Riskiness,endogenous productivity dispersion and business cycles

In the data, cross-sectional productivity dispersion is countercyclical at both the plant level and the firm level, see e.g. Bloom (2009). I incorporate a firm׳s choice of risk level into a model of firm dynamics with real business cycle features to explain this empirical finding both qualitatively and quantitatively. In the model, in every period, each firm chooses the investment amount and the risk level associated with a production project every period. All projects available to each firm have the same expected flow return, determined by the aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks to the firm׳s productivity, and differ from one another only in their risk. The endogenous option of exiting the market and the limited funding for new investment jointly play an important role in motivating firms׳ risk-taking behavior. The model predicts that, in each period, relatively small firms are more likely to take risk and hence exhibit a higher exit rate, and that the cross-sectional productivity dispersion, measured as the standard deviation of the realized individual component of productivity, is larger in recessions.     

Value and risk dynamics over the innovation cycle

This paper studies investment in intellectual capital and corresponding value and risk dynamics over the innovation cycle. We assume that the innovation cycle consists of three phases, R&D, trial, and market introduction phases. We use a real option investment model to characterize firm value and risk dynamics over the innovation cycle and find that firm value is the sum of the value of assets in place and non-linear option values related to breakthrough, exit, and market introduction options. Firm risk over the innovation cycle is highly non-linear and quite distinct in different phases. During the R&D phase risk is high as the firm faces high operating leverage originating from R&D fixed costs together with technological uncertainty. During the trial phase risk is significantly lower and dominated by option risk to launch the product in the market while after the introduction of the product in the market risk is equivalent to the asset risk of the company. Our model is consistent with the view that positive excess returns of R&D intensive firms are a compensation for risk. Based on this insight we derive several testable predictions.     

Investment timing decisions under threat of potential competition: Why firm size matters

We study the value of the option to wait when other firms are looking at similar opportunities and may enter while one firm is waiting for uncertainty resolution. There are two important results. First the value of an investment project is affected by a firm’s assets-in-place, giving some firms a comparative advantage in competitive situations. Second, when two firms with different sized assets-in-place are looking at similar investment decisions, in the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium, the smaller firm invests earlier and also exits before a competing firm with larger assets-in-place. This makes an otherwise identical investment more valuable for the smaller firm. The larger firm optimally foregoes first-mover advantage because of higher expected exit costs.     

The impact of idiosyncratic uncertainty when investment opportunities are endogenous

This paper develops a general equilibrium model to study the impact of aggregate fluctuations in idiosyncratic volatility that incorporates the endogenous determination of investment opportunities. By making investment options more valuable, an increase in volatility encourages the creation of new investment options. I find the response of the economy to a volatility shock depends on how investment opportunities are obtained. If potential entrants are allowed to invest in new idiosyncratic technologies, thereby acquiring options for further investment, the volatility shock increases overall investment and results in an economic boom. On the other hand, if such an investment in option creation is precluded and investment opportunities are exogenously given, the volatility shock decreases aggregate investment.     

Real Options in an Asymmetric Duopoly: Who Benefits from Your Competitive Disadvantage?

This paper analyzes the impact of investment cost asymmetry on the optimal real option exercise strategies and the value of firms in duopoly. Both firms have an opportunity to invest in a project enhancing ( ceteris paribus ) the profit flow. We show that three types of equilibrium strategies exist. Furthermore, we express the critical levels of cost asymmetry delineating the equilibrium regions as functions of basic economic variables. The presence of strategic interactions among the firms leads to counterintuitive results. First, for a certain range of the asymmetry level, a marginal increase in the investment cost of the firm with the cost disadvantage can enhance this firm's own value. Moreover, such a cost increase can reduce the value of the competitor. Finally, we discuss the welfare implications of the optimal exercise strategies and show that the presence of identical firms can result in a socially less desirable outcome than if one of the competitors has a significant cost (dis)advantage.     

Effect of green innovation strategy on firm‐idiosyncratic risk: A competitive action perspective

Despite increasing concern for corporate environmental responsibility in numerous industries, the relationship between green innovation strategy (GIS) and idiosyncratic risk is a rarely scrutinised topic, particularly in the automotive domain. In this study, we empirically explore the association between GIS and idiosyncratic risk and analyse the moderating role played by the firm's competitive action. We rely on the secondary information sourced for 132 top automotive firms, in the period ranging from 2011 to 2017 by applying the system generalised methods of moments estimator to the dynamic panel data model. Our findings indicate that GIS significantly reduces the idiosyncratic risk of all firms, and this relationship strengthens with the increase in the competitive action of the firms. Our evidence supports “it pays to be green” firm heterogeneity argument. This study highlights the academic and managerial implications and focuses on the environmental issues published in environmental management literature.     

The peer-firm effect on firm’s investment decisions

This study investigates the effect of peer firms on firm investment strategies. We test the peer group effect hypothesis along differing levels of financially constrained firms as well as differing degrees of industry competition. Using idiosyncratic equity returns as the instrument variable, we use 2-stage least squares regression to identify the influence of peer firms’ investment decisions on a firm’s own investment policies. Our analyses empirically confirm that there is a peer group effect in making firm investment decisions. More financially constrained firms show greater dependency on peers’ investment decisions. Tests of peer sensitivity to the increase in industrial competition, however, displayed a U-shaped quadratic curve, which shows that firms have the lowest peer group effect in medium-competition markets. We claim that imitative behavior in investment is presumably weak in the mid-competition market because firms are yet to be distinguished in this market.     

Investment decisions in finite-lived monopolies

This paper studies the value and optimal timing for investment in finite-lived monopolies, extending the literature on real option games by considering the cases of random and certain-lived monopolies. Under these settings, firms face the risk of demonopolization, that can occur as a random or a certain event. We show that these new settings produce significantly different results when compared to the canonical monopolistic and duopolistic models. In a certain-lived monopoly, the leader invests sooner than in a duopoly if there is a risk of being preempted, and later than in a monopoly if the leader role is pre-assigned. In a random-lived monopoly, entry occurs somewhere between the duopoly and monopoly cases. Higher uncertainty delays investment in all cases.     

The Fama-French model for estimating the cost of equity capital: The impact of real options of investment projects

We use the classic and modified Fama-French models to estimate the cost of capital of stock portfolios listed on selected markets. We compare four highly developed markets (US, EU, Japanese and global) and the Polish market as an alternative investment opportunity and a CEE emerging market. The performance of the applied procedures for estimating the cost of capital for company projects is examined and cost of capital is assessed with and without real option adjustment. We adjust the portfolios’ returns using the firms’ book-to-market ratios and idiosyncratic volatility as option proxies. The variability of cost of capital is evaluated using bootstrap methods. Our study shows a clear difference between bootstrapped distributions of cost of capital for the tested developed market and the Polish market portfolios. Wider confidence intervals of the estimated cost of capital of the studied Polish portfolios may result from political motivations in managing state-controlled companies. Our findings also indicate a clear difference between the cost of capital for tested portfolios with and without option adjustment. The widths of the estimated confidence intervals increase after option adjustment. The highest/lowest values of the cost of capital both with and without option adjustment are found for the US/Japanese market portfolios.     

Debt and Development

This paper examines incentive and valuation effects of debt financing on land investment. When land is debt financed, the landowner holds both a development option on the land and a default option on the debt. Because development typically devalues the default option, investment may be delayed past the point at which efficient investment would otherwise proceed. The incentive to underinvest is shown to be more pronounced as debt level increases, i.e., as the debt becomes riskier. This agency problem provides an explanation as to why land is generally difficult to debt finance and may also explain why debt levels are relatively low for “land-intensive” real estate firms. Novel comparative statics show that debt value may increase for a given increase in asset volatility as well as for a given increase in interest rate. Renegotiation and restrictive contract provisions are considered as mechanisms to promote efficient investment policy in the presence of debt financing.     

Understanding the consequences of diversification on financial stability

In this paper, we study the consequences of diversification on financial stability and social welfare using an agent based model that couples the real economy and a financial system. We validate the model against its ability to reproduce several stylized facts reported in real economies. We find that the risk of an isolated bank failure (i.e. idiosyncratic risk) is decreasing with diversification. In contrast, the probability of joint failures (i.e. systemic risk) is increasing with diversification which results in more downturns in the real sector. Additionally, we find that the system displays a “robust yet fragile” behaviour particularly for low diversification. Moreover, we study the impact of introducing preferential attachment into the lending relationships between banks and firms. Finally, we show that a regulatory policy that promotes bank–firm credit transactions that reduce similarity between banks can improve financial stability whilst permitting diversification.

     

确定性等值法的经理人股票期权估值研究——基于经理人投资决策的期权估值模型

鉴于用股价来估计期权价值的缺陷,本文从经理人投资决策会影响企业价值,继而影响经理人股票期权价值的角度,引入确定性等值法,构建了对经理人股票期权价值估计模型,并对模型进行了数值模拟,得出以下结论:经理人投资风险项目底线值是其风险规避程度和风险项目波动幅度的增函数,是经理人持有股票期权比例的减函数;股票期权价值是经理人风险规避程度的减函数,是风险项目波动幅度的增函数。     

Market Risk Disclosures and Investment Efficiency: International Evidence from the Gulf Cooperation Council Financial Firms

This study examines the association between market risk disclosures (MRDs) and the investment efficiency of financial firms from six emerging markets in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region. Based on a sample of 553 firm‐year observations over the 2007–2011 period, we find that MRDs are significantly and negatively associated with both under‐investment and over‐investment and that this association is more pronounced for larger firms. We also find that the association between MRDs and under‐investment is moderated during periods of economic distress such as the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and that the association between MRDs and over‐investment is magnified during periods of reduced financial distress. Our results are consistent with the idea that MRDs reduce information asymmetry, which ultimately improves investment efficiency. We contribute to the literature in an emerging market context by providing empirical evidence on the association between MRDs and investment efficiency across six emerging GCC capital markets. This study also fills a gap in the literature by providing evidence on the factors affecting the investment efficiency of financial firms.     

Strategic and Natural Risk in Entrepreneurship: An Experimental Study

We report on the results of experiments where participants choose between entrepreneurship and an outside option. Entrepreneurs enter a market and then make investment decisions to capture value. Payoffs depend on both strategic risk (i.e., the investments of other entrepreneurs) and natural risk (i.e., luck). Absent natural risk, participants endogenously sort themselves into entrepreneurial and safe types, and returns from the two paths converge. Adding natural risk fundamentally changes these conclusions: Here we observe excessive entry and excessive investment so that entrepreneurs earn systematically less than the outside option. These payoff differences persist even after many repetitions of the task. With a risky outside option, entry further increases and about one‐third of entrepreneurs adopt a passive strategy, investing little or nothing. Finally, we examine an environment where an individual must become an entrepreneur but chooses the stakes over which she will compete. Due to under‐entry and under‐investment in the high stakes setting, the returns gap grows to over 15 percentage points. A two‐factor model incorporating loss aversion and love of winning can rationalize these returns patterns.     

The impact of option listing on the price volatility and trading volume of underlying OTC stocks

This paper examines the impact of an initial option listing on the price volatility and trading volume of underlying OTC stocks. The sample is divided by market value to determine whether larger firms are impacted differently by option listing than smaller firms. We find relative trading volume increases significantly, with the small and medium market value firms showing the largest gain. However, the tests show no evidence of changes in price volatility following option listing. No significant changes were found in either the firms' betas or variance following option initiation. The results provide further evidence that option listing does not destabilize the market for the underlying stock.     

The financial investment decision of non-financial firms in China

This paper constructs a portfolio model to analyze the determinants of the financial investment decision of non-financial firms in China. Unlike the literature assuming that financial investments are riskless, our model allows risks in both fixed and financial investments. We show that this extension provides an analytically similar but economically different model from the literature. In particular, it is relative risk and risk-adjusted return gap, not pure risk and simple return gap that enter into firms’ financial investment decision model. Using firm-level panel data of 1902 firms listed in Chinese stock market over the period from 2006 to 2016 with semi-annual frequency, we find that the ratio of fixed investment risk over total risk dominates financial investment decisions of non-financial firms. However, rates of risk-adjusted return gap between financial and fixed investments play no role in Chinese firms’ financial investment decisions, which is in stark contrast to the results using a model assuming riskless financial investments. The baseline findings are robust to alternative measures of financialization and investment risk and different firm sizes, ownership structures and time periods.     

Overinvestment in partially relationship-specific assets and R&D

This paper considers a firm that can engage in partially relationship specific investments. The firm does not have the option to engage in investments that are not at all relationship specific. I show that, in such a setting, equilibrium investment may exceed the socially optimal level. This is contrary to the intuition obtained from standard idiosyncratic (i.e., relationship-specific) investment models, in which the possibility of “hold-up” leads to underinvestment. The driving force behind this result is that when assets are only partially relationship-specific, marginal investment may yield higher benefits when transacting with the market at large even though cumulative investment yields higher benefits within a bilateral relationship. This finding is relevant to many bilateral relationships in which investments that are targeted to improve the joint payoff of the relationship inevitably have spillover effects that improve the payoff of transacting with the market.     

Solving the liquidity constraint by options on futures

The aim of this paper is to show that an option on futures may solve the liquidity constraint problem. I consider a consumer (or an investor) who wishes to discount her future income in order to finance her present consumption (investment). Under asymmetric information, such an agent may incur a liquidity constraint (credit rationing). However, the optimal constrained consumption, as a function of future income, resembles a short position of a put option written on future income. This implies that allocating savings to a long call option position on futures may restore the unconstrained relationship between the optimal present consumption and future income. The option on a futures contract is constructed so that the (future) agent’s income is correlated with some futures contract (but this is private information) on which the option is issued. The allocation of savings of the borrower to the option on futures turns out to be financially beneficial compared to the allocation of savings to the risk-free investment.     

公司风险视角下上市国企管理层股权激励研究

在允许国有控股上市公司实施股权激励的背景下,考察了其不同种类风险与经营者股权激励强度的关系。先界定了风险的类型,再通过构建基于风险的两种股权激励模型,并进一步推导得出：若国有上市企业的管理层不能（可以）买卖公司以外的市场证券组合时,其最优股权激励强度与公司特别性风险成反向变化关系,而与公司整体性风险的相关关系不确定（无关）,这为正在实践中摸索的国有上市企业管理层股权激励合同的设计提供了进一步的理论建议。     

Do managerial behaviors trigger firm exit? The case of hyperactive bidders

This paper investigates the effects of managerial mergers- and acquisitions-related investment strategies on the exit risk of firms. Using a sample of hyperactive bidders, I show that managerial excessive acquisitiveness can precipitate firm exit. Overbidding is associated with weak corporate governance and lower disclosure quality within firms. I find that hyperactive bidders take more risk compared to conservative bidders. Such bidders also misallocate firms’ resources and dent firms’ reputational capital. Eventually, the external corporate control market is more effective compared to mechanisms such as bankruptcy reorganization, forced liquidation, leveraged buy-out, and expulsion from stock exchanges in disciplining hyperactive bidders by turning them into targets of takeover. These results suggest that a hyper acquisition-induced growth strategy is, on average, detrimental to the long-term survivability of firms and that the internal and external corporate-control mechanisms may not be effective enough to forestall falling value of an excessively acquisitive firm.