Reducing government bank presence in the Brazilian financial system Why and how

This paper examines the motives for government banking in Brazil. The dependency of the government financial institutions for financial support on the Federal Government are shown to have created loopholes that have made problematic the execution of monetary policy. The recent Federal Government program to reduce the presence of state financial institutions in the financial system is described and examined. The linkage of this program to the renegotiation of state government debt to the Federal Government under subsidized conditions is found to have been critical to state government acceptance of the privatization, extinction, transformation, and restructuring of state government financial institutions.     

Persistent deficits and the market value of government debt

This paper investigates whether postwar Canadian public financial policy satisfies a borrowing constraint. Direct tests of the present-value relation suggested by this constraint shed light on the sustainability of current policy. We examine monthly data on Canadian federal government finances using tests for cointegration. The finding is that the joint behaviour of real debt and real surpluses is inconsistent with intertemporal budget balance for the government. One interpretation of this finding is that the government is systematically paying real returns to bondholders by issuing further debt. Alternatively, bondholders may expect the government to finance future interest payments from a source other than primary surpluses, e.g. the sale of physical assets.     

Risk behavior in the presence of government programs

Our paper assesses the impacts of the 1996 US Farm Bill on production decisions. We apply the expected utility model to analyze farmers’ behavior under risk and assess how farmers’ production decisions change in the presence of government programs. Specifically, we empirically evaluate the relative price and the risk-related effects of farm policy changes at the intensive margin of production, as well as the extra value that these policies add to farmers’ certainty equivalent. We use farm-level data collected in Kansas to estimate the model. We find evidence that decoupled government programs have only negligible impacts on production decisions.     

Indexed versus nominal government debt under inflation and price-level targeting

This paper presents a DSGE model in which long run inflation risk matters for social welfare. Optimal indexation of long-term government debt is studied under two monetary policy regimes: inflation targeting (IT) and price-level targeting (PT). Under IT, full indexation is optimal because long run inflation risk is substantial due to base-level drift, making indexed bonds a better store of value than nominal bonds. Under PT, where long run inflation risk is largely eliminated, optimal indexation is substantially lower because nominal bonds become a relatively better store of value. These results are robust to the PT target horizon, imperfect credibility of PT and model calibration, but the assumption that indexation is lagged is crucial. A key finding from a policy perspective is that indexation has implications for welfare comparisons of IT and PT.     

地方政府债务的形成机制及对策

近年来,我国一些地方政府债务规模不断增长,且存量规模大、结构复杂,具有不可忽视的潜在风险。新一轮以减税降费为主要特征的积极财政政策,有可能给地方财政带来更大压力和挑战。财政分权、预算软约束、经济绩效晋升激励、政府担保和金融市场效率,是一些地方政府债务形成的理论机制;道德风险是地方政府性债务形成机制的本质。建议深化财政体制改革,合理划分中央和地方事权与支出责任,建立以一般性转移支付为主体的转移支付结构,建立财政转移支付的有效监督机制,堵旁门开正门,加快推进地方政府性债务管理制度建设。     

Private debt overhang and the government spending multiplier: Evidence for the United States

Using state‐dependent local projections and historical US data, we find that government spending multipliers are considerably larger in periods of private debt overhang. In particular, while multipliers are below or close to one in low private debt states, we find significant crowding‐in of private spending in periods of debt overhang, resulting in multipliers that are much larger than one. In high private debt episodes, more government purchases even reduce the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product. These results are robust for the type of shocks, and when we control for the business cycle, financial crises, deleveraging episodes, government debt overhang, and the zero‐lower‐bound.     

Unconventional government debt purchases as a supplement to conventional monetary policy

In response to the Great Financial Crisis, the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and many other central banks have adopted unconventional monetary policy instruments. We investigate if one of these, purchases of long-term government debt, could be a valuable addition to conventional short-term interest rate policy even if the main policy rate is not constrained by the zero lower bound. To do so, we add a stylised financial sector and central bank asset purchases to an otherwise standard New Keynesian DSGE model. Asset quantities matter for interest rates through a preferred habitat channel. If conventional and unconventional monetary policy instruments are coordinated appropriately then the central bank is better able to stabilise both output and inflation.     

The central government grant allocation problem in the presence of misrepresentation and cheating

This study deals with the central government grant allocation problem under conditions of asymmetric information. Using a simple model, we examine herein the optimal design of random audit and incentive mechanisms to encourage the grantee (the local government authority) to report truthfully on local parameters required in the granting process. The local government authority must choose between two possibilities: a menu of contracts that could be considered as a matching grant programme with random auditing vs. a lump-sum grant without any audit mechanism. We will show that addressing the optimal grant system problem is similar to comparing slopes on the graph of the indirect local government welfare function at two distinct points.Received: January 2003, Accepted: November 2003, JEL Classification: H21, H23, H71, H77We would like to express our thanks to Howard Chernick and an anonymous referee for their extremely helpful comments.     

Impact of increased external debt servicing on government budgetary priorities: The case of Argentina

As external debt servicing has increased, developing countries have been forced to re-evaluate programs in an effort to curtail government spending. This paper attempts to examine the character of the sectoral adjustments that have taken place (1961–1982) in the main functional areas of Argentinean government expenditures. In general, it appears that social services, particularly education and health along with public administration, have borne the brunt of the government's rising debt service problem. The social sectors have suffered further due to regime changes, with military regimes tending to cut back even more severely allocations to the social sectors than normal debt service constraints would have warranted.     

Dealing with a liquidity trap when government debt matters: Optimal time-consistent monetary and fiscal policy

How does the need to preserve government debt sustainability affect the optimal monetary and fiscal policy response to a liquidity trap? To provide an answer, we employ a small stochastic New Keynesian model with a zero bound on nominal interest rates and characterize optimal time-consistent stabilization policies. We focus on two policy tools, the short-term nominal interest rate and debt-financed government spending. The optimal policy response to a liquidity trap critically depends on the prevailing debt burden. While the optimal amount of government spending is decreasing in the level of outstanding government debt, future monetary policy is becoming more accommodative, triggering a change in private sector expectations that helps to dampen the fall in output and inflation at the outset of the liquidity trap.     

The debt crisis in Ireland

This paper takes a multidisciplinary approach to analyze the current debt crisis in Ireland. It briefly reviews Irish economic performance from 1980 to 2008 and in particular the Celtic Tiger years. The paper looks at changes in the Irish money supply and its contribution to the Irish housing bubble and the subsequent economic problems facing Ireland. An estimate of the negative wealth effect in Ireland since 2007 is made. Given that Ireland is a small open economy, a number of other factors which are both domestic and international are considered in an attempt to explain what has happened in Ireland, where might Ireland go from here and what lessons can be learnt. These factors include: the theory of political economics, the principal-agent problem, the theory of optimal currency areas, the Balassa Samuelson effect, the dynamics of a capitalist economy, neo-liberalism, European monetary integration, international bond markets and ‘insurance’ that was sold to cover a Eurozone breakup. The Irish culture is considered to differentiate Ireland from other EU countries, in particular, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain.     

Long-run consequences of debt

Empirical evidence suggests that both public and private debt may have long-run detrimental effects on the economy. However, theoretical works have not provided a unique explanation to the issue. In this paper, therefore, we propose a framework that is able to describe the long-run effects of different kinds of debt. We introduce a stock-flow consistent dynamic model where the economy is represented as a network of trading relationships among agents. Debt contracts are one of such relationships. The model is characterized by a unique and stable steady-state and predicts that: (i) aggregate income is always limited from the above by the money supply; (ii) debts cause in the long-run a redistribution of borrowers’ wealth and income in favor of lenders; (iii) the redistribution is magnified by the level of the interest rate and (iv) by the degree of debt persistence. In the aggregate this may also lower the average marginal propensity to spend and nominal income, providing therefore a clear-cut explanation to the empirical evidence.     

Financing constraints and the use of performance-sensitive debt

Performance-sensitive debt (PSD) is a popular financial instrument in the corporate private debt market. In a real-options setting, this paper aims to clarify how PSD impacts on investment policy, capital structure, and agency cost of financing constraints when the firm faces the upper limit of debt issuance. We show that the constrained leverage hardly depends on the performance sensitivity. In particular, our conclusions predict that PSD can decrease the severity of financing constraints relative to the fixed-coupon debt case and the loss of firm value arising from investment and financing distortions due to the presence of financing constraints. The higher the performance sensitivity, the less likely that the firm is financially constrained. These findings provide a novel investment-based explanation for issuance of PSD.     

government and the PSBR

The government has changed its view of how to gauge the size of the budget deficit. Nick Parsons and David Coleman, of Union Discount, argue that this change is an ill-omen for the control of public spending.     

Managerial compensation and the agency costs of debt finance

This paper presents a model of the agency costs of debt finance, based on the conflict of interest between shareholders and bondholders. We show how the terms of the compensation contract offered to management by shareholders can reduce these agency costs. We derive a managerial compensation contract that restores the first-best outcome and leads to a local irrelevance result for financial structure. More generally, the model points out that the nature of managerial compensation contracts will affect the firm's optimal financial structure, and offers a reason why managerial compensation is typically not closely correlated with shareholder returns.     

Government debt spillovers in a monetary union

This paper presents estimates of the impact of debt issued by one government in a monetary union on the yields of the bonds issued by other governments in the union. These debt spillovers may occur if there is a risk of monetary accommodation, implicit or explicit inter-jurisdictional bailout provisions, or interdependent revenues. The analysis empirically distinguishes between two channels through which debt spillovers may affect bond yields: currency depreciation risk and default risk. Data on the yields of individual Canadian provincial government bonds for the period 1983–2005 are employed. No evidence is found of debt spillovers between provinces, but a one percentage point increase in the central government's debt to GDP ratio raises the yield on provincial government bonds by 4.2 basis points—2.9 basis points by increasing the expected depreciation rate of the Canadian dollar and 1.3 basis points by raising the risk of provincial government default. These results imply that a rise in the Canadian central government debt to GDP ratio from 0.25 to 0.58, equivalent to the rise that occurred between 1983 and 1995, would lead to an increase in provincial government bond yields of approximately 140 basis points.     

Let's fight the next sovereign debt war now

Recent difficulties in Mexico have reminded us of the dangers of financial crisis in heavily indebted countries. In this article, Richard Portes argues that we need to plan now to deal with the next sovereign debt crisis. He proposes a programme of reform to enable an orderly 'work-out'of debt in such situations. This, he argues, is preferable to an expensive bailout or a messy and dangerous default.     

我国乡村债务问题探讨

我国的乡村债务问题由来已久,文章主要介绍了乡村债务的构成、特点及现状,分析了乡村债务的成因,并探讨了农业税的取消对乡村债务造成的影响,最后提出了多种化解乡村债务的途径。在化解乡村债务时,要保证乡村两级组织的正常运转,促进农村经济的发展,提高农民生活水平,早日实现我国全面建设小康社会的宏伟目标。     

Excessive risk taking and the maturity structure of debt

This paper analyses the effect of short term debt on equityholders' risk taking decisions. We show that if short term debt limits the expropriation of debtholders, it also implies a lower leverage, which prevents the firm from increasing tax shields. We then examine the incentive of equityholders to increase the firm risk when debtholders hold the option to swap a perpetual coupon bond with short term debt. We find that this option mitigates equityholders' risk shifting incentives. Compared to standard short term debt, this restructuring option deters debtholders expropriation, it increases leverage and it reduces the loss in tax shields due to asset substitution.