Can television bring down a dictator? Evidence from Chile’s “No” campaign

Can televised political advertising change voting behavior in elections held in authoritarian regimes? We study the case of Chile, where the opposition used television campaigns weeks before the election that ended the seventeen-year dictatorship known as the Pinochet regime. Using national surveys conducted before the election and administrative electoral data, we provide evidence of a positive effect of television exposure on opposition votes. When compared to similar estimates in democracies, the effect of campaigns in Chile appear large. These results suggest that televised political campaigns can help to defeat dictators at the polls.     

Unbundling democracy: Political rights and civil liberties

Much recent political economy and political science literature views democracy in terms of political rights. This view, often referred to as electoral democracy, is particularly pronounced in the empirical literature. We reincorporate the role of civil liberties, which are at the core of modern democracy, in two ways. We identify four fundamental sources of potential differences in the evolution of political rights and civil liberties. We present systematic, robust and varied empirical evidence on the direct impact of two of these potential sources of differences using cross-national panel data and accounting for the modernization hypothesis. We obtain two noteworthy empirical results: civil liberties exhibit greater persistence than political rights in affecting subsequent outcomes; and, our main result, civil liberties are complementary to political rights when affecting subsequent outcomes, while the reverse is not the case. Consequently, one must incorporate civil liberties as a determinant of electoral democracy. More generally, both dimensions must be considered to understand the setbacks recently experienced by many democracies, despite their holding of free and fair elections.     

Democracy and Education in twentieth‐century Latin America

Do democratic electoral systems strengthen a country's outcomes in education? Does the degree of inclusiveness of a democratic system matter? This article offers evidence that political competition and the inclusion of marginalized populations in electoral systems transformed education over an 80‐year period in Latin America. It finds that democracy has a positive effect on education enrollment and illustrates how current work on democracy and development has overlooked important democratic subcomponents, specifically, who votes and how. Our results deepen current work on democracy, operationalizing the impact of electoral expansion in comparative analysis and showing how democracies respond to specific education demands.     

离开威权主义后的演进路径

本文对威权政体进行了新的分类,以此研究政体类型对非民主政体的存续或消亡的影响,以及不同的威权主义政体对民主发展的影响。本文研究结果显示,不同的威权主义政体所面对的民主发展倾向是不同的。因此,威权主义的不同本质应当成为民主的关键前提之一。有限的多党政体是迈向民主体制的主要方式。事实上,这种政体类型已经成为威权主义迈向民主未来的最常见形式：一党体制或军事体制,都有可能先转化为有限的多党政体,再进一步迈向成熟的民主政体。     

The Role of Regime Type in the Political Economy of Foreign Reserve Accumulation

Authoritarian regimes have surpassed democracies in foreign reserve accumulation since the Asian Financial Crisis. Two prominent institutionalist theories could explain this diverging trend in reserves: First, the political business cycle theory, suggesting that reserves are reduced before an election. Second, the veto player theory, implying that a high number of veto players increases the de facto independence of central bankers, who are reluctant to invest in reserves. A time-series cross-sectional analysis for up to 182 countries over the period 1990–2013 shows that democratic governments tend to reduce their reserves before elections. While veto players do not affect reserves directly, a high number of veto players tends to limit a political business cycle before an election. Elections and veto players do not have an influence in authoritarian regimes. Election cycles tend to explain why democracies have relatively fallen behind in a period of massive reserve accumulation.     

Short Changing the Value of Democracy for Economic Development in Africa

Official donor policy towards Africa seems to be informed by the twin requirements of alleviating poverty on the one hand and ensuring respect for human rights and democratization on the other. In practice, when these interests conflict, as they usually do in Africa, donors tend to choose to continue supporting dictatorships, arguing that economic development will eventually lead to democratization. This paper argues that this faulty reasoning is a product of modernization theory that has had undue influence in western policy circles. Based on a broad survey of the literature, the paper shows that there is no theoretical or empirical basis for the claim that authoritarian regimes would provide better economic performance than democracies in general and particularly in Africa. Furthermore, available evidence suggests that the lack of democratization (defined broadly to include the substance of democracy such as government accountability and basic freedoms in addition to meaningful democratic elections) is a key constraint on economic and social development in Africa. Finally, the paper argues that even when the empirical case to establish a definite causal relationship between democratization and development cannot be ascertained, a very strong case can be made for prioritizing democratization for the long term societal transformation of the continent.     

Short Changing the Value of Democracy for Economic Development in Africa

Official donor policy towards Africa seems to be informed by the twin requirements of alleviating poverty on the one hand and ensuring respect for human rights and democratization on the other. In practice, when these interests conflict, as they usually do in Africa, donors tend to choose to continue supporting dictatorships, arguing that economic development will eventually lead to democratization. This paper argues that this faulty reasoning is a product of modernization theory that has had undue influence in western policy circles. Based on a broad survey of the literature, the paper shows that there is no theoretical or empirical basis for the claim that authoritarian regimes would provide better economic performance than democracies in general and particularly in Africa. Furthermore, available evidence suggests that the lack of democratization (defined broadly to include the substance of democracy such as government accountability and basic freedoms in addition to meaningful democratic elections) is a key constraint on economic and social development in Africa. Finally, the paper argues that even when the empirical case to establish a definite causal relationship between democratization and development cannot be ascertained, a very strong case can be made for prioritizing democratization for the long term societal transformation of the continent.     

Pre-colonial ethnic institutions and party politics in Africa

We examine the role of ethnic institutions on party politics in African democracies. We combine geo-referenced data from 15 countries, 32 parliamentary elections and around 2700 electoral constituencies. First, we document a strong negative association between the degree of pre-colonial ethnic institutional centralization and the local level of competition between political parties in democratic elections today. Second, to address concerns about unobservable differences in geography or history, we show that results hold true when leveraging for identification the redrawing of constituency boundaries over time. Pre-colonial ethnic institutions shape local electoral outcomes and matter for the present and future of African democracies.     

Toward state funding of elections in india? a comparative perspective on possible options

This paper explores the issue of introduction of state funding of elections in India, focussing on the incentive structures of electoral finance reforms. After summarising the main points in the history of political finance reform in other democracies, and in India, the historical pattern of fund-raising and election expenditures of major parties in India is surveyed. Six electoral finance reform options for India are outlined. It is argued that the time is now ripe for state funding of elections from the point of view of the incentives facing parties and donors.     

Differences matter: The effect of coup types on physical integrity rights

What is the effect of coups d’état on repression? Do ‘bad’ coups against democracies decrease respect for physical integrity rights? Does it make a difference whether a coup d’état is staged by the military or a civilian leader? We argue that the impact of coups on repression varies with regime type as this determines the relative costs of repression and buying political support. Combining updated panel datasets on democracy and coups d’état from 1960 to 2010, we provide an analysis of the effects of coups on physical integrity rights, differentiating post-coup regime type. We find that post-coup respect for physical integrity rights decreases when non-democratic regimes depose democratic regimes through a coup d’état - an effect which is fading over time. As opposed to military autocracies, civilian-led regimes are more repressive in the year after successfully ousting the previous government. Together with supplementary findings on democracy-inducing and failed coups, our findings show that differences in regime types do matter in research of coups d’état.     

Natural resources and the tradeoff between authoritarianism and development

Why do African and Middle Eastern countries seem cursed by an abundance of natural resources yet USA, Australia and Norway seem blessed? A growing literature has argued that the benevolence or malignance of natural resources depends upon the quality of institutions. This paper offers a new explanation based on associational freedom and its interaction with the political system. The model predicts that natural resources have an adverse impact on economic performance and transition to democracy in authoritarian regimes but not in democracies. It also predicts that repression of associational freedom will be increasing in natural resources in authoritarian regimes. I test the model's predictions using fixed-effects regressions on an international panel from 1975 to 2000 and find support.     

The poverty of democracy in Latin America

This paper reviews recent Latin American presidential elections as a means of examining the quality of democracy in the region. Its principal hypothesis is that, notwithstanding the claims of mainstream analysis, the (re)introduction of formal democratic procedure has not represented a meaningful advance in authentic, broad-based political and economic enfranchisement of the region’s working class and peasant majorities. In many cases the so-called democratic transition has merely disguised the adaption of previously authoritarian mechanisms of social control.     

Defective democracy and the political budget cycle

Using a panel of democracies from 1987 to 2016, this study examines the effect of a defective democracy on the political budget cycle. To separate defective democracies from embedded democracies, we apply cluster analysis to the central elements of democracy. We find that the political budget cycle is significant only in defective democracies. Our finding indicates that the electoral cycle can persist even though democracies become old and economies become advanced. We also find that, of the central elements of democracy, weak rule of law and an ineffective government mainly explain the political budget cycle in defective democracies.     

British colonialism and democracy: Divergent inheritances and diminishing legacies

Did British colonial rule promote post-independence democracy? We provide evidence that the relationship follows a strong temporal pattern. Former British colonies were considerably more democratic than other countries immediately following independence, but subsequent democratic convergence has largely eliminated these differences in the post-Cold War period. Existing theories expounding superior British culture or alternative colonial institutions cannot account for divergent inheritances and diminishing legacies. To explain the time-varying pattern, we analyze European powers’ varying policy approaches to decolonization as well as changes in the international system. Britain more consistently treated competitive democratic elections as a prerequisite for gaining independence, leading to higher initial democracy levels. However, nascent democracies that lacked deep-rooted societal transformation faced challenges to democratic consolidation because of Cold War superpower competition. Later shifts in the international system toward promoting democracy further contributed to convergence by destabilizing colonially rooted dictatorships.     

A few signatures matter: Barriers to entry in Italian local politics

Competition for public office is an essential feature of democracy but having many candidates competing for the same position might lead to voter confusion and be counterproductive. In current democracies, ballot access regulations limit citizens’ right to become candidates, seeking to balance this trade-off by discouraging frivolous contenders. This paper examines the causal effect of signature requirements – a widespread ballot access regulation – and finds that their impact goes beyond this goal. I use data on Italian local elections and apply a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to estimate the effects of these requirements on electoral competition, candidates’ selection, voter participation and administrative efficiency. I find that signature requirements reduce the number of candidates running for office, decrease electoral competition, lead to a more experienced pool of candidates, and reduce voter turnout. The positive effects of this policy are observed in municipalities with fragmented political systems, where signature requirements lead to fewer wasted votes and fewer spoiler candidates. The downside is observed in municipalities with concentrated political systems: signature requirements increase the frequency of uncontested races and reduce voter participation. Findings reveal how this barrier to entry impacts key dimensions of democracy and indicate that designing efficient electoral institutions requires a clear understanding of local political contexts.     

Democratic institutions and regulatory reforms

We use a sample of 144 countries over the period 2003–2013 to investigate the link between democratic institutions and regulatory reforms. Democracy may be conducive to reform, as politicians embrace growth-enhancing reforms to win elections. On the other hand, authoritarian regimes may not worry as much about public opinion and could undertake reforms that are painful in the short run but bring long-term benefits. We test these alternative hypotheses, using data on regulatory reforms from the World Bank’s Doing Business database. The results provide mixed support for the hypothesis that democracy is good for regulatory reforms. We also show that regulatory reforms are more likely just after parliamentary elections in poor and middle-income countries.     

Political Regimes and Currency Crises

This paper examines the relationship between political regime type and currency crises. Some theories suggest that democratic regimes, owing to their greater political transparency and larger number of veto players, should have a lower risk of currency crisis than dictatorships. Alternative arguments emphasize the advantages of political insulation and rulers with long time horizons, and imply that crises should be most likely in democracies and least common in monarchic dictatorships. We evaluate these competing arguments across four types of political regimes using a time‐series cross‐sectional dataset that covers 178 countries between 1973 and 2009. Our findings suggest that the risk of currency crisis is substantially lower in monarchies than in democracies and other types of dictatorship. Further analyses indicate that the adoption of prudent financial policies largely account for this robust negative association between monarchies and the probability of currency crises. This suggests that political regimes strongly influence financial stability, and perverse political incentives help explain why currency crises are so common.     

How do electoral and voice accountability affect corruption? Experimental evidence from Egypt

How far does democracy decrease corruption? And which specific aspects of democracy help generate such effects? Corruption is famously one of the strongest obstacles to social and economic development. Whereas there has been extensive research identifying the causes of corruption, there is little experimental research on the impact of political institutions on corruption using designs that control for significant confounders. This paper uses a series of laboratory experiments conducted in 2013 Egypt in which a government official decides whether to spend tax revenues paid by subjects on a self-serving good or a good that benefits everyone equally. We have two experimental manipulations: (a) whether the official is electorally accountable to subjects or not; (b) whether subjects could send messages of protests to the official (and one another). We find evidence that electoral accountability does decrease the probability of the official choosing the self-serving good by 17% whereas voice accountability generates such outcome only in the authoritarian treatment (a reduction of corruption by 29%). We also find suggestive evidence that, in the authoritarian treatment, the likelihood of funding the self-serving good decreases by 27% when taxes paid by citizens fall short of the official’s threshold. Our contribution to the literature is two-fold: (a) we are able to single out the effect of specific democratic mechanisms on government corruption; (b) we test outcomes of democratic mechanisms on a traditionally understudied subject pool.     

Making Economic Policy in a Democratic Indonesia: The First Two Decades

After three decades of rapid economic growth during the authoritarian Soeharto era, followed by the deep but relatively short‐lived Asian financial crisis, Indonesia transitioned rapidly to democratic and decentralized governance. We examine policy‐making processes and economic outcomes during the first two decades of this new era, leading up to the 2019 national elections where it was widely conjectured that Indonesia might follow the global trends of authoritarian rule and illiberalism. We conclude that, thus far, Indonesia has navigated the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule quite successfully. Compared to the Soeharto era, growth has been somewhat slower, inequality has risen, and policy reform is slower and generally incremental. But living standards continue to rise and all major political players have elected to operate within the new democratic parameters. Macroeconomic management has continued to be effective. Nevertheless, there are no grounds for complacency: there is a large outstanding reform agenda, and the economy is not providing enough economic opportunities for the better‐educated senior secondary and tertiary graduates entering the workforce.     

Toward Subnational Democracies of Scale: Tensions between Democratic Legitimacy,Legality, and Effective Governance

Although democracy is often discussed as a universally applicable ideology, the liberal democratic state tends to assess democracy on the basis of government institutions. This paper argues that democratic institutionalism favours national governments and makes it difficult for subnational governments to expand their governance capacity and exercise additional powers. Greenland, Shetland, and Tresco (Isles of Scilly) serve as case studies of different subnational strategies for exercising greater governance capacity: 1) Actual adherence to democratic form (Greenland), 2) Symbolic adherence to democratic form (Shetland), and 3) Operating external to democratic form (Tresco). Despite the efforts of local governance actors, governance in these three island communities has proved problematic in terms of democratic legitimacy, legality, and/or effectiveness. It is argued that pressure toward the development of liberal democratic government institutions can in fact decrease the quality of subnational democracy. This requires a reassessment of definitions of democracy and authoritarianism. It is necessary to pursue place-specific and community-sensitive democracies of scale if we wish to democratically empower local communities.