Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights in a Product‐cycle Model of Skills Accumulation

This paper examines the effects of stronger intellectual property rights protection in the South based on a North–South general‐equilibrium model with foreign direct investment (FDI). Two types of innovation are considered – innovation targeting all products and innovation targeting only imitated products. We show that for both types of innovation, there will be increases in the innovation rate and Northern wage inequality and a decrease in the proportion of Northern unskilled labor if imitation intensity is sufficiently low. As regards the pattern of production, the extent of FDI will increase while the extent of Northern production and Southern production will decrease.     

The Growth Effects of National Patent Policies*

We construct a two‐country (innovative North and imitating South) model of product‐cycle trade, fully endogenous Schumpeterian growth, and national patent policies. A move towards harmonization based on stronger Southern intellectual property rights (IPR) protection accelerates the long‐run global rates of innovation and growth, reduces the North–South wage gap, and has an ambiguous effect on the rate of international technology transfer. Patent harmonization constitutes a suboptimal global‐growth policy. However, if the global economy is governed by a common patent policy regime, then stronger global IPR protection: (a) increases the rates of global innovation and growth; (b) accelerates the rate of international technology transfer; and (c) has no impact on the North–South wage gap.     

Innovation,imitation and multinationalisation in a North–South model: a theoretical note

We consider a dynamic general equilibrium product variety model of international product cycle with endogenous rate of imitation in the South; and find that a policy of strengthening intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in the South lowers the rate of product innovation, rate of multinationalisation and South–North relative wage if multinationalisation [or, foreign direct investment (FDI)] is the channel of production transfer. These results are significantly different from those obtained in the exogenous imitation model of Lai (J Dev Econ 55(1): 133–153, 1998). So a stronger IPR protection policy adopted by the South may not be interpreted as an incentive to encourage Northern FDI in the South and to raise the rate of innovation in the North.      

南方最优知识产权保护水平与南方企业自主创新

构建了一个扩展的南北贸易模型,讨论了南方知识产权保护的决定因素及其对南北双方福利的影响。在模型中,南方政府内生决定知识产权保护水平,北方厂商内生决定研发投资水平和市场竞争策略,南方厂商内生决定自主创新或模仿。研究发现:南方的最优知识产权保护水平与北方存在差异;当南方厂商模仿北方厂商的技术时,南方执行最严格的知识产权保护对北方福利和南方福利都造成损害;当南方厂商的创新效率较高时,严格的知识产权保护能激励南方厂商进行自主创新、改善南方福利。     

Intellectual property rights and quality improvement

This paper explores why theories about the effects of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection on foreign direct investment (FDI) and innovation have reached mixed conclusions. In our model, Northern firms innovate to improve the quality of existing products and may later shift production to the South through FDI. Southern firms may then imitate the products of multinationals. We find that imitation can increase FDI and innovation for quality improvements, whereas the opposite occurs when innovators develop new varieties. Hence, stronger IPR protection, by reducing imitation, may shift innovation away from improvements in existing products toward development of new products.     

Intellectual property rights, multinational firms and economic growth

This paper develops a model of North-South trade with multinational firms and economic growth in order to analyze formally the effects of stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in developing countries. In the model, Northern firms invent new higher-quality products, multinational firms transfer manufacturing operations to the South and the Southern firms imitate products produced by multinational firms. It is shown that stronger IPR protection in the South (i.e., the adoption and implementation of the TRIPs agreement) leads to a permanent increase in the rate of technology transfer to the South within multinational firms, a permanent increase in R&D employment by Southern affiliates of Northern multinationals, a permanent decrease in the North-South wage gap, and a temporary increase in the Northern innovation rate.     

Innovation,Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights with International Capital Movement

This paper extends the established Helpman (1993 ) model by introducing international capital movement, and obtains new results concerning the welfare implications of tightening intellectual property rights (IPR) in the South. First, if separated capital markets in the North and the South are integrated, enforcement of IPR would have more desirable welfare effects in both regions. Second, when international capital movement is allowed, the North always gains from the tightening of IPR if the imitation rate is sufficiently high. This implies that the North's demand on the South to tighten IPR becomes stronger as the integration of international capital markets progresses.     

DOES FOREIGN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION AFFECT US EXPORTS AND FDI?

Several previous studies have examined the relationship between intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, exports, and FDI independently. However, very few prior analyses jointly examined the linkages between IPR protection and multiple modes of international transactions. This paper investigates how foreign IPR protection affects how US firms jointly serve overseas markets through exports and FDI. Using both static pooled regressions and a dynamic panel GMM estimator on a panel data of 53 countries, we examine whether stronger foreign IPR protection stimulates US international transactions. The empirical results suggest that foreign countries that strengthen their IPR protection, especially those with strong imitative ability, can attract more international transactions from the USA.     

Technology and outsourcing: An explanation to the rising wage gap

The recent phenomenon of widening skilled–unskilled wage gap in both North and South has been either explained by a technological change or by increasing trade or globalization. The paper provides a new explanation and emphasizes that it is neither technology nor trade alone but both that have contributed to the widening wage inequality. It argues, using a two-country occupational choice model, that any technological improvement in North results in a rise in the skilled–unskilled wage gap in North via an increase in the productivity of skilled labor followed by a rise in the same in South via trade or the outsourcing activities of the northern firms. The extent of outsourcing or the number of northern firms that outsource jobs to South is endogenously determined in the model. The paper also analyzes some major economic impacts of such a technological upgradation in North on the southern economy.     

International Outsourcing, Technological Change, and Wage Inequality

This paper analyzes the impact of international outsourcing on UK wage inequality during the 1990s by applying the mandated wage approach proposed by Feenstra and Hanson (1999 ). The methodology is extended in order to obtain additional insight into the relative importance of the factor and sector bias of international outsourcing and technological change. The results indicate that technological change is the predominant force behind the increase in wage inequality, but international outsourcing also contributed significantly. In explaining the increase in wage inequality the factor bias of technological change was slightly larger than its sector bias, while for international outsourcing the sector bias was much more important. The relative importance of the two effects hinges crucially on the estimated rate of productivity passthrough.     

International intellectual property rights protection and economic growth with costly transfer

This paper develops a product‐cycle model with costly technology transfer, which requires resources from both the North and the South. In the basic model, we show that strengthening intellectual property rights (IPR) protection induces a large technology transfer and narrows the North–South wage gap. However, we obtain an ambiguous result regarding the effect on economic growth, which depends crucially on the size of the transfer cost. Although strengthening IPR protection induces a high growth rate when the transfer cost is small, it can induce a low growth rate when the transfer cost is large. In the extended model, in order to examine what factors determine the transfer cost, we consider the situation where the Southern firms may misbehave and the Northern firms incur a cost to monitor them. We show that the degree of investor protection and the degree of morality in developing countries influence the size of the transfer cost, which affects economic growth.     

Intellectual property rights,technology transfer and exports in developing countries

We develop a model to analyze one mechanism under which stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) protection may improve the ability of firms in developing countries to break into export markets. A Northern firm with a superior process technology chooses either exports or technology transfer through licensing as its mode of supplying the Southern market, based on local IPR policy. Given this decision, the North and South firms engage in Cournot competition in both markets. We find that stronger IPR would enhance technology transfer through licensing and reduce the South firm's marginal production cost, thereby increasing its exports. Welfare in the South would rise (fall) if that country has high (low) absorptive capacity. Excessively strong IPR diminish competition and welfare, however. Adding foreign direct investment as an additional channel of technology transfer sustains these basic messages.     

Intellectual property rights, technology transfer and exports in developing countries

We develop a model to analyze one mechanism under which stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) protection may improve the ability of firms in developing countries to break into export markets. A Northern firm with a superior process technology chooses either exports or technology transfer through licensing as its mode of supplying the Southern market, based on local IPR policy. Given this decision, the North and South firms engage in Cournot competition in both markets. We find that stronger IPR would enhance technology transfer through licensing and reduce the South firm's marginal production cost, thereby increasing its exports. Welfare in the South would rise (fall) if that country has high (low) absorptive capacity. Excessively strong IPR diminish competition and welfare, however. Adding foreign direct investment as an additional channel of technology transfer sustains these basic messages.     

Imitation and innovation driven development under imperfect intellectual property rights

Developing countries employ about two-fifth of the world's researchers, originate one quarter of world expenditures on R&D, and their inventions are subject to imitation. Nevertheless, the previous literature focuses on North–South setups in which the South is restricted to imitating northern inventions. To analyze the effects of IPR policies on developed and developing countries, we extend this literature to allow not only for southern innovation and imitation of northern goods, but also for imitation targeted at southern innovations. We find the effects of IPRs on R&D and welfare to be non-monotonic and dependent on innovation efficiency and an innovation threshold in the South. For sufficiently strong IPRs the South engages in original R&D and stronger IPRs promote southern innovation, welfare, and a reduction in the North–South wage gap. Below the threshold, a strengthening of IPR protection fails to promote innovation and decreases welfare. Stronger IPRs exclusively for southern firms can benefit both regions by shifting southern resources from the imitation of northern goods to original southern innovation.     

知识产权保护、FDI与国际收入转移

"加强知识产权保护能吸引更多外商直接投资(FDI),并能使后发国受益"这一命题能否构成支持加强后发国知识产权保护的论据?文章将知识产权保护对FDI、自主创新、国内模仿和国外模仿的影响纳入三方参与的两阶段动态博弈模型,讨论后发国通过加强知识产权保护来吸引FDI的政策效应。分析认为后发国通过加强知识产权保护能吸引更多FDI,但并不一定能从中获益。因为:FDI偏向进入能够对后发国产生最小收益的产业;加强知识产权保护产生了大量国际收入转移;通过加强知识产权保护,由FDI进入新行业而增加的利润将被已有FDI产业利润的减少所抵消。根据各行业特征选择相应的最优知识产权保护才能使总体福利最大化。     

Gradual globalization and inequality between and within countries

Abstract.  This paper investigates the effects of gradual trade liberalization on intra‐country and inter‐country inequality. It assumes two countries, North and South, and two factors, skilled labour and unskilled labour. North is defined as the one that is relatively skilled‐labour abundant and larger. A marginal trade liberalization from autarky is shown to (a) increase (decrease) in skilled‐unskilled wage differential in the North (South) and (b) raise the inequality between North and South. As the global economy approaches free trade, a marginal trade liberalization has effects, which are the opposite of (a) and (b); that is, the relative wage falls in the North and rises in the South, and North‐South inequality decreases.     

Technology diffusion and global welfare effects: Imitative R&D vs. South-bound FDI

A country in question is positioned in the middle of a global technology race. To shorten its technology gap with the forerunner (North), this middle country must invest in imitative R&D. To exploit cheap labor in the technological laggard (South), it also must invest in South-bound FDI. A dynamic general-equilibrium model of three countries (North, Middle, South) is set up to numerically analyze how the Middle’s refraining South-bound FDI affects international technology diffusion, international wage gaps, and international welfare. The Middle always finds a need to socially optimize investing balance between imitative R&D and South-bound FDI, while the South is instead in favor of as much South-bound FDI as possible. Interestingly, the North may, or may not, align with the Middle’s tightening South-bound FDI, depending on how fast the Northern product innovation can proceed over time. Both transitional dynamics and the steady-state equilibrium are computed.     

Outsourcing and Wage Inequality in a Dynamic Product Cycle Model

This paper constructs a dynamic North–South trade model with outsourcing and endogenous innovation. Production of high quality goods is first performed in the North (Northern phase), then split between the North and the South (Outsourcing phase), and finally shifted to the South (Southern phase). This cycle is reignited whenever a Northern firm innovates a higher quality product. We find that an increase in the fraction of outsourced production raises the Northern skill premium unambiguously, while raising the Southern skill premium if and only if the skill intensity of outsourced production is higher than that of local Southern production.     

Foreign direct investment and international trade in a continuum Ricardian trade model

We develop a continuum Ricardian trade model to capture both North–South trade and technology transfer via foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational enterprises (MNEs). We show that there is a unique range of products produced in the South by MNEs. In the case of an infinitely elastic supply of expatriates, if the ability of Southern workers in absorbing Northern technology increases, then (a) the range of MNE production increases, (b) Northern workers's welfare and Southern workers' welfare change in opposite directions, and (c) the world aggregate welfare increases under certain conditions. We explore issues such as North–South wage gaps, FDI policies and the product cycle. We also derive results under a general supply of expatriates.     

North–South Outsourcing,Immigration, and Skilled Wages: Through the Lens of Incomplete Contracts

The forces of immigration and offshore outsourcing are subject to factors that leave sufficient room for incompleteness in a contract. The authors present a model that allows one to compare the effects of immigration and offshore outsourcing, on skilled wage, when both are subject to contractual incompleteness. They capture the sensitivity of the effect on the skilled wage, of immigration and offshore outsourcing to complementarities between firm‐specific human capital and human capital that is transferable across firms manufacturing intermediate goods. In particular, the authors show that the North–South gap in skilled wages is likely to (i) increase through the forces of immigration when the intermediate goods' technology is super‐modular in the North but sub‐modular in the South and (ii) decrease through the forces of outsourcing when the intermediate goods' technology is sub‐modular in the North but super‐modular in the South.