Learning in Elections and Voter Turnout

Voter turnout in game theoretic models of voting has typically been difficult to predict because of the problem of multiple Nash equilibria ( Palfrey and Rosenthal 1983, 1985 ). Many of these equilibria require an extreme precision of beliefs among voters that is unlikely to be reached in real elections. At the same time, mechanisms like pre‐election polls exist to shape the beliefs of voters about expected turnout. We combine these two features in a model of voter learning in elections and characterize the asymptotically stable equilibria of both complete and incomplete information games in a simple symmetric setting with two candidates. We also show how the model can be used to qualitatively explain several phenomena observed in reality: increases in costs of voting affect turnout adversely but there may be persistence of turnout levels between elections even though costs and other parameters change. Increase in uncertainty increases turnout while increases in the size of the electorate decrease it, in line with intuition.     

Damaging democracy? Security provision and turnout in Afghan elections†

In emerging democracies, elections are encouraged as a route to democratization. However, not only does violence often threaten these elections, but citizens often view as corrupt the security forces deployed to combat violence. We examine the effects of such security provision. In Afghanistan's 2010 parliamentary election, polling centers with similar histories of pre‐election violence unintentionally received different deployments of the Afghan National Police, enabling identification of police's effects on turnout. Using data from the universe of polling sites and various household surveys, data usually unavailable in conflict settings, we estimate increases in police presence decreased voter turnout by an average of 30%. Our results adjudicate between competing theoretical mechanisms through which security forces could affect turnout, and show behavior is not driven by voter anticipation of election‐day violence. This highlights a pitfall for building government legitimacy via elections in weakly institutionalized and conflict‐affected states.     

A Psychologically Based Model of Voter Turnout

We analyze a psychologically based model of voter turnout. Potential voters experience regret if they fail to vote, which is the motivation for participation in voting. Regret from abstention is inversely related to the margin of victory. Voters on the winner's side experience less regret than those on the loser's side. We show that the unique equilibrium involves positive voter turnout. We show that the losing side has higher turnout. In addition, voter turnout is positively related to importance of the election and the competitiveness of the election. We also consider scenarios in which voters are uncertain about the composition of the electorate's political preferences and show similar phenomena emerge.     

Electoral fraud and voter turnout: An experimental study

In this paper we experimentally investigate the consequences of electoral fraud on voter turnout. The experiment is based on a strategic binary voting model where voters decide whether to cast a costly vote in favour of their preferred candidate or to abstain. The electoral process is illicitly influenced by applying ballot-box stuffing. In the experiment we implement two different framings: we compare voter turnout in a neutral environment and with framed instructions to explicitly replicate elections. This approach enables us to both test the model's predictions and to estimate the framing effects of voting and fraud. Comparison of experimental results with theoretical predictions reveals over-voting, which is exacerbated when fraud occurs. Turnout increases as predicted with a moderate level of fraud while, with higher levels of electoral fraud, voters fail to recognize that the existence of a relatively larger number of “agents” voting with certainty considerably decreases the benefits of voting. Importantly, framing matters, as revealed by the higher turnout of those in the majority group, against which the fraud is applied.     

SEQUENTIAL VOTING WHEN LONG ELECTIONS ARE COSTLY

This paper analyzes sequential voting in binary elections when voters are motivated by a desire both to elect their preferred candidate and to avoid a long and costly election. I find a unique equilibrium in which a voter's action depends both on the intensity of the voter's preferences as well as how well the candidates have done in earlier voting rounds. This equilibrium results in momentum in which voters are more likely to vote for the candidate currently in the lead. Furthermore, the probability a voter votes for a candidate is increasing in the size of the candidate's lead. As a consequence, a candidate is more likely to win the election if the candidate's stronger supporters vote earlier in the election.     

Exit polls,turnout, and bandwagon voting: Evidence from a natural experiment

We exploit a voting reform in France to estimate the causal effect of exit poll information on turnout and bandwagon voting. Before the change in legislation, individuals in some French overseas territories voted after the election result had already been made public via exit poll information from mainland France. We estimate that knowing the exit poll information decreases voter turnout by about 11 percentage points. Our study is the first clean empirical design outside of the laboratory to demonstrate the effect of such knowledge on voter turnout. Furthermore, we find that exit poll information significantly increases bandwagon voting; that is, voters who choose to turn out are more likely to vote for the expected winner.     

Dissertation abstract: Voting in the laboratory

Almost every week national elections are held somewhere in the world. Many more elections take place at federal and local levels of government. Surely, these are important events to many of us. This thesis aims at providing a better understanding of why and how people vote in elections. Three original modifications of Palfrey and Rosenthal’s (1983) participation game are used to study voter turnout theoretically and experimentally.¹ In the basic game, each voter supports (i.e., prefers) one of two exogenous candidates and privately decides between voting at a cost and abstaining (without costs). The candidate who receives more votes wins the election (ties are broken randomly) and each supporter of this candidate receives an equal reward, independent of whether or not she voted. The first study (published in the American Political Science Review 100, pp. 235–248) analyzes the effects of social embeddedness on turnout, assuming that voters may be influenced by observing the decisions of other voters around them (e.g., a family or working place). Our experimental results show that the social context matters: this information increases turnout by more than 50%. The increase is greater when neighbors support the same candidate rather than when they support opponents. The second study investigates the effects of public opinion polls on voter turnout and welfare. Poll releases resolve uncertainty about the level of support for each candidate caused by `floating’ voters, whose preferences change across elections. This information increases turnout in the laboratory by 28–34%, depending on the fraction of floating voters in the electorate. If polls indicate equal levels of support for both candidates—in which case aggregate benefits for society are not affected by the outcome—welfare decreases substantially due to costs from excessive turnout. In the final study, elections are preceded by the competition between two candidates: they simultaneously announce binding policy offers in which some voters can be favored at the expense of others through inclusion and exclusion in budget expenditure (Myerson 1993).² We observe that policy offers include 33% more voters—yielding a smaller budget share for each—when voting is compulsory rather than voluntary. Moreover, we find evidence of political bonds between voters and long-lived parties. Overall, in all three experiments many subjects strongly react to economic incentives (i.e., benefits, costs, and informational clues), often in line with what is observed outside of the laboratory. JEL Classification C72, C92, D72 Dissertation Committee: Arthur Schram, University of Amsterdam (advisor) Axel Ockenfels, University of Cologne Thomas Palfrey, California Institute of Technology Cees van der Eijk, University of Nottingham Frans van Winden, University of Amsterdam ¹Palfrey, T.R., & Rosenthal, H. (1983). A strategic calculus of voting. Public Choice, 41, 7–53. ²Myerson, R.B. (1993). Incentives to cultivate favored minorities under alternative electoral systems. American Political Science Review, 87, 856–869.     

Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates

   Summary. A no-show paradox occurs each time a single voter or a group of voters can manipulate the outcome by not participating to the election process. Among other voting procedures, the scoring run-off methods, which eliminate progressively the alternatives on the basis of scoring rules, suffer from this flaw. We here estimate how frequent this paradox is for three candidate elections under the classical Impartial Culture and Impartial Anonymous Culture assumptions, for different population sizes. The conditions under which this paradox occurs are also described, as well as the relationships with manipulations for a fixed number of voters. Received: October 21, 1999; revised version: January 12, 2000     

Searching for the Downsian Voter with a Simple Structural Model

Studies of voter turnout consistently find that turnout responds to the closeness of the election, yet it is widely claimed that the probability of casting the deciding vote is too minute to be of consequence. We provide evidence on this puzzle by deriving a structural rational voting model in the form of a relatively simple regression equation, and fitting it to data from a large sample of US congressional elections.     

Voter turnout and the principle of ‘one person,one vote’: empirical evidence from the constituency freeze in India

This article uses panel data from national and state elections in India during the period 1977–2007 to examine the effect of inequality in constituency population size on voter turnout. During this period, constituency boundaries in India remained fixed. As a result, differences in population size between constituencies increased, thus changing the value of a single vote. Using this large variation in population size and informative data, this article carefully distinguishes the effect of population size from other factors. We find that an increase of one million electorates decreases voter turnout by 12–27%. In addition, we find that the share of votes gained by national political parties is greater in small-population constituencies. This suggests that political parties direct their efforts in electoral campaigns preferentially to less populous constituencies; as a result, voters in small constituencies are more likely to participate in elections.     

Voter turnout in US presidential elections: does Carville’s law explain the time series?

We estimate a time series model of voter turnout for 34 US presidential elections, 1880–2012. Employing a variety of econometric techniques, our major results are as follows. (1) A negative and significant structural shift in voter turnout occurs in 1972 and is too large to be explained by the lowering of the voting age. (2) The 1972 shift is the only statistically significant structural shift to occur since the first decade of the twentieth century. (3) Short-term macroeconomic conditions significantly impact turnout, with unemployment having a positive effect. (4) Turnout in recent presidential elections has not deviated significantly from the post-1972 norm. (5) Turnout is positively related to the expected closeness of the election outcome, but contrary to some theoretical predictions, closeness exhibits no trend over time.     

Coordinated voting in sequential and simultaneous elections: some experimental evidence

This paper studies a situation wherein a set of voters choose between two alternatives in the presence of a payoff externality. Specifically, regardless of her intrinsic preference, a voter’s payoff is maximized should she vote for the alternative that garners a majority of the votes cast. Are votes coordinated on a single alternative? Using laboratory experiments, we examine voting patterns in sequential voting and simultaneous voting elections. Across both election types, we also vary the amount of information that an individual voter has regarding the intrinsic preferences of the other voters. Our main findings are as follows. In the “low” information treatment, sequential voting elections facilitate coordinated voting. However, in the “high” information treatment, voting patterns are not dependent on how the election is structured.     

THE STRATEGIC TIMING OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY

This paper focuses on the strategic timing of elections by agenda-setters in direct democracy settings. Because concurrent elections affect turnout, scheduling referenda for different elections will produce different median voters. I hypothesize that agenda-setters with power over the timing of a referendum will schedule the referendum in conjunction with the other set of races that produce a policy closest to their preferred outcome. Consistent with the theory, I show that Wisconsin school boards' use of special elections for school referenda are related to differences in the revealed preferences of voters in low- and high-turnout elections.     

Term limit extension and electoral participation. Evidence from a diff-in-discontinuities design at the local level in Italy

We study the effect of term limits on voter turnout in Italian local elections. Since 2014 the Italian law allows mayors in municipalities with a population size lower than 3,000 inhabitants to re-run for a third term, whereas mayors in cities with a number of residents above the cut-off still face a two-term limit. The introduction of the reform permits us to implement a difference-in-discontinuities design exploiting the before/after with the discontinuous policy change. We find that voters negatively react to the introduction of the reform: electoral participation decreases by about 5 percentage points in municipalities eligible to the treatment compared to municipalities in the control group. This negative effect is essentially driven by a decrease in the political competition. We also find that relaxing term limits does not improve the quality of politicians running for election.     

Voter turnout and the size of government

This paper uses Swedish and Finnish municipal data to investigate the effect of changes in voter turnout on the tax rate, public spending and vote-shares. A reform in Sweden in 1970, which overall lowered the cost of voting, is applied as an instrument for voter turnout in local elections. The reform increased voter turnout in Sweden. The higher voter turnout resulted in higher municipal taxes and greater per capita local public spending. There are also indications that higher turnout decreased the vote share for right-wing parties. I use an individual survey data set to conclude that it was in particular low income earners that began to vote to a greater extent after the reform.     

Abstention and signaling in large repeated elections

I consider a two period model of repeated elections in which politicians update their beliefs about the preferences of the voters after the first period election and set second period policies accordingly. When voting is costless, a positive fraction of voters abstains for any finite population, but abstention vanishes in the limit of an arbitrarily large election. I demonstrate that in large elections, a single vote changes second period policies by an amount exponentially large compared to the probability of influencing the first period election if the probabilities with which voters vote for the two candidates differ. Using this, I prove that the limiting voting behavior in the first election is independent of the first period policy choices of the candidates. The incentive to vote to signal oneʼs preferences thus dominates the incentive to vote to increase the chances of electing oneʼs preferred candidate.     

Divided government and dominance solvability

This paper considers strategic voters who face an institutional structure in which there are two branches of the government: the executive, elected by plurality rule and the legislature, elected by proportional rule. Policy outcomes are described through a compromise between these two branches. I solve the game by relying only on purely non-cooperative behavior of individual voters. I prove the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the legislative subgame, where the election of the president is known. This equilibrium can be obtained by the process of iterated elimination of dominated strategies. I then solve the whole game by backward induction. The results suggest moderate behavior of voters, due to the desire to balance the plurality of a party in the presidential election by voting for the opposite party in the legislature. Similar results can be obtained in the case of reverse timing of the elections, as well as in the case where elections of the two branches of the government are simultaneous.     

DISENTANGLING THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION ON VOTER TURNOUT: THE FLEMISH MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

Political fragmentation has been shown to be an important determinant of electoral turnout. We introduce an empirical approach that allows disentangling the impact of two dimensions of such fragmentation: the number of parties and the size inequalities between those parties. This is important as it allows us to assess the size, significance, and direction of the individual effects of each element – an aspect disregarded in previous research. Our empirical analysis of the 2000 Flemish municipal elections shows that a higher number of parties competing in the election lowers turnout. The size inequalities between the parties exert a positive – though insignificant – influence on voter participation.     

Turnout and Closeness: Evidence from 60 Years of Bavarian Mayoral Elections

One prediction of the calculus of voting is that electoral closeness positively affects turnout via a higher probability of one vote being decisive. I test this theory with data on all mayoral elections in the German state of Bavaria between 1946 and 2009. Importantly, I use constitutionally prescribed two‐round elections to measure electoral closeness and thereby improve on existing work that mostly uses ex post measures that are prone to endogeneity. The results suggest that electoral closeness matters: a one standard deviation increase in closeness increases turnout by 1.27 percentage points, which corresponds to 1/7 of a standard deviation in this variable. I also evaluate how other factors such as electorate size or rain on election day affect turnout differentially depending on the closeness of the race. While rain decreases turnout on average, this effect is mitigated in close elections, as indicated by a positive interaction effect of the two variables.     

Do non-citizens affect U.S. Congressional elections?

U.S. citizens against immigration argue that immigrants commit voter fraud and skew election outcomes towards progressive candidates. These arguments have increased in number and severity since the Supreme Court ruled in 2013 that states cannot require photo identification from voters. We examine whether the size of the non-citizen population is related to election outcomes. Previous research indicates that non-citizens sway elections in favour of progressive candidates but only in elections where the victory margin is small. We find no evidence of a relationship between non-citizens and vote outcomes. We find evidence that the percent of the population that is non-white is positively related to percent of votes cast for democratic candidates.