The time-varying degree of inflation expectations anchoring

Well-anchored inflation expectations have become a key indicator for the credibility of a central bank’s inflation target. Since the outbreak of the financial crisis, the (de-)anchoring of long-term U.S. inflation expectations has been under debate. We propose a time-varying parameter (TVP) model in order to explore gradual changes in central bank credibility and the corresponding degree of inflation expectations anchoring. Our results confirm that inflation expectations have been partially de-anchored during the financial crisis. However, the TVP model reveals that inflation expectations have been successfully re-anchored ever since.     

Disagreement in inflation expectations: empirical evidence for Colombia

The literature on expectation disagreements in emerging economies is scarce. This paper examines the disagreements in inflation expectations for the Colombian economy during the 2010–2017 period. We combine empirical tests with an analysis of a monthly survey of expectations of financial analysts in Colombia to obtain valuable evidence to formulate guidelines on the expectations modelling in developing economies. The findings indicate that disagreements present inertia and that inflation volatility increases disagreements. However, the central bank’s stance, as established through a press release, can reduce disagreement. Moreover, if central bank communication is clear and there is a credible inflation target, there tend to be fewer disagreements.     

Would helicopter money be spent? New evidence for the Netherlands

According to some economists, central banks should use ‘helicopter money’ to boost inflation (expectations). Based on a survey among Dutch households, we examine whether respondents would spend the money received via such a transfer. Our results show that respondents expect to spend about 30% of the transfer and that helicopter money would hardly affect inflation expectations. Furthermore, whether transfers come from the central bank or the government makes no difference. Finally, our results suggest that the effect of helicopter money on public trust in the ECB is ambiguous.     

Assessing inflation expectations anchoring for heterogeneous agents: analysts,businesses and trade unions

Forecasts of agents who are actively involved in the setting of prices and wages are less readily available than those of professional analysts but may be more relevant for understanding inflation dynamics. Here we compare inflation expectations anchoring between analysts, businesses and trade unions for one country for which comparable forecasts are available for almost two decades: South Africa. Forecasts are modelled as monotonically diverging from an estimated long-run anchor point, or ‘implicit anchor’, towards actual inflation as the forecast horizon shortens. We find that the estimated inflation anchors of analysts lie within the 3–6 percent inflation target range of the central bank. However, those for businesses and trade unions, which our evidence suggests may be the most relevant for driving the inflation process, have remained above the top end of the official target range. Our results point to challenges for central banks seeking to gain credibility with agents whose decisions directly influence inflation.     

Does clarity of central bank communication affect credibility? Evidences considering governor-specific effects

Central banks have made great efforts to increase transparency and accountability to the public. Since then, studies seek empirical evidences about the effects of monetary policy communication over agent’s expectations. The recent literature on central bank communication draws attention to the importance of clarity of central bank communication. However, researches on this theme are still scarce, and there are few empirical studies with conclusive findings. Our study seeks empirical evidences on the relation between clarity of central bank communication and credibility of monetary policy. Estimates through different methods aim to identify whether clarity of central bank communication improves credibility. The study is the first to provide empirical evidence that a clearer communication can improve credibility. We also consider the differences between the two governors who ruled the Central Bank of Brazil in the period under analysis. The results indicate that a clear communication can improve credibility, but it depends on the commitment of the central banker with the goal of inflation control. Furthermore, estimates based on quantile regression indicate that the benefit brought by the clarity to the credibility depends on the commitment of the monetary authority with the goal guiding inflation expectations.     

CONSUMERS' INFLATION EXPECTATIONS AND MONETARY POLICY IN EUROPE

This article analyses the effects of monetary policy decisions on inflation expectations of European consumers. Using a novel approach, I convert qualitative survey responses of consumers in various European countries into a quantitative time series of inflation expectations. I investigate the effects of unanticipated movements in interest rates and inflation on inflation expectations across European countries. I inter alia seek to explore whether the reaction differs of consumers in countries with more credible central banks than those in less credible countries.     

Inflation literacy and inflation expectations: Evidence from Austrian household survey data

Inflation expectations are known to be quite heterogeneous across agents. We investigate whether this heterogeneity is primarily due to differences in people’s understanding of the inflation process and of the goals and intentions of the central bank. Using micro data from a survey conducted among 2000 Austrian households, we construct an indicator of “inflation literacy” from several questions on people’s knowledge about different aspects of inflation. We find that this indicator helps explain both the level and the uncertainty of inflation expectations: Households with relatively higher levels of inflation literacy tend to have lower and more accurate short-term and long-term inflation expectations. Interestingly, however, they are less certain about their inflation expectations than people with lower levels of inflation literacy. We also find that people’s trust in the central bank and in its ability to maintain price stability significantly dampens their inflation expectations.     

Effects of transparency,monetary policy signalling and clarity of central bank communication on disagreement about inflation expectations

The literature on transparency and central bank communication and the literature on disagreement about expectations are evolving; however, both have been evolving separately. Despite the advances in the literature, several key issues remain open and there are gaps to be filled. Therefore, this study analyses the effects of monetary policy signalling and clarity of central bank communication on disagreement about inflation expectations. It also investigates whether greater transparency coincides with lower levels of disagreement in inflation expectations in Brazil. The findings suggest that transparency is important to reduce disagreement about inflation expectations. Moreover, our estimates indicate that central bank communication and clarity affect disagreement about inflation expectations in Brazil.     

Signalling commitment with monetary and inflation targets

This article studies a two-period game between the public and a central bank about whose ability to commit to an announced target the public is uncertain. The central bank chooses between announcing a target for an intermediate variable (money growth) and its goal variable, inflation. Prior to setting its instrument, the central bank receives private, noisy information about the link between money growth and inflation. Monetary targeting facilitates communication of the central bank's type, in that the probability of separation is always higher than under inflation targeting. This advantage of monetary targets from a dependable central bank's perspective is outweighed for most parameter values by the advantage of inflation targeting in terms of inflation control. If the regime choice is treated as a strategic decision, over a large range of parameter values both central banks choose the regime that a dependable central bank would prefer.     

Deposit insurance and depositor discipline: direct evidence on bank switching behaviour in Japan

As Japan's financial system becomes more market oriented, depositor discipline is playing a larger role in the monitoring of banks. Matching household survey data with banks’ financial data, we examine households’ response to bank risk and different deposit insurance schemes. We find that bank switching in response to risk increased between 1996 and 2001 and households’ choice of bank adequately reflects banks’ financial health. We also examine the determinants of households’ knowledge of the deposit insurance scheme and how this affects switching behaviour. The results suggest that depositor discipline works and could play an important supplementary role in bank monitoring.     

Financial market imperfections and monetary policy strategy

In a model with imperfect money, credit and reserve markets, we examine if an inflation-targeting central bank applying the funds rate operating procedure to indirectly control market interest rates also needs a monetary aggregate as policy instrument. We show that if private agents use information extracted from money and financial markets to form inflation expectations and if interest rate pass-through is incomplete, the central bank can use a narrow monetary aggregate and the discount interest rate as independent and complementary policy instruments to reinforce the credibility of its announcements and the role of inflation target as a nominal anchor for inflation expectations. This study shows how a monetary policy strategy combining inflation targeting and monetary targeting can be conceived to guarantee macroeconomic stability and the credibility of monetary policy. Friedman's k-percent money growth rule, which can generate dynamic instability, and two alternative stabilizing feedback monetary targeting rules are examined.     

Anchoring of inflation expectations in the euro area: Recent evidence based on survey data

This article analyses the anchoring of inflation expectations of professional forecasters and consumers in the euro area. We study anchoring, defined as the central bank's ability to manage expectations, by paying special attention to the impact of the ECB inflation target and ECB inflation projections on inflation expectations. Our analysis indicates that in the post-crisis period longer-term inflation expectations have become somewhat more sensitive to shorter-term ones and to actual HICP inflation. We also find that the ECB inflation projections have recently become more important for short- and medium-term expectations of professional forecasters and at the same time the role of the ECB inflation target for those expectations has diminished. Overall, our analysis suggests that in recent years inflation expectations in the euro area have shown some signs of de-anchoring.     

Are survey expectations theory-consistent? The role of central bank communication and news

In this paper we analyze whether central bank communication can facilitate the understanding of key economic concepts. Using survey data for consumers and professionals, we calculate how many of them have expectations consistent with the Fisher Equation, the Taylor rule and the Phillips curve and test, by accounting for three different communication channels, whether central banks can influence those. A substantial share of participants has expectations consistent with the Fisher equation, followed by the Taylor rule and the Phillips curve. We show that having theory-consistent expectations is beneficial, as it improves the forecast accuracy. Furthermore, consistency is time varying. Exploring this time variation, we provide evidence that central bank communication as well as news on monetary policy can facilitate the understanding of those concepts and thereby improve the efficacy of monetary policy.     

Revisiting the inflation perception conundrum

Households' inflation perceptions and expectations play a key role in many dynamic macroeconomic and monetary models and are important for the ability of central banks to reach their objective of price stability. This paper revisits the issue of overestimation bias in inflation perceptions and expectations based on new and unique microdata from the Danish part of the EU-Harmonised Consumer Expectations Survey linked to rich household-level data from administrative registers. The analysis shows that accounting for even several of the household characteristics and social gradients usually addressed in the literature is far from sufficient to explain the inflation perception bias. Furthermore, we find that respondents participating in the survey more than once tend to be persistent in their degree of perception bias and that overpessimistic households have larger perception bias than other households. This indicates that inflation perception bias is related to fundamental personality traits. Finally, households' expectations of the future inflation level tend to be mean reverting and associated with the same types of bias as inflation perceptions.     

Can central bank communication help to stabilise inflation expectations?

This paper examines whether central bank communication stabilises euro area inflation expectations through the information and news channel. A novelty of the study is its use of data from Google Analytics on ECB website traffic as proxy for visitors’ attention to its communication. We conduct several econometric tests with daily data to measure the impact of ECB communication on the information demand of the public and ultimately on inflation expectations. Overall, this study shows that website attention, as captured by search volumes of visitors, influences euro area inflation expectations. We find that increased website attention contributes to narrowing the gap between market-based forecasts and (the mean of) longer-term professional inflation expectations. Our findings add to the theoretical evidence on the existence of an information and news channel.     

CENTRAL BANK STRATEGIC FORECASTING

In most of the literature on transparency it has been standard to assume that central banks release truthful information when communicating with the public. However, the monetary policymaker may act strategically and misrepresent private information intending to reduce economic volatility by manipulating inflation expectations. We set up a simple model which includes misrepresentation as a possible action for the central bank and derive some testable implications. The empirical evidence from the analysis of inflation forecasts of six central banks (Brazil, Canada, England, Iceland, New Zealand, and Sweden) is consistent with the existence of strategic forecasting. (JEL E52, E58)     

Inflation Expectations and Monetary Policy Surprises*

We estimate monetary policy surprises for European consumers over time, based on monetary policy changes that were unanticipated according to consumers’ stated beliefs. We find that such monetary policy surprises have the opposite impact on inflation expectations from the impact found when assuming that consumers are well informed. Relaxing the latter assumption by focusing on consumers’ stated beliefs, unanticipated increases in the interest rate raise inflation expectations before the 2008 financial crisis. This is consistent with imperfect information theoretical settings where interest rate hikes are interpreted as positive news about the state of the economy by consumers who know that policymakers have relatively more information.     

What determines households inflation expectations? Theory and evidence from a household survey

The purpose of the present paper is to study how households form inflation expectations using a novel survey dataset of Italian households. We extend the existing ‘inattentiveness’ literature by incorporating explicitly inflation targets and distinguishing between aggregate and disaggregate dynamics based on demographic groups. We also consider both the short- and long-run dynamics as households update their inflation expectations. While we find clear distinctions between the various demographic groups behavior, households tend to absorb professionals forecast. The short-run dynamics also indicate they not only overreact when updating their expectations but also adjust asymmetrically to any perceived momentum change of future inflation.     

Monetary policy with heterogeneous households and imperfect risk-sharing

This paper considers a sticky-price model with heterogeneous households and financial frictions. Financial frictions lead to imperfect risk-sharing among households with idiosyncratic labor incomes. I study implications of imperfect risk-sharing for optimal monetary policy by documenting its impacts on the monetary transmission mechanism, the inflation–output tradeoff faced by the central bank, the policy objective function, and the resulting targeting rule. The main finding is that while the central bank continues to have the conventional dual mandate — the output gap and inflation stabilization — it should place a greater weight on the later as the degree of financial frictions increases because price stability provides the additional benefit of reducing undesired consumption dispersion.     

Interest rate policy and interbank market breakdown

Using a DSGE-model with interbank market frictions, calibrated to match the frequency of financial crises, I investigate central banks' ability to prevent credit-related recessions by following an interest rate rule which accounts for financial conditions —an approach called ‘leaning against the wind’. The model's key feature is that boom-bust cycles emerge as a result of a savings glut and moral hazard in the banking sector. Although financial conditions predict crises, the policy maker cannot break the boom-bust cycle and reduce the crisis-frequency. When crises become more likely, low inflation forces the central bank to decrease the interest rate despite its intention to do otherwise. Responding to crisis-predictors eventually dilutes the primary objective of stabilizing inflation and leads to higher inflation volatility. The results suggest that central banks should refrain from leaning against the wind.