Social capital and social economics

The “discovery” of social capital in the early 1990s led to an upsurge of research into the economic impact of social cohesion and governmental effectiveness. This paper outlines key developments in the social capital literature over the past 13 years. It then examines theory and evidence of the links between social cohesion, quality of governance, economic performance and human welfare. The literature indicates that social capital makes a measurable contribution to economic development and overall wellbeing, particularly in developing countries. Partly in response to this emerging body of evidence, there has been increased interest in the application of community development principles to economic development initiatives. This paper argues that the advent of social capital theory represents a partial convergence between social economics and mainstream economics, and signifies an increased acceptance that economic activity cannot be meaningfully “disembedded” from social and political context.     

Social capital and social learning after Hurricane Sandy

The post-disaster context is one characterized by profound uncertainty. Those affected by the storm, or earthquake, or flood, must determine what strategies to pursue in response to the disaster and must find ways to coordinate their recovery efforts with others in their community. Ex ante it is not clear what strategies will be most effective. If communities are to recover after a disaster, community members must engender and engage in a process of social learning involving experimentation, communication, and imitation. This paper explores the post-disaster social learning process. Specifically, we focus on the importance of social capital in facilitating social learning after a disaster, including facilitating community members’ ability to communicate their desire to return, to assess damage, to overcome barriers to rebuilding through collective yet voluntary action, and to learn from and imitate others’ successes. Focusing on how this process took place after Hurricane Sandy in Rockaway, New York, especially within the Orthodox Jewish community, we examine how community groups (a) adapted existing organization structures and (b) created new procedures and imitated the successful actions of others in order to spur recovery.     

Social economics and economics imperialism

Address delivered at a session on April 2, 1993 at the Midwest regional meetings of the Association for Social Economics, Indianapolis, IN.     

Kantian dignity and social economics

Many social economists endorse the ethics of Immanuel Kant, specifically his emphasis on the dignity of humanity and the equal respect due all persons. Based on these tenets, Kant mandates a social outlook in which concern for others, characterized by negative duties of respect and positive duties of beneficence, are broadly required of all rational agents. However, some of the positions that social economists derive from Kantian dignity actually violate it, such as support for a welfare state and opposition to the institution of wage employment. I will show that both of these positions are inconsistent with the traditional understanding of Kantian dignity, suggesting that social economists should either ground their positions on a different concept of dignity, or revise them to remain consistent with Kant's specific sense of dignity. For helpful comments and criticism I thank John Davis, Charles Wilber, David Ellerman, and the rest of the participants in the “Economic Philosophy and Theories of Justice” session at the 2003 meetings of the Association for Social Economics, as well as two anonymous referees. All remaining errors are my own.     

The new institutional economics and its relevance to social economics

There has been a quiet revolution in economic theory, led by the New Institutionalists. Pioneered by Douglass C. North, this group argues that institutions are the main determinants of economic performance, yet neoclassical economics has no role for institutions. Contrary to many misconceptions, this theory of institutions can be integrated with neoclassical economics, leaving mainstream economic theory in tact, but broader and more relevant. The purpose of this article is twofold. First, the main arguments of the New Institutionalists are summarized. Second, the bridge between institutions and social economics is explored. The article concludes by arguing that the New Institutional approach is fruitful, and that the theory will gradually be integrated with neoclassical economics, until the two merge into a single body of theory.     

Social preferences and public economics: Mechanism design when social preferences depend on incentives

Social preferences such as altruism, reciprocity, intrinsic motivation and a desire to uphold ethical norms are essential to good government, often facilitating socially desirable allocations that would be unattainable by incentives that appeal solely to self-interest. But experimental and other evidence indicates that conventional economic incentives and social preferences may be either complements or substitutes, explicit incentives crowding in or crowding out social preferences. We investigate the design of optimal incentives to contribute to a public good under these effects would make either more or less use of explicit incentives, by comparison to a naive planner who assumes they are absent.     

Signaling in social network and social capital formation

This paper presents a model of social capital and social network formation. The key interaction within the model is that whom an individual chooses to become friends with affects the value (social capital) of the friendship. In the model, how a player searches for and then forms friendships reveals how willing she is to engage in cooperation with a potential friend. Individuals observe their local network structure (friends and cliques) and the actions of players within these. Willingness to cooperate is private information and is captured by the discount factor of an individual. Cooperative types have high discount factors and can signal their type by forming a clique through befriending a friend of a friend. Uncooperative types do not form these kinds of friendships because of the local observability of their actions to all members of a clique. Thus, when a player meets someone with whom she shares a friend, her belief that the individual has a high discount factor is greater than the population average. In this sense, people “trust” each other more when they share a friend in common. Finally, I relate the primitives of the model to characteristics of the implied social network by nesting the sequential equilibrium in an algorithm of network formation proposed by Jackson and Rogers (Am Econ Rev 97(3):890–915, 2007). The model highlights a trade-off between maximizing the total amount of social capital in a society and distributing it equitably across individuals.     

On representative social capital

This paper analyzes the behavior of subjects randomly drawn from the Dutch population who reveal their capacity to provide and sustain social capital by their propensity to invest and reward investments in an economic experiment. We find that heterogeneity in behavior is characterized by several asymmetries—men, the young and elderly, and low educated individuals invest relatively less, but reward significantly more investments. The age effects are found to corroborate existing findings, whereas those of gender and education do not. Higher expected levels of investments by others are found to have a positive and significant effect on own investments. Finally, a laboratory experiment with student subjects is found to provide a lower bound of the population level of social capital.     

Barbara Wooteen's lament for economics and vision of a social economics

The British social economist Barbara Wootton (1897–1988), engaged in a searching critique of the narrowness and abstraction of Neoclassical orthodoxy in herLament for Economics (1938), which was provoked by Robbins'Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, and in her reply to Hayek'sThe Road to Serfdom. Her participation in Beveridge's wartime “brains trust” resulted in her Fabian Society pamphlet,Full Employment (1943). This paper examines Wootton's critique of Neoclassical Economics; her vision of a broader, more realistic social economics; her attempts to apply that vision of social economics inThe Social Foundations of Wages Policy (1955), andIncomes Policy (1974), and parallels between her work and North American developments in social economics. *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A03DH034 00003     

Human capital theory and social capital theory on sports management

This paper analyzes sports managers' earnings and blends traditional aspects of management derived from human capital theory with new aspects derived from social capital theory. It captures the integrative and relational aspects of sports management. In 2000, the authors carried out a questionnaire in the Madeira Island. Data about the amateur sports managers were then taken from it. Results obtained verify that sports managers' earnings are function of both types of theoretical determinants posited by the human capital theory and the social capital theory. The authors conclude that both issues are determinants of sports managers' earnings.     

Social capital and snake oil

This paper argues that the social capital that comes from group identification has a mixture of effects on welfare. In this sense, this form of social capital is neither snake oil nor elixir but something in between. Strong group distinction and identification reduce the adverse impact that relative comparisons can have on happiness, and they probably help with existential anxieties. However, strong groups in this sense can also plausibly heighten inter-group animosity to the detriment of all. Whether they do, however, is likely to depend on the character of the beliefs that give identity to each group. The paper further argues that an ‘open’ set of beliefs in the Austrian or Hayekian sense are the ones least likely to spawn such animosity. In this way, the paper points public policy away from the encouragement to group formation to the character of the groups that are formed.      

The basic income guarantee and social economics

This article introduces the Review of Social Economy symposium on the basic income guarantee (BIG). It argues that there are several ways in which the BIG is consistent with social economics. First, the BIG is an attempt to meet the minimum material needs of US citizens and contribute to the common good. Second, important arguments for a BIG move beyond the positive-normative dichotomy. Finally, the BIG would help individuals function as social citizens.     

The elementary economics of social dilemmas

Abstract.  A social dilemma is, in essence, a prisoners' dilemma in a continuous strategy space. I discuss a number of social dilemmas that have caught my attention, offer an elementary, diagrammatic synthesis of them, and discuss some of the economic insights that the diagrams capture, including incentives for pre‐commitment. Finally, I model pre‐commitment via delegation and link results to the literature on the evolution of preferences.     

Social responsibility for living standards: Presidential address,association for social economics, 2007

This address presents a vision of economics—drawing upon social, institutional, and feminist economics—that supports the assertion that there should be social responsibility for living standards. Alternative definitions of what an economy is and what economics should study are related to three definitions of living standards presented in Amartya Sen's 1985 Tanner Lectures on the topic. A social provisioning approach to economic life emphasizes that provisioning needs to be organized to promote human flourishing. One contemporary challenge is to do this in a manner that sustains caring and promotes gender equity. 1 1 Following my Presidential Address and prior to publication, I have benefited from comments by Wilfred Dolfsma, Laurie Nisonoff, Nancy Folbre, Ellen Mutari, Martha Starr, and an anonymous reviewer.      

Ethics and social capital for global well-being

Social capital is associated with considerable benefits for individuals and communities. Because some social capital is non-excludable, people may be disinclined to undertake activities that will create it. This is especially likely when the norm of self-interest is prominent. In addition, given the birds of a feather phenomenon, social capital appears to thrive in homogenous networks, and to languish in the face of diversity. I argue that social capital meets the criteria of a moral concept and that treating it as such can address these vulnerabilities. In particular, as a moral principle, social capital would be more demanding than mere self-interest and the moral requirement of universality would trigger a duty to act impartially with respect to networks. Since market interactions can create social capital, and social capital is a moral good, market interactions are in part constitutive of the good. I also argue that global social capital is important for both global well-being and sustainable globalization. Given the benefits of social capital, including it in the choice architecture as a moral principle will be worth the investment.