Index-linked government bonds and the efficiency of monetary policy

This essay considers James Tobin's suggestion that the introduction of index-linked government bonds could make monetary policy more efficient. A macroeconomic model incorporating a given state of expectations and uncertainty is used to show that there should be no systematic difference between the effects of a given monetary policy shift in a regime in which government bonds are index-linked and in a regime in which government bonds are nominal. Monetary policy could have different effects in the two regimes when the model is complicated to allow the monetary policy shift to generate changes in the state of expectations and uncertainty; even so, it is impossible to say a priori in which regime monetary policy would be more efficient.     

Theory and Practice of Contagion in Monetary Unions: Domino Effects in EMU Mediterranean Countries

This paper analyzes strategic interactions and contagion effects in the peripheral countries of a monetary union. Using game theory and cost-benefit analysis, the paper determines the set of equilibrium solutions under which country-specific shocks are transmitted to other member countries giving rise to contagion. Numerical simulations, obtained by a simple calibration of the model on some key Mediterranean countries of the Euro Zone, show the probabilities of contagion from Greece, Spain and Italy.     

MONETARY CREDIBILITY VS. VOTER APPROVAL: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND EXCHANGE‐RATE STABILIZATION DURING CRISES

This paper analyzes how political institutions affect the execution of exchange‐rate policy. By focusing on policy‐makers' responses to the emergence of speculative pressure on their currencies, we argue that the effect of democratic institutions on exchange‐rate stability is likely to be conditioned by the officially announced exchange‐rate regime. Officially fixed exchange rates are the main instrument of autocrats to signal commitment to long‐term stability. Autocratic governments with strictly fixed exchange rates are thus more likely to defend their exchange rates than autocrats with an intermediate regime because the latter implicitly signal that they care less about monetary stability. In contrast, democrats defend more often in intermediately than in fully fixed official regimes by using a combination of external and internal adjustments, which reduce the negative effects of a devaluation on voters. Our analysis of 189 currency crises between 1975 and 1999 supports this conditional effect.     

Robust central banking under wage bargaining: Is monetary policy transparency beneficial?

We study the role of transparency in an environment of robust monetary policy under wage bargaining. The standard view from the game-theoretical literature is that, with unionised labour markets, monetary policy transparency is unambiguously “bad” (it induces increases in wage and price inflation, unemployment and may lead to higher inflation uncertainty). The empirical literature is instead ambiguous about the macroeconomic effects of transparency. By recasting the earlier theory into a robust monetary policy environment, and focusing transparency on the uncertainty about the preference for price stability, we show that the macroeconomic effects of transparency are more favourable than normally found. The impact on nominal wages, inflation and real variables (real wages and unemployment) is not parameter-free but depends on the public's informedness about this coefficient. The impact on real variables is found to disappear in case unions do not internalise the effect of wage decisions on the economy (i.e. in the case of atomistic unions). Finally, we find that the effect of transparency on inflation uncertainty is more complex than in the standard approach. We show that transparency may have the beneficial effect of reducing inflation variability not only when monetary uncertainty is low (as previously reported), but also when monetary uncertainty exceeds an upper threshold.     

Asymmetric expectation effects of regime shifts in monetary policy

This paper addresses two substantive issues: (1) Does the magnitude of the expectation effect of regime switching in monetary policy depend on a particular policy regime? (2) Under which regime is the expectation effect quantitatively important? Using two canonical DSGE models, we show that there exists asymmetry in the expectation effect across regimes. The expectation effect under the dovish policy regime is quantitatively more important than that under the hawkish regime. These results suggest that the possibility of regime shifts in monetary policy can have important effects on rational agents' expectation formation and on equilibrium dynamics. They offer a theoretical explanation for the empirical possibility that a policy shift from the dovish regime to the hawkish regime may not be the main source of substantial reductions in the volatilities of inflation and output.     

Strategic interactions and airline network morphology under demand uncertainty

In this paper, we examine how strategic interactions affect airline network under demand uncertainty. We develop a three-stage duopoly game: at stage 1 airlines determine their network structure (linear versus hub-and-spoke); at stage 2 they decide on their capacities; at stage 3 firms compete in quantities. The main feature of the model is that firms have to decide on network structure and capacities while facing demand uncertainty. We show that while hubbing is efficient, airlines may choose a linear network for strategic reasons. Furthermore, we show that this structure softens competition by preventing contagion of competition across markets.     

Asymmetric responses of money demand to oil price shocks in Saudi Arabia: a non-linear ARDL approach

Saudi Arabia is an open oil-based economy with fixed exchange rates; therefore, it has limited monetary policy autonomy. Using non-linear autoregressive distributed lag approach, this article investigates the asymmetric effects of oil price shocks on the demand of money in Saudi Arabia over the period 1990:Q1–2014:Q4. The empirical results show evidence of positive long run but asymmetric effects of oil price shocks on the money demand. In particular, we find that the positive oil price shocks are more important than negative shocks. Therefore, two policy responses can be considered: either sustaining the fixed exchange rate regime and following an economic diversification policy or switching towards a flexible exchange rate regime to achieve price stability. In that case, the existence of a stable money demand function in Saudi Arabia is a necessary precondition for adopting a monetary policy strategy targeted to price stability using instruments like money targeting.     

Financial distress and fiscal inflation

Is inflation ‘always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon’ or is it fundamentally a fiscal phenomenon? The answer hinges crucially on the underlying monetary–fiscal policy regime. Scant attention has been directed to the role of credit market frictions in discerning the policy regime, despite its growing importance in empirical macroeconomics. We augment a standard monetary model to incorporate fiscal details and credit market imperfections. These ingredients allow for both interpretations of the inflation process in a financially constrained environment. We find that introducing financial frictions to the model and adding financial variables to the dataset generate important identifying restrictions on the observed pattern between inflation and measures of financial and fiscal stress, to the extent that it overturns existing findings about which monetary–fiscal policy regime produced the U.S. data. To confront policy regime uncertainty, we propose the use of dynamic prediction pools and find strong cyclical patterns in the estimated historical regime weights.     

HOW DO FISCAL CONSOLIDATION AND FISCAL STIMULI IMPACT ON THE SYNCHRONIZATION OF BUSINESS CYCLES?

Using quarterly data for a panel of advanced economies, we show that synchronized fiscal consolidation (stimulus) programmes in different countries make their business cycles more closely linked. We also find: (i) some evidence of decoupling when an inflation targeting regime is unilaterally adopted; (ii) an increase in business cycle synchronization when countries fix their exchange rates and become members of a monetary union; (iii) a positive effect of bilateral trade on the synchronization of business cycles. Global factors, such as a rise in global risk aversion and uncertainty and a reversal of nonstandard expansionary monetary policy, can also reduce the degree of co‐movement of business cycles across countries. From a policy perspective, our work shows that an inflation targeting regime coupled with simultaneous fiscal consolidations can lead to more business cycle synchronization.     

A dynamic Nelson-Siegel yield curve model with Markov switching

This paper proposes a model to better capture persistent regime changes in the interest rates of the US term structure. While the previous literature on this matter proposes that regime changes in the term structure are due to persistent changes in the conditional mean and volatility of interest rates we find that changes in a single parameter that determines the factor loadings of the model better captures regime changes. We show that this model gives superior in-sample forecasting performance as compared to a baseline model and a volatility-switching model. In general, we find compelling evidence that the extracted factors from our term structure models are closely related with various economic variables. Furthermore, we investigate and find evidence that the effects of macroeconomic phenomena such as monetary policy, inflation expectations, and real economic activity differ according to the particular regime realized for the term structure. In particular, we identify the periods where monetary policy appears to have a greater effect on the yield curve, and the periods where inflation expectations seem to have a greater effect in yield determination. We also find convincing evidence of a relationship between the regimes estimated by the various switching models with economic activity and monetary policy.     

Time inconsistency problems and commitments of monetary and fiscal policies

Within a policy game, where monetary and fiscal authorities are subject to a time inconsistency problem vis-à-vis a monopoly-union, we provide additional support for commitments of either authority: monetary commitment moderates fiscal time inconsistency problems, and fiscal commitment moderates monetary time inconsistency problems. In contrast with the benefits of commitments, a regime of coordinated monetary and fiscal policy may turn out to be counterproductive.Comments and suggestions from Torben M. Andersen and one anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. Errors and omissions are, of course, my own responsibility.     

The government's time discount rate: Choices and consequences in a dynamic framework

This paper considers a closed macroeconomy where the monetary authority pursues an inflation target and policy outcomes are the consequence of a Nash game between fiscal and monetary authorities. The specification of the macroeconomic framework is characterized by nonlinearities which lead to multiple equilibria with differing stability properties. Employing a calibrated model and simulations derived using the Mathematica package, the stability properties of the economy and the likely choice of equilibrium are examined. Within this framework, the dynamic consequences of different time discount rates for the fiscal authority are investigated, both in a world of certainty and also in a world of uncertainty. It is shown that, in a world of certainty, it will be optimal to choose the fiscal authority's time discount rate equal to the market rate of interest. However, depending on the degree of uncertainty in evaluating the time discount rates of consumers and of the fiscal authority, it may be appropriate to bias the fiscal authority's discount rate above or below the expected interest rate.     

A Framework for Independent Monetary Policy in China

As the Chinese economy becomes more market based and continuesits rapid integration into the global economy, having an independentand effective monetary policy regime oriented to domestic objectiveswill become increasingly important. Employing modern principlesof monetary policy in light of the current state of China'sfinancial institutions, we motivate and present a package ofproposals to guide the operation of a new monetary policy regime.Specifically, we recommend an explicit low long-run inflationobjective, operational independence for the People's Bank ofChina (PBC) with formal strategic guidance from the government,and a minimal set of financial sector reforms (to make the Chinesebanking system robust against interest rate fluctuations). Weargue that anchoring monetary policy with an explicit inflationobjective would be the most reliable way for the PBC to tiedown inflation expectations, and thereby enable monetary policyto make the best contribution to macroeconomic and financialstability, as well as economic growth. The management and monitoringof money (and credit) growth by the PBC would continue to playa useful role in the stabilization of inflation, but a moneytarget would not constitute a good stand-alone nominal anchor.(JEL codes: E5 and P2)     

The Implications of Uncertainty for Monetary Policy

This paper uses a simple model of the Australian economy to empirically examine the consequences of parameter uncertainty for optimal monetary policy. Optimal policy responses are derived for a monetary authority that targets inflation and output stability. Parameter uncertainty is characterised by the estimated distribution of the model coefficient estimates. Learning is ruled out, so the monetary authority can commit to its ex ante policy response. For certain shocks, taking account of parameter uncertainty can recommend more, rather than less, activist use of the policy instrument. While this finding is specific to the model specification, parameter estimates and the shocks analysed, it contrasts with the widely held belief that the generic implication of parameter uncertainty is more conservative policy.     

Firms’ money demand and monetary policy

Standard New Keynesian models for monetary policy analysis are ‘cashless’. When the nominal interest rate is the central bank's operating instrument, the LM equation is endogenous and, it is argued, can be ignored. The modern theoretical and quantitative debate on the importance of money for monetary policy conduct, however, overlooks firms’ money demand. Working in an otherwise canonical New Keynesian setup, we show that macroeconomic dynamics are critically affected by the firms’ money demand choice. Under the conventional Taylor‐rule framework, we prove that equilibrium determinacy may require either an active interest rate policy, overreacting to inflation, or a passive interest rate policy, underreacting to inflation, depending on the elasticity of production with respect to cash balances. We then develop a numerical analysis to evaluate our theoretical results. We find that macroeconomic stability is more likely to occur under an active, but not overly aggressive, monetary policy stance. We also examine the dynamic effects of forward‐looking feedback rules. We show that, in this policy regime, indeterminacy is likely to be induced by both active and passive rules, even for relatively low productivity effects of money.     

Asymmetric effects of uncertainty shocks: Normal times and financial disruptions are different

We examine whether the response of the euro area economy to uncertainty shocks depends on financial conditions. We find strong evidence that uncertainty shocks have much more powerful effects on key macroeconomic variables in episodes marked by financial distress than in normal times. We also document that the recovery of economic activity following an adverse uncertainty shock is state dependent: it is gradual in normal times, but displays a more accelerated rebound when the shock hits during financial distress, reflecting monetary accommodation provided by the central bank. These findings are based on a non-linear data-driven model that accounts for regime switching and time-varying volatility. Our findings imply that whether financial markets are calm or distressed matters when it comes to the appropriate policy responses to uncertainty shocks.     

货币政策能否促进银行对小微企业信贷投放——基于宏观经济不确定视角的研究

本文研究在宏观经济不确定条件下,不同货币政策工具能否促进银行对小微企业信贷投放。首先,将货币政策引入考虑了宏观经济不确定性的银行资产组合模型中,论证货币政策、宏观经济不确定性与银行信贷资产配置的理论关系。然后利用我国181家银行2004—2018年的数据,检验在宏观经济不确定条件下,不同货币政策工具对银行小微企业信贷行为调控的作用效果。研究结果表明：宏观经济不确定性会抑制银行信贷行为。其中小微企业信贷占比较大的银行受到的影响更为显著。与数量型货币政策相比,价格型货币政策能够更显著地减轻不确定性对银行小微信贷的消极影响。其中银行同业拆借利率的调控效果最强。研究结论对于选择适宜的货币政策工具促进银行向小微企业信贷投放,化解经济不确定性对银行信贷行为的影响并助力小微企业发展等具有政策借鉴意义。     

Monetary policy transmission under different banking structures: The role of capital and heterogeneity

This work deals with the transmission of monetary policy through the bank loan market, in the presence of a capital requirement regulation. Unlike standard models, based on the “representative bank” shortcut, we adopt the heterogeneous agents approach: this allows us to explicitly model the strategic interaction between well-capitalized and under-capitalized banks. The main results are the following. (I) The propagation of a monetary policy impulse through the loan market differs considerably, depending on the market structure: under monopolistic competition, strategic complementarity among well-capitalized banks leads to a “multiplier effect”; in the Cournot oligopoly framework, an effect of the opposite sign is at work, due to strategic substitutability. (II) Well-capitalized banks are more important, in shaping the adjustment following a monetary policy shock, than what is implied by their relative number over total; this fact strengthens the monetary policy effectiveness. This result holds under both monopolistic competition and oligopoly, although the interaction among banks, leading to such a result, differs across the two banking structures.     

The more contagion effect on emerging markets: The evidence of DCC-GARCH model

The paper aims to test the existence of financial contagion between foreign exchange markets of several emerging and developed countries during the U.S. subprime crisis. As a result of DCC-GARCH analysis, we find the evidence of contagion during U.S. subprime crisis for most of the developed and emerging countries. Another finding is that emerging markets seem to be the most influenced by the contagion effects during U.S. subprime crisis. Since financial contagion is important for monetary policy, risk measurement, asset pricing and portfolio allocation, the findings of paper may be interest of policy makers, investors and portfolio managers.     

On labour mobility and the neutrality of money in unionised economies

A recent literature suggests that when wage setters are non-atomistic, strategic interaction between trade unions and the central bank may cause the monetary regime to matter for the labour market outcome, see Cukierman and Lippi (1999), Soskice and Iversen (2000), Vartiainen (2002), Holden (2003), Lippi (2003), Corricelli et al. (2006), Gnocchi (2006) and references therein. I show that when perfect labour mobility is introduced in a game between large wage setters and the central bank in a small open economy, the monetary regime is of no importance for real wages, employment or profits. The result suggests that if labour mobility is sufficiently high, worker migration is likely to mitigate the labour market effects of monetary regimes over time.