Executive Compensation and the Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt

Executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives' portfolio sensitivities to changes in stock prices (delta) and stock return volatility (vega). Large deltas discourage managerial risk‐taking, while large vegas encourage risk‐taking. Theory suggests that short‐maturity debt mitigates agency costs of debt by constraining managerial risk preferences. We posit and find evidence of a negative (positive) relation between CEO portfolio deltas (vegas) and short‐maturity debt. We also find that short‐maturity debt mitigates the influence of vega‐ and delta‐related incentives on bond yields. Overall, our empirical evidence shows that short‐term debt mitigates agency costs of debt arising from compensation risk.     

The determinants of debt maturity in Australian firms

We examine the determinants of debt maturity in the Australian capital market with the Top 400 firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange for the period 1989–2006. We find that Australian firms not only exhibit a positive leverage–maturity relationship but also use short‐term debt to signal their high quality to the market. Our results are robust to different estimation methods that control for endogeneity and error‐dependence. We also find that ignoring the interaction between leverage and maturity can lead to erroneous conclusions about the support for the matching principle, the agency costs hypothesis and the transaction costs hypothesis.     

Sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance measures in all-equity firms

We investigate the relation between chief executive officer compensation and accounting performance measures as a function of the firm's capital structure. We specifically analyse pay–performance relationships for all‐equity firms relative to high‐levered firms. We find a significant positive association between return on equity and the level of compensation for all‐equity firms. Consistent with optimal contracting theory, we cannot discern any such relationship for high‐levered firms. Because of agency costs of debt, managerial compensation in high‐levered firms plays the role of a precommitment mechanism in addition to its conventional role of aligning management incentives with shareholder interest.     

Why do managers avoid EPS dilution? Evidence from debt–equity choice

Survey evidence reveals that managers prefer to avoid dilution of earnings per share (EPS), though financial theory suggests it is irrelevant in firm valuation. We explore contracting and behavioral explanations for this apparent paradox using a large sample of debt–equity issuers. We first provide evidence that firms with greater agency conflicts between managers and shareholders are more likely to use EPS as a performance measure in bonus contracts. After controlling for possible endogeneity related to compensation contract design, we find that managers are more likely to avoid earnings dilution when their bonus compensation explicitly depends upon EPS performance. This effect is increasing in the magnitude of bonus compensation for this subset of firms; we document no such associations for the firms that do not use EPS in setting bonus pay. Additional tests of firms’ speed of adjustment to target leverage ratios and firms’ debt conservatism levels indicate that explicitly rewarding executives on EPS performance helps to resolve underleveraging problems. We also find that clientele effects are associated with managers’ aversion to earnings dilution. Our findings provide a deeper understanding of the factors that underlie the use of accounting performance in compensation contracts and new evidence on the implications of the contracting role of accounting in firm decision-making.     

Industry Structure and Corporate Debt Maturity

We examine how industry competition affects firms’ choice of short‐term debt. We find that the percentage of short‐term debt is positively related to industry concentration at low levels of concentration, and inversely related to industry concentration at higher levels of concentration. This nonlinear relation is stronger in industries where firms are either more homogeneous or compete more aggressively. Moreover, we find that firms with shorter‐maturity debt are less aggressive than their rivals in the product market. The overall evidence suggests that although financial contracts alleviate agency problems, they exacerbate the risk of predation.     

The role of accounting conservatism in M&A target selection

Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are among the most important investment activities for companies, but they contain great risks. We investigate the role of accounting conservatism in M&A target selection and risk. We find that for risk-averse reasons, firms with high accounting conservatism are likely to acquire profitable targets and avoid loss-making targets. When such firms acquire loss-making targets, the conservatism’s risk-control role reduces M&A risk and increases M&A performance, but only when control of the target is transferred and the acquirer has high long-term debt and low management power. Furthermore, accounting conservatism reduces risk by increasing the maturity match between cash flow and debt. Our results suggest that accounting conservatism plays not only a risk-averse role but also a risk-control role, providing new evidence for the usefulness of accounting conservatism in M&A decisions.     

The Allowance for Uncollectible Accounts,Conservatism, and Earnings Management

We study the interrelation between conservatism and earnings management by examining the allowance for uncollectible accounts and its income statement counterpart, bad debt expense. We find that the allowance is conservative and that it has become more conservative over time. Conservatism may, however, facilitate earnings management. We find that firms manage bad debt expense downward (and even record income‐increasing bad debt expense) to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts and that conservatism accentuates the extent to which firms manage bad debt expense. Further, we find that firms manage bad debt expense downward by drawing down previously recorded over‐accruals of bad debt expense that have accumulated on the balance sheet. An implication of our study is that tighter limits on the amount by which firms are permitted to understate net assets may reduce their ability to manage earnings.     

The Determinants of Debt Maturity Structure: Evidence from France,Germany and the UK

We examine the determinants of the debt maturity structure of French, German and British firms. These countries represent different financial and legal traditions that may have implications on corporate debt maturity structure. Our model incorporates the factors representing three major theories (tax considerations, liquidity and signalling, and contracting costs) of debt maturity. It also controls for capital market conditions. The results confirm the applicability of most theories of debt maturity structure for the UK firms. However, the evidence from France and Germany are mixed. Overall the findings suggest that the debt maturity structure of a firm is determined by firm‐specific factors and the country's financial systems and institutional traditions in which it operates.     

Growth Opportunities and the Choice of Leverage, Debt Maturity, and Covenants

We investigate the effect of growth opportunities in a firm's investment opportunity set on its joint choice of leverage, debt maturity, and covenants. Using a database that contains detailed debt covenant information, we provide large‐sample evidence of the incidence of covenants in public debt and construct firm‐level indices of bondholder covenant protection. We find that covenant protection is increasing in growth opportunities, debt maturity, and leverage. We also document that the negative relation between leverage and growth opportunities is significantly attenuated by covenant protection, suggesting that covenants can mitigate the agency costs of debt for high growth firms.     

Corporate Pyramids,Conservatism and Cost of Debt: Evidence From Taiwan

This study investigates the extent to which the span of corporate pyramids (as measured by the number of ownership layers) is associated with higher agency costs of debt, and whether conservatism can moderate the agency cost. Consistent with corporate pyramids generating higher agency costs and information asymmetries between corporate insiders and outside creditors, we find a positive association between the number of investment layers and cost of debt. However, we also find that multi-layered firms mitigate organizational opaqueness through increased financial reporting conservatism, which results in lower cost of debt capital. These findings provide new insights into the relationship between organizational structure and financial reporting quality.     

Contracting costs and the window of opportunity for straight debt issues

We analyze whether fluctuation in economy-wide factors cause time-series variation in the contracting costs of moral hazard, adverse selection, and financial distress for a sample of straight debt issues. We find that the announcement period abnormal returns to debt issues are more negative in periods of higher interest rates and in industry downturns. When we partition the impact of each issue- and firm-specific measure of contracting costs across high and low levels of each economy-wide variable, we find that only the measures of agency cost are significant in general, and measures of financial distress become relevant for those debt issues that constitute a leverage increase for the firms.     

Agency costs,taxes and debt: The UK evidence

This paper provides an empirical examination of the impact of the corporation tax and agency costs on firms' capital structure decisions. Our evidence suggests that the agency costs are the main determinants of corporate borrowing. Consistent with the agency theory, we find that firms that have fewer growth options have more debt in their capital structure. Moreover, our results show that debt mitigates the free cash flow problem and that firms that are more likely to be diversified and less prone to bankruptcy are highly geared. the negative effect of insider shareholding on leverage disappears, however; when all the agency mechanisms are accounted for. In addition, we find that, in the long run, companies that are tax exhausted exhibit significantly lower debt ratios than tax-paying firms. However, in the short run, firms' capital structure decisions are not affected by taxation.     

Agency costs of free cash flow and conditional conservatism

This study investigates whether agency costs of free cash flow (FCF) are associated with conditional conservatism. Prior research documents that conditional conservatism improves ex ante efficient investment decisions and facilitates ex post monitoring of managers’ investment decisions. As conditional conservatism can provide protection from possible managerial expropriation, the demand for conditional conservatism should increase with the agency costs of FCF. Using excess cash as a proxy for the agency costs of FCF, I provide evidence that firms with higher agency costs of FCF incorporate losses in a timelier manner relative to gains compared to their counterparts. Additionally, the association between excess cash and conditional conservatism predictably varies with the presence of alternative monitoring mechanisms that mitigate FCF problems, such as debt or dividend payouts or repurchases. Further investigation suggests that greater conservatism is associated with a lower likelihood of overinvestment among firms bearing high agency costs of FCF, demonstrating the ability of conservatism to reduce agency costs of FCF.     

CEO Compensation Risk and Timely Loss Recognition

Prior studies demonstrate that high CEO compensation risk encourages managers to engage in risk‐seeking behavior, thus intensifying agency conflicts between creditors and borrowers. We argue and document that accounting conservatism plays an important role in mitigating debt holder and shareholder conflicts over asset substitution arising from high CEO compensation risk. Our empirical results show that firms with high CEO compensation risk tend to use more timely loss recognition and this positive relationship is more pronounced for firms with high leverage. Additional results show that the positive relationship between CEO compensation risk and borrowing costs is reduced for firms using timely loss recognition, suggesting that creditors perceive timely loss recognition as a risk‐reducing mechanism. Using the passage of FAS 123R as a quasi‐natural experiment on managerial compensation risk, we find a significant reduction in the use of timely loss recognition for firms experiencing a decrease in CEO compensation risk after the passage of FAS 123R. Lastly, we show that timely loss recognition is positively associated only with the compensation risk of the firm's primary decision maker (i.e., its CEO) and not with the compensation risk of subordinates.     

The Effect of Accounting Conservatism on Corporate Investment during the Global Financial Crisis

This paper examines the effect of accounting conservatism on firm‐level investment during the 2007–2008 global financial crisis. Using a differences‐in‐differences design, we find that firms with less conservative financial reporting experienced a sharper decline in investment activity following the onset of the crisis compared to firms with more conservative financial reporting. This relationship was stronger for firms that were financially constrained, faced greater external financing needs, or had higher information asymmetry. We also find that more conservative firms experienced lower declines in both debt‐raising activity and stock performance. The evidence suggests that accounting conservatism reduces underinvestment in the presence of information frictions.     

Proxy contests and debt contracting behavior: The interplay of managerial,shareholder and creditor incentives

We evaluate how heterogeneity in the strategic interplay among shareholder, creditor and manager incentives influences debt contracting behavior around proxy contests. We find that, after proxy contests, new loan originations have significantly higher spreads and more stringent non-pricing contracting terms. The effect, however, occurs largely in contest firms where Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are provided with risk-taking incentives. Further, creditors’ simultaneous equity holdings and credit default swaps (CDS) trading attenuate the impact of proxy contests on debt contracting costs. Finally, proxy contests that culminate in voting and dissident victory experience the largest increase in loan pricing. Overall, our results suggest an increase in the agency cost of debt occurs after proxy contests, particularly when managerial risk-taking incentives are high, and when creditors do not simultaneously hold target firms’ equity or CDS.     

An Analysis of Concepts and Evidence on the Question of Whether IFRS Should be Conservative

Do international accounting standards require conservative accounting? The IASB's conceptual framework suggests that they should not, while the research literature is largely silent on the matter, typically presuming conservatism to be an outcome of private contracting rather than standardized, public, general purpose financial reporting. In this paper, we analyze the actual requirements of IFRS. We find multiple examples of recognition requirements that lead to unconditional conservatism, measurement requirements that lead to conditional conservatism, and also presentation/disclosure requirements that further support a conservative reporting environment. These findings complement, support and deepen existing evidence in the empirical literature that accounting is in practice conservative. We show, however, that the requirements for conservatism in IFRS conflict with, first, the IASB's stated position in its conceptual framework that accounting should not be conservative and, second, the private contracting explanation for conservatism that is generally accepted in the literature. What is missing, and lies behind both conflicts, is an acknowledgement and understanding of the role of an agency/contracting perspective in enhancing the decision‐usefulness of general purpose accounting standards, given the information/incentive asymmetry and uncertainty that characterizes the real‐world context in which those standards operate. From a policy perspective, such an understanding would reconcile the IASB's conceptual framework with the actual requirements of IFRS. From a research literature perspective, such an understanding would re‐position accounting standards as central to the practice of accounting conservatism, which would in turn require revision to the generally accepted theory of a private contracting explanation for the empirical evidence of conservative accounting practice.     

Accounting conservatism and voluntary corporate governance mechanisms by Australian firms

This study examines the relationship between voluntary adoption of selected corporate governance mechanisms and accounting conservatism for a sample of firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) over the 11‐year period prior to the promulgation of the ASX Corporate Governance Council Good Governance Principles and Best Practice Recommendations in 2003. Using four accounting and market‐based accounting conservatism measures, our results provide evidence of both conditional and unconditional conservatism in accounting reporting for Australian firms. We find that voluntary audit committee formation, increasing board independence and decreasing board size are positively associated with unconditional accounting conservatism and negatively related to the degree of conditional conservatism. Our results support the contention that firms voluntarily adopting perceived best practice corporate governance mechanisms employ unconditional accounting conservatism as a complimentary agency control device and are consistent with the observed negative association between the unconditional and conditional forms of accounting conservatism practice.     

Do Banks Price Litigation Risk in Debt Contracting? Evidence from Class Action Lawsuits

Class action lawsuits can be detrimental to debtholders because they deteriorate defendant firms’ financial position and lower these firms’ value. This study examines whether banks price their borrowers’ litigation risk in debt contracting. We find that banks charge 19% higher interest spreads on loans to lawsuit firms after litigation. In addition, banks monitor lawsuit firms more closely by using tighter non‐price terms. The results are robust after correcting for possible endogeneity issues using the propensity score matching approach. We further find that the effects of lawsuit filing are more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance. Following a lawsuit in the industry, banks also perceive an increased likelihood of litigation for industry peer firms and adjust price and non‐price terms accordingly. Finally, we find that the magnitude of the lawsuit filing effect is greater for firms with lower ex‐ante litigation risk. Taken as a whole, our findings suggest that banks, as informed stakeholders, perceive litigation risk to be detrimental and price this risk in debt contracting.