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1.
Truc Do 《Accounting & Finance》2023,63(3):3643-3674
We examine how board ethnic diversity impacts executive pay-to-performance sensitivity. Using firm-year observations in Australia for the period 2007–2017, we document that board ethnic diversity leads to higher executive pay-to-performance sensitivity. The finding is robust in controlling for endogeneity using instrumental variable regression analysis, as well as using modified measures of board ethnic diversity. We also document that the impact of board ethnic diversity on executive pay-to-performance sensitivity is more pronounced for firms suffering from high agency costs and when the CEO's ethnicity is different from that of the majority of the board. This study helps to inform the debate on the issue of board ethnic diversity in Australia. 相似文献
2.
In this study, we focus on the relation between bank governance and bank merger results under Taiwan’s special regulatory environment in 2000. Adopting governance variables (executive remuneration, managerial ownership, and board diversity), we find that managerial ownership is positively related to bank merger results and that board size is negatively correlated with bank mergers’ performance. This study supports sound governance mechanisms to prevent banks from pursuing a value-loss merger and acquisition (M&A). Our results offer the insight that internal bank governance structures have a bigger impact on the value effects from bank mergers. Thus, regulators may elevate the performance of bank M&As by enhancing corporate governance codes. 相似文献
3.
Stephen G. Sapp 《European Financial Management》2008,14(4):710-746
This paper examines the relationship between the compensation of the top five executives at a set of over 400 publicly listed Canadian firms and various internal and external corporate governance‐related factors. The media is full of stories suggesting a relationship between large executive compensation packages and failures in governance at various levels within organisations, but there exists little formal analysis of many of these relationships. Our analysis provides empirical evidence supporting some of these assertions, refuting others and documenting new relationships. We find that variances in internal governance related to differences across firms in the characteristics of the CEO, compensation committee and board of directors do influence both the level and composition of executive compensation, especially for the CEO. Considering external measures of corporate governance, we find that different types of shareholders and competitive environments impact executive compensation. We do not find that either the internal or external governance characteristics dominate. 相似文献
4.
We study motives for executive stock option backdating, the practice of changing the grant dates of current options to dates in the past using hindsight. We find that smaller, younger and less profitable firms tend to be more heavily involved in backdating. These results are consistent with the retention hypothesis. In line with the incentive hypothesis, we find that backdating occurs more for options that are out‐of‐the‐money. We derive some evidence for the agency hypothesis, in the sense that backdating companies have a larger percentage of inside directors. However, contrary to this hypothesis, we conclude that backdating firms have better protection for minority shareholders compared to firms that do not backdate. 相似文献
5.
本文以2002—2011年716家上市公司为样本,在动态内生性框架下,运用动态面板System GMM估计方法,在考虑了高管薪酬与其他治理机制间的交互作用情况下,研究了高管薪酬与公司绩效间的动态关系。研究结果表明：（1）前期高管持股比例与公司绩效呈负相关,前期高管货币薪酬与公司绩效呈正相关;（2）前期公司绩效对高管薪酬产生了显著的反馈效应;（3）高管薪酬与其他公司治理机制间存在＂交互效应＂,即高管薪酬与其他治理机制间的相互作用对公司绩效产生了显著的影响;（4）高管薪酬与公司绩效间存在动态内生性。 相似文献
6.
We examine the link between the monitoring capacity of the board and corporate performance of UK listed firms. We also investigate how firms use the flexibility offered by the voluntary governance regime to make governance choices. We find a strong positive association between the board governance index we construct and firm operating performance. Our results imply that adherence to the board‐related recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance Code strengthens the board's monitoring capacity, potentially helping mitigate agency problems, but that investors do not value it correspondingly. Moreover, in contrast to prior UK findings suggesting efficient adoption of Code recommendations, we find that firms at times use the Code flexibility opportunistically, aiming to decrease the monitoring capacity of the board, which is followed by subsequent underperformance. This finding questions the effectiveness of the voluntary approach to governance regulation followed in the UK and in many countries around the world. 相似文献
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8.
We provide the first evidence on the effects of executive compensation on corporate risk management for insurers. Our unique data set allows the construction of a new, more complete measure of corporate risk management behavior. Specifically, we include hedging-driven usage of not only derivatives but also insurance. To address potential endogeneity, we utilize a difference-in-differences approach, based on the implementation of FAS 123R that required firms to expense stock-based compensation at fair value. We find that the decline in the convexity of executive compensation following FAS 123R led firms to significantly increase corporate risk management, primarily through increased demand for insurance. 相似文献
9.
This paper shows that in the lightly regulated Alternative Investment Market (AIM) voluntary corporate board structures might not reduce agency costs between shareholder and executive directors. In this less regulated market, we find that the extent of debt affects executive pay. In addition, the theoretical determinants of executive pay affect CEO and other executives’ pay and incentives differently in this market. We find no evidence that debt levels affect CEO pay in a matched sample of Main Market firms. Our results suggest that debtholders could be better monitors of executive directors’ actions, in comparison to voluntary governance committees in less regulated markets. 相似文献
10.
Kenneth A. Borokhovich Kelly R. Brunarski Maura S. Donahue Yvette S. Harman 《The Financial Review》2006,41(3):307-337
We examine board quality and executive replacement decisions around deaths of senior executives. Stock price reactions to executive deaths are positively related to board independence. Controlling for such factors as the deceased's stockholdings, outside blockholdings, board size, and whether the deceased was a founder, board independence is the most significant factor explaining abnormal returns. Board independence is particularly important when there is no apparent successor and firm performance is poor. The results are consistent with independent boards being reluctant to discipline poorly performing incumbent managers, but nevertheless using the opportunity of an executive death to improve the quality of management. 相似文献
11.
This paper investigates the impact of M&As on bidder (CEO and other) executive compensation employing a unique sample of 100 completed bids in the UK over the 1998–2001 period. Our findings indicate that less independent and larger boards award CEOs significantly higher bonuses and salary following M&A completion both for the full sample and for the UK and US sub‐samples. UK CEOs and executives are rewarded more for the effort exerted in accomplishing intra ‐ industry or large mergers than for diversifying or small mergers and their cash pay is unaffected by other measures of their managerial skill or performance. US bidders are rewarded at higher levels than their UK counterparts and their remuneration is related only to measures of CEO dominance over the board of directors. Overall our findings offer support for the managerial power rather than the agency theory perspective on managerial compensation. 相似文献
12.
《Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics》2014,10(2):100-114
The objectives of this paper are (i) to provide evidence on the association between the choice of group versus individual compensation schemes for senior executives and firm characteristics, and (ii) to provide evidence on the economic consequences of adopting a particular compensation scheme. Our key findings based on 2517 firm years for the period of 2001–2010 show that on average, the choice between group or individual compensation schemes for senior executive compensation schemes are consistent with a firm’s economic characteristics and on average, the choice of compensation schemes does not affect subsequent firm performance. However, we find some evidence that firms that adopt compensation schemes inconsistent with their economic characteristics have lower subsequent performance. Our findings are robust to a number of sensitivity tests. 相似文献
13.
本文以2002—2011年716家上市公司为样本,在动态内生性的框架下,运用动态面板的System GMM估计方法,以动态性视角研究了管理层薪酬激励与公司风险承担间的关系。研究发现：管理层薪酬激励与公司风险承担间存在动态内生性问题,不仅当期管理层薪酬激励对当期公司风险承担有显著的影响,而且前期管理层薪酬激励也对当期公司风险承担有显著的影响,并且两种薪酬激励方式对公司风险承担的影响方向相反。此外,前期公司风险承担对当期管理层薪酬有反馈效应。 相似文献
14.
We investigate the effect of say‐on‐pay (SOP) proposals on changes in executive and director compensation. Relative to non‐SOP firms, SOP firms’ total compensation to CEOs does not significantly change after the proposal. However, the mix of compensation does change—companies move away from using cash compensation toward more incentive compensation, offsetting the reduction in bonus. Further, the mix of compensation of non‐CEO executives changes similarly to that of CEOs. Compensation to directors of SOP firms increases less than non‐SOP firms. Firms whose CEOs are well compensated, especially with cash‐based compensation, are most likely to receive a proposal. 相似文献
15.
Pablo Ruiz‐Verdú 《European Financial Management》2008,14(5):921-943
This paper presents a model of the firm in which the manager has discretion over his own compensation, constrained only by the threat of shareholder intervention. The model addresses two main questions. How does shareholder power affect managers' compensation and their incentives to maximise firm value? And what is the optimal level of shareholder power? Expectedly, the model shows that increasing shareholder power leads to lower managerial pay. Greater shareholder power, however, also weakens the manager's incentives to maximise value and may even lead to lower profits for shareholders. There might, thus, be too much, as well as too little, shareholder power. The model characterises the optimal level of shareholder power and yields predictions about the relation between shareholder power, managerial pay, performance and firm characteristics. 相似文献
16.
公司控制权是公司治理中的核心问题。近几年，国内关于公司治理的实证研究文献越来越多，但是讨论公司控制权与公司治理之间关系的实证研究文献却并不多，这是我国公司治理研究领域比较薄弱的一个环节。本文从我国证券市场的实际情况出发，以公司控制权机制对公司治理的影响为研究主题，通过实证分析，讨论了公司控制权机制对公司治理绩效的影响，并提出了一些建议。 相似文献
17.
We analyze the potential role of indexed stock options in future pay‐for‐performance executive compensation contracts. We present a unified framework for index‐linked stock options, discuss their incentive effects, argue that indexation schemes based on the capital‐asset pricing model (CAPM) are the most suitable for executive compensation, and derive a subjective pricing model for the class of CAPM‐based indexed stock options. Contrary to earlier work, executives would not be motivated to take on investment projects with high idiosyncratic risk once their lack of wealth diversification and degree of risk aversion are factored into the analysis. 相似文献
18.
Pascal Frantz Norvald Instefjord Martin Walker 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》2013,40(9-10):1184-1220
Recent public policy debates have led to increased calls for full transparency of executive compensation. However, in practice, many firms are reluctant to disclose the full details of how they link executive compensation to performance. One possible reason for lack of full disclosure is that managers use their power to hide the details of their compensation plan in order to disguise opportunistic rent extraction. If this is the reason for secrecy, then public policy designed to force firms to provide full disclosure is unlikely to be resisted by shareholders. However, another possible explanation for less than full transparency is that some degree of secrecy about executive compensation may be in the interest of the company and its shareholders. If this explanation is correct, then public policy moves to increase transparency may be met by counter moves designed to protect managers and shareholders from such policies. In this paper we investigate if full disclosure of executive compensation arrangements is always optimal for shareholders. We develop a model where optimal executive remuneration solves a moral hazard problem. However, the degree to which the moral hazard problem affects the shareholders depends on hidden information, so that disclosure of the executive compensation scheme will typically reveal the hidden information, which can be harmful to shareholders. The model derives, therefore, the optimal disclosure policy and the optimal remuneration scheme. We find that the shareholders are better off pre‐committing not to disclose the executive compensation scheme whenever possible. Executive directors are shown to be better off too in the absence of disclosure of executive compensation schemes. An argument for mandating disclosure is that it provides better information to shareholders but our analysis demonstrates that disclosure does not necessarily achieve this objective. The results suggest that less than full disclosure can be in the interest of shareholders, the reason for this being that disclosures cannot be made selectively to shareholders but will also be made to strategic opponents. This will be the case if the board of directors and the remuneration committee includes enough independent directors. Whether or not non‐disclosure to shareholders is in their interest is however an empirical matter involving a trade‐off between the proprietary costs associated with disclosure to shareholders and the costs of potential collusion between executive and non‐executive directors associated with non‐disclosure. 相似文献
19.
本文选取2010―2019年中国A股上市公司数据,实证分析了高管薪酬粘性对企业投资效率的影响及其作用机制。研究表明:(1)高管薪酬粘性对企业投资效率具有负向影响,会加剧企业过度投资,由此加大非效率投资及降低投资效率。(2)高管薪酬粘性对企业投资效率的负向影响仅对“奖优-低惩劣”薪酬契约有效。相对于非国有、高估值与制造业企业,高管薪酬粘性对国有、低估值与非制造业企业投资效率的负向影响更为显著。(3)管理者权力的提高会加剧高管薪酬粘性对企业投资效率的负向影响,加剧高管权力寻租引发的薪酬补偿效应,由此稀释薪酬奖惩对业绩变动的敏感度。融资约束程度的提高会减弱高管薪酬粘性对企业投资效率的负向影响,这种负向影响主要针对投资不足企业,对过度投资企业不显著。(4)风险承担在高管薪酬粘性与企业投资效率的关系中承担着中介作用,高管薪酬粘性通过影响企业风险承担来影响企业投资效率,“高管薪酬粘性-风险承担-企业投资效率”的传导渠道有效。 相似文献
20.
The chief executive officers (CEOs) of firms announcing layoffs receive 22.8% more total pay in the subsequent year than other CEOs. The pay increases result almost entirely from increases in stock‐based compensation and are found to persist. In addition, layoff announcements are accompanied by shareholder value increases averaging $40 million to $95 million. One‐time labor cost savings from layoffs average $65 million. We conclude that CEOs receive pay increases following layoffs as rewards for past decisions and to motivate value‐enhancing decisions in the future. 相似文献