Negotiating improved interconnection between US telcos and their competitors

The issue of determining the types and quality of interconnection between US telephone companies and their new competitors is addressed. Instead of prescribing a detailed solution, a regulatory commission should establish ground rules for negotiations, ie ‘market rules’. It must also establish the ‘starting point’ from which bargaining can take place. A ‘starting point’ for negotiations is the a priori property rights vested in the bargaining parties.     

British Managers' Attitudes and Behaviour in Industrial Relations: A Twenty-Year Study

A unique longitudinal study of Britain's managers conducted in 1980, 1990 and 2000 permits comparisons of managerial attitudes and behaviour in industrial relations over twenty years. We find clear evidence of the relationship between macro‐level political and economic movements of the period from 1980 up until the late 1990s on managerial attitudes, the impact of changes in power relations and the ‘lag effect’ of institutions. The most unexpected findings are the modest rise of managerial unionism in the 1990s and the limited evidence of the replacement of collective bargaining by either individual or group involvement or by employee financial participation.     

Patterns of Continuity and Change in Managerial Attitudes and Behaviour in Industrial Relations, 1980-1990

In this paper, data are reported from a longitudinal study of managers' attitudes and behaviour in industrial relations based on a sample of fellows and members of the British Institute of Management. An account of two surveys, carried out in 1980 and 1990, follows an examination of theories of the managerial role in industrial relations and the presentation of a research model. Managerial attitudes and behaviour are then analysed with respect to views on trade unions, personal commitments to collective representation, collective bargaining, employee participation and involvement and views on the role of government. The findings have an added significance because survey dates roughly correspond with the so-called ‘Thatcher years’. The conclusion is that some major changes in industrial relations have occurred during the decade in question, but there are also substantial continuities which cannot be ‘read off’ directly from the dramatic alterations in the political, economic and legal environment.     

Conglomerate Unions and Transformations of Union Democracy

Confronted with membership losses and declining bargaining power, trade unions have engaged in both political and organizational responses. A frequent type of organizational response has involved the creation of conglomerate unions, which bring together workers from various sectors and occupations. Pointing out a number of parallels between organizational developments in trade unions and political parties, this article analyses the emergence of conglomerate unions as a cause and consequence of changing conceptions of union democracy. Drawing on two in‐depth case studies conducted in France and Germany, the article examines how trade unions perceive their situation and how they define a reform rationale based on increasing their organizational ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’. In accordance with this rationale, unions engage in mergers and create larger conglomerates, thereby centralizing decision‐making bodies and professionalizing their staff. The reform of trade unions’ internal organization, in turn, affects unions’ capacity for interest aggregation and representation.     

Employment Institutions under Liberalization Pressures: Analysing the Effects of Regulatory Change on Collective Bargaining in Spain

This article discusses the effects of regulatory change in employees’ working conditions and the dynamics of collective bargaining in Spain, a model affected by a drastic regulatory change, and draws a comparison with the UK, the more deregulated and single‐employer bargaining model in Europe. The comparison is carried out using EU‐SILC panel data to identify commonalities and differences in the patterns of change in salaries and working hours. Second, national data from Spain are used to analyse the impacts of reforms on the characteristics and outputs of collective bargaining. The findings show that regulatory changes provoked a drastic adjustment in wages in Spain, following patterns similar to the British model. However, the results lead us to highlight the need to enhance knowledge about the dynamics of bargaining processes as they crucially reveal that these trends are happening in mostly unchanged institutional characteristics.     

The Role of Arbitration Costs and Risk Aversion in Dispute Outcomes

The effects of risk aversion and of arbitration costs on bargaining outcomes are investigated using data from 171 simulated negotiations. The results are generally consistent with predictions from a simple economic bargaining model. We find strong evidence that directs costs of arbitration lead to higher rates of agreement. There is only weak evidence the risk aversion is related to the probability of agreement, but negotiated settlements seems to favor the less risk-averse bargainer.     

Workplace Characteristics and Working Class Vote for the Old and New Right

This article focuses on the role of plant size for working class vote. We argue that workplace size does matter for political behaviour. Workers in smaller plants are less unionized and therefore base their voting decisions more strongly on their cultural attitudes, which undermine the support for social democratic parties. Using data from the European Social Survey (2002–2010), we find that workers in small plants have more right‐wing attitudes and, consequently, vote for new and old right parties, contrarily to workers in larger plants. Our research points towards important structural explanations of working class support for the right and its cross‐national differences.     

Bargaining Theory Meets Interest‐Based Negotiations: A Case Study1

This is a case study of the 2005 national contract negotiations between Kaiser Permanente and the Coalition of Kaiser Permanente Unions. Given the scale and complexity of these negotiations, their successful completion provides an exemplar for collective bargaining in this country. In 1997 Kaiser Permanente and the Coalition of Kaiser Permanente Unions formed a labor management partnership, and negotiations were structured around the principles of interest‐based negotiation (IBN). Drawing on direct observation of all parts of the bargaining process, interviews with individuals from Kaiser and the Coalition of Unions, and surveys we conducted after bargaining was completed, we conclude that the parties employed a mix of interest‐based and traditional negotiation processes across an array of integrative and distributive issues. We find that IBN techniques were used extensively and successfully to reach mutually satisfying agreements when the parties shared interests. When interests were in greater conflict, the parties resorted to more traditional, positional tactics to reach resolution. Strong intraorganizational conflicts limited the use of IBN and favored the use of more traditional positional bargaining. While a high level of trust enabled and supported the use of IBN, tensions that developed limited the use of IBN and required surfacing and release before either IBN or more traditional positional processes could proceed effectively. The use of IBN tools helped the parties apply the principles underlying the partnership in which these negotiations were embedded. We conclude that IBN served as a way of applying or operationalizing integrative bargaining and affected the process dynamics in ways the Walton and McKersie theory predicted. As such we see IBN as techniques that neither displace nor render obsolete other aspects of bargaining theory or practice but that show considerable promise for helping collective bargaining to address the complex issues and challenges found in contemporary employment relationships.     

The effect of mergers on variety in grocery retailing

We study a merger between two Dutch supermarket chains to assess its effect on the depth as well as composition of assortment. We adopt a difference-in-differences strategy that exploits local variation in pre-merger competitive conditions and thus in the merger outcomes. To define our control group, we account for selection on observables through a matching procedure. We observe that, after the merger, the assortment of the merging parties converges in markets where they are not directly competing one with the other. Instead, the merging parties reposition their assortment to avoid cannibalization in the areas where they directly competed before the merger. While the target’s stores reduce the depth of their assortment when in direct competition with the acquirer’s, the latter increase their assortment. This suggests that variety is a strategic variable in retail chains’ response to changes in local competition.     

Proper Treatment of Buyer Power in Merger Review

In this paper, we assess the appropriate treatment of buyer power in merger review. We conclude that, for changes in bargaining outcomes due to a buyer merger to create efficiencies, it must be the case that, post-merger, the parties are able to arrive at a more optimal price schedule, perhaps due to reduced transactions costs. Empirical tests will be important to the evaluation of such efficiencies. We further conclude that, under certain conditions, powerful buyers may be able to prevent higher prices from a merger of suppliers. Once again, empirical tests should guide the evaluation of this merger defense.     

Anatomy of a public-private partnership: Hold-up and regulatory commitment in Ultrafast Broadband

In recent years, the preference for purely private funding and ownership of telecommunications networks has given way to a ‘new wisdom’ that some form of public funding is now likely necessary if faster and more capacious next generation access (NGA) networks are to be constructed in a timely fashion for the majority of the population. Policy-makers are charged with deciding how that public investment will take place. One approach is via Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), where public and private actors collaborate in UFB (Ultrafast Fibre Broadband) investment, construction and operation. However, the body of analysis of PPPs in NGA networks to guide policy-makers is scant.By using the concept of regulatory commitment, the paper compares the experiences gained in a hold-up situation in PPPs in other infrastructures (e.g. roading) with the UFB context. A case study of New Zealand's Ultrafast Fibre Broadband Initiative is used to draw new insights for government purchasers and regulatory agencies. In comparing the different forms of PPPs, the paper shows that UFB PPPs reverse the typical direction of financing and ownership observed in roading PPPs. Financing and asset ownership are separated in UFB PPPs, increasing the potential for misalignment of incentives and the likelihood that the public party can use its legislative powers to alter regulatory settings after the PPP contract is signed, and thereby hold up the private party once existing network assets are sunk. Whilst the government instigating the PPP may not be inclined to act opportunistically, a successive government facing different political priorities does not face the same incentives. To the extent that the private party can anticipate this risk, it should structure the initial agreement to ensure that the public party is penalised if such an event occurs (i.e. an automatic right to favourable renegotiation or payment of compensation). Such terms will discourage opportunism, so that the project benefits from time-consistent alignment of incentives and objectives.     

Do mass layoffs affect voting behaviour? Evidence from the UK

How bad are mass layoffs politically? We study this question across both regional and individual-level datasets. Using a difference-in-difference framework with differential timing on constituency-level data for the UK, we find no evidence that mass layoff announcements negatively affect incumbents – either locally or nationally – in the General Elections 2010, 2015, 2017 and 2019. Using individual data on party preferences, we demonstrate that our results are not an artefact of the UK majority voting system and associated tactical voting. We also find no evidence that the null results can be explained by increased outmigration of affected individuals or changes of candidates by political parties. We find evidence that economic expectations are not strongly affected by mass layoffs, which, although a surprising finding by itself, might help to explain the absence of an effect on political outcomes.     

Toward a legitimacy‐based view of political risk: The case of Google and Yahoo in China

Traditional political risk theories often focus on a developing host country government's ability to intervene in the activities of foreign multinationals in the extractive or infrastructure sectors. This results in inadequate understanding of (1) how a government's motivation to intervene is influenced by the broader societal context, (2) the importance of multinationals' political risk at home, and (3) the increasing political risk faced by high‐tech and service firms. We argue that there is a need to update the bargaining power and political institutions theories and further develop a legitimacy‐based view of political risk. Then, we examine the political risk experienced by Google and Yahoo at home and abroad due to their activities in China to illustrate the benefits of a holistic approach to political risk. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Role of the State in Balancing the Minimum Wage in Turkey and the USA

In this article, the direct role of the state in industrial relations is scrutinized by focusing on the political basis of decisions regarding the minimum wage. We argue that in order to ensure stability and growth, any state must balance the interests of capital and labour when taking this kind of distributional decision. This idea is operationalized using O'Connor's concepts of accumulation and legitimation as the basis for an analytical model. Application to Turkey and comparison with the USA reveals that in Turkey, governments take account of legitimacy concerns in their minimum wage decisions due to the large number of workers directly dependent on minimum wages and weak collective bargaining institutions. In the USA, despite rather similar industrial relations conditions, this tendency is not present, probably due to the much smaller number of minimum wage earners and their weakness in the political process. However, in the USA, too, we observe that there is a difference between political parties and historical periods in the way in which the minimum wage is determined.     

Bargaining Structure and Wage Outcomes in the British Coal Industry

The arguments below use case study and time series data to investigate the relationship between bargaining structure and wage settlements in the British coal industry. Consideration of the different bargaining structures in this industry suggests that bargaining power and wage outcomes are very sensitive to market conditions when the negotiating structure is decentralized; when negotiations are centralized in industry-wide bargaining, power and wage outcomes are quite insensitive to market conditions. These conclusions may help in understanding recent events in this industry and perhaps can be generalized to other cases where bargaining structures are undergoing change.     

Investments to create bargaining power: the case of franchising

Hybrid organizational forms such as franchise systems join two or more independent parties under a contract. The ability of each party to achieve its goals depend upon the relative bargaining power in the relationship established by the contract. Using transaction cost economics and Porter's (1980) characterization of sources of bargaining power, this paper argues that the franchisor can make investments in activities such as tapered integration and buyer selection to increase its bargaining power and decrease conflict and litigation in a franchise system. Specifically, tapered integration (owning some units while franchising others), selecting inexperienced franchisees, and employing a long training program are predicted to increase the franchisor's bargaining power and the franchisee's compliance with franchisor standards. An empirical analysis of litigation in restaurant franchise systems supports the theoretical hypotheses. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of competition and corporate political responsiveness on multinational bargaining power

This paper empirically investigates the effects of competition and corporate political responsiveness on multinational bargaining power. The results indicate that the more intense the competition, the weaker the bargaining power of multinationals vis-à-vis that of host governments. Further, higher corporate political responsiveness plays an increasingly important role in safeguarding the bargaining power position of multinationals as competition intensifies. Implications and future research development are suggested.     

Accounting for Greenfield Union Organizing Outcomes

This paper presents a framework for evaluating and accounting for the outcomes of ‘greenfield’ union organizing campaigns. It argues that previous studies have tended to focus too much on the establishment of collective bargaining and negotiation of first contract as a campaign outcome. Instead, the effectiveness and representativeness of new union structures are emphasized, and the sustainability of those structures is emphasized as the most important outcome. A key finding from the empirical data is that campaigns that build both workplace activism and are co‐ordinated by officers create more sustainable outcomes than campaigns that focus on one or the other. The evidence shows how and why these outcomes emerge, and the paper concludes with a consideration of the theoretical and practical implications.     

The Union Response to International Corporations

The purpose of this paper has been to examine, on a pre-liminary basis, some of the implications of the international corporationunion interface for individual countries. It has been suggested that the impact of this interface will depend on the production strategy of the international corporation, the solidarity of the coalition of the unions in different countries, and the economic and political conditions prevailing in the individual countries. In order to gain a deeper understanding of the bargaining relationship between unions and international corporations, it is suggested that research will have to be conducted on the following topics: the industrial relations decision-making process of international firms, in particular the ways in which these firms react to international collective bargaining; the alternative strategies open to unions in international collective bargaining; the impact of international unionism and international firms on the industrial relations system of individual countries; the problems associated with international collective bargaining involving unions with different political ideologies; and the impact of international unionism on economic and political integration and the perception of national governments.