Imitation by price and quantity setting firms in a differentiated market

We study the evolution of imitation behaviour in a differentiated market where firms are located equidistantly on a (Salop) circle. Firms choose price and quantity simultaneously, leaving open the possibility for non-market-clearing outcomes. The strategy of the most successful firm is imitated. Behaviour in the stochastically stable outcome depends on the level of market differentiation and corresponds exactly with the Nash equilibrium outcome of the underlying stage game. For high level of differentiation, firms end up at the monopoly outcome. For intermediate level of differentiation, they gravitate to a “mutually non-aggressive” outcome where price is higher than the monopoly price. For low level of differentiation, firms price at a mark-up above the marginal cost. Market-clearing always results endogenously.     

Drug innovation and price competition

This study is designed to examine the relationship between drug innovation and price competition. The empirical results presented here support the hypothesis that new drugs-as measured by new chemical entities-exert downward pressure on the prices of existing competitors within the same therapeutic class. The implication of this finding for public policy is that drug innovation not only provides new therapy but also stimulates price competition.     

Workers' enterprises in price competition

Extending earlier equivalence results for perfect competition and for (imperfect) quantity competition, here it is shown that in price competition, too, the behavior of a workers‘ enterprise (defined by the coincidence of its workers with its partners) is tamed by the worker-partnership market so as to be identical with that of a twin entrepreneurial firm. Thus, not only is Bertrand–Nash equilibrium unaltered when an entrepreneurial firm is replaced by its workers’ enterprise twin, but such a replacement also leaves Bertrand-von Stackelberg equilibrium intact whether we switch the leader or a follower from one form of ownership/management to the other.     

Hierarchies in organisations and labour market competition

This paper studies the endogenous determination of hierarchies in firms. Firms can design a hierarchy with a continuum of ranks, one for each ability level. Nevertheless, in the market equilibrium, they choose to have only a finite number of ranks, so that in each rank there are workers of different abilities, who produce different output, and receive the same wage. It is also shown that an increase in the extent of labour market competition reduces the number of ranks in the hierarchy.     

Spatial price competition in the Manhattan hotel market: The role of location,quality, and online reputation

We investigate whether and to what extent price competition among hotels in Manhattan is driven by geographic location, quality, and online reputation. We investigate (a) which of the three product differentiation dimensions matters most for hotels' pricing decisions and (b) whether and to what extent competition is localized. Results show that hotel quality and geographic location matter the most for price competition. Whereas hotels of similar reputation also react to each other's prices, the effect is less important. Also, results indicate that hotels' prices react most aggressively to prices set by the four nearest hotels in the area.     

House price structure and market equilibrium

After the accumulation of empirical research on house price structure that has taken place over the last decade, a theoretical framework to explain observed differences in house price structure across markets is not yet well developed. To explain house price structure a model of market equilibrium has to be formulated that allows the derivation of comparative statics results. This paper presents such an analysis in the context of momentary equilibrium, with continuous spectrums of household types and housing types.     

Evolutionary competition in a mixed market with socially concerned firms

In this paper we study an oligopoly market where profit-maximizing firms and socially concerned firms compete in quantities. Confronting remarks by Milton Friedman and Gary Becker, we are using an evolutionary setting to investigate the endogenous choice of the proper objective of business firms and the influence of product differentiation on the long run survival of firms which pursue non-profit motives. We find that firms which consider a combination of profit and consumer welfare can indeed have larger market shares and profits than their profit-maximizing rivals. One insight is that it might pay off for shareholders to consider stakeholder welfare, but that the level of social concern should not be too high. Based on a strategy׳s profitability, we consider asynchronous evolutionary updating with firms selecting Nash quantities or choosing best replies to the expected market quantity. Here we observe that the consumers׳ willingness to pay a price premium for products is crucial for the long run survival of socially concerned firms. Depending on the degrees of product differentiation and social concern, long run outcomes consist either of both types of firms or only one type of firm. If the firms׳ propensity to switch between a social or a profit-maximizing strategy is sufficiently large, steady states are unstable and even complicated dynamics can occur.     

Deregulation and price discrimination in the conveyancing market

Using data from a telephone survey of solicitors in England and Wales, this paper presents data on the impact of deregulation on price discrimination in 27 local conveyancing markets. It is concluded that variations in price discrimination can be explained not only by differences by firm and market structure but also by systematic differences in firm conduct. In particular, the nature of the response within different markets to deregulation in the legal profession (advertising and licensed conveyancers) has a significant effect on the extent of price discrimination.     

Asset price and wealth dynamics in a financial market with heterogeneous agents

This paper considers a discrete-time model of a financial market with one risky asset and one risk-free asset, where the asset price and wealth dynamics are determined by the interaction of two groups of agents, fundamentalists and chartists. In each period each group allocates its wealth between the risky asset and the safe asset according to myopic expected utility maximization, but the two groups have heterogeneous beliefs about the price change over the next period: the chartists are trend extrapolators, while the fundamentalists expect that the price will return to the fundamental. We assume that investors’ optimal demand for the risky asset depends on wealth, as a result of CRRA utility. A market maker is assumed to adjust the market price at the end of each trading period, based on excess demand and on changes of the underlying reference price. The model results in a nonlinear discrete-time dynamical system, with growing price and wealth processes, but it is reduced to a stationary system in terms of asset returns and wealth shares of the two groups. It is shown that the long-run market dynamics are highly dependent on the parameters which characterize agents’ behaviour as well as on the initial condition. Moreover, for wide ranges of the parameters a (locally) stable fundamental steady state coexists with a stable ‘non-fundamental’ steady state, or with a stable closed orbit, where only chartists survive in the long run: such cases require the numerical and graphical investigation of the basins of attraction. Other dynamic scenarios include periodic orbits and more complex attractors, where in general both types of agents survive in the long run, with time-varying wealth fractions.     

Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly: price competition with managerial delegation

We introduce a managerial delegation contract into the mixed duopoly model and examine its influence on price setting in a mixed duopoly in the context of the endogenous‐timing problem. We obtain the result that owners of a public and a private firm prefer to delay the setting of the prices of their products as much as possible. Thus, in equilibrium, the firms choose their prices simultaneously in the latter stage of the game. This is in contrast to the findings of the entrepreneurial case, according to which firms choose prices simultaneously in the former stage. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Incomplete regulation, market competition and collusion

Regulators often do not regulate all firms competing in a given sector. Due to product substitutability, unregulated competitors have incentives to bribe regulated firms to have them overstate their costs and produce less, thereby softening competition. The best collusion-proof contract entails distortions both for inefficient and efficient regulated firms (distortion ‘at the top’). But a contract inducing active collusion may do better by allowing the regulator to ‘team up’ with the regulated firm to indirectly tax its competitor. The best such contract is characterized. It is such that the unregulated firm pays the regulated one to have it truthfully reveals its inefficiency. We finally compare those contracts.     

会计师事务所的进入、退出与审计市场的竞争

本文主要从进入、退出的角度研究审计市场的竞争。本文的分析表明,审计市场的市场占有率变动率更为合理地衡量市场的动态变化,审计市场的进入壁垒主要是准入壁垒(管制壁垒),而结构性壁垒和流动性壁垒主要存在于大客户市场,对于小客户市场的影响作用很小。为了防止进入者的进入,在位者通过各种流动性壁垒的设置以提高进入者的成本。但从总体看,审计市场仍然是高度竞争的。     

论中国股票市场的投资价值

从动态一般均衡的角度看，中国股票市场存在巨大泡沫，没有投资价值。但是，股票市场的内在规律又决定了中国股票市场未来几年将在巨大泡沫的基础上走向巨大的牛市，中国股票市场面临非常好的投资机会。这有利于中国政府抓住机会解决股票市场中长期仔在的规范、发展问题，同时也为广大投资、上市公司、中介机构带来了难得的历史机遇。     

论中国股票市场的投资价

从动态一般均衡的角度看,中国股票市场存在巨大泡沫,没有投资价值.但是,股票市场的内在规律又决定了中国股票市场未来几年将在巨大泡沫的基础上走向巨大的牛市,中国股票市场面临非常好的投资机会.这有利于中国政府抓住机会解决股票市场中长期存在的规范、发展问题,同时也为广大投资者、上市公司、中介机构带来了难得的历史机遇.     

Conglomerate mergers,mutual forbearance behavior and price competition

This paper tests the hypothesis that conglomerate mergers lessen price competition through the creation of mutual forbearance behavior. This hypothesis is tested by estimating the impact of multi-market contacts on price competition in manufacturing industries. Potential interfirm contacts are computed for 195 of the top 200 American manufacturers in 1963. Measures of multi-market contacts are then constructed and introduced as additional explanatory variables in a three-equation model of the determinants of industry price-cost margins. The empirical results do not support the mutual forbearance hypothesis, and suggest that conglomerate mergers should not be proscribed on that basis.     

Nash equilibria in a model of multiproduct price competition: an assignment problem

We study the market interaction of a finite number of single-product firms and a representative buyer, where the buyer consumes bundles of these goods. The buyers’ value function determines their willingness to pay for subsets of goods. We show that Nash-equilibrium outcomes are solutions of the linear relaxation of an integer programming assignment problem and that they always exist. The Nash-equilibrium price set is characterized by the Pareto frontier of the associated dual problem’s projection on the firms’ price vectors. We identify the Nash-equilibrium prices for monotonic buyers’ value functions and, more importantly, we show that some central solution concepts in cooperative game theory are (subgame perfect) equilibrium prices of our strategic game.     

Wholesale price discrimination: Innovation incentives and upstream competition

In intermediate good markets where there are alternative supply sources, wholesale price discrimination may enhance innovation incentives downstream. We consider a vertical chain where a dominant firm and a competitive fringe supply imperfect substitutes to duopoly retailers which carry both varieties. We show that a ban on price discrimination by the dominant supplier makes uniform pricing credible and reduces retailers’ incentives to decrease the cost of acquiring the competitively supplied variety, leading to higher upstream profits and lower downstream welfare. Our analysis complements existing results by identifying a novel channel through which wholesale price discrimination can improve dynamic market efficiency.     

Multiproduct price competition with heterogeneous consumers and nonconvex costs

This paper extends the oligopolistic model of price competition to environments with multiple goods, heterogeneous consumers, and arbitrary continuous cost functions. A Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies with an endogenous sharing rule is proven to exist. It is also shown that, in environments with fixed costs and constant marginal costs, all (symmetric and asymmetric) equilibria exhibit price dispersion across stores. Furthermore, the paper identifies scenarios in which prices will necessarily be random. In these markets, stores keep each other guessing because, given the fixed costs, they would incur a loss if their price strategies were anticipated and beaten by competitors. This is interpreted as an important economic feature that is possibly behind random price promotions such as weekly specials.     

Learning cycles in Bertrand competition with differentiated commodities and competing learning rules

This paper stresses the importance of heterogeneity in learning. We consider a Bertrand oligopoly with firms using either least squares learning or gradient learning for determining the price. We demonstrate that convergence properties of the rules are strongly affected by heterogeneity. In particular, gradient learning may become unstable as the number of gradient learners increases. Endogenous choice between the learning rules may induce cyclical switching. Stable gradient learning gives higher average profit than least squares learning, making firms switch to gradient learning. This can destabilize gradient learning which, because of decreasing profits, makes firms switch back to least squares learning.