Dealing with a liquidity trap when government debt matters: Optimal time-consistent monetary and fiscal policy

How does the need to preserve government debt sustainability affect the optimal monetary and fiscal policy response to a liquidity trap? To provide an answer, we employ a small stochastic New Keynesian model with a zero bound on nominal interest rates and characterize optimal time-consistent stabilization policies. We focus on two policy tools, the short-term nominal interest rate and debt-financed government spending. The optimal policy response to a liquidity trap critically depends on the prevailing debt burden. While the optimal amount of government spending is decreasing in the level of outstanding government debt, future monetary policy is becoming more accommodative, triggering a change in private sector expectations that helps to dampen the fall in output and inflation at the outset of the liquidity trap.     

Liquidity traps and expectation dynamics: Fiscal stimulus or fiscal austerity?

We examine global dynamics under infinite-horizon learning in New Keynesian models where the interest-rate rule is subject to the zero lower bound. The intended steady state is locally but not globally stable. Unstable deflationary paths emerge after large pessimistic shocks to expectations. For large expectation shocks that push interest rates to the zero bound, a temporary fiscal stimulus, or in some cases a policy of fiscal austerity, will insulate the economy from deflation traps if the policy is appropriately tailored in magnitude and duration. A fiscal stimulus “switching rule,” which automatically kicks in without discretionary fine-tuning, can be equally effective.     

UK term structure decompositions at the zero lower bound

This paper employs a zero lower bound (ZLB) consistent shadow‐rate model to decompose UK nominal yields into expectation and term premium components. Compared to a standard affine term structure model, it performs relatively better in a ZLB setting by capturing the stylized facts of the yield curve. The ZLB model is then exploited to estimate inflation expectations and risk premiums. This entails jointly pricing and decomposing nominal and real UK yields. We find evidence that medium‐ and long‐term inflation expectations are contained within narrower bounds since the early 1990s, suggesting monetary policy credibility improved after the introduction of inflation targeting.     

Solving endogenous regime switching models

This paper solves rational expectations models in which structural parameters switch across multiple regimes according to state-dependent (endogenous) transition probabilities. Assuming small shocks and smooth transition probabilities, we apply a perturbation approach. We first provide for conditions under which a unique bounded equilibrium exists. We then compute first- and second-order approximations. In a new-Keynesian model with monetary policy switching, we document new effects of monetary policy switching when transition probabilities depend on inflation.     

The Government Spending Multiplier at the Zero Lower Bound: Evidence from the United States

We estimate state-dependent government spending multipliers for the United States. We use a factor-augmented interacted vector autoregression (FAIVAR) model. This allows us to capture the time-varying monetary policy characteristics including the recent zero interest rate lower bound (ZLB) state, to account for the state of the business cycle and to address the limited information problem typically inherent in VARs. We identify government spending shocks by sign restrictions and use a government spending growth forecast series to account for the effects of anticipated fiscal policy. In our baseline specification, we find that government spending multipliers in a recession range from 3.56 to 3.79 at the ZLB. Away from the ZLB, multipliers in recessions range from 2.31 to 3.05. Several robustness analyses confirm that multipliers are higher, when the interest rate is lower and that multipliers in recessions exceed multipliers in expansions. Our results are consistent with theories that predict larger multipliers at the ZLB.     

Monetary Targets and the World Economy

The dominant obsessions to watchers of the world economy at the moment are the weakness of the US dollar and the fear that the world economy is stagnating. In this ‘Briefing Paper’ we seek to put both events into the same intellectual framework, and to show that they are the consequence of monetary policies which are not logically related to each other, nor to a common objective of bringing world inflation steadily down to an acceptable level. Specifically, the US - which for reasons outlined below can warrant monetary growth rather below the world average if it is to preserve some dollar stability - is showing an above average outturn in its monetary aggregates. Germany and Japan, which can accommodate increases well above the average, are in fact adopting monetary targets which are leading to exchange rate appreciation, arid a reduction in both countries' expectations for real growth. The dangers for the world economy in this situation are very serious, particularly at a time when further dollar devaluation could be risky both from the viewpoint of US inflation wide the dollar's role as the key reserve asset. It could lead at worst to US protectionism and a monetaryled recession, rein forcing the slow growth rates already being widely predicted in 1978 for many other industrial countries. However, we show in this ‘Briefing Paper’ that this is not a necessity outcome of the present situation, given three vital perceptions. The first, required by statesmen as much as by technicians. is that the recent stagnation in European & Japanese output and exchange rate instability are essentially a monetary phenomenon, requiring essentially monetary (rather than fiscal) remedies. The second is acceptance of the need and practicability of some monetary consignation, based on reasonably common objectives among the major countries regarding inflation, bands for exchange rate movement and red rates of growth. the third, at the most practical level, is agreement on the actual monetary numbers which broadly reconcile these objectives and also take account of the very different ‘unwanted’ rates of monetary growth between countries which reflect their different underlying conditions of output, productivity and demand for money. It is the (ambitious) aim of this ‘Briefing Paper’ to substantiate these perceptions and to provide the numbers mound which a consideration of monetary policies can be framed. The numbers are necessarily based on trends established over a number of years and need to be supplemented by detailed understanding of each country's financial status But the monetary targets provided do, in our judgement, embody trade-offs between inflation, growth and exchange rate movements which should broadly satisfy national ambitions, and reset the world economy on a worthwhile growth path during 1978 or 1979.     

Self-fulfilling deflations

What types of monetary and fiscal policy rules produce self-fulfilling deflationary paths that are monotonic and empirically relevant? This paper presents simple theoretical conditions that guarantee the existence of these paths in a general equilibrium model with sticky prices. These sufficient conditions are weak enough to be satisfied by most monetary and fiscal policy rules. A quantification of the model which combines a real shock à la Hayashi and Prescott (2002) with a simultaneous sunspot that deanchors inflation expectations matches the main empirical features of the Japanese deflationary process during the “lost decade”. The results also highlight the key role of the assumption about the anchoring of inflation expectations for the size of fiscal multipliers and, in general, for any policy analysis.     

Briefing Paper: The Interdependence of Fiscal and Monetary Policy under Economic and Monetary Union

This article explores the implications of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) for the conduct of fiscal policy. Under EMU, where the European Central Bank is successful in controlling inflation, the loss of seigniorage revenues causes a potential problem for public sector deficits. To prevent the debt-income ratio from spiralling upwards, a primary budget surplus is ultimately required. EMU has usually been considered as a strong central monetary authority which forces fiscal discipline on lax national governments. But this is not the only possibility. Because the debt ratio can be reduced by surprise inflation, the price expectations of the private sector are important. Once these are taken into account, EMU can be examined in a 'game' framework in which the reputation of the authorities and the existence or otherwise of cooperation between the fiscal and monetary authorities becomes a critical factor.
The paper finds that where the authorities enjoy reputation and cooperate, a one-off reduction in public spending will lead to a permanent decline in the real interest rate and crowd in extra private spending (consumption and investment). Without reputation the cut in government spending has to be sustained. Where there is neither reputation nor cooperation, the outcome depends on the structure of the European economy and whether fiscal policy can effect the terms of trade between countries. If the terms of trade remain unchanged, the outturn is similar to the case of cooperation without reputation, but where the terms of trade can be improved in one country, there is no incentive to cut public spending. In this case the outturn is higher inflation with private spending crowded out.     

通货膨胀背景下的中国经济增长

当前我国物价水平仍然较高,与改革开放以来的前几次通货膨胀有所类似.本次通货膨胀的原因也可归结为中国传统增长模式中常出现的“两难困境”,即长期以来,中国经济增长过度依赖于政府投资,银行信贷与货币的发放难以受到控制,经济高增长的同时始终存在着高通货膨胀的风险,而高通货膨胀所带来的企业生产成本的上升反过来又挤压企业经营利润,从而降低经济增长率.可以预计的是,在货币政策作用空间有限的背景下,此次通货膨胀的压力将持续一段时间.能否处理好总量和结构、抑制通货膨胀和促进经济增长的关系,关键取决于货币政策与财政政策的有机配合.     

Monetary Policy and the Zero Bound to Interest Rates: A Review1

Abstract.  This paper reviews the literature on what the zero bound to nominal interest rates implies for the conduct of monetary policy. The aim is to evaluate the risks of hitting the zero bound; and to evaluate policies that are said to be able to reduce that risk, or policies that are proposed as means of helping the economy escape if it is in a zero bound 'trap'. I conclude that policies aimed at 'cure' are arguably more uncertain tools than those aimed at 'prevention', so prevention is a less risky strategy for policymakers. But since the risks of hitting the zero bound seem quite small anyway, and the risks of encountering a deflationary spiral smaller still, it is conceivable that inflation objectives that typify modern monetary regimes already have more than enough insurance built into them to deal with the zero bound problem.     

Asset price targeting in an open economy with cognitive limitations: The best for macroeconomic and financial stability?

The choices of policy targets and the formation of agent expectations have been critical issues addressed by monetary policy management since the financial crisis of 2008. This paper evaluates macroeconomic stability in a new Keynesian open economy in which agents experience both cognitive limitations and asset market volatility. The (im)perfect credibility of various monetary policies (e.g., a Taylor-type rule with- or without asset price targeting, strict domestic inflation targeting, strict CPI inflation targeting, and exchange rate peg) may lead agents to react according to their expectation rules, and thus create various degrees of booms and busts in output and inflation. Simulations confirm that a Taylor-type CPI inflation targeting including an asset price target is the best choice. In contrast, the business cycles induced by Keynesian “animal spirits” are enhanced by strict inflation targeting. Furthermore, a credible exchange rate pegging system with an international reserve pooling arrangement can improve social welfare and stability in an open economy, even though its absolute value of the loss function is slightly lower than a Taylor-type CPI inflation targeting including an asset price target.     

The impact of credit and fiscal policy under a liquidity trap

This study examines the interaction of non-conventional credit policy and fiscal policy when adverse financial conditions drive the economy to a deep contraction and conventional monetary policy becomes ineffective as the policy interest rate reaches its effective lower bound. Consistent with other studies, under counter-cyclical financial intermediation costs, credit easing policies aimed at reducing credit spread ameliorate the response of the economy and lead to a faster recovery. More importantly, I find that expansionary fiscal policy during an episode of liquidity trap is associated with a large multiplier effect that prevents an otherwise deeper and longer recession. Moreover, the large impact of expansionary fiscal policy is maintained even if credit policy is already in place.     

The unique dollarization case of Lebanon

We perform a thorough analysis of the unique dollarization case of Lebanon, a heavily dollarized economy with recurring public deficits and monetary financing of the public debt, together with contained inflation and a de facto fixed exchange rate lasting for more than 20 years. What makes Lebanon’s case specific is the high level of foreign currency liquidity in the hands of the banking system due to the abundant capital inflows in the last three decades, and the high levels of the central bank’s gross international reserves, contrasting with its low and sometimes negative levels of net international reserves. We shed light on a number of areas that have so far been unexplored in international finance and monetary economics, mainly the difference between gross and net international reserves and their relative fiscal costs, together with a synthetic classification of sterilization techniques. We explain the monetary “freezing” mechanism that helped contain inflation in Lebanon, despite the monetary financing of the country’s recurring public deficits. We also assess the results of Lebanon’s monetary and exchange rate policy in the last two decades, and make a number of policy recommendations in light of previous studies.     

Do enlarged fiscal deficits cause inflation? The historical record

We survey the historical record for two centuries on the connection between expansionary fiscal policy and inflation. The relationship holds in wartime when fiscally stressed governments resorted to the inflation tax. In two peacetime episodes in the early twentieth century, bond‐financed fiscal deficits, unbacked by future taxes, may have contributed to inflation. Fiscal influence on monetary policy was important in the Great Inflation 1965–1983. Expansionary monetary and fiscal policy did not lead to inflation in the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–08 but, by contrast, the fiscal and monetary response to the COVID‐19 pandemic may involve risks of fiscal dominance and future inflation.     

Impacts of Monetary, Fiscal and Exchange Rate Policies on Output in China: A Var Approach

Applying the VAR model and using the interest rate as a monetary policy variable, we find that in the long run, output in China responds negatively to a shock to the interest rate, the real exchange rate, government debt, or the inflation rate, and it reacts positively to a shock to government deficits or lagged own output. When real M2 is chosen as a monetary policy variable, long-term output in China responds positively to a shock to real M2 or lagged own output, and it reacts negatively to a shock to the real exchange rate, government debt, or government deficits. Its response to a shock to the inflation rate is negative when government debt is used and is positive when government deficits are considered. In the short run, fiscal policy is more important than monetary policy in three out of four cases. In the long run, monetary policy is more influential than fiscal policy in three out of four cases. Therefore, the government may consider conducting monetary and fiscal policies differently in the short run and long run. The government needs to be cautious in pursuing deficit spending as its long-term impacts depend on the monetary variable employed. The policy of maintaining a relatively stable exchange rate is appropriate as the depreciation of the Yuan may hurt the economy in the short run.JEL Classifications: E5, F4, H6     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that the course of the world economy in 1988 was a product not so much of the stock market crash of October 1987 but of the reaction to the crash. Monetary policy and to a lesser extent fiscal policy were eased and consumer spending responded to cuts in interest rates and rising real incomes. With the world recovery in its sixth year, capacity pressures began to emerge and investment also boomed, helped by a lower cost of capital. As a result of this strong private sector demand, OECD output increased 4 per cent in 1988 as a whole and industrial production and world trade rose even more rapidly. Against the background of buoyant demand and output, inflationary fears have resurfaced. Since the spring monetary authorities in most countries have been tightening policy, raising interest rates by early 1989 above the levels which helped bring about the stock market crash. Their aim is to effect a slowdown in demand before a significant upward movement in inflation and inflationary expectations takes hold. In our judgement the present policy stance will achieve its aim of a "soft landing" for the world economy. The pick-up in world inflation is contained below 5 per cent and by the second half of this year inflation eases, paving the way for a relaxation of monetary policy. Output growth slows from 4 per cent to 3 percent in 1989 and 2 per cent in 1990, picking up again as interest rates are lowered in 1991–2.     

Optimal fiscal and monetary policy with occasionally binding zero bound constraints

This paper studies optimal fiscal and monetary policy when the nominal interest rate is subject to the zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint in a stochastic New Keynesian economy. In the baseline model calibrated to match key features of the U.S. economy, it is optimal for the government to increase its spending when at the ZLB in the stochastic environment by about 60 percent more than it would in the deterministic environment. The presence of uncertainty creates a unique time-consistency problem if the steady state is inefficient. Although access to government spending policy increases welfare in the face of a large deflationary shock, it decreases welfare during normal times as the government reduces the nominal interest rate less aggressively before reaching the ZLB.     

On the Low‐Frequency Relationship Between Public Deficits and Inflation

We estimate the low‐frequency relationship between fiscal deficits and inflation and pay special attention to its potential time variation by estimating a time‐varying vector autoregression model for US data from 1900 to 2011. We find the strongest relationship neither in times of crisis nor in times of high public deficits, but from the mid 1960s up to 1980. Employing a structural decomposition of the low‐frequency relationship and further narrative evidence, we interpret our results such that the low‐frequency relationship between fiscal deficits and inflation is strongly related to the conduct of monetary policy and its interaction with fiscal policy after World War II.Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The fiscal and monetary response to COVID‐19: What the Great Depression has – and hasn't – taught us

Although some regard the New Deal of the 1930s as exemplifying an aggressive fiscal and monetary response to a severe economic crisis, the US fiscal and monetary policy responses to the COVID‐19 crisis have actually been far more substantial – and, so far, much more effective in reviving aggregate spending. Although many fear that these responses, and the large‐scale increase in bank reserves especially, must eventually cause unwanted inflation, the concurrent sharp decline in money's velocity has thus far more than offset any inflationary effects of money growth, while forward bond prices reflect a general belief that inflation will remain below 2 per cent for at least another decade. Notwithstanding the growth of the Fed's balance sheet, Fed authorities can always check inflation by sufficiently raising the interest return on bank reserves. Nonetheless, recent developments have heightened the risk of ‘fiscal dominance’ of monetary policy at some point in the future.     

Monetary policy with interest on reserves

I analyze monetary policy with interest on reserves and a large balance sheet. I show that conventional theories do not determine inflation in this regime, so I base the analysis on the fiscal theory of the price level. I find that monetary policy can peg the nominal rate, and determine expected inflation. With sticky prices, monetary policy can also affect real interest rates and output, though higher interest rates raise output and then inflation. The conventional sign requires a coordinated fiscal–monetary policy contraction. I show how conventional new-Keynesian models also imply strong monetary–fiscal policy coordination to obtain the usual signs. I address theoretical controversies. A concluding section places our current regime in a broader historical context, and opines on how optimal fiscal and monetary policy will evolve in the new regime.