董事会结构、股权结构与中小企业绩效

以中小企业板2004～2009年数据为基础,分析了中小上市企业董事会结构、股权结构与绩效之间的关系。实证结果表明,中小上市企业的董事会结构、股权结构与绩效之间的内生性特征不显著。董事会规模对Tobin’Q具有负向影响,对总资产收益率无显著影响。CEO双重性对Tobin’Q和总资产收益率分别具有负向影响和正向影响。董事会独立性对总资产收益率具有负向影响,对Tobin’Q无显著影响,表明独立董事在中小上市企业中并未起到有效的监督作用。Tobin’Q和股权集中度之间呈现显著的倒W形关系,但总资产收益率和股权集中度之间无显著相关性。Tobin’Q和总资产收益率与管理层持股之间均呈现显著的N形关系。     

Firm Performance and Managerial Succession in Family Managed Firms

Abstract:  This paper investigates whether the family status of a company's top officer affects managerial replacement decisions. We report evidence that family-managed companies are characterized by higher levels of board control and potentially weak internal governance systems. Family CEOs are less likely than non-family CEOs to depart their position following poor performance. Stock prices react favorably and operating performance improves when companies announce the departure of a family CEO. Overall, our evidence suggests that shareholders benefit when a powerful CEO leaves their position in the company.     

Board Independence,Ownership Structure and Performance: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts

For Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), mandatory distribution of income limits free cash flow. But, restrictions on source of income and asset structure result in widely dispersed stock ownership, which makes external monitoring through the takeover market less likely. As such, alternative monitoring mechanisms, including external directors, must be in place to discourage deviant managerial behavior. Using a simultaneous equation system, we conclude that while independent directors enhance REIT performance, the effect is weak. Higher CEO stock ownership and control through tenure and chairmanship of the board reduce the representation by outside directors, and adversely affect REIT performance. Institutional ownership or blockownership fails to serve as alternate disciplining mechanism to (inadequate) monitoring by outside board members, although their presence seems to enhance performance.     

The Level and Stability of Institutional Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from Taiwan

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of shareholding stability of institutional investors on firm performance. We analyze 647 sample companies listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2009 using the coefficient of variance of institutional holding proportion as the measure for ownership stability. The empirical results show that increasing stability of institutional holdings is related to better firm performance. The low-risk and younger firms with higher CEO incentive compensation, larger insider holdings, and higher growth usually have better performance. Furthermore, when the long-term institutional shareholdings, particularly of foreign institutions, are higher, the firm performance is better.     

The Interrelationship Between Managerial Ownership and Board Structure

Abstract:  The paper tests the hypothesis that high managerial ownership entrenches managers by allowing the CEO to create a board that is unlikely to monitor. The results show a strong negative relationship between the level of managerial ownership and corporate governance factors, such as, the split of the roles of the CEO and the Chairman, the proportion of non-executive directors, and the appointment of a non-executive director as a Chairman. I also find that companies with low managerial ownership are more likely to change their board structure to comply with the Cadbury (1992) recommendations. The results suggest that managers, through their high ownership, choose a board that is unlikely to monitor. Overall, the findings cast doubt on the effectiveness of the board as an internal corporate governance mechanism when managerial ownership is high.     

Disproportionate insider control and firm performance

The effect of disproportionate insider control on firm performance is ambiguous. Disproportionate control may enhance insiders’ ability to expropriate perquisites; on the other hand, it may provide stability of management and reduce short‐term market pressures. Using a hand‐collected sample of U.S. dual‐class firms, we find that disproportionate control is positively associated with accounting‐based performance, but negatively associated with Tobin's Q. These results are consistent with the incentives of entrenched insiders who are interested in profitability but less beholden to capital markets.     

股权结构、董事会特征与业绩研究——中国保险公司的治理结构分析

本文选取中国上市保险公司2007年和2008年的年报数据和中期报表数据,依据本文建立的股权结构、董事会特征与业绩模型对样本数据进行多元回归分析,得出如下结论:政府持股比例和高管持股比例与保险公司业绩呈正向关系,即政府持股比例增加和高管持股将有利于保险公司业绩的提高;境外战略投资者持股不利于保险公司业绩的提高;董事会规模与保险公司业绩呈负向关系,即董事会规模越大越不利于保险公司业绩的提高;独立董事以及具有金融从业经验的独立董事与保险业绩无关。     

Corporate performance and firm perception: The British experience

Previous academic research has presented a theoretical basis for a relationship between attributes of a firm's reputation and its financial performance. For the United States, researchers have analysed the correspondence between market and accounting based measures of US firm performance and external evaluators' perceptions of the qualitative attributes of US firms. In this study, expert surveys on the qualitative performance of British firms conducted by the British publication, the Economist, which are similar in content to surveys conducted by Fortune magazine for US firms, are used to determine the correspondence between qualitative and quantitative measures of British firms' performance. Results indicate that differences may exist between US and Britain in the use of qualitative survey data on a firm's strategic attributes as a forecast of a firm's future quantitative performance measures. Results also indicate that for small firms, certain qualitative factors (e.g. capacity to innovate) may be of greater importance in forecasting accounting and security market returns.     

Do related party transactions affect family firm valuations?

We examine the likelihood and value relevance of related party transactions in family firms. Based on an extensive hand-collected sample, we find that founder-led family firms are more likely to enter into related party transactions than other firms. We also find that the founder-led family firm valuation premium is reduced when these firms disclose related party transactions, especially opportunistic related party transactions. We also examine the significant change in related party transaction reporting regulations enacted in 2006 and find that it led to a decline in the number of value-decreasing related party transactions for founder-led family firms. We find a corresponding decrease in the detrimental effect of related party transactions on founder-led family firms’ valuation. Our results suggest that changes in the 2006 SEC related party transaction reporting regulations better protected minority shareholders from wealth extraction via related party transactions in founder-led family firms.     

The Effects of Ownership Structure and Intragroup Loans on Leverage: Evidence from Family Firms in Chile

This article examines the effects of family control and pyramidal ownership on firms’ capital structure decisions. After studying a sample of listed family and nonfamily firms in Chile, we find that families take a conservative approach to debt and financial risk exposure. We test the hypothesis that family firms restrict the use of debt in order to avoid the monitoring role of creditors, which could limit their enjoyment of the private benefits of control. In keeping with this hypothesis, we find a U-shaped relationship between leverage and the degree of pyramidal ownership that is more pronounced among family firms than nonfamily firms. We do not find any evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that family-controlled firms have low leverage ratios due to their access to internal capital markets. In fact, conversely, we find that listed family firms provide more loans to related companies than comparable nonfamily firms.     

Bank Relationship and Firm Performance: Evidence From Thailand Before the Asian Financial Crisis

Abstract:   This study examines the relation between bank relations and market performance in Thailand, an economy in which commercial banks play a crucial role through lending relationship and, for a number of companies, equity ownership. Overall, bank relationships, both equity‐based and debt‐based, positively affect capital investment. However, there is a negative relation between lending relationships, both short‐term and long‐term, and market performance indicating that bank lending may not always be consistent with value maximization. There is also evidence of a positive marginal effect of bank monitoring through equity ownership on market performance. Further, the relation between bank equity ownership and market performance appears to be non‐linear with a concave function. Ownership by corporate insiders is also negatively related to bank equity ownership. Overall, the findings highlight the detrimental effects of excessive short‐term debt usage, one of the factors believed to contribute to the financial crisis in Thailand, and the marginal benefit of the equity‐based relationship on firm value.     

A股民营公司独立董事制度的控股方效应研究

上市公司治理机制的核心在董事会,而董事会结构及其治理效果又受到控股方影响。本文利用A股民营公司的数据实证考察了控股方的控制结构对独立董事比例这～治理机制的影响。结果显示,A股民营公司独立董事比例仅处于满足监管数量要求的“达标”边界,控股方的控股比例越高,越不愿强化董事会独立性;若控股方直接担任董事长或总经理、抑或两职兼任,则愿引进更多独立董事。总的说来,A股民营公司的独立董事机制难以越出控股方的意图。     

Wealth Effects of Private Equity Placements: Evidence from Singapore

We examine institutional characteristics and the wealth effects of private equity placements in Singapore. Our findings show that private placements in Singapore generally result in a negative wealth effect and a reduction in ownership concentration. We find that at high levels of ownership concentration, the relation between abnormal returns and changes in ownership concentration is significantly negative. We also show that the market reacts less favorably to placements in which management ownership falls below 50%, but more favorably to issues to single investors. We do not find evidence suggesting that our results are due to an information effect.