The political transfer problem: How cross-border financial windfalls affect democracy and civil war

Following a rise in the price of oil in the 1970s, a number of developing countries received a significant boost in foreign transfers as oil producers could not absorb all of their new rents domestically. When those transfers ended, some recipients of these transfers eventually democratized as part of the ”Third Wave” while others languished as violent autocracies. This raises a puzzle: how can declines in external transfers foster democratization in some cases, but heighten political violence in others? We develop a formal model to reconcile this tension and demonstrate that autocratic incumbents can become more repressive with higher levels of transfers and either experience civil conflict or democratize at lower levels of transfers. We characterize these dynamics as a ”political transfer problem” and then use case studies and econometric evidence to argue that the largest windfall of the 20th century, the period from 1973–85 during which oil prices were at all-time highs, and its aftermath, produced political dynamics consistent with our model.     

Towards a unified scheme for environmental and social protection: Learning from PES and CCT experiences in developing countries

Environmental protection and poverty alleviation in the developing world are usually heralded as joint objectives. However, these two goals are often associated with different sectoral policy instruments. While so−called payments for environmental services (PES) are increasingly being promoted for environmental protection, poverty alleviation is increasingly addressed by conditional cash transfers (CCT) program. These instruments although aimed to achieve distinct objectives have a number of similarities and challenges in their design and implementation phases. This paper elaborates on these similarities and develops a unifying generic framework that is used to discuss the extent to which both approaches could be unified.     

Social Insurance and Redistribution with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection*

Rochet (1991) showed that with distortionary income taxes, social insurance is a desirable redistributive device when risk and ability are negatively correlated. This finding is re‐examined when ex post moral hazard and adverse selection are included, and under different informational assumptions. Individuals can take actions influencing the size of the loss in the event of accident (or ill health). Social insurance can be supplemented by private insurance, but private insurance markets are affected by both adverse selection and moral hazard. We study how equity and efficiency considerations should be traded off in choosing the optimal coverage of social insurance when those features are introduced. The case for social insurance is strongest when the government is well informed about household productivity.     

基于集体主义的企业科技向善：逻辑框架与竞争优势

新冠疫情对经济及社会运行造成了重大冲击,除了履行慈善捐赠等传统社会责任行为,一些企业还通过科技创新与善意的产品供给抗击疫情,企业与社会的融合互动更加紧密,据此引出企业科技向善概念。通过厘清企业科技向善概念,梳理了企业科技向善与竞争优势的关系,讨论了企业科技向善的未来研究方向,从企业与社会关系角度丰富和扩展了企业战略管理研究,并为企业管理实践与政府监管提供了新视角。     

Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics

Do societies choose inefficient policies and institutions? An extension of the Coase theorem to politics would suggest the answer is no. This paper discusses various approaches to political economy and develops the argument that there are strong empirical and theoretical grounds for believing that inefficient policies and institutions are prevalent. We conclude that these inefficient institutions and policies are chosen because they serve the interests of politicians or social groups that hold political power at the expense of the rest. The theoretical case depends on commitment problems inherent in politics; parties holding political power cannot make commitments to bind their future actions because there is no outside agency with the coercive capacity to enforce such arrangements. Journal of Comparative Economics 31 (4) (2003) 620–652.     

产品伤害中时间与社交距离对消费者购买决策的影响

基于心理距离理论,以果汁和手机伤害为例,分析研究产品伤害中,时间与社交距离对消费者购买决策的影响。实验一的结果表明,时间与社交距离都为近时,产品伤害对消费者的购买决策的影响程度最大,二者都为远时,影响程度最小;在实验二中引入伤害程度后发现,伤害程度在时间距离对购买决策的影响中起到调节作用,但在社交距离与购买决策间的调节效应不显著。     

融资约束下企业社会责任信息披露质量与创新持续性

利用2012-2016年我国中小板企业数据,实证研究了不同类型企业社会责任信息披露质量对创新持续性的影响路径。结果显示,对股东、员工的责任信息披露质量能显著缓解融资约束,从而正向影响企业创新持续性;对供应商、客户、消费者、社会和环境的责任信息披露质量只能部分缓解融资约束,但仍正向促进企业创新持续性;国有性质的中小板企业对社会责任信息披露质量更加敏感。以上结论说明,我国中小板企业应注重履行并披露对不同利益相关者的社会责任信息,这对于企业缓解融资约束、维持创新持续性具有积极作用。     

Conformism and diversity under social learning

Summary. When there are competing technologies or products with unknown payoffs an important question is which technology will prevail and whether technologies with different payoffs can coexist in the long run. In this paper, we use a social learning model with local interactions to study this question. We show that the adoption of technologies as well as the prospects of conformism/diversity depend crucially on the nature of interaction between individuals and the heterogeneity of preferences in a society. Received: May 10, 1999; revised version: February 4, 2000