits took place, and it argues that it is unlikely that major crises of capitalism can be eliminated.     

Money and velocity during financial crises: From the great depression to the great recession

This study models the demand for a broad monetary aggregate (M2) from the Great Depression through the Great Recession. Key to the model is the interaction between a measure of time-variation in economic agents’ perceived financial risk and an index of the cost of portfolio adjustment. The finding of a useful money demand relationship suggests that skepticism regarding the indicator role of a broad, liquid money aggregate as a policy guide may be exaggerated. Further, our model provides some guidance for policymakers who face the challenge of unwinding large balance sheets as risk premia return to normal and velocity adjusts.     

Mismatch Shocks and Unemployment During the Great Recession

We investigate the macroeconomic consequences of fluctuations in the effectiveness of the labor market matching process with a focus on the Great Recession. We conduct our analysis in the context of an estimated medium‐scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with sticky prices and equilibrium search unemployment that features a shock to the matching efficiency (or mismatch shock). We find that this shock is not important for unemployment fluctuations in normal times. However, it plays a somewhat larger role during the Great Recession when it contributes to raise the actual unemployment rate by around 1.3 percentage points and the natural rate by around 2 percentage points. The mismatch shock is the dominant driver of the natural rate of unemployment and explains part of the recent shift of the Beveridge curve. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Private Sector Debt,Financial Constraints,and the Effects of Monetary Policy: Evidence from the US

We characterize the response of U.S. real GDP to monetary policy shocks conditional on the level of private sector debt and the degree to which financial constraints are binding. To incorporate state-dependent effects of monetary policy, we use the local projection framework. We find that although the amount of private sector debt potentially weakens the monetary policy transmission mechanism, policy shocks exert substantially larger effects on output when high private debt coincides with binding financial constraints.     

An extreme value analysis of the last century crises across industries in the U.S. economy

The two large scale crises that hit the world economy in the last century, i.e. the Great Depression and the Great Recession, have similar outbreak and recovery patterns with respect to several macroeconomic variables. In particular, the largest depressions are likely to be accompanied by stock-market crashes. This study investigates the behavior of the U.S. stock market before, during and after deep downturns, focusing particularly on the tails of the return distribution. We develop two automatic procedures to identify multiple change-points in the tail of financial time series as well as in the co-crash and co-boom probabilities of different markets. We then apply our methodology to twelve time series representative of the sectors of the U.S. economy. We find that regime shifts in the lower tail of the distribution tend to co-occur before deep downturns. Our results contribute to a better understanding of the origin and systemic nature of large scale events to make policy interventions more timely and effective.     

Bad news in the Great Depression,the Great Recession,and other U.S. recessions: A comparative study

In economic recessions consumption usually drops in tandem with other aggregate quantities as output or employment. Following the permanent income hypothesis, these drops can be rationalized by the idea that consumers have pessimistic views about their long-run income. Using a standard signal-extraction model, we show that this pessimism can be due either to a persistent fall of aggregate productivity before and during the recession (signaling a future decline of income), or to other negative information unrelated to contemporaneous fundamentals, which we label “bad news”. We classify U.S. recessions (from 1919 to 2015) according to a (bad) news index reflecting this negative information. We find that both the Great Depression and the Great Recession score highest in this index. The index is such that we can rule out that this is due merely to the length or the depth of these recessions. Instead, these two recessions are similar in that both were aggravated by a wave of pessimism about future income which cannot be related to contemporaneous fundamentals.     

Antecedents of concession bargaining in the Great Recession: evidence from Ireland

Concession or ‘give back’ bargaining involves firms seeking changes in pay and conditions of employment from trade unions in return for pledges of enhanced job security and sometimes other forms of reciprocation. Several distinct modes of concession bargaining are distinguishable in the literature, and three modes of concession bargaining have been identified in Ireland during the Great Recession: integrative, distributive and minimal engagement. Deploying qualitatively informed quantitative data on the conduct of collective bargaining during the Great Recession, this article examines a series of antecedent influences on the choices firms make in conducting concession bargaining with unions.     

The joint impact of labour policies and the “Great Recession” on unemployment in Europe

The paper consists of an empirical analysis of the separate as well as joint impacts on total and youth unemployment of indicators of labour market policies on the one hand, and the financial crisis associated with the “Great Recession” on the other. In particular, we investigate labour market data in the past two decades for the Enlarged Europe and adopt a variable accounting for the idiosyncratic severity shock of the crisis. This time-varying and country-specific crisis variable enables us to test empirically and in a novel way the joint impact of labour market policies and the economic crisis on labour market dynamics even when accounting for common macro shocks.     

The credit crunch and fall in employment during the Great Recession

We study how a bank credit crunch—a dramatic worsening of firm and consumer access to bank credit, such as the one observed over the Great Recession—translates into job losses in U.S. manufacturing industries. To identify the impact of the recent credit crunch, we rely on differences in the degree of dependence on external finance and of tangibility of assets across manufacturing industries and in the sensitivity of these industries׳ output to changes in the supply of consumer credit. We find that, for employment, household access to bank loans matters more than firm access to bank loans. In addition, we show that, over the recent financial crisis, tightening access to commercial and industrial loans and, in particular, consumer installment loans may have contributed significantly to the drop in employment in the manufacturing sector.     

DSGE forecasts of the lost recovery

The years following the Great Recession were challenging for forecasters. Unlike other deep downturns, this recession was not followed by a swift recovery, but instead generated a sizable and persistent output gap that was not accompanied by deflation as a traditional Phillips curve relationship would have predicted. Moreover, the zero lower bound and unconventional monetary policy generated an unprecedented policy environment. We document the actual real-time forecasting performance of the New York Fed dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model during this period and explain the results using the pseudo real-time forecasting performance results from a battery of DSGE models. We find the New York Fed DSGE model’s forecasting accuracy to be comparable to that of private forecasters, and notably better for output growth than the median forecasts from the FOMC’s Summary of Economic Projections. The model’s financial frictions were key in obtaining these results, as they implied a slow recovery following the financial crisis.     

How do socially controversial companies do during a stressful time? Evidence from the Great Recession

This study investigates the performance of socially controversial companies during a financial crisis. Companies are usually considered controversial if they are involved in controversial businesses such as alcohol, tobacco, firearms, nuclear etc. The results show that controversial firms exhibit higher firm value as well as better accounting performance during the Great Recession than otherwise similar, albeit non-controversial, firms. The results are consistent with the notion that the demand for controversial products remains relatively stable even during a stressful time. Further analysis confirms the results, including random-effects analysis, GMM dynamic panel data analysis, and instrumental-variable (IV) analysis. The results of this paper are particularly relevant to portfolio management, where controversial firms may be added to portfolios to inoculate them from a negative shock brought about by an economic crisis.     

The Impact of the 2008 Crisis on UK Prices: What We Can Learn from the CPI Microdata1

This paper takes the locally collected price quotes used to construct the CPI index in the UK for the period 1996–2013 and explores the impact of the Great Recession (2008‐9) on the pricing behaviour of firms. We develop a time series framework which captures the link between macroeconomic variables and the behaviour of prices in terms of the frequency of price change, the dispersion of price levels and the size, dispersion and kurtosis of price‐growth. We find strong evidence for inflation having an effect, but not output. The change in the behaviour of prices during the Great Recession is largely explained by the changes in inflation and VAT. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the inflation effect is sufficiently small that it need not influence monetary policy.     

The Impact of the 2008 Crisis on UK Prices: What We Can Learn from the CPI Microdata1

This paper takes the locally collected price quotes used to construct the CPI index in the UK for the period 1996–2013 and explores the impact of the Great Recession (2008-9) on the pricing behaviour of firms. We develop a time series framework which captures the link between macroeconomic variables and the behaviour of prices in terms of the frequency of price change, the dispersion of price levels and the size, dispersion and kurtosis of price-growth. We find strong evidence for inflation having an effect, but not output. The change in the behaviour of prices during the Great Recession is largely explained by the changes in inflation and VAT. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the inflation effect is sufficiently small that it need not influence monetary policy.     

Time Variation in Macro‐Financial Linkages

We analyze the contribution of credit spread, house and stock price shocks to the US economy based on a time‐varying parameter vector autoregressive model. We find that the contribution of financial shocks to gross domestic product growth fluctuates from about 20% in normal times to more than 50% during the Great Recession. The Great Recession and the subsequent weak recovery can largely be traced back to negative housing shocks. Housing shocks have become more important for the real economy since the early 2000s, and negative housing shocks are more important than positive ones. Unexpected increases in credit spreads have not been deflationary recently. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.