Status-seeking behavior,the evolution of income inequality,and growth

Using an overlapping generations model, this paper investigates the implications of status-seeking behavior, induced by preferences for relative income, for the evolution of income inequality. When average income rises, an individual’s marginal utility of their own income may increase (keeping up with the Joneses, or KUJ), or decrease (running away from the Joneses, or RAJ). It is shown that income inequality is shrinking over time in the KUJ economy, whereas it is expanding in the RAJ economy. We also explore the implications for long-run growth and inequality, in the existence of both KUJ and RAJ agents. I am truly grateful to Koichi Futagami for his encouragement and guidance in writing this paper. I have benefitted from comments by an anonymous referee, Been-Lon Chen, Giacomo Corneo, Akiomi Kitagawa, Kazuo Mino, Kazuhiro Yuki, and seminar participants at Osaka University, the 2006 Japanese Economic Association Autumn Meeting at Osaka City University, the Far Eastern Meeting of Econometric Society 2007 at Taipei, SER Conference 2007 at Singapore, and the European Meeting of Econometric Society 2007 at Budapest. All remaining errors are, of course, my own. The financial support from JSPS Research Fellowships for Young Scientists is greatly acknowledged.     

Income inequality and economic growth

Despite the extensive existing literature on income inequality and economic growth, there remains considerable disagreement on the effect of inequality on economic growth. Existing literatures find either a positive or a negative relationship. In this paper, we attempt to theoretically examine that relationship with a stochastic optimal growth model. We make the disagreement clear within a single model. We conclude (i) that both are possible – that is, higher inequality can retard growth in the early stage of economic development, and can encourage growth in a near steady state, (ii) that income redistribution by high income tax does not always reduce income inequality. Income inequality can be reduced by higher income tax in a near steady state, but it cannot be reduced in the early stage of economic development, and (iii) that two government polices – rapid economic growth and low income inequality – can be achieved by low income tax in the early stage of economic development, but both cannot be achieved simultaneously in a near steady state.     

International intellectual property rights: Effects on growth, welfare and income inequality

What are the effects of strengthening developing countries’ protection for intellectual property rights on economic growth and income inequality in the global economy? To analyze this question, we develop a two-country R&;D-based growth model with wealth heterogeneity. In this growth-theoretic framework, we show that strengthening patent protection in either country increases economic growth and income inequality in both countries. Furthermore, we derive the Nash equilibrium level of patent breadth and find that it is sub-optimally low relative to globally optimal patent breadth due to the positive externality effects that are captured by a spillover parameter.     

Political capitalism: The interaction between income inequality,economic freedom and democracy

We study the relationship between income inequality and economic freedom for a panel of 100 countries for the 1971–2010 period. Using a panel Granger non-causality approach, we reject the null hypothesis of Granger non-causality running from income inequality to economic freedom, but not vice versa. From a series of dynamic panel estimations we show that the effect of income inequality on economic freedom is negative and robust to the inclusion of additional controls. In particular, inequality is negatively associated with those components of economic freedom related to international trade, domestic market regulation as well as the rule of law and property rights protection. We argue that the negative effect of inequality on economic freedom is due to the economic elite converting its economic power into de facto political power to defend its economic interests; these interests run counter to economic freedom, discouraging innovation and competition as well as protecting the elite's rents. Finally, we show that economic freedom decreases with income inequality even in democratic countries, suggesting that democratic institutions do not prevent economic freedom from eroding. We argue that the latter finding corresponds to a system of political capitalism or captured democracy, where a powerful economic elite can nevertheless exercise de facto political power by cooperating with politicians and other decision-makers for their mutual benefit.     

The role of factor substitution in the theory of economic growth and income distribution: Two examples

While much empirical evidence suggests that the Cobb–Douglas production function may be a reasonable benchmark for aggregate analysis, we argue that the practice, particularly prevalent in contemporary growth theory, of adopting the Cobb–Douglas technology, may lead to misleading implications. Using two examples, we show that key implications of the models are highly sensitive to small deviations of the elasticity of substitution from unity. The first employs the standard neoclassical model and emphasizes the sensitivity of the speed of convergence to small changes in the elasticity of substitution. This in turn has profound consequences for wealth and income distribution. The second deals with foreign aid and highlights how the relative merits of “tied” versus “untied” aid are also very sensitive to the elasticity of substitution.     

A refinement of the relationship between economic growth and income inequality

There is mixed evidence in the literature of a clear relationship between income inequality and economic growth. Most of that work has focused almost exclusively on developed economies. In what we believe to be a first effort, our emphasis is solely on developing economics, which we classify as high-income and low-income developing countries (HIDC and LIDC). We make such distinction on theoretical and empirical grounds. Empirically, the World Bank has classified developing economies in this manner since 1978. The data in our sample are also supportive of such classifications. We provide theoretical scaffolding that uses asymmetric credit constraints as a premise for separating developing economies in such a way. We find strong evidence of a negative relationship between income inequality and economic growth in LIDC to be in stark contrast with a positive inequality–growth relationship for HIDC. Both correlations are statistically significant across multiple econometric specifications. Using international data from 1960 to 2010, this article explores the effect of income inequality on economic growth using dynamic panel technique, such as system generalized method of moments (GMM) that is believed to mitigate endogenous problem. These results are strikingly contrasting to the previous estimation results of Forbes (2000) displaying significant positive correlation between two variables in the short to medium term.     

Testing structural benefit transfer: The role of income inequality

How the valuation of environmental goods is related to income is a key question for economics, but the role of income inequality is often neglected. We study how income inequality affects the international transfer of the estimated value of environmental goods from a study to a policy site—a practice called value or benefit transfer. Specifically, we apply theory-driven, structural transfer factors to test whether adjusting for income inequality affects errors made in benefit transfer, drawing on a multi-country valuation study on water quality improvement. Our convergent validity analysis shows that the structural income inequality adjustment reduces benefit transfer errors by between 1.5 and 1.8 percentage points on average across all transfers. We therefore find that adjusting for income inequality offers only a minor improvement of benefit transfers as compared to adjusting for differences in mean income. Overall, our results shed light on the potential of structural approaches to benefit transfer for environmental valuation and public policy appraisal.     

Fuzzy measurement of income inequality: Some possibility results on the fuzzification of the lorenz ordering

Summary This paper starts from the premise that the concept of income inequality is ill-defined, and hence, it studies the measurement of income inequality from a fuzzy set theoretical point of view. It is argued that the standard (fuzzy) transitivity concepts are not compatible with fuzzy inequality orderings which respect Lorenz ordering. For instance, we show that there does not exist a max-min transitive fuzzy relation on a given income distribution space which ranks distributions unambiguously according to the Lorenz criterion whenever they can actually be ranked by it. Weakening the imposed transitivity concept, it is possible to escape from the noted impossibility theorems. We introduce some alternative transitivity concepts for fuzzy relations, and subsequently, construct a class of fuzzy orderings which preserve Lorenz ordering and satisfy these alternative transitivities. It is also shown that fuzzy measurement can be used to construct confidence intervals for the crisp conclusions of inequality indices.I wish to thank Ashish Banerjee, Kaushik Basu, Larry Blume, Gary Fields, Semih Koray, Tapan Mitra, Antony Shorrocks, Sinan Unur and two anonymous referees of this journal for insighthul comments and suggestions. I am also grateful to the participants of the 1993 Midwest Mathematical Economics Conference held in University of Wisconsin at Madison and the 2nd International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare held in University of Rochester.     

Wealth inequality,governance and economic growth

Links between economic growth and inequality are of growing interest for researchers and policy makers. Previous studies of this relationship have focused mainly on inequalities in income rather than in wealth. Yet from many perspectives wealth inequality is arguably more important. Using a new panel data set from Credit Suisse for 45 sample countries over the period 2000–2012, this study investigates the effects of wealth inequality on economic growth. Empirical results from system GMM estimation suggest that the wealth inequality is negatively associated with cross-country economic growth. This result is robust to alternative estimators and measures of wealth inequality, as well as the econometric specification. Further empirical investigation reveals that impact of wealth inequality on growth is mitigated by better governance.     

The response of household debt to income inequality shocks: a heterogeneous approach

This article explores the impact of changes in income inequality on household indebtedness using Pedroni's heterogeneous panel VAR. As a result, we find evidence in support of large cross-country heterogeneity in the responses of household leverage to income inequality shocks. We also find that such heterogeneity stems from differences in the strength of financial regulations and supervision.     

The composition effects of tax-based consolidation on income inequality

Many advanced economies have recently embarked on fiscal austerity. As this has come at a time of high and rising income disparities, policy-makers have fretted about the inequality effects of fiscal consolidations. We shed new light on this issue by empirically investigating the (composition) effects of tax-based consolidations on income inequality, output and labour market conditions for a sample of 16 OECD countries over the period 1978–2012. We find that tax-based consolidations reduce income inequality, but at the cost of weaker economic activity. However, tax composition does matter. Indirect taxes reduce income inequality by more than direct taxes, possibly due to the operation of a positive labour supply channel. Higher indirect taxes increase the price of the consumption basket and create incentives for agents to increase their labour supply. We find this effect to be stronger for middle-aged women. Looking at specific instruments, general consumption taxes and personal taxes are the most suited to reduce inequality while at the same time minimizing the equity-efficiency trade-off.     

Land inequality and the transition to modern growth

Can the initial distribution of land, in a country's early history, affect its subsequent economic development? In this paper, I show that when land ownership is sufficiently concentrated, the landed elite will lobby the government to raise barriers to industrialization in order to protect its rents in the rural economy. I develop a small open economy model in which barriers take the form of tariffs on the imports of intermediate inputs used in industry. Such tariffs can affect both the timing and the pace of industrialization. The quantitative application of the theory is motivated by an important question in economic history: why did Argentina not replicate Canadian economic success, despite reasonable expectations to the contrary in the late 19th century? I provide evidence that Argentina had a markedly higher inequality in land ownership than Canada. Taking as given the observed differences in land distributions in the early 20th century, the model produces differences in equilibrium tariffs similar to the ones observed at the time, and the ones required to account for the Canadian–Argentine income gap until 1950. Over time however, as land becomes unimportant in production, land inequality ceases to be a source of policy disparities and income gaps.     

The synchronization club: classification of global economic groups by inequality

We find that, from 1970 to 2006, the GDPs of 181 countries are described by a log-normal with a power law tail before 1992, but by a kinked power law distribution after 1992. In the 15 years from 1992 to 2006, there are two obvious scale-free zones for annual GDPs, ranked from the largest to smallest. If the countries in each scaling region are regarded as a group, the world is divided into two groups, each with a roughly stable number of members. The power exponents of the two groups are different and hence lead to different inequalities. Therefore, the basis for classification is the macro-consistent inequality within each group. The wealth grows in a synchronous nonlinear manner within groups that have a stable wealth distribution and rank structure. If each group is considered as a club, we name it a ‘synchronization club’.     

The impact of infrastructure investments on income inequality: Evidence from US states

Our analysis of US state-level data on an annual frequency, from 1976 to 2008, sheds new light on a plausible causal link between infrastructure investments, namely public spending on highways, and income inequality. This causal relationship is drawn out using the number of seats in the US House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations (HRCA) as an instrument to identify quasi-random variations in state-level spending on highways. An exogenous pattern which emerges when a state gains an additional member to the HRCA is that it is allocated with new federal grants. This increase in federal transfers for infrastructure financing results in slashing of expenditures on highways and a crowding-out effect of federal funding for state investments on highways. Spending cuts on highways produced by a new HRCA member being attained by a state can unwittingly cause income inequality to rise over a short 2-year time horizon. Similar challenges with decentralized development to finance infrastructure via federal transfers to state and sub-national governments may be encountered by other industrially advanced, emerging and low-income developing economies. US data over the mentioned period reveal a strong positive correlation with state spending on highways and wages paid for construction jobs. Suggestive evidence indicates that the construction sector also plays an important role in the transmission channel from a rise in state spending on highways to lowering income inequality, albeit during specific intervals, as opposed to on a long-term basis.     

Religious adherence and county economic growth in the US

We estimate a Barro-type conditional convergence model using religious adherence data from the American Religious Data Archive to analyze independent effects of church adherence rates on economic growth in the United States at the county-level. Per capita income growth is modeled as a function of initial per capita income, initial human capital stock, and a set of control and related variables including religious adherence, religious diversity, and regional indicator variables. We also investigate the independent effects of three main denominations, namely Catholics, Evangelical Christians, and Mainline Christians, on county economic growth. Our results indicate that the religious adherence in general is significantly greater than zero and not beneficial for US county income growth. We find mixed results for effects of various denominations.     

Income inequality and income bias in voter turnout

In the era of growing income inequality around the world, it remains inconclusive how higher income inequality affects income bias in turnout (i.e., high-income citizens vote more likely than low-income citizens). Using large-scale cross-national survey data, we show that (1) strong income bias in turnout exists in many parts of the world, (2) higher income inequality is related to lower income bias in turnout by demobilizing high-income citizens and mobilizing low-income citizens, and (3) this relationship is partly explained by the pattern that vote buying is more common in societies with higher income inequality and thus mobilizes low-income citizens but decreases political efficacy among high-income citizens. Ultimately, this study suggests that growing income inequality may not exaggerate political inequality, but may challenge the legitimacy of democratic elections.     

The effects of progressive income taxation on job turnover

We examine whether the level of the income tax rate and the convexity of the income tax schedule affect job mobility, as measured by moving to a better job. While the predicted effect of the level of the tax rate is ambiguous, we predict that an increase in the convexity of the tax schedule decreases job search activity by taxing away some of the benefits of a successful job search. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we estimate that both higher tax rates and increased tax rate progressivity decrease the probability that a head of household will move to a better job during the coming year. Our estimates imply that a five-percentage-point reduction in the marginal tax rate increases the average probability of moving to a better job by 0.79 percentage points (a 8.0% increase in the turnover propensity) and that a one-standard-deviation decrease in our measure of tax progressivity would increase this probability by 0.86 percentage points (a 8.7% increase in the turnover propensity). This estimate is robust to sensitivity analysis examining the importance of different sources of identification and variation in estimated effects across subgroups in the population. Our estimated importance of tax policy for job turnover suggests a potential role in explaining the responsiveness of taxable income to marginal tax rates.     

Long term trends in fair and unfair inequality in the United States

This article analyses the microeconomic sources of wage inequality in the United States from 1967–2012. Decomposing inequality into factors categorized by degree of personal responsibility, education explains over twice as much of inequality today as 45 years ago. However, neither hours worked nor education, industry, marital status, or geographical location can explain the rise in income inequality. In fact, ‘unfair’ inequality (income disparity derived from non-responsibility factors) has risen faster than ‘fair’ inequality (income disparity derived from responsibility factors), regardless of the set of variables chosen as fair sources of inequality. We further examine income inequalities within gender and racial groups, finding substantial heterogeneity. Overall, using micro data to understand the sources of inequality and how these changes over time can provide better information for policymakers motivated to combat rising inequality.     

The relationship between income inequality and aggregate saving: an empirical analysis using cross-country panel data

If the rich save more than the poor, an increase in income inequality raises aggregate saving. We investigate whether income inequality is positively related to aggregate saving ratio by estimating a fixed-effect model based on a panel data of 48 countries for the period 1991–2010. We find evidence that aggregate saving ratio increases with income inequality using various inequality measures. In particular, the effect of income distribution on saving is greater and statistically more significant with in financially developed, rich and OECD countries. It suggests that the rich save much more than the poor under advanced financial system and in a rich country. We also find that the relationship between income inequality and saving ratio is closer in the 2000s than the 1990s. This finding may result from financial development and the high income level in the 2000s.