Speculative attacks and defenses as wars of attrition

This paper extends the currency crisis models in Obstfeld [Obstfeld, M., 1994. The logic of currency crises. Cahiers Economiques et Monetaries], [Obstfeld, M., 1996. Models of currency crises with self-fulfilling features. European Economic Review 40, 1037–1047] by modeling both the government's side and speculators' side and introducing uncertainty about each party's payoff. We argue that a speculative attack (defense) can be well modeled as a war of attrition between the government and speculators under asymmetric information. We then solve for a pure strategy, weakly perfect, Bayesian rational expectation equilibrium in which each party's time until concession depends on her benefits from winning and her costs of fighting. Using this model, we are able to explain important facts of currency crises. First, the model shows that failed defenses (attacks) can be ex-ante rational for governments (speculators). Second, the model predicts systematic variations in the durations of defenses. Finally, we also show that currency crises can be self-fulfilling in the sense that there exist multiple rational expectation equilibria in our model.     

The choice between multiplicative and additive production uncertainty

When modeling output uncertainty, the multiplicative specification is consistently chosen over the additive form, despite the latter being arguably intuitively more obvious. The rationale for this seems to be that when production risk is the only source of uncertainty, additive uncertainty does not reduce output below the certainty level, while multiplicative uncertainty does. We show that, in the absence of hedging, this result is drastically modified when there is simultaneous price and output uncertainty. In this situation the theoretical implications of the two specifications are sufficiently similar to preclude any a priori choice between the two. Thus the choice between the additive and multiplicative formulations may be dictated by how each performs in empirical analyses.     

货币危机与银行危机共生因子实证分析——国别比较的视角

共生危机的事实表明,货币危机与银行危机共生的现象在不同类型的国家均可能出现,而非某一类国家所特有的现象.基于对共生性货币银行危机触发机制国别差异的考察,文章在对1980～2006年间60个国家共生危机发生情况识别的基础上,分别构建了工业化国家和发展中国家共生危机生成的逐步Logistic回归模型.研究表明,工业化国家的共生危机主要是经济中各类矛盾累积的结果,发展中国家则主要源于本国制度缺陷,而采用滞后一期的变量来解释工业化国家共生危机时,效果不显著.     

论银行体系在货币投机攻击中的融资角色

20世纪末爆发于东南亚国家的金融危机给该地区乃至整个世界经济都造成了严重的损失。危机之后一些学者对于该地区银行的经营业绩与危机之间的关系作了大量的研究,研究结果表明经营状况较差的银行体系往往会诱发货币危机的爆发。本文在前人研究的基础上独辟蹊径,论述了一国良好的银行体系在投机性货币攻击中所扮演的角色,进而提出了对一国国内信贷量进行控制的政策操作建议。     

The more contagion effect on emerging markets: The evidence of DCC-GARCH model

The paper aims to test the existence of financial contagion between foreign exchange markets of several emerging and developed countries during the U.S. subprime crisis. As a result of DCC-GARCH analysis, we find the evidence of contagion during U.S. subprime crisis for most of the developed and emerging countries. Another finding is that emerging markets seem to be the most influenced by the contagion effects during U.S. subprime crisis. Since financial contagion is important for monetary policy, risk measurement, asset pricing and portfolio allocation, the findings of paper may be interest of policy makers, investors and portfolio managers.     

Evaluating currency crises: A Bayesian Markov switching approach

In this paper we examine the nature of a currency crisis. We do so by employing an out-of-sample forecasting exercise to analyse the Mexican crisis in 1994. Forecast evaluation was based on modern econometric techniques concerning the shape of forecaster’s loss function. We also extend the empirical framework suggested by Jeanne and Masson [Jeanne, O., Masson, P., 2000. Currency crises and Markov-switching regimes. Journal of International Economics 50, 327–350] to test for the hypothesis that the currency crisis was driven by sunspots. To this end we contribute to the existing literature by comparing Markov regime switching model with a time-varying transition probabilities with two alternative models. The first is a Markov regime switching model with constant transition probabilities. The second is a linear benchmark model. Empirical results show that the proxy for the probability of devaluation is an important factor explaining the nature of currency crisis. More concretely, when the expectation market pressure was used as a proxy of probability of devaluation, forecast evaluation supports the view that currency crisis was driven by market expectation unrelated to fundamentals. Alternatively, when interest rate differential is used as a proxy for probability of devaluation, currency crisis was due to predictable deterioration of fundamentals.     

补充货币的理论、实践与启示——基于后危机时代的思考

补充货币作为官方货币的补充形式,具有异于官方货币的独特功能,为应对当前货币危机、失业、老龄化、环境污染等问题提供了有益的思考。文章在回顾补充货币的相关理论的基础上,考察了补充货币在不同时期的实践情况,提出补充货币对解决我国经济和社会问题的重要意义。     

Stabilizations, crises and the “exit” problem – A theoretical model

Exchange-rate-based stabilizations, even if successful, usually lack credibility initially. This is reflected in high (ex post) real interest rates and some degree of real exchange rate appreciation. Empirical observation suggests that wage inflation declines smoothly over time whilst interest rates are volatile. Our model captures these features and provides insights into: the eruption of exchange rate crises after a long period of apparently successful stabilization; the potential advantages of a heterodox approach; when to delay a stabilization attempt; and the optimal date for “exit” to a floating exchange rate.     

基于外汇储备属性的外汇储备币种结构研究

文章对外汇储备币种结构确定的现有思路进行了梳理并对现有思路进行了分类评述,在此基础上通过解析非国际货币发行国外汇储备的基本属性,探讨了基于外汇储备属性的非国际货币发行国确定外汇储备最优币种结构的可行思路,从而为非国际货币发行国外汇储备币种结构确定的研究和实践提供借鉴。文章认为,非国际货币发行国的外汇储备包含国际支付工具、国际风险资产和宏观政策工具三种基本属性;对应于外汇储备的每一种基本属性都可以根据一定的原则和方法找到相应的最优币种结构;在此基础上,结合中央银行依据自身偏好和宏观经济现状为外汇储备三种基本属性设定的权重,通过对外汇储备不同属性下的最优币种结构进行加权组合可以求出本国外汇储备的最优币种结构。     

Experimental analysis on the role of a large speculator in currency crises

Corsetti et al. (2004) demonstrate that the presence of a large speculator in the foreign exchange market makes the remaining traders more aggressive in their speculative attacks. We conduct an experiment designed to test their theoretical predictions and also use the experiment to analyze an additional aspect that has not been previously covered in the literature: namely, whether the entry of a large speculator and the exit of the same speculator have the same effect in magnitude on the probability of a successful speculative attack. We obtain two main findings. First, the results support the main conclusion of Corsetti et al. (2004) that the presence of a large speculator makes other small speculators more aggressive. Second, the results suggest that the effect of the entry of a large speculator on the probability of successful speculative attacks is larger than that of the exit of the same speculator.     

The International Politics of Reactive Currency Statecraft: Japan’s Reaction to the Rise of the Chinese Renminbi

This study analyses how a state’s reactive currency statecraft – its strategic reaction to an international currency issued by a foreign state – is shaped, by devoting special attention to its broad foreign policy stance towards the state issuing that international currency, with a main empirical focus on the Japanese case with regard to the Chinese renminbi. This research argues that a state uses its policy related to a foreign international currency as a diplomatic means of managing its political relationship with the state issuing that currency, while also showing that in general most market actors are not greatly interested in their governments’ policies regarding foreign international currencies, especially those that are newly internationalising ones. This study finds as well that the conventional notion of ‘competition’ between international currencies does not necessarily affect a state’s reactive currency statecraft, even if its own currency is a major international one. All of this suggests that the inter-state politics between the state issuing an international currency and foreign states does have a crucial impact on the currency’s international use, especially during its early stages of internationalisation. It also implies that a state’s reactive currency statecraft can be fluid, depending upon the directions of its foreign policy.     

Do Monetary Unions Make Economic Sense? Evidence from the Scandinavian Currency Union, 1873–1913

Popular propositions as to what constitutes a successful single currency area are examined by looking at the Scandinavian Currency Union (1873–1913) formed by Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Applying a frequently used indicator of the desirability of monetary union, we study the symmetry of country-specific structural shocks (measured net of the non-Scandinavian influence) in these three countries. It is found that country-specific shocks are not highly symmetric. This conclusion is also supported by the absence of clear-cut differences between the pattern of structural shocks in Belgium and structural shocks in the Scandinavian countries. This suggests that the three Scandinavian countries did not form an optimum currency area during the period 1873–1913.
JEL classification : F 15; F 33; N 13     

从OCA理论看东亚地区货币金融合作的前景

在经济全球化和金融自由化的背景下,国家之间的货币政策协调越来越显得重要,最优货币区理论就是在这一背景下提出的.对东亚地区而言,在东南亚金融危机爆发以后,加强国家之间的货币金融合作的呼声越来越高,并且东亚地区许多方面已经满足了最优货币区的标准.但由于政治上的原因,在东亚地区建立统一货币区的时机还不成熟,因此,东亚地区货币区的建立应该在最优货币区理论的指导下循序渐进地进行.